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Solon and Early
Greek Poetry:
The Politics of
Exhortation

ELIZABETH IRWIN

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SOLON AND EARLY GREEK POETRY

The poetry of archaic Greece gives voice to the history and politics of the culture of that age. This book explores the types of history that have been, and can be, written from archaic Greek poetry, and the role poetry had in articulating the social and political realities and ideologies of that period. In doing so it pays particular attention to the stance of exhortation adopted in early Greek elegy, and to the political poetry of Solon; it also stresses the importance of considering performance context as a critical factor in interpreting the political expressions of this poetry. Part I of this study argues that the singing of elegiac *paraenesis* in the élite symposium reflects the attempt of symposiasts to assert a heroic identity for themselves within this wider polis community. Parts II and III turn to the political poetry of Solon; Part II demonstrates how the elegy of Solon both confirms the existence of this élite practice, and subverts it, drawing on the poetic traditions of epic and Hesiod to further different political aims; Part III looks beyond Solon's appropriations of poetic traditions to argue for another influence on Solon's political poetry, that of tyranny. The book concludes by exploring the implications of this reading of elegy for a political interpretation of the Homeric epics in Athens.

ELIZABETH IRWIN is a Research Fellow at Girton College, Cambridge. She is the author of articles on Greek literature and a contributor to *The Hesiodic Catalogue of Women* (editor Richard Hunter; Cambridge, forthcoming).

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The Politics of Exhortation

ELIZABETH IRWIN

Girton College, Cambridge



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ABBREVIATIONS AND EDITIONS

All fragments of elegy and iambus are quoted from West's second edition (1992). All other ancient authors are quoted from the most recent Oxford Classical Text, or, where no OCT exists, the most recent Teubner text, unless I have specified an edition below. Scholia editions are as follows: *Odyssey*, W. Dindorf (ed.), *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Odysseam*, Oxford 1855; *Iliad*, H. Erbse (ed.) *Scholia Graeca in Homeri Iliadem*, Berlin 1969–88; Aristophanes, W.J.W. Koster et al. (eds.), *Scholia in Aristophanem*, Groningen 1960–96. Journal abbreviations are for the most part as in *L'Année philologique*, while those of ancient authors are as in the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, or are – it is hoped – self-explanatory.

<i>ARV</i> ²	<i>Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters</i> , 2nd edn, J. Beazley, Oxford 1963.
Bernabé	Bernabé, A. (ed.) <i>Poetae Epici Graeci. Testimonia et Fragmenta</i> vol. 1, Stuttgart/Leipzig 1987.
<i>CEG</i>	<i>Carmina Epigraphica Graeca</i> vol. 1, ed. P. Hansen, Berlin and New York, 1983.
Chambry	Chambry, E. (ed.), <i>Aesopi Fabulae</i> , Paris 1927.
Dindorf	Dindorf, W., <i>Aristides</i> , 3 vols. Leipzig 1829.
DK	Diels, H. and Kranz, W. (eds.) <i>Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker</i> , Berlin 1952.
<i>Etym. Gud.</i>	<i>Etymologicum Gudianum</i> , ed. A. De Stefani, Leipzig 1909–20.
<i>Etym. Mag.</i>	<i>Etymologicum Magnum</i> , ed. T. Gaisford, Oxford 1848.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>FGrHist</i>	<i>Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker</i> , ed. F. Jacoby, Berlin and Leiden 1923–.
FH	Friedländer, P. and Hoffleit, H. B. (eds.), <i>Epigrammata: Greek Inscriptions in Verse from the Beginnings to the Persian Wars</i> , Berkeley and Los Angeles 1948.
<i>FHG</i>	<i>Fragmenta Historicorum Graecorum</i> , ed. K. Müller, Paris 1841–70.
Gentili-Prato	Gentili, B. and Prato, C. (eds.), <i>Poetarum Elegiacorum Testimonia et Fragmenta</i> , Leipzig 1985–1988.
Gigon	Gigon, O. (ed.), <i>Aristotelis Opera</i> vol. 3: <i>Librorum Deperditorum Fragmenta</i> . Berlin 1987.
Greene	Greene, W., <i>Scholia Platonica</i> , Haverford, Penn. 1938.
<i>IG</i>	<i>Inscriptiones Graecae</i> , Berlin 1873–.
KA	Kassel, R. and Austin, C. (eds.), <i>Poetae Comici Graeci</i> , Berlin 1983–91.
Keaney	Keaney, J. J. (ed.), <i>Harpocration: Lexeis of the Ten Orators</i> , Amsterdam 1991.
<i>LfgrE</i>	<i>Lexicon des frühgriechischen Epos</i> , eds. B. Snell and H. Erbse, Göttingen 1955–.
<i>LIMC</i>	<i>Lexicon Iconographicum Mythologiae Classicae</i> , eds. L. Kahil et al., Zurich 1981–97.
LSJ	Liddell, H., Scott, R. and Jones, H., <i>A Greek–English Lexicon</i> , 9th edn, Oxford 1940.
ML	Meiggs, R. and Lewis, D. (eds.), <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions to the End of the Fifth Century B.C.</i> Revised edn, Oxford 1988.
Müller	Müller, C., <i>Geographi Graeci Minores</i> II. Paris 1861.
<i>Paroem. Gr.</i>	<i>Paroemiographi Graeci quorum pars nunc primum ex codicibus manuscriptis vulgatur</i> , ed. T. Gaisford, Oxford 1836.
Perry	Perry, B., <i>Aesopica</i> , Urbana 1952.
<i>PMG</i>	<i>Poetae Melici Graeci</i> , ed. D. L. Page, Oxford 1962.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>P Oxy</i>	<i>Oxyrhynchus Papyri</i> , eds. B. P. Grenfell, A. S. Hunt et al., London 1898–.
<i>RE</i>	<i>Paulys Realencyclopädie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft</i> , eds. G. Wissowa, et al., Stuttgart 1893–1978.
Rose	Rose, V. (ed.), <i>Aristotelis Fragmenta</i> , 3rd edn, Leipzig 1886.
Sev.	Severyns, A. (ed.) <i>Recherches sur la Chrestomathie de Proclus</i> , Paris 1938–63.
Stallbaum	Stallbaum, G. (ed.), <i>Eustathii commentarii ad Homeri Odysseam</i> , Leipzig 1825–6.
Steph. Byz.	<i>Stephan von Byzanz. Ethnika</i> , ed. A. Meineke, Berlin 1849.
Suda	<i>Suidae Lexicon</i> , ed. A. Adler, Leipzig 1928–38.
Uhlig	Uhlig, G. (ed.), <i>Grammatici Graeci</i> , Leipzig 1867–1910.
van der Valk	van der Valk, M. (ed.), <i>Eustathii archiepiscopi Thessalonicensis commentarii ad Homeri Iliadem pertinentes</i> , Leiden 1971–87.
Voigt	Voigt, E.-M. (ed.), <i>Sappho et Alcaeus. Fragmenta</i> , Amsterdam 1971.
W	West, M. L. (ed.), <i>Iambi et Elegi Graeci ante Alexandrum Cantati</i> , 2nd edn, Oxford 1989 and 1992.
Wehrli	Wehrli, F. <i>Die Schule des Aristoteles</i> , 2nd edn, Basel/Stuttgart 1967–74.

INTRODUCTION

In the late sixth century, Heraclitus could call Hesiod ‘the teacher of most men’ (διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων, 57 DK). Xenophanes could speak similarly of Homer (ἐξ ἀρχῆς καθ’ “Ὅμηρον ἐπεὶ μεμαθήκασι πάντες, ‘From the beginning all have learned according to Homer’, 10 DK) and, moreover, criticise Homer and Hesiod for attributing to the gods ὅσα παρ’ ἀνθρώποισιν ὀνείδεα καὶ ψόγος ἐστίν (‘however many things that among men are a source of censure and reproach’, 11 DK); no doubt the detrimental effects such stories had on human behaviour played no small part in this critique.¹ A century later, Herodotus tells us that Cleisthenes, the archaic tyrant of Sicyon, brought an end to rhapsodic performances of Homeric epic because of its excessive praise of the Sicyonians’ enemies, the Argives: ῥαψωδοὺς ἔπαυσε ἐν Σικυῶνι ἀγωνίζεσθαι τῶν Ὀμηρείων ἐπέων εἵνεκα, ὅτι Ἀργεῖοί τε καὶ Ἄργος τὰ πολλὰ πάντα ὑμνέεται (‘he suspended the rhapsodic contests in Sicyon, because they involved the Homeric epics, which constantly celebrate Argos and the Argives’, Hdt. 5.67.1).² Finally, Aristotle demonstrates the selection process involved in how a great majority of the fragments of archaic poetry – especially those of Solon – have come to survive, εἴλοντο κοινῇ διαλλακτὴν καὶ ἄρχοντα Σόλωνα, καὶ τὴν πολιτείαν ἐπέτρεψαν αὐτῷ, ποιήσαι τι τὴν ἐλεγείαν ἧς ἐστίν ἀρχή ... (‘They agreed to choose Solon as an arbitrator and archon and they entrusted the political system to Solon, who wrote the elegy of which this is the beginning ...’, *Ath. Pol.* 5.2). This survey of apparently unrelated passages conveys a similar point. Whatever their relationship to the poetry and/or events they describe, each attests to the early belief that poetry in the archaic period was felt to interact significantly with its social context, whether influencing

¹ Leshner (1992) 84. ² Waterfield’s translation (1998).

behaviour, instrumental in political spheres, or simply reflective of the historical context that produced it. Together the passages positively encourage investigation of the relationship between archaic poetry and the cultural and political situations in which it thrived, at the same time as they illustrate the varying types of evidence such an investigation will need to confront and assess.

Accepting the encouragement and challenges of our sources, this book examines the articulation of archaic political culture and language in early Greek poetry, and in particular that of Solon. It focuses on the relationships this poetry struck between the poetic traditions to which it was indebted and the political and social present in which it was performed. The primary concern is how a particular body of early Greek poetry, elegy, manipulated and appropriated traditional hexameter poetry and its themes for the needs of its contemporary audience, and more specifically how to contextualise Solon within that genre. Elegy provides the starting-point for two reasons. First, of the forms of early Greek poetry, elegy is the most closely akin to the dominant genre of extant early Greek poetry, ἔπαια, hexameter poetry, and it is this relationship that has allowed the material expressed in both genres to be most extensively compared.³ Second, a stance adopted by elegy is particularly significant to an investigation of the intersection of archaic poetics and politics, namely the stance of exhortation or *paraenesis*. Elegiac poets frequently purport to address their immediate audience in their capacities as citizens of a polis, and thus the fragments are replete with political material, a feature that has led scholars to reconstruct a strong civic function behind elegy, particularly in comparison to epic. In response to both the importance of this stance, and the scholarly responses it has induced, the bulk of this study will evaluate the place of elegiac exhortation within archaic poetic and political culture, and consider what a re-evaluation of the former may contribute to a better understanding of the latter. It will also concentrate on the earliest proponents of this type of

³ On the shared metrical forms see West (1974) 9–10; for the elegists' application of ἔπαια to their own work see West (1974) 7 and Bowie (1986) 31–2. See below pp. 22–9.

elegy, beginning with Callinus and Tyrtaeus, and culminating in Solon, precisely because both ancient and modern treatments of their fragments bring to the fore crucial issues of interpretive method involved in historical contextualisations – a topic to which I shall return.

It is not only the collective opinion of the ancients and the suitability of the content of the fragments of early Greek poetry that invite their use in reconstructing archaic culture and politics; there is also the compulsion of necessity. Without the remains of archaic poetry any access to this period would have been greatly hindered, not just for us, but also for the earliest proponents of such reconstruction – Aristotle for one – in the centuries immediately following the archaic era. Apart from scant inscriptional evidence, this poetry remains among our best evidence for the culture and history of an age to which major political transformations are attributed, and as such warrants its pre-eminent status as a source.

The opinion of the ancients, the content of the fragments, and their value as sources make such a study seem natural and obvious, as numerous studies in the twentieth century bear out.⁴ Yet the difficulties of gaining access to the archaic period through the meagre remains of its poetry and the biases of the sources who quote them generate a final reason for participating in the continual re-evaluation of this poetry's relationship to its historical context. How are poetic texts to be understood in relation to their contemporary political and cultural environment, what can they reveal about the culture that produced and enjoyed them? Perhaps nowhere in the study of Classics are these questions so urgent as in the study of early Greece, a period in which poets and poetry occupied an important position,⁵ but where the amount of evidence at our disposal seems inversely proportional to the methodological concerns it elicits.

As issues of methodology raised by these questions will be discussed in greater detail in the chapters to follow, this introduction focuses on a fundamental tension in the study of

⁴ See Gerber's critical bibliography (1991). ⁵ Thomas (1995).

early Greek poetry that has shaped this study: the tension between the fragment and the narrative. Studying poets who are known almost entirely through a handful of short, usually fragmentary, poems and whose cultural context is plotted only through the points that they themselves and the largely silent record of archaeology constitute makes for an extraordinary situation. As Robin Osborne asks regarding archaic Greek law, ‘how do we join up the dots’?⁶ How do we create a narrative? And what kind of narrative should it be?

Just as nature abhors a vacuum, a survey of the scholarship suggests that fragments of poetry require a narrative. A seemingly irresistible need to contextualise this poetry is shared by ancients and moderns alike.⁷ We encounter the majority of the extant fragments in ancient narratives, narratives which are likely to have been largely constructed from the poems themselves.⁸ Forced to lean, however mistrustfully, on these narratives, never *un*-influenced by them, we extract the fragments, judiciously, in order to enclose them in narratives of our own making. Creating narratives is inevitable: it is how we make meaning. In most cases if we did not find a narrative in our research, we could not proceed to write – though we hope that what results comes without too much violence to our sources. But with fragments, particularly of archaic poetry, this inevitable feature is often a danger. Circularity threatens at every point: we construct narratives that then enable (or force) the fragments to help us understand them better. The more persuasive and continuous the narrative the greater the threat that it may for ever encase the fragments that it tries to explain. And to develop a narrative of such coherence and staying

⁶ Osborne (1997).

⁷ The ancients did, however, in most cases have the luxury of creating the fragments we so gratefully cherish, selecting their quotations from complete poems and from larger collections of poetry: see Plutarch’s references to the 100 exceedingly well composed (χαρίεντως πάνυ πεποιημένων) verses of the *Salamis* of which he quotes only six, *Sol.* 8.1–3. On fragments see Bowie (1997).

⁸ There are also the anthologies which tell their own implicit story about reception, a tale of the endeavours of later generations to preserve, narrating implicitly the purposes this poetry came to serve for readers separated by centuries.

power is on some level one of the aims to which we aspire when we write.

The initial starting-point of this book – it must be admitted – was less the search for a narrative, than a presumed narrative awaiting its details. I intended to produce an account of the political language in the early Greek poets, in particular their representations of the polis which one might well expect to reflect in some way the extensive transformations this entity underwent during the archaic period. The more I worked the more I became aware of the predictive powers of my intended narrative, the problems of presuming, if not the story, then the *kind* of story, these fragments should tell. Archaic poetry forms a corpus of material spanning some 200 years and stretching across several *poleis*, both colonies and mother cities, islands and mainland, in Asia Minor, Greece, and Magna Graecia. However good the evidence for the panhellenic aspects of early Greek poetry may be, attempts to impose overarching narratives, typically those of development, on such limited amounts of temporally and spatially diverse material are as likely to distort as to facilitate access to the poetry; not to mention (potentially) also to overlook the particular dialogue between the panhellenic and the local that each poet, or genre, might foster.

Early Greek poetry is an over-exploited body of poetry, providing as it does the props to support several types of developmental narratives, *topoi* of progress, or at least change – whether literary or historical. Diachronic approaches to the material can generate one such narrative type. While capable of the greatest good, and absolutely fundamental to philological method, diachronic studies of given concepts or subjects are also capable of the greatest harm when it comes to archaic poetry. The overwhelming, if also understandable, focus on the fifth and fourth centuries for which we have comparatively abundant evidence can generate predictive, teleologically driven, narratives of which the classical period serves as the culmination. Viewing the poems obliquely from the perspective of later centuries, such studies often fail to address the poems in their own right, in ways which carefully take into account

their genre, performance and audiences, and their own cultural context.⁹

A similar pattern can occur in historical contextualisations of archaic poetry. Increasingly in recent decades scholars have focused on the important political developments of the seventh and sixth centuries, a period characterised by the 'rise of the polis'. Adopting this view, one is encouraged to interpret the poetry produced in this time as (usually) a (positive)¹⁰ reflection of this phenomenon.¹¹ Such contextualisations provide interesting narratives, heirs to the tradition of Aristotle,¹² but the picture they offer is often so general as to be a distorting one. One thing must be certain, the polis did not *simply* 'rise'. While of course no literary product is ever divorced from its historical and social context, historical developments so visible from a diachronic perspective often provide too crude a basis to contribute to finer interpretations of the poems themselves or of their interaction with their contemporary context.¹³ Blunt historical contextualisations may blinker our readings of the poems, most regrettably since, with so little extant poetry, we need approaches that will make us more sensitive, rather than less so.¹⁴ Moreover, the comparisons with Homeric epic underlying many such discussions often compromise their interpretations. Literary concerns, such as epic distancing and the uncertainty of dating the Homeric poems, both

⁹ Obliquely viewed from the fifth century, even Homer often suffers in such discussions, as in Seaford (1994) 1–13, esp. n. 49. To do the most service to one's sources in such studies, one must either address each body of poetry in its own right, understanding the influence of genre and performance context, or be explicit that one is analysing, on the basis of what can be observed from their own literature, how later generations received or would have received such earlier poetry. Although beginning with Aristotle, Fisher's study (1992) of *hybris*, for instance, is commendable for its treatment of each body of literary evidence on its own terms.

¹⁰ Sometimes negative: see Kurke (1992).

¹¹ See, for instance, Raaflaub (1993), Nagy (1990). See also pp. 28–9.

¹² See Davies (1997) 26–7.

¹³ This is not inevitable, but rather the product of an overwhelming tendency in diachronic analysis implicitly to conceive of the individual moments of which it (and the evidence upon which it is based) is composed as static.

¹⁴ A more complex model may be no less blunting, as Morris (1996). See also pp. 58–62.

as unities and in their parts, defy the use of epic in simple historical reconstructions.¹⁵

A larger problem is that these two approaches to the poetry often rely heavily on influential studies from the early twentieth century which have enshrined our fragments in certain irresistible narratives. They are well known: the evolution of genres – epic, lyric, tragedy – and their relationship to the *Entwicklung des Geistes*; Tyrtaeus revealing the nascent characteristics of classical Sparta; or the great lawgiver Solon forging a new idea of Δίκη.¹⁶ These influential ideas continue to underlie many discussions. Historical and literary teleologies have dominated the reading of these poems, often buttressing one another: poetry helping to write the history, and history helping to interpret the poetry. That we still engage with such discussions as Snell's and Jaeger's is of course appropriate: their narratives are impressive and were particularly so in their time; they are often more stimulating than those of their critics. One might, however, regret that these narratives are frequently encountered before the poems themselves, or immediately relied upon to fill the gaps and silences left by their fragmentary state. The persistence and propagation of such persuasive narratives serve to occlude wider analysis of the poems, causing one to forget that there are silences, and that they may be filled otherwise. The relative lack of communication between disciplines exacerbates the problem: many historical accounts are still influenced by the approaches that philosophers and philologists have long since undermined.¹⁷

This could be a very exciting time for early Greek poetry – and Solon. In recent decades scholarly focus on the enormous historical and cultural developments of this period has been

¹⁵ See the excellent discussion of this issue by Rose (1997).

¹⁶ The formulations of Jaeger (1966, originally published 1926 and 1932) and Snell (1982, originally published 1946).

¹⁷ For instance, Snell looms large in such historians as Murray (2nd edn 1993) and Raaflaub (1993), despite the work of Lloyd-Jones (1965, 1971), and more recently Williams (1993); cf. Renehan (1979) and Wirshbo (1993). But the reductivism of some philologists also poses problems: see pp. 22–3 and Ch. 2, n. 31.

met by a greater appreciation of all aspects of the poetry¹⁸. The work done in several areas – on genre, on the symposium as the performance context of this poetry, on understanding allusion in orally derived poetry – as well as the challenges to traditional dating of the Homeric poems against which we inevitably compare melic poetry, not only invite a comprehensive reinvestigation of the inherited orthodoxies, but demand that new approaches be forged that can embrace these many features.¹⁹

In this book I attempt to recontextualise the poems of Tyrtaeus, Callinus and Solon differently. I assume that as our best source for the archaic period these poems and fragments do have something to say about contemporary politics and social dynamics, but I challenge the ways in which they have hitherto been enabled to speak. The purpose of this study is to open up discussion, to allow for and to advocate continual re-examination of our fragments from differing perspectives, to recognise and even to embrace the limitations of the evidence while remaining continually receptive to what these shards of poetry could be trying to say. I look closely at the political language of the poetry itself and privilege that language as an indication of the poetry's meaning. For although this poetry is, at best, a frustrating source for reconstructing the details of specific events in archaic history (a subject outside the scope of this book) there are some things which the fragments are excellently placed to reveal, primary among which is contemporary archaic political discourse, or, at the very least, poetic representations of this discourse. While it was my aim to focus closely on the language of this poetry from a literary and cultural perspective – to put to one side, at least temporarily, more embracing narratives of development – the

¹⁸ Dougherty and Kurke (1993), Mitchell and Rhodes (1997), Fisher and van Wees (1998). Two new commentaries on Solon, Noussia (2001) and Mülke (2002), will no doubt stimulate new studies.

¹⁹ For genre see Bowie (1986); for the symposium see Murray's volume (1990b); for allusion in orally derived poetry see Foley (1991, 1997) on the concept of traditional referentiality; for the dating and shape of the Homeric poems see Burkert (1976, 1987), West (1995), and Nagy (1996).

results, or at least the method of this study, should be relevant for wider historical, political, legal and intellectual studies in which these poets are enjoined as ‘evidence’.

So through confronting methodological concerns, a guiding principle of this research emerged. My design was to take each poet on the terms set by the language of his poetry, not only with carefully maintained uncertainty about what narrative I should expect, but also with an ambivalence towards, even suspicion of, the narrative itself. I hoped to liberate the poems from the enabling narratives upon which they (and we) had come to depend, without too much violence, regardless of the concern that a book of loosely-joined chapters would result. And yet, of course a narrative must emerge – the reader will be relieved to learn – but one less obvious, less predictable, and therefore hopefully less *predictive* – less distorting – than those that have prevailed. A close examination of one type of elegy, that of exhortation, provides an important connecting thread between three poets of the seventh and early sixth centuries, Tyrtaeus, Callinus, and Solon. Their use of hexameter poetry in the genre of elegiac exhortation and Solon’s apparently close responses to Tyrtaean poetry suggest important aspects of the political uses of poetry and poetic tradition. Furthermore, Solon, both poet and political agent, provides the ideal figure through which to explore the dimensions of the dialogue between poetic and political discourse and the function of poetry in archaic politics.²⁰

The study progresses in three Parts. Part I analyses the genre of martial exhortation elegy and the scholarly approaches to its content and social function. Its three chapters seek to *defamiliarise* the poems, to look at them afresh, extracted from the

²⁰ Between the submission of this study as a doctoral thesis and its publication, Solon studies have experienced a boom: two new – and sorely needed – commentaries, Noussia (2001) and Mülke (2002); a new Loeb, Gerber (1999); extended studies, Balot (2001) and Almeida (2003); and an international conference, ‘Solon: new historical and philological perspectives’, convened by Josine Blok and André Lardinois (Soeterbeeck, the Netherlands, 11–15 Dec. 2003), whose papers are to be published by Brill. I have attempted where relevant to provide a reference to these works in my notes, indicating those places where they have contributed to refining my arguments.

age-old narratives of historical and literary development they have been made to tell. A re-evaluation of the content of this type of elegy, its similarity with Homeric exhortation, and its performance context at the symposium lead to an interpretation of this poetry diametrically different from that which currently prevails.

Part II centres on one poem of Solon, immersing itself in a close reading of Solon 4 ('Solon's *Eunomia*'). In this poem Solon enacts a relationship to the dominant hexameter traditions, as well as to the genre of martial exhortation elegy. A close reading demonstrates how this poem carefully situates itself in an adversarial relationship to the martial poetic traditions of epic and elegiac exhortation, while positively embracing the themes of Hesiod and Odyssean epic. These chapters develop a way of addressing the issues of allusion and intertextuality which attempts to recognise and respond to similarity without reverting to an anachronistic model of textual interaction.²¹ Indications of a political stance inherent in Solon's poetics provide the basis for the more wide-ranging discussion offered in Part III.

Part III builds on this close reading of Solonian exhortation and addresses the task of *recontextualising* both the poetry and the figure into a political context. These two chapters take us outside the confines of earlier chapters to other genres of poetry – particularly iambus – and to the biographical traditions involving Solon, exploring more fully the political implications of Solon's poetic usage. Chapter 7 examines those aspects of Solon's language in elegy and iambus that suggest the influence of contemporary political language, particularly language associated with tyranny, on Solon's poetry, as well as his active manipulation of this influence. Chapter 8 returns to the ancient narratives regarding Solon in order to demonstrate, contrary to expectations, that this reading of Solon finds support in traditions surrounding him. Both chapters provide a basis for future directions in which research on

²¹ As, for instance, Pucci (1994). See also pp. 114–19 and 155–64.

Solon – his poetry and political activities – and the political dimension of early Greek poetry may be taken.

Each section presents its own methodological issues and problems, and these are analysed in detail as they occur. This is fitting, as Tyrtaeus, Callinus, and Solon were not exact contemporaries, they did not originate from the same cities, and the circumstances or purposes of their later reception were not the same, though some of the factors involved may have been shared. It is, however, useful to present below a summary of some of the overriding concerns of the book, or, seen another way, the significant ‘encounters’ that transformed my initial subject of research into the study it has now become.

The first concerns arise from the fundamental issue of how exactly we are to evaluate the political language of early Greek poetry. Lexical analysis, whatever the methodological concerns it elicits, is the bread and butter of classical philology and it is upon this that we must still rely. Such analysis of language must, however, embrace crucial determinants of meaning long recognised in the fields of linguistics and political theory, those of *context* and *contest*.²² Language is not divorced from its social context. It derives its meaning as much from its performance context as from its lexical potential. For the study of archaic poetry, embracing the issue of context means understanding that the aristocratic symposium is not the same as a public space, as the agora, that the meaning or force of expressions about politics or civic obligation must be recognised as moderated by the context in which they are uttered. This has great implications for how we understand sympotic elegy.

This point brings us to the issue of contest. Studies that presume our texts can be read simply as neutral indicators of the linear progress of the meaning of concepts are inherently flawed. The meanings of words at any given time are not static: not only can context determine meaning, but several conflicting

²² See Freeden (1996) with full critical discussion. For context see Ch. 2 and for contest see pp. 108–10, 174–80 and Ch. 7. Some recent work has begun to make excellent progress in this area: Stehle (1997) and see also the timely conclusion of Bowie’s article (2002) 198–9 on sympotic praise.

meanings can simultaneously exist. Contestation is endemic in most political language, particularly during a period of change and development. Key concepts are often subjected to struggles between different sides attempting to settle disputed meanings in their own favour, and such contests within any given period are often responsible for the diachronic changes which classical philologists so dispassionately trace.²³ Above all, we must listen closely to the debates that the fragments reflect and in which they participate.

The second set of concerns relates to the notion of poetic appropriation and allusion in these poets.²⁴ In asking how we should understand their relationship to traditional hexameter poetry, past discussions have tended to focus on the alluding poet. Allusion has, however, as much to do with the audience as with the poet, particularly in a performance culture such as that of archaic Greece. I focus instead on issues that unite poet and audience, the forces behind allusion: not only what causes a poet to allude in a particular way to an established tradition, but also how is the audience expected to receive this allusion? What are the political and social implications of these alignments effected by elegy?

These are difficult questions, particularly as disagreements often rage over identifying allusions and therefore over the very issue of what constitutes allusion in our texts. This book assumes a model of allusion closer to that of intertextuality. It is fairly clear that some forms of Homeric epic, Hesiodic and elegiac poetry are genres that flourished contemporaneously, and similarities in language and themes between them suggest at the least circulation and interaction between them at the level of reception. Any interpretation must recognise the importance of this contemporaneity.²⁵ While similarities between these bodies of poetry may defy linear models of allusion derived from later

²³ Given that the major work on it began in the fifties with Gallie (1955/6), one cannot fault earlier philological studies for overlooking this feature of language, though one may wonder why Thucydides 3.82.4 did not cause classical philologists to lead this movement. It is, however, disappointing when new studies are conducted without such critical awareness (e.g. Helm [1993]).

²⁴ See Part II. ²⁵ Dalby (1998) is an important step in this direction.

eras of poetry, it must still be important to recognise similarities and differences, for from this recognition we may come to generate other models of appreciating the interactions of poetic texts with one another and with their environment in the archaic period.

My final point is about the use of the term 'archaic'. I use it in this book simply for convenience to designate the seventh and sixth centuries BC. The word, however, can and sometimes does carry connotations of that which is primitive. When applied to the period prior to the fifth century, the associations of the term can slide quickly into a judgement that 'archaic' literary, political, artistic achievements are merely sketches of the glories to come in the 'classical' period.²⁶ Again teleologies seem to run rampant, a particularly unfair situation given the disparity in the samples that the vicissitudes of reception have preserved. An aim of this study is to contribute to revealing the sophisticated and subtle interaction between archaic poetry and its political and cultural context, an interaction that will have reverberations for our understanding of the classical period, its true heir.

²⁶ See Pollitt (1972) 1–2, and Cartledge (1980) 91; on the 'invention' of the archaic in literary analysis see Hinds (1998) 55.

PART I

THE POLITICS OF EXHORTATION

INTRODUCTION

Hector exhorts his fellow warriors to battle with the words, ὅς δέ κεν ὑμέων | βλήμενος ἢ τυπεῖς θάνατον καὶ πότμον ἐπίσπῃ | τεθνάτω· οὗ οἱ ἀεικὲς ἀμνησιμένω περὶ πατρὸς | τεθνάμεν ('And whoever hit by a missile or struck by a sword finds his death and fated end, let him die. It is not unseemly for one to die protecting the land of his fathers', *Il.* 15.494–7). A generation later than the Homeric epic (according to traditional dating)¹ a genre of exhortation poetry thrived in archaic Greece; it is epitomised by the poet Tyrtaeus' simple formulation, τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν ἐνὶ προμάχοισι πεσόντα | ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν περὶ ἧ πατρίδι μαρνάμενον ('For it is a fine thing for a man having fallen nobly amid the fore-fighters to die, fighting on behalf of the fatherland', 10.1–2).² For both literary critics and historians these and similar passages function as 'artefacts' conveying poetic representations of political notions. The evident parallels between the sentiments expressed in these two distinct genres of poetry have yielded numerous discussions of the relationship between them, and of their connection to the historical and political settings in which they took shape. Employing a strictly philological approach, the most

¹ This traditional dating has come under considerable challenge in recent years on various grounds. I name only three of the most influential critics: Burkert (1976, 1987) and West (1995), who argue for a date not earlier than the second quarter of the seventh century, based on near eastern allusions in the text; and Nagy (1996) who sees the reform of Homeric performance traditions by the Peisistratids as the definitive period of the poem's formation. I agree with Burkert (1976) 19 and West (1995) 218 that literary history does not require a great, or even any, gap between Homer and the early elegists. Accordingly, in interpreting the relationship between exhortation elegy and martial epic, the following chapters will treat the *Iliad* merely as a representative of the genre – a late and extremely successful instantiation of it – presupposing neither its predominance nor necessarily its existence for the elegists in the form we have it. On Homer and the Peisistratids see Ch. 8 and the Conclusion.

² All citations of elegy and iambus will be from West (1992) unless otherwise stated.

influential scholarship of this century has focused on detecting differences in order to create evolutionary models of the development of many political concepts including ‘patriotism’ and obligation to one’s city.³

These are powerful narratives. This Part seeks to *defamiliarise* the genre of martial exhortation elegy, to help us unlearn what we think we know about this poetry and its historical significance. It challenges prevailing interpretations through the exploration of a central problem. The genre of elegiac poetry both invites and exploits analogies between, on the one hand, its immediate audience and performance setting and, on the other, the broader civic identities of that audience and larger civic context to which they belong. And yet, the circumscribed social setting for which it was produced, the private aristocratic *symposion*, complicates the interpretation of seemingly all-embracing political terms in this poetry such as city, fatherland, country. By asking what it means for symposiasts to sing in the first person exhortations evocative of those spoken by the heroes of epic, the pretensions implicit in this heroic role-playing are revealed, pretensions that are themselves deeply political.

These chapters demonstrate the dynamic interplay between the values, situations, and language of epic and the social, cultural, and political environment in which epic thrived. Through an examination of the city’s place within the genres of sympotic exhortation elegy and archaic verse inscriptions, I explore the function of ‘epicising’ poetry for its contemporary audiences. I argue that the interaction between these poets and epic extends beyond literary allusion and functions as a tool of self-definition and justification for a privileged section of the community. The merging of poetic tradition and contemporary society is a complex phenomenon, and what results is a poetry that simultaneously articulates and influences concurrent developments in the polis – its groups and institutions – and its language.

³ Snell (1982) and Jaeger (1966) 103–42 stand at the fore of this tradition. See Greenhalgh (1972) for a survey of these positions.

UNDERSTANDING THE POLITICAL IN MARTIAL EXHORTATION ELEGY

I

Our notion of ‘exhortation poetry’ is constructed almost entirely from the extant fragments of Tyrtaeus and Callinus. Tyrtaeus seems to epitomise the genre in the lines quoted above.¹ In Tyrtaeus 12 martial valour is couched within a hierarchy of ἀρεταί: of men with other qualities, Tyrtaeus says οὐτ’ ἂν μνησαίμην οὐτ’ ἐν λόγῳ ἄνδρα τιθείην ... (‘I would not remember, nor would I hold him of any account’, 12.1), and claims the primacy of martial valour: ἥδ’ ἀρετὴ, τόδ’ ἄεθλον ἐν ἀνθρώποισιν ἄριστον|κάλλιστόν τε φέρειν γίνεται ἀνδρὶ νέῳ (‘This is excellence, this is the best prize among men, and finest to win for a young man’, 12.13–14). Such fighting is ξυνὸν δ’ ἐσθλὸν τοῦτο πόλῃ τε παντί τε δῆμῳ (‘this is a common good for city and the entire people/demos’, 12.15), and the personal rewards of such valour are both fame, which transcends the here and now (e.g. 12.31), and the esteem of one’s community: λαῶ γὰρ σύμπαντι πόθος κρατερόφρονος ἀνδρὸς | θνήσκοντος, ζῶν δ’ ἄξιος ἡμιθέων (‘For there is a longing among the entire people when the strong-hearted man dies, and while alive he is worthy of demigods’, Callinus 1.18–19).²

This type of elegy has a certain ‘inviting’ quality. The simplicity of its language and straightforwardness of sentiment coupled with the scarcity of other texts for the archaic period have made it irresistible to historians and philologists alike. Several ‘stories’ about the archaic period have found the poetry of Tyrtaeus and Callinus accommodating, particularly

¹ For fighting among the πρόμαχοι (‘fore-fighters’) and being the best (ἀριστεύω) see Tyrtaeus 10.1, 10.21, 11.4, 11.12, 12.16, 12.23, 12.33, Mimnermus 14.6.

² See also Callinus 1.16–17, Tyrtaeus 12.24, 27–32, 37–44. The transcendence of κλέος is implicit in Mimnermus 14.1–4.

stories documenting development – literary, cultural and historical. From a literary perspective, exhortation elegy has been seen as the bridge between Homer and classical literature. At the same time, historians have found the concerns of this poetry, the close association of martial valour with a notion of the collective good – fighting on behalf of the πατρίς ('land of one's fathers'), γῆ ('land')³ – and with the regard of one's πόλις ('city') and the δῆμος ('people') or λαός ('people'),⁴ useful in constructing both the rise of the archaic polis and the early history of Sparta.

Although seeming to invite such reconstructions, the simplicity of this poetry – its apparently transparent meaning – is deceptive. That its references to the city as community justify, with whatever qualifications, its status as a crucial source in the construction of the political and social history of this period, and of the history of Greek political ideas, cannot be denied. But poetry is, as is all too well known, a frustrating source for history. It may respond to a contemporary context, but that context is caught up in a complex transformation, shaped by and expressed in a genre only tentatively understood owing to the meagreness of its extant representatives, and this sample itself has reached us only after being sifted through the concerns and tastes of subsequent generations. This 'filter' of reception calls for particular attention precisely because it facilitates the teleologically driven interpretations of the literary and historical importance of the poetry that has survived.

In beginning to interpret anew, to ask what was the function of this poetry for its seventh- and sixth-century audiences, it is first of all necessary to identify the more general and pervasive biases inherent in our sources. Tyrtaeus is our primary representative, and his poetry has always been tied closely with historical accounts of the early development of Sparta, treated both in antiquity and up to the present day as a kind of eye-witness account of the Messenian Wars and the constitution

³ Callinus 1.6, Tyrtaeus 10.2, 10.13, 12.15, 12.33–4.

⁴ Callinus 1.16–21, Tyrtaeus 12.27–32, 12.37–44. On the differences between δῆμος and λαός see Casevitz (1992), and Haubold (2000) 114 n. 316, 184 n. 40.

that ensued.⁵ Although most scholars would now blush to call Tyrtaeus a 'superior officer at headquarters who had a gift for encouraging the troops',⁶ Tyrtaeus' poetry is almost always interpreted teleologically: his verses are seen to contain the seeds of Sparta's later history, most particularly, its famous militaristic character. The meaning of his elegy seems obvious, and so scholars construct with Tyrtaeus the beginnings of Sparta's later identity through a process not dissimilar to that of the authors in whose writings the fragments are preserved. Jaeger, most influentially, saw in 12 'the moment of transition when the aristocratic Sparta of the archaic age turned into the classical Sparta of the sixth century, with its ethic of the warrior state'.⁷

Another teleology underlies the dubbing of Tyrtaeus as an 'able propagandist'.⁸ Fifth-century Athens appropriated for the civic honours due to the war dead of their own city the Tyrtaean concept of the καλὸς θάνατος ('beautiful death'), the soldier dying in war on behalf of the fatherland. The use of this concept at Athens belonged explicitly to a civic ideology, supported by the city and part of the democratic phenomenon whereby aristocratic ideals were distributed over the larger citizen body.⁹

⁵ As in Arist. *Pol.* 1306b36, Strabo 6.3.3, Paus. 4.14.4–5, Plut. *Lycurg.* 6. For modern historians, Tyrtaeus is regarded as the main and for some the only reliable literary source for the Messenian Wars. Jaeger (1966) 105 comments, 'We can know only as much of the Messenian wars as can be gathered from Tyrtaeus.' Starr (1965) 258 puts the sources in perspective: 'Since Pausanias and Plutarch lived in the second century after Christ, they are as far removed from such an event as the first Messenian War as we are from the first Crusade.' See also Cartledge (1979) 114.

⁶ Bowra (1938a) 70. Cf. Strabo 8.4.10, 106, Plut. *Apophth. Lac.* 230d, Lycurg. *Leocr.* Athen. 14 630, Suda s.v. Τυρταῖος.

⁷ Jaeger (1966) 120. Reacting against those scholars who sought to athetise various fragments of Tyrtaeus, Jaeger argued that even those fragments lacking explicit historical references were nevertheless manifestly the product of seventh-century Sparta. He introduces his essay by claiming 'as yet nobody has managed to show unambiguously how the poems stem from the historical conditions of a particular epoch', 103. This is a position recently elaborated on by Meier (1998) 229–327. For the proponents of athetesis, see Schwartz (1899), Meyer (1892–99) 226, and Verrall (1896) 269–277; tempered by Schachermeyr (1932). See also the surveys of Jaeger (1966) 103–107, Prato (1968) 8*–20* and Meier (1998) 236–8.

⁸ Huxley (1962) 54. See also Shey (1976), Tarkow (1983), Meier (1998). I pass over the issue of how modern scholarship maps its own categories onto Tyrtaeus as in the use of the terms 'state' and 'propaganda'.

⁹ Loraux (1977) and Jaeger (1966) 135–6.

One must be wary, however, of allowing this later Athenian use to retroject into Tyrtaeus' poetry, and into its original context, the function that it had over one and a half centuries later in Athens.¹⁰ These poems did, no doubt, have an ideological content for their audience, but defining this content in terms of its later meaning in Athens attributes to elegiac paraenesis a civic function for its seventh-century audience greater than it *could* then have had, though undoubtedly one that this poetry came to embody in later centuries.¹¹

These are the more pervasive biases of our sources. I turn now to the central question of how to interpret martial exhortation elegy and its relationship to its cultural context. In the next two sections, I address the two prevailing approaches: first, the relationship of these poems to Homer; and second, the issue of performance context and genre. It is through a synthesis of both these discussions that a new interpretation is proposed.

II Exhortation elegy and Homer

In recent years scholars have lost the confidence necessary to offer 'hard' readings of the intertextuality between Homeric epic and elegy such as those championed in the early twentieth century. The present-day appreciation of the orality of archaic poetry and a recognition of the uncertainty in dating the Homeric texts have forced us to re-evaluate the dependence of elegiac language on the epic hexameter tradition and more specifically on Homer,¹² with the result that scholars inclined

¹⁰ Athens is of course the source of several distorted pictures not only because it is the city-state from which we derive the most evidence, but because of its influential representations of Sparta, such as Pericles' funeral oration (Thuc. 2.35–46). Modern discussion of this theme has been extensive; for a masterful treatment see Loraux (1986) 'Index' s.v. 'Sparta'. See also the tradition of Tyrtaeus 'really' being Athenian (Pl. *Laws* 629a; Strabo 4.15.6) for one type of Athenian distortion and the most recent discussions of it, Fisher (1994) 362–4 and Meier (1998) 316–22.

¹¹ See Lycurg. *Leocr.* 107, Pl. *Laws* 629b–e for examples of the uses to which Tyrtaeus could be put.

¹² See Bowie (1986) 14. Close extended parallels between elegy and epic: Tyrtaeus 10.21–30 and *Il.* 22.71–6; 11. 29–34 and *Il.* 13.130–5, 16.215–17; 11.11–14 and

toward this approach now limit themselves to such questions as whether it is at all possible to detect specific allusions to a fixed Homeric text in exhortation elegy, how to understand allusion in oral poetry, or how to be certain of it given the meagreness of the extant poetry from this period.¹³ Impressive as these contributions may be, it is unfortunate that the awareness of these concerns has had only a negative function, employed primarily to undermine the arguments of previous generations, rather than to develop a new method of understanding the relationship between epic and lyric poetry.

In contrast to the present sceptical trend, the most influential scholarship of the early twentieth century theorised upon the social, cultural and spiritual development implied in the perceived chronological succession of epic to elegy. Detailed comparisons of Homeric and elegiac passages were held to reveal dramatic developments both in political notions and in the concept of the individual. Most important for this chapter is the judgment offered in the works of Fränkel, Jaeger and Snell that in the poetry of Callinus and Tyrtaeus, and in contrast to Homer, one could observe the increasing primacy of the city and the beginnings of civic obligation.¹⁴ Jaeger writes, 'The spirit of the early Greek polis found its ideal embodiment, expressing the inner law of all political society, in a great series of imperishable works, beginning with the poems of Tyrtaeus and Solon ... in which the problem of the state is of central concern', and of Tyrtaeus alone, 'he has recast the

Il. 5.529–32 = 15.561–4; Callinus I and *Il.* 15.494–9, 13.95–124, 6.486–93 and 12.310–28. See Fowler (1987) 30–2. Callinus I will be discussed in greater detail below pp. 46–57.

¹³ Fowler (1987) breaks the question into two, 'Did Homer's text exist in nearly final form in the early seventh century? Had it already eclipsed other epics, so that it was the principal representative of the epic tradition, as it is for us?' His own systematic investigation of suggested cases of epic allusion in lyric poetry dismisses most as groundless, as neither imitation nor allusion in any strict sense (9, 30–2). Of course, even when imitation is admitted, the direction of the allusion is still open to question: West (1995) 206 and (1970) 150. See also Lohmann (1970) 119 n. 44, 168 n. 15, who maintains lines like οὐ οἱ δεικὲς ... τέθνημεν ('it is not unseemly ... to die', *Il.* 15.496) are interpolated from Tyrtaeus. Against this view see Latacz (1977) 1–10.

¹⁴ Fowler (1987) 105–6 n. 2 surveys these studies and assembles a thorough survey of the various opponents of this school, in addition to providing his own criticisms (esp. 4–10).

Homeric ideal of the single champion's ἀρετή ['excellence'] into the ἀρετή of the patriot ... there is only one standard of true ἀρετή – the state'. In a similar vein, Snell accounts for the differences that he perceives between elegy and Homeric poetry by asserting that 'the community has redoubled its claim on the individual'.¹⁵

The conclusions had implications for histories of Sparta. Ancient accounts of early Sparta in which the fragments of Tyrtaeus served as testimony for the beginnings of its militaristic character could be clothed in a new sophistication with the help of this kind of *Geistesgeschichte*. Despite the mounting criticisms from a literary perspective, a strong assertion of the difference between Homeric and elegiac sentiment still informs the narratives of several recent historians.¹⁶ Oswyn Murray is clearly influenced by Snell when he writes, 'Kallinos brings together a whole series of scattered Homeric phrases to present a new ideal.'¹⁷ Tigerstedt in *The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity* likewise brings the legend to the present day. In discussing fr. 11, he follows Jaeger, identifying Tyrtaeus' version of ἀρετή as 'the unconditional sacrifice of self for one's city', and asserting besides, 'This civic "virtue", this new idea of the state found its first and greatest expression in Tyrtaeus. He is the first poet of the Greek city state.'¹⁸ But such grand statements beg to be couched in the passive and have their agents discovered: by whom exactly was this new idea of the state found in Tyrtaeus, or in exhortation elegy? Such analysis of early Greek poetry creates a suspiciously simple picture of the progression of certain ideas, both leaving unanswered the question of the function of these texts in any particular time frame, and provoking one to ask why *these* texts have survived to evoke such a picture.

Certainly the methodological problems involved in reconstructing *Geistesgeschichten* justify reservations. The pitfalls of this approach have been well identified: over-dependence on

¹⁵ Jaeger (1966) 103 and (1965) 90. Snell (1982) 172. See also Adkins (1960).

¹⁶ See, for instance, Murray (1993), Raaflaub (1993).

¹⁷ Murray (1993) 134, heavily indebted to Snell (1982) 171–4.

¹⁸ Tigerstedt (1965) 50.

lexicographical studies, and the temptation to impose a false or exaggerated account of development on the meagre amount of extant poetry from this period.¹⁹ Moreover, the uncertainty about the circulation and even the form of the Homeric texts at this early date requires that attempts to construct the meaning and function of exhortation poetry for its contemporary audience be independent of strong assertions of a well-known fixed Homeric text, and instead treat both genres as products of a shared cultural and poetic tradition. And yet while of course the security of the Homeric text and its impact on the question of allusion are important, these considerations have often unfortunately paralysed attempts to move beyond such caution. It is clearly impossible to deny some form of intertextual relationship between epic poetry, as represented by Homer, and the vocabulary and themes of martial elegy.²⁰ Likewise, whatever differences in emphasis and in values have been postulated between elegy and epic, exhortation is a shared and fundamental element of both. There are clear affinities with elegiac exhortation in the sentiments expressed, for instance, in the lines uttered by Hector with which this Part opened (*Il.* 15.486–99), those of Agamemnon (5.529–32),²¹

ὦ φίλοι, ἀνέρες ἔστε καὶ ἄλκιμον ἦτορ ἔλεσθε,
ἀλλήλους τ' αἰδεῖσθε κατὰ κρατερὰς ὑσμίνας·
αἰδομένων ἀνδρῶν πλέονες σόοι ἢ ἐπέφαιται·
φευγόντων δ' οὐτ' ἄρ κλέος ὄρνυται οὔτε τις ἀλκή

Friends, be men and embrace a courageous heart, and feel a sense of regard for one another in the violent encounters. For more come out safely when men are showing regard, but when men run in retreat, neither any fame nor war spirit is at work.

and those of Ajax in 12.269–71,

¹⁹ Fowler (1987) 4–13.

²⁰ For the epic language of exhortation elegy see Verdenius (1969) and (1972), Prato (1968) 48–62 and his apparatus to the individual fragments, Campbell (1982) 162, Adkins (1985) 61. Hudson-Williams (1926) 71 and 106 analyses the vocabulary of Callinus and Tyrtæus. See also Prato (1968) 48–62, Krischer (1979) 385 and Tarkow (1983) 59 n. 41. The similarities are particularly striking in battle descriptions: see Latacz (1977) and van Wees (1994). For extended parallels see n. 12.

²¹ These lines are repeated with slight modification by Ajax in 15.561–4.

ὦ φίλοι, Ἀργείων ὅς τ' ἔξοχος ὅς τε μεσήεις
 ὅς τε χερείτερος, ἐπεὶ οὐ πῶ πάντες ὁμοῖοι
 ἀνέρες ἐν πολέμῳ, νῦν ἔπλετο ἔργον ἅπασι.

Friends, you who excel among the Argives, you who are in the middle, and you who are worse – since in no way are all men equal in war – now the task is for all.

And this manifest similarity is of course the very fact that initiated the comparisons underlying our influential *Geistesgeschichte*.

My main concern, however, is to clear away the overall conclusion to which these studies have led: that the city and the concept of obligation to it are more developed in these poets than in Homeric poetry. The extant body of elegy and epic itself frequently inverts the traditional characterisations of these genres created by scholars. The concerns of personal κλέος, the safety of one's family, and of his πατρίς/πάτρη ('land of one's father') all occupy important positions in both bodies of poetry, in different proportions depending on the context of the passage. Despite the competitive ethos argued to characterise the Homeric hero, the collective good is a central preoccupation of the *Iliad*: on the level of plot, the very conflict of Book 1 is initiated by Achilles' response to the collective suffering from the plague, while on the level of the formula, the often repeated phrase ὤλεσα/ε λαόν ('I/he destroyed my/his [dependent] people') is spoken of as the most damaging of admissions or criticisms.²²

Patriotic sentiment is also to be found in epic. One need look no farther than the character of Hector: in 12.243 he defies Polydamas' advice with the exclamation, εἷς οἰωνὸς ἄριστος ἀμύνεσθαι περὶ πάτρης ('one bird sign is best, to fight for the fatherland'); later, his father describes him thus:

ὅς δέ μοι οἶος ἔην, εἴρυτο δὲ ἄστν καὶ αὐτούς,
 τὸν σὺ πρῶν κτείννας ἀμυνόμενον περὶ πάτρης
 Ἔκτορα·

²² *Il.* 1.53–67, esp. 55–6. ὤλεσα/ε λαόν ('I/he destroyed the people'): 22.104–7, 110, etc. See Haubold (2000) ch. 2.

He who was the only one I had, and who protected the city and the [Trojans], Hector, whom you so recently killed while he was protecting his land (*Il.* 24.499–501)²³

Conversely, the frequent claim that there is little or no patriotism in Homer, that when such concepts as fighting for the fatherland and yearning for one's home are 'concretely described they resolve themselves into family, estates and native hearths', can also be made of exhortation elegy.²⁴ As Greenhalgh has pointed out, '[w]e need only examine how Tyrtaeus actually expressed this "true patriotic love of his country" to find that it resolves itself into family, estates and native hearth no less clearly than do the Homeric sentiments'.²⁵ So, for instance, Tyrtaeus 10.1–6:

τεθνάμεναι γὰρ καλὸν ἐνὶ προμάχοισι πεσόντα
 ἄνδρ' ἀγαθὸν περὶ ἧ πατρίδι μαρινάμενον.
 τὴν δ' αὐτοῦ προλιπόντα πόλιν καὶ πίονας ἀγροῦς
 πτωχεύειν πάντων ἔστ' ἀνιηρότατον,
 πλαζόμενον σὺν μητρὶ φίλῃ καὶ πατρὶ γέροντι
 παισὶ τε σὺν μικροῖς κουριδίῃ τ' ἀλόχῳ.

²³ Linked to this passage is the explanation of the name Ἀστυάναξ given by the people to Hector's son, *Il.* 6.403. For πάτερ see *Il.* 17.156–9, when Glaucus upbraids the Trojans, saying:

εἰ γὰρ νῦν Τρώεσσι μένος πολυθαρσὺς ἐνείη
 ἄτρομον, οἷόν τ' ἄνδρας ἐσέρχεται οἱ περὶ πάτρης
 ἀνδράσι δυσμενέεσσι πόνον καὶ δῆριν ἔθεντο,
 αἰψὰ κε Πάτροκλον ἐρυσάμεθα Ἴλιον εἴσω.

For if now the Trojans possessed a bold spirit, unshaken, the kind that enters men who for the sake of their fatherland inflict labour and strife on enemy men, straightaway would we drag Patroclus into Troy'

Along another line, the poet describes Thetis lamenting the fate of Achilles, 'who was going to perish in Troy' τηλόθι πάτρης ('far from the land of his fathers'), 24.86, and indeed τηλόθι πάτρης is an often repeated formula (e.g. *Il.* 1.30, 16.461, 18.99, 24.541, *Od.* 2.365).

²⁴ Starr (1961) 308. Greenhalgh (1972) 535 rejects this position unequivocally: '[T]here is no qualitative contrast between those concepts as expressed in Homer and Tyrtaeus as Starr would have it.' He convincingly argues against Starr, Finley and Bowra on this point, concluding that when searching for patriotism in the *Iliad*, 'the historian should disregard the Panachaean and concentrate on the single state situation, where he will find 'Tyrtaeian' expressions of community responsibility and pride alongside the more usual personal and familial obligations', 533. Commenting on *Il.* 15.494–9, Janko (1992) 282 agrees.

²⁵ Greenhalgh (1972) 535. See also Verdenius (1972) 4–5.

For it is a fine thing for a good man to die having fallen among the fore-fighters as he fought for the land of his fathers. But it is most miserable when one leaves behind his city and his fertile fields and takes to begging, roaming about with his dear mother and his old father, and with his small children and his wedded wife.

And of course personal honour is also an important motivation of the elegiac warrior as shown by Callinus 1.16–21, and especially by Tyrtaeus 12.27–44.

By illustrating how easily the sharp distinctions between the themes of martial epic and elegy can be broken down, these comparisons suggest that constructions based on the notion of development and progress reflected in apparent transitions from one genre to the other are suspect. When one examines these claims for sharp distinctions the case becomes stronger: influenced by this developmental narrative many scholars have inadvertently misrepresented the passages on which they base their theories of difference.²⁶ A crucial elision by Snell – Hector's οὐ οἱ ἀεικὲς ἀμυνομένῳ περὶ πατρὸς|τεθνάμεν, 'It is not unseemly for one *to die*, when he is fighting on behalf of the fatherland', as 'It is not unseemly *to defend* one's fatherland' – rendered Hector's sentiments as wanting when faced with the vigorous 'patriotism' of Callinus.²⁷ More recently, Kurt Raaflaub's 'Homer to Solon: the rise of the polis' epitomises the contrasting levels of commitment to the collective in a comparison of *Il.* 15.494–9 and Tyrtaeus 12:

In dying for his *patrê*, Hektor says, the soldier saves his house and family. Clearly, to this fighter his *oikos* is at least as important as the community. In Tyrtaeus the community, facing no less serious outside danger, takes center stage; the poet focuses on its collective feeling and actions; here the family appears to be secondary.²⁸

Couched in this way, poor Hector is again found wanting. But the simplicity of the distinction is artificial: Raaflaub omits

²⁶ Or at least, they have sometimes failed to juxtapose the most comparable parallels: see Krischer (1979) and discussion below.

²⁷ Snell (1982) 172–3 (my italics). For this point see Krischer (1979) 385–6 (cf. Verdenius (1969) 339), and p. 46 below.

²⁸ Raaflaub (1993) 41–2.

from his translation of Tyrtaeus precisely those lines that upset the traditional schema. Lines 33–4, for instance, include the family: ὄντιν ἀριστεύοντα μένοντά τε μαρνάμενόν τε | γῆς πέρι καὶ παίδων θοῦρος Ἴαρης ὀλέση ('whomever rushing Ares destroys as he is being the best in battle, remaining firm, and fighting for his land and children').²⁹

This is not to argue that there are *no* differences in the content and expression of patriotic or collective sentiment in the extant body of epic as opposed to martial elegiac poetry, but rather to assert that these differences have overly occupied the attention of modern scholars, and at times their extent has been overemphasised and sometimes even misrepresented. Even if Homer's temporal precedence were secure, any perceived differences in expression could plausibly be attributed solely to generic differences, rather than to a marked historical change or a new stage of political development. Of course one must also allow for the possibility that a motivating factor in the creation or popularity of the genre of exhortation poetry could be a new and heightened 'civic awareness'. But then it would make greater sense to investigate the meaning of these epic sentiments in their new textual and physical/performance *context* rather than impose upon this poetry an interpretation that argues for a substantial change in its *content*. This change of emphasis from the differences to the similarities between epic and elegiac exhortation is fundamental for a new interpretation of exhortation elegy. But before it can be developed we must consider the second prevailing approach to this poetry, a consideration of its performance context and genre.

²⁹ In addition he does not address those lines casting the warrior as a heroic individual without reference to the community, such as 36, nor those that suggest the self-interest of the warrior (i.e. 38) and that cast the community or fellow citizens in a potentially negative light, such as 39–40: οὐδέ τις αὐτὸν | βλάπτειν οὔτ' αἰδοῦς οὔτε δίκης ἐθέλει ('and no one wishes to cheat him neither of respect nor justice'). He admits that 'the progression is not as straight and simple' as he portrays it, but continues his discussion in a similar vein (1993) 42.

III Martial exhortation elegy and its archaic context

Since Kenneth Dover's important article, 'The poetry of Archilochus', genre in the archaic period has been defined not only by the formal features displayed by the poetry comprising it, but also by the occasion of that poetry's performance.³⁰ The second prevalent approach to martial exhortation elegy follows from this enlarged concept of genre, focussing on it as an apparently distinctive and panhellenic sub-genre of elegy and on its performance context of the symposium.³¹

The Panhellenism of exhortation poetry

The stirring exhortations of Tyrtaeus have not only informed accounts of the early history of Sparta, they have also had enormous influence on modern interpretations of archaic elegy. This is well illustrated by Nagy: 'The poetics of Tyrtaeus in particular and elegiac poetics in general amount to a formal expression of the ideology of the polis, in that the notion of social order is envisaged as the equitable distribution of communal property among equals.'³² But Tyrtaeus as elegiac poet, in particular one of martial exhortation, poses a potential problem for interpreting the genre. Those scholars who assign a *unique* position to the poetry of Tyrtaeus as the product of a particular historical context – the subjugation of and extended warfare with Messenia – must simultaneously acknowledge the *generic* quality of the poetry we label martial exhortation. Not only the extended fragment of Callinus, but also fragments of Archilochus, Mimnermus, Solon, and the *Theognidea* suggest that this poetry had function and meaning

³⁰ Dover (1964), esp. 189. See also Gentili (1988) 36 and Bartol (1993) 1–11, 45.

³¹ Bowie (1986) esp. 15–16 and (1990), Murray (1991), Nagy (1990), Morris (1996). Bartol (1993) 57–60 helpfully assembles the sources for discussing elegy as a genre.

³² Nagy (1990) 270 (informed by Detienne (1996, orig. 1967) ch. 5), to which many adhere: see, for instance, Morris (1996) 30. I leave for later discussion the issues of whether (and how far) the ideology of the polis and elegiac poetics were in fact coextensive, and the related task of identifying the group(s) who would have attempted to maintain this to be so.

in several *poleis*:³³ explanations for its existence and popularity would need, it seems, to look beyond the exigencies and concerns of a specific geographical and historical context, such as that of Sparta under the threat of their Messenian enemies.³⁴

Historicising literary interpretations of Tyrtaeus' elegy have tended to overlook the *similarities* between Sparta and other city-states, and the need to see Sparta within its wider Greek context.³⁵ But as historians of ancient Sparta have continually noted, literary, archaeological and epigraphical evidence together confirm 'the healthy and free life in pre-classical Sparta', as well as all the divisions in wealth and status typical of the archaic polis.³⁶ Such cultural continuities with the rest of Greece suggest that particular interpretations of the supposed role of Tyrtaean elegy in Sparta should not necessarily influence our views on the general function of martial exhortation,³⁷ or rather – to frame it more positively – that any account of the social function, or even the attraction, of exhortation poetry for its contemporary audiences must incorporate the poetry's wide geographic appeal.

³³ See Archilochus 3, 7a (on the latter as exhortation, see West (1985) 8–13 and Peek (1985) 13–17; *pace* Slings (1986) 1–8); Mimnermus 14; Solon 1–3; and Theognis 549–54. On Mimnermus 14, see especially Cook (1958/9) 27–8, who sees imitation of Agamemnon's exhortation of *Il.* 4.370–400, Gerber (1997) 110, and Allen (1993) 10–11 and 23 n. 11, who also includes fr. 9. Bowie (1990) 222, following West's over-narrow definition (1974) 10, overlooks Solon's *Salamis* despite Polyaeus, *Strat.* 1.20.1, but it is rightly classified by Gerber (1997) 100. For discussion of the *Salamis* see pp. 134–46. For the popularity of exhortation elegy see West (1974) 74 and Murray (1991) 96.

³⁴ Furthermore, Reitzenstein (1893) 46 long ago pointed out, prompted by Tyrtaeus 12, that the scarcity of reference to specific fighters or foes allowed such elegy to be sung in any polis. See Bowie (1990) 223.

³⁵ To name but a few: Shey (1976), Fuqua (1981), Tarkow (1983).

³⁶ Tigerstedt (1965) 336 n. 217 with bibliography; and again, 'One thing is certain: this fertile settlement is no school for poverty and self-denial... This Sparta has nothing barren, nothing "Spartan" about it', 40. Cartledge (1979) 128–9, 165 likewise warns against retrojecting the Spartan 'mirage' too early into the archaic period. See also Starr (1965) 265–7, Hodkinson (1997) 83–102. On inequalities of wealth and status in archaic Sparta see Alc. 17 and Alc. 360, Meier (1998) *passim* and van Wees (1999) 2–6.

³⁷ As far as I know Meier (1998) is the only concerted attempt to synthesise the generic and symptomatic dimensions of Tyrtaeus with a historicising interpretation of the poet, with some success, though in my opinion she does not respond sufficiently to the biases that have caused us to have the Tyrtaeus that we do, and therefore, despite the innovations of her perspective, recapitulates the traditional narrative.

Exhortation elegy and the symposium

I turn then to that audience. Scholarship of the last three decades has re-emphasised the symposium as among the most important occasions for the performance of early elegy, and the only performance context securely attested for our extant shorter poems, as Ewen Bowie well demonstrated.³⁸ Responding critically to Martin West's reconstruction of the circumstances of elegy's performance based on literal interpretations of the content of the poems, Bowie systematically showed that those allusions to circumstances external to the symposium belonged to the assumption of roles by the singers in the symposium, the best example being perhaps the metaphor of the symposium at sea.³⁹ In a second article, Bowie directs his attention to the symposium, rather than the battlefield, as the setting for the performance of martial exhortation elegy.⁴⁰ Reiterating the observations of several scholars, he shows that various word choices in Callinus 1 suggest a

³⁸ Bowie (1986), cf. (1990). Theognis 237–43 provides the most vivid description of the sympotic performance of his elegy. On elegy and the symposium, see also Vetta (1983), Pellizer (1990). All such studies are heavily indebted to the early work of Reitzenstein (1893) 45–86. For the symposium, see the essays collected in Murray (1990b). For a survey of the profusion of symposia studies see Schmitt-Pantel (1985).

³⁹ Bowie (1986) and (1990), West (1974) 10–13. Bowie's caution in using the poems to construct the circumstances of their performance is related, as he acknowledges (1986) 15, to similar concerns regarding the poet's 'I'. For a recent discussion of the poet's 'I' see Slings (1990). The symposium at sea has an extended bibliography of both the poetry and visual imagery, but see Slater (1976), Davies (1978) and Lissarrague (1990a) 107–22. See the famous story of the house called the 'trireme' attributed to Timaeus (*FGrHist* 566 F 149) and reported by Athenaeus (2 37b-e).

⁴⁰ Bowie (1990). Bowie discusses in detail the tradition that Spartans sang Tyrtæan verse in the tent of their king while on campaign (Philochorus *FGrHist* 328 F 216; cf. Lycurg. *Leocr.* 107 and Athen. 14 630f). He argues that such practices are unlikely to date as early as Tyrtæus, and, irrespective of their date, they seem to represent in content and origin, as do the *sussitia* (*phiditia*, *philitia*, *andreia* – for terminology see Hodkinson (1983) 251–4), more a special instance of the symposium, rather than an entirely different performance context for elegy. Most scholars ascribe an early to mid sixth-century date to the initiation of this institution, some two to three generations after Tyrtæus: see Bowie (1990) 225 n. 16 and most recently Meier (1998) 40–3, 170–83. On parallelisms between the archaic *sussitia* and symposia: see Athen. 4 143a–d = Dosiados *FGrHist* 458 F 2 and Murray (1983a) 267 and (1983b). On the aristocratic features of the *sussitia* see Nafissi (1991) 173–5 and Hodkinson (1997) 91. See also Lombardo (1988).

symptotic context: for example, the verbs *κατάκεισθε* ('you lie') in line 1, and *μεθιέντες* ('relaxing') in 3.⁴¹ More generally, rather than implying the literal circumstances of recitation, the elaborate evocations of battle are better attributed to the purpose of *ἐνάργεια* ('vivid description') precisely for a performance context removed from the battlefield, namely the symposium.⁴²

Seen in this way, martial exhortation operated with two fundamental and interlinked dynamics in relation to the city and to the symposiasts who sang it: it was poetry performed at aristocratic symposia within a given city *and* it was a form of elegy common to the aristocratic symposia of several cities. In order to understand the full consequences of this dual dynamic for its archaic audiences, the generic and performative features of this poetry must be further explored. But first, a summary.

IV Moving forward

The two approaches discussed above embrace several features of exhortation poetry: performance setting, genre, the debt to a poetic tradition, and the issue of what poetry can reveal about the history and development of the culture for and in which it was composed. While scholars would all recognise some intertextuality, however loose, between elegy and Homeric paraegetic speeches, and some attempt through textual analysis to determine the extent of this relationship, I will explore what it may have meant to sing similar speeches in the particular environment of the symposium. Perhaps the point of reciting such poetry for its contemporary audience is precisely its *similarities* with epic poetry, and not the *differences* that philologists from the beginning of the twentieth century have insisted on stressing.

By changing the emphasis of the questions we ask of this poetry, a better synthesis can be made of poetic allusion,

⁴¹ See Reitzenstein (1893) 50, Bowra (1938a) 14, Tedeschi (1978) 203–9. See Bowie's survey of the scholarship (1990) 223.

⁴² Bowie (1990) 222.

historical and social context, and performance setting and genre. I argue that, at the same time as seeming to depict the polis as a unified entity and expressing a strong and positive attachment to it, the performance of heroic-style exhortation in the exclusive and status-oriented environment of the symposium may function quite paradoxically to separate and define an élite, or section of an élite, group. These poems can be seen as conveying a plurality of messages to a plurality of groups, and one of these messages is likely to have been the reinforcement of social division and privilege. A central issue is the function of context in the creation of meaning: how are we to understand the political language of early Greek elegy? How are we to understand its intertextuality with epic poetry?

SYNTHESISING CONTENT AND CONTEXT

I Narrowing the gap

The previous chapter argued that interpretations based on apparent differences between Homeric epic and elegy have been exaggerated: a certain circularity has prevailed in which philologists and historians reinforce each other's constructions, particularly in the case of Sparta and the poetry of Tyrtaeus. Instead, I argued that in order to understand the function of exhortation elegy for its contemporary audience it may in fact be more important to emphasise the obvious similarities between these bodies of poetry rather than to isolate particular differences. In this chapter I propose that the intertextuality between elegy and epic, coupled with the context of sympotic performance, suggests that an important function of the poems of this genre is the articulation of social stratification and division. They provide a means for its audience, who are simultaneously its singers, to represent and distinguish themselves as a heroic élite. Three features of exhortation elegy and epic contribute to this reading of martial exhortation.

Stratification as a feature of epic exhortation

If the similarities with Homeric poetry are stressed at least as much as the differences, then it becomes important to explain the motivations behind reciting poetry that seems to be excerpted and adapted from the exhortations of heroic characters. Social stratification is both an explicit and implicit feature in Homer, even in the scenes of exhortation, and therefore appropriation of this material may bring in its train élitist or exclusive elements. Not only do the characters in Homer represent largely the 'best' segment of society, these characters

are also represented through martial prowess as affirming their entitlement to the social and political status they possess.¹ There are moments of exhortation in the *Iliad*, occurring late in the poem, where a larger group is embraced or addressed, as in Ajax's address to the three sections of the army at 12.269–71,² but it is precisely because such an exhortation is an attempt to embrace social difference, that it implies exclusion to have been the norm. Such attempts reveal that prior to this moment in the text, characters have primarily or solely addressed their peers in battle. Full-blown exhortation in the *Iliad* is a form used exclusively by and overwhelmingly towards heroic characters, *hetairoi* ('companions', 'peers') – they are 'persuaded' or 'exhorted', never given orders; at the same time, neither does a hero exhort the *laos* ('the [dependent] people'), nor does the *Iliad* waste time showing heroes commanding the *laoi*.³

Stratification within martial exhortation elegy

Second, this stratification is not only a feature of those exhorting or receiving exhortation within epic: it clearly seems also to have a place in exhortation poetry. Callinus 1 ends with a representation of the warrior in heroic terms, complete with references to the λαός, and a strong contrast between the many and the one:

ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἔμπης δῆμῳ φίλος οὐδὲ ποθεινός·
τὸν δ' ὀλίγος στενάζει καὶ μέγας ἦν τι πάθῃ·
λαῶ γὰρ σύμπαντι πόθος κρατερόφρονος ἀνδρὸς
θυήσκοντος, ζῶων δ' ἄξιος ἡμιθέων·
ὥσπερ γὰρ μιν πύργον ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὀρώσιν·
ἔρδει γὰρ πολλῶν ἄξια μούνος ἑών.

¹ See Morris (1986), van Wees (1988), Thalmann (1988) esp. 5–6 and (1988), and Rundin (1996). Rose (1997) and Pucci (1997) provide important discussions of the complexities of the ideology of the *Iliad*.

² Quoted on p. 26.

³ Recognised by Krischer (1979) 388–9. Compare the differences in the quality of Odysseus' exhortations when directed at the βασιλῆς καὶ ἑξοχος ἄνθρωπος ('kings/princes and the pre-eminent man', *Il.* 2.188–97) as opposed to the δῆμον ἄνθρωπος ('man of the people', 2.198–206). See also van Wees (1992) 45–55, esp. 48 on the social equality of the Homeric heroes. On the social dynamics in Homer, in particular the dynamics of the terms *laos* ('people') and *hetairoi* ('companions'), see Haubold (2000).

But in any case this man is not dear to the people nor is he longed for, but the great and small man groan for the man who suffers in some way. For there is a longing in the entire people when the great-hearted man dies, and living he is worthy of demigods. For in their eyes they see him as a tower, for he does deeds worthy of many, although a single man. (Callinus 1.16–21)⁴

Note the parallelism of lines 19 and 21 with the shared line position of the evaluative term ἄξιος ('worthy'): while alive the warrior is ἄξιος of the demigods, and his deeds are ἄξια of many although he is only one. Alive or dead he is distinguished from his larger social context: in lines 18–19 the longing of the entire λαός marks his absence, while in life he seems to belong more appropriately to a different order of being.

But it is not performance alone that generates distinctions: the weaponry itemised in the exhortation of Tyrtaeus, although typical of epic descriptions, implicitly addresses a particular section of society. Tyrtaeus makes the existence of this preferred audience explicit. After a rousing exhortation of 34 lines directed at those he calls 'the race of invincible Heracles', Tyrtaeus 11 ends by addressing a particular group, the γυμνήτες:

ὑμεῖς δ', ὦ γυμνήτες, ὑπ' ἀσπίδος ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος
 πτώσσοντες μεγάλοις βάλλετε χερμαδίοις
 δοῦρασί τε ξεστοῖσιν ἀκοντίζοντες ἐς αὐτοῦς,
 τοῖσι πανόπλοισιν πλησίον ἰστάμενοι.

You, light-armed men [lit. naked ones], each cowering on different sides under shields, throw huge rocks, and let fly at them your polished spears, taking a position near to the fully armed. (11.35–8)

Even at first sight, the length and the position in the poem of this passage indicate a secondary status for the group addressed.⁵ It follows a lengthy description of the type of fighting the initial addressees will perform, itemising in detail the kind of weaponry they will use. Furthermore, through the use of a name conveying a physical description, a group

⁴ See Singor (1995) 198 on Callinus 1: '... to be honoured as one of the *hemitheoi* not after death but live and well ... smacks of a social élite, as opposed to the *demos* or *laos* mentioned in the poem to which this *aner* clearly does not belong'.

⁵ Compare the treatment of women in Pericles' funeral oration, Thuc. 2.45.2.

distinct from the original addressees is demarcated. These lines imply that the γυμνήτες ('lightly armed') are not the same as the main group addressed by the poem, the γένος ἀνικήτου Ἡρακλῆος ('race of invincible Heracles') who are described as possessing elaborate weaponry. The manner of address also points in this direction: ὑμεῖς ('you') in elegy, unlike the mere second person plural verb, seems to indicate a sharp separation from the speaker, as in Solon 4c.⁶

Surprisingly, the strongly derogatory nature of the description of these fighters has drawn little comment from scholars. Debates have focused on whether these γυμνήτες cower behind their own shields or those of the πάνοπλοι: do these lines evoke the epic image of Teucer, fighting from behind Ajax's shield (*Il.* 8.266–334), or the wicker shield of the light-armed soldiers?⁷ Leaving this question aside, πτώσσοντες in line 36 is a startling description. Prato claims, 'the act of "crouching" under the shield is already shown in Homer: 'cf. N 408 τῇ (scil. ἀσπίδι) ὑπο πᾶς ἐάλη ["he was crouched fully under his shield"]',⁸ and indeed Callinus demonstrates an elegiac rendition of this Homeric image – ὑπ' ἀσπίδος

⁶ Solon 4c:

ὑμεῖς δ' ἡσυχάσαντες ἐνὶ φρεσὶ καρτερὸν ἦτορ,
οἱ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐς κόρον [ἡ]λάσατε,
ἐν μετρίοισι τίθεςθε μέγαν νόον· οὔτε γὰρ ἡμεῖς
πεισόμεθ', οὔθ' ὑμῖν ἄρτια τα[ῦ]τ' ἔσεται.

You, having quieted the strong heart in your breast, you who sated yourself of many good things, keep your great mind within measure. For neither will we obey, nor will these things be fitting for you.

Cf. Theognis 493. On the importance of deictic terms in Tyrtaeus see Meier (1998) 173–4 (though she is oddly silent about fr. 11), and in sympotic poetry more generally see Rösler (1983), Pellizer (1990) 179. See also pp. 106–7.

⁷ Most commentators now agree that whatever the evocations of Ajax and Teucer, the shield belongs to the individual γυμνῆς ('lightly-armed fighter'): he is not cowering behind someone else's shield. See Lorimer (1947) 76–138, esp. 127–8, Defradas (1962) *ad loc.*, Campbell (1982) 176, and Gerber (1999) 57; for the opposite view see Wilamowitz (1900) 113–14, Prato (1968) 115 and most recently van Wees (2000) 151, but all three must acknowledge the lack of allusion to archery in these lines (as noted by Lorimer, an omission called by Prato incredible, 'meraviglia').

⁸ 'L'atto del 'rannicchiarsi' sotto lo scudo è già rappresentato in Omero ...', Prato (1968) 115.

ἄλκιμον ἦτορ | ἔλσας ('keeping your brave heart wrapped tightly under your shield', 1.10). But these alleged parallels only serve to underscore the difference in the description of the γυμνήτες. Tyrtaeus actually employs a different verb, and one that has strongly negative connotations: πτώσσω invariably has negative or insulting meaning in Homer and in fact all archaic and classical Greek.⁹ In the *Iliad*, πτώσσω ('cower') is never divorced from fear, and is employed consistently and significantly in order to goad the addressee not to hang back from battle, as in 4.370–3:

ὦ μοι Τυδέος υἱὲ δαΐφρονος ἵπποδάμοιο
τί πτώσσεις, τί δ' ὀπιπέυεις πολέμοιο γεφύρας;
οὐ μὲν Τυδεί γ' ὦδε φίλον πτωσκαζέμεν ἦεν,
ἀλλὰ πολὺ πρὸ φίλων ἐτάρων δῆϊοσι μάχεσθαι ...

Son of Tydeus, that skilled tamer of horses, why do you cower, and why do you eye the ranks of battle? Tydeus never preferred to cower in this way, but way in front of his dear companions to fight the enemy.

The implication of such language in Tyrtaeus 11 is that the γυμνήτες are demonstrating shameful behaviour. Moreover, πτώσσω is not reserved in Homer for the nameless λαός or for a group distinguished from the main characters: the same group receives both positive and negative exhortation.¹⁰ In contrast to Homer, Tyrtaeus does not use this word to address the (perceived) slack within the same body of warriors, but uses the word in conjunction with a term by which he explicitly denotes a different group – he does not say, 'you, timid ones' who could also be πάνοπλοι, but rather employs a term exclusive of πάνοπλοι – thus importing nearly the force of generalisation about the behaviour of that other group. He is not then

⁹ In exhortations: *Il.* 4.371, 5.634, 7.129, 20.427. The only other Iliadic appearances of this verb describe the Trojans before Achilles: 21.14, 21.26. In the *Odyssey* the verb is used of begging and humble behaviour (17.227, 18.363). See also καταπτώσσω ('cower down'): *Il.* 4.224, 340, 5.254, 476. *Il.* 5.253–4 is particularly suggestive: Diomedes says it is not γειναῖον ('noble') for him to 'cower down', καταπτώσειν. For πτώσσω elsewhere, see for example, Hes. *Op.* 393, Pind. *Pyth.* 8.86, and Hdt. 9.48.3. For Aristotle, in fact, the verb πτώσσω characterises behaviour that is the antithesis of bravery (*NE* 1116a, quoting a version of *Iliad* 2.391).

¹⁰ This is also true of Callinus 1.

displaying the range of Homeric exhortation, positive and negative, as exhibited by Agamemnon in Homer, on individuals of the same quality and status; rather, he is directing different types of exhortation at different groups, and addressing the aggressive and negative exhortation at a group of lower status.¹¹

The combination of the 'you' address and the derogatory implications of the description contradicts Jaeger's romantic notion that 'War wipes away all privileges whenever the whole commonwealth is at stake, as in the revolt of the Messenians. The country's need is a[n] ... equalizer.'¹² While the previous 34 lines elevate their addressees through the use of epic language, these four lines undermine their addressees through the same medium. Their inclusion ultimately arises only from the desire to glorify the main addressees of the poem, the πάνοπλοι, not from any inclusive desire to represent all levels of fighting citizens. Not only does the division implicit in the poem's derogatory address to a group of soldiers upset many of the assertions of uniformity and civic unity in early Sparta derived from the poetry of Tyrtaeus, at the same time it also challenges prevailing characterizations of elegy.

Outside fr. 11, Tyrtaeus' poems may in fact bear other élite elements, as in what seems to be a chariot-racing simile in the context of a battle description in fr. 20 and the epic depiction of the warrior as a lion in fr. 13. Given that Tyrtaeus' traditional characterisation as patriotic and constitutional poet arose in part from the particular biases and needs of later generations, it is important to remember that he was a sympotic poet.¹³ Although many have argued that exhortation elegy attempts to elevate the whole citizen army to heroic stature,¹⁴ it is in fact

¹¹ This is particularly clear in that the *Iliad* does provide a model of subordinate yet valued heroic fighting in the figure of Teucer, a combination eschewed by Tyrtaeus. For a further discussion of the γυμῆτες and their military function see Appendix I.

¹² Jaeger (1966) 119; see Meier (1998) 176.

¹³ Meier (1998) 172–5 and 242 n. 54 is good on this point, though she uses it to different ends.

¹⁴ Beginning with Jaeger (1966) 119, 'in place of the old hereditary nobility it calls into being a new kind of nobility for all citizens that is only bestowed by heroic courage in battle against the enemy' and many scholars follow suit: see for instance, Murray (1993) 131–6. See also the discussion of Krischer (1979) below.

aimed at a sympotic, not general, audience. However popular these sentiments became for classical audiences – the diffusion of aristocratic culture to a broader body – care must be taken not to accelerate this process of social change by reading it into the exhortation of the seventh century. Instead, the appearance of social stratification within exhortation elegy, coupled with its affinity to the highly stratified exhortation of epic, strongly suggests that status and exclusivity played an important part in the associations, and possibly function, that martial elegy had for its intended sympotic audience.

Epic exhortation, feasting, and the symposium

The issue of feasting in epic exhortation has a bearing on the interpretation of exhortation elegy. Perhaps the most frequent means of expressing a warrior's status in epic is through feasting, food and drink. Presence at the feast both confirms the epic warrior's status and seems to oblige him to continue demonstrating that he is worthy of that honour.¹⁵ References to feasting and the honour derived from it, moreover, have a prominent place particularly in speeches of martial exhortation. Such references function in positive exhortation, such as in Agamemnon's exhortation to Idomeneus (*Iliad* 4.257–64):

Ἰδομενεῦ περὶ μὲν σε τίω Δαναῶν ταχυπόλων
 ἡμὲν ἐνὶ πτολέμῳ ἢδ' ἄλλοίω ἐπὶ ἔργῳ
 ἢδ' ἐν δαίθ', ὅτε πέρ τε γερούσιον αἶθοπα οἶνον
 Ἀργείων οἱ ἄριστοι ἐνὶ κρητῆρι κέρωνται.
 εἴ περ γάρ τ' ἄλλοι γε κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοὶ
 δαιτρὸν πίνωσιν, σὸν δὲ πλείον δέπας αἰεὶ
 ἔστηχ', ὥς περ ἐμοί, πῖεῖν ὅτε θυμὸς ἀνώγει.
 ἀλλ' ὄρσευ πόλεμονδ', οἷος πάρος εὖχεται εἶναι.

Idomeneus, I do esteem you among the Danaans with their swift horses, both in war and for any other task; and in the feast, when the best of the Argives mix in the crater the gleaming wine of the elders.¹⁶ For indeed if the other

¹⁵ On feasting and status, see especially van Wees (1992) 44–9 and (1995a), Rundin (1996), and Pucci (1997).

¹⁶ On the γερούσιος οἶνος ('wine of the councillors') see van Wees (1992) 32–3.

long-haired Achaeans drink their portion, your cup always stands full, as indeed does mine, to drink whenever your heart urges you. Now then rise up to join the battle. Be the man you always boast to be.

They also function in negative exhortation as a reminder of the obligation to live up to this honour, as in *Iliad* 4.340–8:

τίπτε καταπτύσσοντες ἀφέστατε, μίμνετε δ' ἄλλους;
σφῶϊν μὲν τ' ἐπέοικε μετὰ πρῶτοισιν ἔοντας
ἐστάμεν ἡδὲ μάχης καυστεῖρης ἀντιβολῆσαι·
πρῶτω γὰρ καὶ δαιτὸς ἀκουάζεσθον ἐμεῖο,
ὅππότε δαῖτα γέρουσιν ἐφοπλίζωμεν Ἀχαιοί.
ἔνθα φίλ' ὀπταλέα κρέα ἔδμεναι ἡδὲ κύπελλα
οἴνου πινέμεναι μελιηδέος ὄφρ' ἐθέλητον·
νῦν δὲ φίλως χ' ὀρώπτε καὶ εἰ δέκα πύργοι Ἀχαιῶν
ὑμείων προπάρουθε μαχοῖατο νηλεῖ χαλκῷ.

Why do you cower down and stand away from the battle, and wait for the others? It is fitting for you both to take a stand among the first men, and to face head on the blazing battle. For you are among the first to pay heed to my feast, whenever the Achaeans lay out a feast for the elders. Then it is dear to you to eat the roasted meat and to drink cups of honey-sweet wine whenever you wish. But now you are happy to just look on, even if ten walls of Achaeans stand before you fighting with the pitiless bronze.

We might compare also *Iliad* 8.229–35 for the reference to a past (and presumably common) occasion in which drinking and boasting of martial valour were combined, used precisely as a reprimand for current inactivity:¹⁷

πῇ ἔβαν εὐχολαί, ὅτε δὴ φάμεν εἶναι ἄριστοι,
ἃς ὀπότην ἐν Λήμνῳ κενεαυχέες ἡγοράσασθε,
ἔσθοντες κρέα πολλὰ βοῶν ὀρθοκραϊράων
πίνοντες κρητῆρας ἐπιστεφέας οἴνοιο,
Τρώων ἄνθ' ἑκατόν τε διηκοσίῳ τε ἕκαστος
στήσεσθ' ἐν πολέμῳ· νῦν δ' οὐδ' ἐνὸς ἀξιοῖ εἶμεν
Ἑκτορος ...

Where have the boasts gone, when we claimed to be the best? The boasts you with your empty vaunts proclaimed in Lemnos, as you ate much meat of straight-horned cows and drank craters filled to the brim with wine, that you

¹⁷ For the contrast of 'sympotic' behaviour with a need to show valour see of course Callinus 1.

each would stand against one hundred or two hundred Trojans. Now as it is we are not even worthy of a single man, Hector . . .

Linked to this negative form of exhortation is Hector's insult to Diomedes (8.161–3),

Τυδείδῃ περὶ μὲν σε τίον Δαναοὶ ταχύπωλοι
ἔδρη τε κρέασιν τε ἰδὲ πλείους δεπάεσσι·
νῦν δέ σ' ἀτιμήσουσι· γυναικὸς ἄρ' ἀντὶ τέτυξο.

Son of Tydeus, the swift-horsed Danaans honoured you with pride of place, meat and full cups. But now they will dishonour you. For you are no better than a woman.

Martial prowess and status are both honoured through, and demonstrated by, a place at the feast – the allocation of meat and drink – and such partaking obliges one to demonstrate the appropriateness of this entitlement.¹⁸ This is of course most clearly formulated in Sarpedon's famous speech to Glaucus, *Il.* 12. 310–28.¹⁹

Such descriptions of feasting have traditionally been interpreted as epic's remembering the great banquet halls and heroic feasting of an earlier era.²⁰ There can be little doubt that feasting was a staple theme of epic given the rich formulaic material that had evolved to describe it, but despite the recapitulation of tradition on the level of theme and phraseology, epic does not necessarily and only look backwards.²¹ The relationship of Homeric (representations of) commensality to its possible historic counterparts raises two fundamental and related questions: first, despite the deliberate archaising portrayals of epic, how far had such scenes evolved to reflect (obliquely) current practices; and second, presupposing no such evolution, to what contemporary institutions would

¹⁸ See Pucci (1997) for a brilliant analysis of these critical exhortations and what they reveal about the gap between pretensions and the actual performance of the Iliadic kings.

¹⁹ This exhortation will be discussed in depth below.

²⁰ See, for instance, Murray (1983c) and (1991). Van Wees (1995b) 177–8, however, argues that in the epics 'the link between dining groups and war bands is tenuous at best', seeing the Homeric feast as analogous in function to the symposium. For a more general critique of Murray see Lombardo (1988).

²¹ On feasting as a type-scene of epic, see Arend (1933) 68–78.

audiences have assimilated epic practices in the process of creating meaning?²² In response to the latter question, even on traditional early dating of Homer, the symposium was certainly available as an institution to which (some part of) the later seventh-century audiences of Homer could in all likelihood assimilate epic exhortation alluding to feasting and drinking. The appearance of Nestor's cup has, however, made the first of these questions more pressing, since it not only pushes the date of the symposium well into the eighth century, but also demonstrates sophisticated manipulation of epic material within a sympotic context.²³

But might the directions of this manipulation be reversed? As in scholarship Homer becomes younger and the symposium older, the relative chronology of the symposium and the Homeric epics is neither fixed nor can it exclude the possibility that poet and text may actively exploit an audience's familiarity with contemporary sympotic practice.²⁴ In fact, several scholars have recognised the continuities in the ethics and function of Homeric and sympotic commensality, and some acknowledge the likelihood that reflections of – and on – the contemporary symposium have entered the Homeric epics, especially the *Odyssey*.²⁵ Most recently Marek Węcowski has identified passages of the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* that both presume and engage their audience's familiarity with sympotic practice, specifically

²² On the problems of interpreting the social and political practices represented in Homer see Morris (1986). Certain features of the Homeric feast lend themselves to assimilation by analogy to the symposium, above all the egalitarian basis of Homeric table companionship and the limited participation of women: on the former, van Wees (1992) 46–55; on the latter, van Wees (1995b) 160–3 and Rundin (1996) 189–90.

²³ On Nestor's cup and the symposium see Murray (1994), Latacz (1994) 362–5, Danek (1994/5), Faraone (1996) and Węcowski (2002a) 633–7.

²⁴ On dating Homer see above Part I, Introduction n. 1.

²⁵ On the soft reading see above all Bielohlawek (1940), Saïd (1979), Slater (1990), Fehr (1990), van Wees (1992) 57 and (1995b) esp. 177–9, Ford (1999a); but an increasing number venture further than positing mere continuity, Slater (1990) 213 Murray (1991) 95, Ford (1999a) 112, Węcowski (2002a); cf. Bielohlawek (1940) 13. On the problems of defining the symposium, see Węcowski (2002b). I take his definition, 'a night-time drinking, a luxurious wine party with a highly ritualized ceremony, in which a very restricted group of males participated on equal terms, and which was dominated by the egalitarian and at the same time competitive spirit of the aristocratic participants' (2002a) 626.

that of organising activities *epidexia*, according to the movement of wine.²⁶

For our purposes here it is not necessary to answer conclusively the question of whether the Homeric poems demonstrate knowledge of the symposium, though I believe there are good grounds to think that they do. Rather, it is sufficient to show a well-established epic association of feasting, food and drink, honour and exhortation in order to suggest the *availability* of this connection for appropriation in sympotic poetry. As with *Iliad* 8.229–34 (quoted above), the boasts Aeneas is reminded of in 20.83–5 are especially evocative in this context, for they establish within the *Iliad* a model of martial exhortation and bragging in the context of drinking:

Αινεία, Τρώων βουληφόρε, ποῦ τοι ἀπειλαί,
ἄς Τρώων βασιλεῦσιν ὑπὶ σκεοῖν οἰνοποτάζων,
Πηλεΐδew Αχιλλῆος ἐναντίβιον πολεμίζειν;

Aeneas, counsellor of the Trojans, where indeed are your threats you made before the kings of Troy as you drank wine, that you would stand opposite Achilles son of Peleus in battle?²⁷

Martial exhortation in the *Iliad* frequently involves reference to feasting and honour, but, more precisely, to the boasts of prowess that take place in the context of drinking.²⁸ Here begins a stronger analogy between heroic practice as represented in

²⁶ Węcowski (2002a): he argues this particularly to be the case in the non-heroic layer of the epics – Scheria, Olympia, and Ithaca – where the poet had more licence as he departed from the traditional image of the heroic past, but also in such passages as Agamemnon's image of the ten-man wine gathering (*Il.* 2.123–30). On *epidexia* as a definitive practice of the symposium, see Węcowski (2002b).

²⁷ Though not explicitly ascribed to a banquet, the boast of Hector at 5.473–4 suggests the competition of a drinking context: φῆς που ἄτερ λαῶν πόλιν ἐξέμεν ἡδ' ἐπικοῦρων | οἶος σὺν γαμβροῖσι κασιγνήτοισί τε σοῖσι ('You once said you could protect the city without your people or allies, single-handedly with your brothers and your sisters' husbands.')

²⁸ Relevant in this discussion, and to my mind a sympotic allusion (overlooked by Węcowski (2002a)), are Hector's words to Paris at the end of book 6, in which an exhortation to battle (ἀλ' ἵομεν, 'Let us go', 6.526) is followed by a prayer that Zeus may grant them to stand a free crater in their halls (κρητῆρα στήσασθαι ἐλεύθερον ἐν μεγάροισιν, 'to stand a free mixing bowl in the halls', 6.528), having driven away the Achaeans. Beyond the collocation of martial exhortation and drinking, the passage seems to exploit two *topoi* of sympotic poetry: the κρητῆρ as central to and metonymous of the symposium – see for instance, Theognis 643, Pind. *Nem.* 9.49

Homeric epic, and the recitation of martial exhortation poetry in the context of the symposium. This point will have important consequences.

There are grounds to press further the analogy between the presence in Homeric epic of exhortation spoken by and for peers that involve feasting as a symbol of honour and status and martial exhortation elegy performed in a sympotic context involving peers and wine. In arguing that Callinus 1 alludes to the famous speech of Sarpedon in *Il.* 12.310–28, Tilman Krischer demonstrates at the least the strong intertextuality between these texts.²⁹ He dismisses Snell's juxtaposition of the inevitability of Fate expressed in Hector's departure from Andromache in *Il.* 6.487–9 with that expressed in Callinus 1.8–15, and shows instead how Sarpedon's exhortation of Glaucus better corresponds to Callinus' exhortation, both *thematically* in the assertion of the inevitability of death as grounds for fighting (12.322–8) and *contextually* in that both passages form part of an exhortation:³⁰

ὦ πέπον, εἰ μὲν γὰρ πόλεμον περὶ τόνδε φυγόντε
αἰεὶ δὴ μέλλοιμεν ἀγήρω τ' ἀθανάτω τε
ἔσσεσθ', οὐτέ κεν αὐτὸς ἐνὶ πρώτοισι μαχοίμην
οὐτέ κε σὲ στέλλοιμι μάχην ἐς κυδιάνειραν·
νῦν δ' ἔμπηξ γὰρ κῆρες ἐφ' ἐστᾶσιν θανάτιο
μυρίαί, ἃς οὐκ ἔστι φυγεῖν βροτὸν οὐδ' ὑπαλύξαι,
ἴομεν, ἢ ἐ τῷ εὖχος ὀρέξομεν ἢ τις ἡμῖν.

Friend, if taking flight and surviving the war we were going then indeed to live ageless and immortal for ever, I would neither myself fight amid the foremost fighters, nor would I send you into the battle where men gain kudos. But as it is, since in any case the fates of death stand all around, countless in number, which it is not possible for a man to flee nor to avoid, let us go, we will bestow glory on someone or he will bestow it on us.

and Lissarrague (1990a) 19–46, (1990b), Luke (1994) 26–7, Węcowski (2002a) 631 – and the κρητήρ ('mixing bowl') or the drinking event around it, as symbolising the city – cf. Slater (1981), Levine (1985), Ford (1999a) 115, and Chapters 5 and 7.

²⁹ Krischer (1979) 385–9. On the relationship between Callinus and Homer see also Latacz (1977) 229–32 and Leimbach (1978).

³⁰ While Krischer actually undermines Snell's formulations by demonstrating that Snell did not compare the most compatible passages of Homer and elegy, he nevertheless agrees with Snell's conclusions. See Snell (1982) 172–3.

The close relationship of content and context of the two passages led Krischer to discover further verbal similarities which are of significance to this discussion whether we regard them with Krischer as narrowly Homeric allusion or interpret them as is more common now in the broader terms of intertextuality.³¹ Krischer argues that Sarpedon's initial question (τίη δὴ νῶϊ τετιμήμεσθα, 'why then are we both honoured?', 310) with the supplied answer from the Lycian people, ἐπεὶ Λυκίοισι μέτα πρώτοισι μάχονται ('because they fight ...', 321) is answered by Callinus' τιμῆν τε γάρ ἐστι ... μάχεσθαι ('for to fight brings honour', 6). Moreover, the status of the heroes, described by the phrase πάντες δὲ θεοὺς ὥς εἰσορόωσι ('all see them as gods', 312), is reworked in Callinus in the two expressions ἄξιος ἡμιθέων ('worthy of demigods') and ὥσπερ γάρ μιν πύργον ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖσιν ὀρῶσιν ('in their eyes they see him as a wall', 19–20). Both poets describe withdrawal from battle as a possible, but undesirable, scenario and with some verbal parallels: Homer, line 322 above, and Callinus, δηϊοτήτα φυγῶν καὶ δοῦπον ἀκόντων ('fleeing the hostilities and the thud of missiles', 14). This possibility is then overturned by a reflection on the inevitability of fate, expressed with similar phraseology: Homer, κῆρες ἐφ'εστᾶσιν θανάτοιο | ... ἄς οὐκ ἔστι φυγεῖν ('the fates of death stand hard upon us which it is not possible to flee', 326–27) and Callinus, οὐ γάρ κως θανάτόν γε φυγεῖν εἰμαρμένον ἐστίν ('For it is not possible to flee one's fated death', 12).³² Such reflections elicit exhortations to fight in both texts: a hortatory subjunctive in Homer, ἵομεν

³¹ Krischer (1979) 388. Contrast Fowler (1987) 30: 'The similarity between all of these passages is fortuitous and is not very extensive, and the few verbal parallels are hardly compelling. The common sentiments arise naturally from the subject matter.' In response to Fowler, however, regardless of whether one remains unconvinced of direct allusion to the Homeric passage, it is unclear in a genre of which the surviving representatives are as fragmentary as those of elegy how any passages under these criteria could ever be more closely related than 'fortuitous' and generated by a common 'subject matter'. Such reductivism risks circumscribing the capacity for allusion in archaic poetic composition by the criteria we construct to convince ourselves of its presence. In any event, allusion is not the only, or even the best, framework in which to discuss the overwhelming similarities of these passages.

³² Krischer might have added that death is personified in both texts, albeit with different figures, as the Μοῖραι (Callinus 1.9) and the Κῆρες (326).

(‘Let us go’, 328), and an imperative construction with indefinite subject³³ in Callinus, ἀλλά τις ἰθὺς ἴτω (‘But straightaway let him go forth’, 9). Between these two overwhelmingly similar texts, there is, however, one explicit correspondence missing: that the trappings of their honoured position that introduce Sarpedon’s musings (τίη δὴ νῶϊ τετιμήμεσθα μάλιστα | ἔδρηι τε κρέασίν τε ἰδὲ πλείοις δεπάεσσιν, ‘why are we both supremely honoured with pride of place, meat and full cups’, 310–11) find no correspondence in Callinus’ elegy is significant and a point to which the argument below will return.

The overall similarities between the passages are striking, but how does one proceed to discuss the consequences of this manifestly close relationship? Should we use a strict model of allusion, pinpoint differences between the content of the expressions, as Krischer does, and conclude by reinforcing the position of Snell and others who see in this elegy the first expressions of intense patriotism? Or should we instead begin to find meaning in the popularity of a genre of poetry with overwhelming similarities to epic?

II The synthesis of content and context

Synthesising the long-observed features of martial exhortation, its epicising features and its sympotic context, one may begin to answer the critical question formulated earlier: what function does martial exhortation serve when it is removed from its narrative context in epic and reformulated in elegy in the social context of the post-banquet drinking? An answer in complete contrast to the traditional characterisations of elegy emerges. I argue for a strong relationship between the *content* of Homeric exhortation and the *content* and *performance context* of exhortation elegy: both genres of exhortation explicitly reflect on the glory of fighting, status as manifest through martial prowess, and the necessity to perform acts of valour; both genres

³³ A common formulation meaning ‘everyone’, see for instance *Il.* 2.382–4: on τις statements in the *Iliad* see de Jong (1987).

connect these values with feasting and drinking among peers; but – and this is the chief difference – what is *explicit* in epic exhortation is conveyed *implicitly* by the context of the symposium itself. In this light, exhortation elegy may be seen as a social positioning of the Sarpedon and Glaucus type in an inverted context. In Homer, these heroes say in the context of battle, ‘Why is it that at home and in peaceful times we enjoy these special dining privileges?’; whereas in elegiac exhortation, the ἀγαθοί at home (if not necessarily in peace)³⁴ implicitly ask, ‘Why is it that we are justified in eating and drinking as we do tonight?’, to which the answer is provided by the subject of the elegy, their asserted valour and prowess in war.

One way to understand the recitation of exhortation elegy in the context of the aristocratic symposium is to construe it as heroic role-playing.³⁵ Such role-playing may have served the purpose not solely, nor even primarily, of emphasising obligation to the polis and concern for the collective, but rather of justifying or asserting for its audience an economic/social position within their community, of flattering themselves, and reaffirming group identity, a purpose which has as much a divisive function as the περὶ πατρὸς (‘for the land of one’s father’) statements seem to have a unifying one.³⁶ Of course the strong presence of references

³⁴ See Callinus 1.3, but ‘peace’ itself can be a sympotic term: see Slater (1981).

³⁵ A role which would likely have been encouraged by the prominence of heroic martial scenes on archaic vessels designed for use at the symposium: see Lissarrague (1987) 111–12 and Murray (1991) 98–9. The assumption of roles is of course a well-known feature of sympotic poetry: see Bowie (1986) esp. 15, 16–21.

³⁶ There is also a lighter side to this role-playing – simultaneously in operation – namely the construction of implicit and explicit analogies between drinking and battle. Later poets like Panyassis (fr. 16 Bernabé) explicitly exploit the tropes of martial paraenesis in exhortations to drink: see especially lines 4–5 which refer to the ὑμῖναι ταλαπενθέες of the δαίς; see also Bielhawek (1940) 23 and cf. Alcaeus 346 with Rösler (1980) 246–7. One might compare how an analogous role-playing *topos*, that of the ‘symposium at sea’ (Slater [1976], Davies [1978], and Bowie [1986] 17–18), seems from the evidence to have become more explicit over time, culminating in Dionysius Chalcus 5. But the assimilation of the symposium to battle is implicit in such verbs as θωρήσσεσθαι, ‘to get drunk’: see Theognis 470 and Duris of Samos *FGrHist* F 27; compare also the war imagery in Solon 4.10 with κοσμεῖν (‘to marshal’) and ἡσυχίη (‘peace’). Indeed all the observations that Tedeschi (1978) employed to establish the symposium as the performance context of Callinus 1 could be pushed further to argue that the poem configures the symposium as a battle, and implicitly exhorts its audience to drink: on this reading

to the polis and to fighting on behalf of the city does suggest that the discourse of social values has been influenced by the developing city, but whether this response is positively or negatively motivated by such developments would be open to debate. I maintain that taking the words of the poems simply as registering a linear development of attachment to the polis is unduly naïve. Rather one should ask what are the forces at play in the creation of such texts, and question the assumptions implicit in the view that the 'rise' of the polis should have been an unproblematic occurrence, or that the forces behind the production of our texts should have been entirely 'positive'.

While interpreting martial exhortation elegy as an élite genre and its civic sentiments as asserting prerogative and division stands in striking contrast to the general consensus on the interpretation of Callinus and Tyrtaeus, and of elegiac poetry more generally,³⁷ it also provides a more direct path to understanding exhortation elegy. Taken on one level, this view has the strength that it does not ignore the greatest methodological pitfall in analysing the relationship of early Greek poetry to its contemporary environment, that is, the 'accidents' of reception: for successive generations particular poets served particular needs, thus leaving us with at best a stereotype of the various early Greek poets and their poetry.³⁸ Such filters must be particularly active in the case of poets and poetry deemed to be at all political.³⁹ To read the poetry of the archaic period through the lens of traditional interpretations of linear political development is often in fact to participate in the same teleologically-driven ancient narratives in which many of these fragments are preserved.⁴⁰

μειγνυμένου πολέμου ('when the battle is mixed') would allude to wine and the crater; see Adkins (1985) 63–4 on this un-Homeric phrase and cf. Panyassis 16.5 Bernabé. For a similar approach using Archilochus 5: see Durán (1999). For the close association of the martial and sympotic, cf. Archilochus 1 with Aloni (1981) 31–48.

³⁷ See Nagy (1990) 270 and Morris (1996). Thomas (1995) 125 n. 51 is right to object to over-simplifications.

³⁸ See Jaeger (1966) 106 on aspects of the filters of reception, as well as Lycurg. *Leocr.* 107 and Pl. *Laws* 629 on the reception of Tyrtaeus.

³⁹ Solon provides a good example: in contrast to the several fragments of political and moralising poetry only four lines of his erotic poetry remain (frs. 25–6).

⁴⁰ See Davies (1997) 26–7, who advocates a 'gentle disengagement from Aristotle'.

On another level, if one asks what problems are solved by a view of martial exhortation as heroic role-playing and justification or assertion of the status of its sympotic and aristocratic audience, it becomes clear that there are more complications implicit in the prevailing view than are often acknowledged. For instance, the tension between claiming that Tyrtaeus' poetry was *unique* to his social context and seeing it as part of a recognisable and predictable genre, is removed by an interpretation that sees his poetry as part of an aristocratic phenomenon common to the symposia of numerous *poleis*. This is not to say that the character of a particular polis had no influence on the creation or meaning of its poetry, but that identifying the common features and functions is a necessary part of the process of assessing the specificity of its manifestations in a given location. Acknowledging such a point becomes crucial in an environment such as archaic Greece where poetry was conceived of, at the level of both production and reception, as a travelling medium, an element that can easily diminish difference.⁴¹

More specifically, significant difficulties are actually generated by the assumption of a great separation between the sentiments expressed in Homeric epic and elegy, difficulties scholars are then compelled to solve within the constraints of their developmental model. For a typical demonstration we might turn again to Krischer: having established a close relationship between Sarpedon's exhortation and that of Callinus 1, Krischer identifies a potential, and for him significant, problem raised by this identification:

If one proceeds from the entire stock of Homeric battle exhortations, one may be surprised that Callinus selected as the model for his exhortation to the entire citizenry this of all speeches directed to a single comrade. There are

⁴¹ Some of Tyrtaeus' poetry is, of course, 'Spartan' in detail; although it is unclear how exactly these poems functioned in the *symposia* of other *poleis*, such details do not seem to have prevented their circulation, a fact which suggests that although the composition of the poetry may have been influenced by particular circumstances at Sparta, its function for audiences in other cities was likely to have been generic. See pp. 110 and 191–3 for discussion of Tyrtaeus' *Eunomia* in connection with Solon 4.

enough exhortations in the *Iliad* directed to the mass of the people. Would not one of these have served his aim better?⁴²

He acknowledges that there exist no such *paraenese*s to the masses in Homer that, as in the case of Sarpedon's, 'reflected on the foundations of noble battle morality', and from this infers that '[s]uch a reflection is obviously only possible among those equal and on a personal level'.⁴³ Krischer answers the problem he poses by attributing the use of Sarpedon's exhortation in a supposed mass context as rooted in the difference between Homeric aristocratic society (*homerische Adelsgesellschaft*) and polis community (*Polisgemeinschaft*),⁴⁴ explicitly returning to the conclusions of Snell, despite having undermined their basis. Still so much influenced by Snell, he creates a problem that ceases to exist if one recognises the implications of the symposium as performance context. One is no longer 'surprised', as Krischer is, by the use of this Homeric exhortation, because the intended audience is not all fellow citizens (*alle Mitbürger*), and such elegy is performed precisely 'among equals and on a personal level'.⁴⁵

The question is then raised, why has exhortation poetry been so uniformly and idealistically construed by scholars despite its sympotic context, circumscribed audience, and the overwhelming epic and heroic pedigree of such exhortation? One answer, as discussed above, relates to the filter of reception.⁴⁶

⁴² Krischer (1979) 388: 'Geht man vom Gesamtbestand homerischer Kampfparänesen aus, so mag es überraschen, daß der Elegiker für seine Mahnung an alle Mitbürger ausgerechnet diese, an den einzelnen Gefährten gerichtete Rede zum Vorbild genommen hat. Gibt es doch in der Ilias Paränesen genug, die an die Masse des Volkes gerichtet sind. Hätte eine von ihnen den Zwecken des Kallinos nicht besser gedient?'

⁴³ Krischer (1979) 388–9: 'Eine solche Reflexion ist offenbar nur unter Gleichgestellten und auf persönlicher Ebene möglich.' Krischer calls Sarpedon's exhortation the most noble (*adligste*) of Homeric exhortations.

⁴⁴ Such a distinction is highly problematic, for it seems to imply that there is an externality to the *homerische Adelsgesellschaft*, a poetic construction, and that both genres of poetry are not flourishing contemporaneously and being consumed by audiences who of course live in a *Polisgemeinschaft*.

⁴⁵ Krischer (1979) 389.

⁴⁶ The issue of reception extends of course to modern scholars. See, for instance, the post-Vietnam spin Shey (1976) 21 gives to the traditional view of Tyrtæus when he concludes his article, 'Tyrtæus and the Art of Propaganda', on this note: 'Forgotten is the fact that Tyrtæus wrote to encourage Spartans in a war of naked aggression.' See also Meier (1998) 241 on Harder (1960).

Implicit in this answer is the fact that transmitted texts become divorced from their original performance contexts, deriving meaning for successive generations to whom we largely owe their preservation. This is, however, not the entire answer: one must still account for the tendency for what remains to be construed in opposing ways. And here a more interesting and intricate picture of the social forces at play for this poetry's contemporary audience becomes apparent.

A central issue in this discussion is self-representation. In the process of giving and receiving exhortations to martial ἀρετή ('excellence'), the group among whom exhortation elegy is performed is at the same time asserting a heroic status. What can then be said about the quality of the representation and its function?

Scholars pinpoint two related aspects in the representation of the warrior in exhortation elegy as proof of a changed social order. They allege that a relative absence of expressions of descent, and an emphasis on the *earning* of honour and status through fighting, rather than its *justification*, reveal historical developments in which honour is not a given of descent, later to be justified, but rather earned through martial prowess. Krischer epitomises this view: combining Callinus' assertion that no one escapes death, οὐδ' εἰ προγόνων ἢ γένος ἀθανάτων ('not even if he belongs to the race of immortal gods', 1.12–13) with the absence in this poem of *Ehrengaben*, the privileges derived from descent, he concludes, 'Among the citizens of Callinus descent is of slighter significance, and the honour of which the poet speaks, is not justified in battle, but earned.'⁴⁷

Even setting aside the most obvious objections that a sympotic performance context provides to such a view,⁴⁸ two other

⁴⁷ Krischer (1979) 389: 'Bei den Politen des Kallinos ist die Herkunft von geringerer Bedeutung, und die Ehre, von der der Dichter spricht, wird im Kampf nicht gerechtfertigt, sondern erworben.'

⁴⁸ Mention of descent is unnecessary, even unwelcome, in a context presupposing equals mainly or most often of the same city; cf. van Wees (1992) 74 and 83 on the ideological import of a comparative downplaying of descent in the Homeric poems. Furthermore, in the context of post-prandial drinking the Homeric-style *Ehrengaben* consisting in feasting may be verbally elided, and instead supplied effectively by the context of the symposium itself.

levels of objection exist: the language of elegy itself, and the generic differences separating epic and elegy. The language of exhortation elegy is a linguistic Rorschach test. The choice to argue for the absence of status distinctions and descent in exhortation depends upon undervaluing certain instances of social division apparent in Tyrtaeus, as in the conclusion of 11 and in the same poem's address to the audience as the 'race of Heracles'. On the other hand, the weight Krischer places on Callinus' verse, 'Everyone dies, even the offspring of gods' (1.13), must be questioned, since this sentiment can be made to embody several interpretations entirely dependent upon its audience. Rather than underplaying the importance of descent, the sheer epic pedigree alone of such a sentiment is better seen as encouraging the audience's identification of themselves with the characters of epic,⁴⁹ confirming the heroic pretensions of those reciting and listening to these verses.

In assessing the claim that exhortation elegy replaces the epic concept of justifying status through martial prowess with one of earning status, it is impossible to separate the levels of language and genre. First of all, the over-emphasis on this distinction between earning and justifying one's status – that is, whether one's status exists *prior to* or as *a result of* the feats which render one deserving of it – in order to gauge political development overlooks the significance of generic difference.⁵⁰ Differences in genre render such straight comparison between epic and elegy impossible: since status and birth are preconditions of the characters of epic, the demonstration of their martial valour can only be described as the justification of status, not the earning of it. This point is

⁴⁹ In addition to Sarpedon, Achilles himself expresses such a sentiment (*Il.* 18.117–18): οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ βίη Ἡρακλῆος φύγε κῆρα, | ὅς περ φίλτατος ἔσκε Διὶ Κρονίῳι ἀνακτι ('For not even did Heracles flee his fate, and he was one most dear to lord Zeus, son of Cronus'). Moreover, Achilles' comparison of himself with Heracles provides a paradigm of self-alignment with the heroic past analogous to that which symposiasts reciting such sentiments create.

⁵⁰ It also fails to notice how fraught the text of the *Iliad* is on precisely this issue of the basis of kingly status. A thorough discussion of these issues in the Homeric poems is outside the scope of this book, and unnecessary given the excellent analyses of van Wees (1992) esp. 78–108 and Rose (1992) ch. 1 which together complement the interpretation provided here of the elegists; see also Pucci (1997).

all the more apparent when one considers that despite generic differences, crucial similarities still prevail: whether earning or justifying status, both genres agree upon martial prowess as the means of securing the esteem of one's city and people.⁵¹ Under these conditions, interpretations of exhortation elegy based on any apparent shifts in language from epic must be re-evaluated.

This is not to deny that the rewards of bravery are crucial elements of exhortation elegy. Rather than be seen as reflecting neutrally and accurately the historical context of this poetry, such expressions can be taken as an idealisation of the status in the community that the audience of this poetry 'want' to, or do, enjoy. If exhortation elegy has appeared to some readers to focus on the *earning* of honour, that appearance may reveal an important element of the genre's function. The recitation of such sentiment may well function as an assertion that the status held by its privileged audience was in fact deserved, not passively inherited; or rather, that regardless of the actual origin of one's status, one would be well capable of earning it.⁵² In so far as it does reflect external political developments, an emphasis on *earning* honour and the relative eclipsing of the notion of justifying it can be read as the result of an aristocracy coping with pressures from without rather than any clear expression of radically changed values. The sympotic audience of exhortation poetry attempts to assert the status of its members within its larger community, but in such an attempt the values of the community must have some place in order for the assertion to have any credibility. The function of such an ideology would then be 'to reinforce solidarity within a would-be élite' through claims that the larger community supports or is actually the source of this desired representation.⁵³ The language is fraught with ambiguities precisely because

⁵¹ Callinus 1.17–21, Tyrtaeus 12.23–42, and epitomised, for instance, in *Il.* 6.402–3. See Rose (1992) 63.

⁵² Significantly, inherited status is nowhere explicitly denied, unless one reads Callinus 1.13 as Krischer.

⁵³ This is a sociological description of 'dominant ideology' as Morris (1996) 21, 43 n. 10 points out.

of the complexity of the social situation in which it was wrought.⁵⁴

The polis remains in this interpretation, nevertheless, an influence on the form of expression used by the poets, but this influence is neither straightforward nor does it represent a dramatic change from the content of Homeric exhortation and the world-view implicit in Homeric poetry. Genre is a decisive factor in the differences in emphases between the texts, and in fact exhortation elegy and Homeric epic may be generically different representations of the same phenomenon. In epic, heroic characters act within a narrative context of war, winning honour and κλέος, that serves also as a justification of their social status. In elegy, members of an élite within a select audience confirm the kind of status they 'ought' to enjoy within their community by assuming heroic roles and depicting themselves as earning their honour. The division between the genres is diminished further by the recognition that despite social status and birth being constituent elements or assumed features of the epic hero, the Homeric poems take pains to emphasise these elements and depict the justification of their status as almost the retrospective demonstration of it having been earned.⁵⁵

These similarities with elegy raise a crucial question regarding epic: in a genre which presupposes characters of great stature, why should the Homeric Sarpedon have ever been made to ask Glaucus such a question about the nature of their obligation to fight and the necessity to confirm their entitlement to the honour they receive?⁵⁶ Why are heroes

⁵⁴ Other features of élite behaviour show a similar ambiguity: as Morris (1996) 25 comments, 'Spending on the gods was ambiguous, creating both a sense of community and a hierarchical structure of honor within it.'

⁵⁵ See Pucci (1997) 58. See also Rose (1997) 186 who, modifying Calhoun (1934) and Geddes (1984), emphasises that 'in the *ideological* world of the poem, prowess on the field, *not* genealogy, is the fundamental principle upon which the legitimacy of leadership depends'. See also van Wees (1988).

⁵⁶ It is worth noticing how much effort is made in Sarpedon's speech to emphasise a connection between the fighting he is undertaking on behalf of the *Trojans* and its value or significance for the *Lycians* (12.312, 315, 317, 318, 321); compare van Wees (1992) 250–3, who demonstrates how systematically the Homeric poems downplay profit as motive for war. Pucci (1997) 55–62 offers a deconstructive reading of Sarpedon's speech and excellently illustrates the tensions between

made to provide justification of their status at all?⁵⁷ The answer no doubt lies in the similarity of the societal forces responsible for creating both this text and martial exhortation elegy.

III Elegy and the polis: old narratives in new clothing

Old teleologies die hard. The most recent accounts of elegy attest to the irresistibility and adaptive capacity of the evolutionary narrative as it assimilates current academic concerns and adapts to scholarly tastes. It is useful here, by way of conclusion, to identify the problems inherent in the persistent application of this narrative in two such accounts, one established and the other gaining ground, and to demonstrate both the economy of interpretation proposed above and its capacity to accommodate a more intricate picture of archaic social and political dynamics.

To begin with the well-established, when increased appreciation of the symposium as the performance context of elegy induces no re-evaluation of Snell's developmental model, a 'problem' of elegy arises for the scholar of the symposium: the question Oswyn Murray poses, to which he has 'no conclusive answer, is why military elegy does not exploit to a greater extent the language and themes of group loyalty'.⁵⁸ His answer lies in the 'official public aim' behind such elegy. In this light he comments that 'the absence of this type of language in military poetry thus appears as less strange than it might seem at first sight' because such elegy reflects the public status of a warrior group rather than the interests of those groups of which it is composed: 'Their poetry is a public poetry, emphasising loyalty to the [overall] community rather than to the group'; '[t]he poetry is not concerned with questions of the creation and maintenance of group loyalties but with

Sarpedon's self-representation and his reception by the Lycians. Compare, too, the emphasis on the public nature of the bestowal of the feast in Agamemnon's exhortations, *Il.* 4.259, 345.

⁵⁷ Van Wees (1992) and Pucci (1997) provide complementary answers to these questions on the levels of ideology and poetics.

⁵⁸ Murray (1991) 97.

relating these loyalties to a larger whole . . . ⁵⁹ Employing, however, the arguments above, the absence of expressions of group loyalties would better be explained not by assuming that elegy objectively ‘reflects the public status of a warrior group’, but rather by the recognition that such poetry reflects a self-representation – an assertion – of the status of its sympotic audience. While martial exhortation poetry, performed within the context of the symposium, reinforces solidarity within its group, its function in the symposium rests on that group’s – the audience’s – desire to secure or perpetuate a certain heroic representation of its role within its community. As a self-representation that strives to assert a validity external to the group, the absolute status of its claim would be compromised if group loyalties were present to reveal it as nothing more than a group ideology striving to be dominant rather than an external reality. Moreover, group solidarity can be taken for granted in the symposium. The combination of these two factors renders Murray’s ‘problem of elegy’ unproblematic.

If this staunch ‘symposiat’ demonstrates how a changed evaluation of the importance of an ancient institution may impact little on the teleological interpretation of the elegists, this next, and increasingly influential, example shows how impervious the traditional reading can be to the influence of modern theory. Despite enlisting the support of contemporary political theory, the most recent attempt to place the exhortation elegy of Tyrtaeus and Callinus into a political narrative – the rise of democracy – produces nevertheless an essentially familiar developmental narrative.⁶⁰ Marshalling the elegists to his aid, Ian Morris argues for a dichotomy in archaic conceptions of social order between strictly aristocratic notions – which he labels ‘elitist’ – and polis-oriented, proto-democratic – ‘middling’ – ones, maintaining that most

⁵⁹ Murray (1991) 98. Murray’s explanation generates several other questions, not least how ‘official’ and ‘public’ are to be defined in an early archaic context.

⁶⁰ Morris (1996), enlisting Robert Dahl’s ‘Strong principle of equality’ (1989). His argument has been influential in some circles: see for instance Ober (1996) and (1998), Csapo and Miller (1999), Kurke (1999), and Morris (2000) 157–91 himself has slightly modified his views but maintains essentially the same reductive model.

of the social history of the archaic period is best understood as a conflict between these two conceptions.⁶¹ In terms of archaic poetry, this conceptual dichotomy, he argues, 'partly corresponds to formal distinctions, with lyric poetry dominating the former and elegy and iambus the latter, but the boundaries are not rigid ... with Homer in some regards standing at the head of the élitist tradition, and Hesiod of the middling; but in neither case is this a clear-cut relationship'.⁶² He acknowledges that both traditions are 'élite' in the sense that they were produced for an élite, but that within the élite tradition they reflect a 'spectrum of social attitudes' between strictly aristocratic notions and polis-oriented ones. The presence of these conflicting attitudes in poetry for Morris corresponds directly to conflicting attitudes between members of the élite in an account that blurs the distinction between poetry and audience: 'The differences between the two poetic traditions came down to a single point: the elitists legitimated their special role from sources outside the polis; the middling poets' rejected that claim.' From the poetic evidence the élite are then divided into two groups, those who chose to place themselves with an 'immanent elite', 'an imagined community evoked in the interstices of the polis world' transcendent of and opposed to the polis, and those with 'middling' inclinations for whom the polis was integral to their self-definition.⁶³

As with many teleological narratives, the irresistible simplicity it offers has eclipsed substantial problems both with the way Morris characterises elegy and its relationship to a wider cultural and political context. The flexibility of the language of elegy means care must be taken not to impose crude frameworks that reveal only apparent results. But, most damagingly of all, extant elegy does not in fact serve Morris's schema, beyond revealing its limitations: Tyrtaeus and Callinus are characterised as 'middling' despite 'heroic war scenes' being

⁶¹ Morris (1996) 20; cf. (2000) 159–61.

⁶² Morris (1996) 27, developing the arguments of Mazzarino (1947) and Kurke (1992).

⁶³ Morris (1996) 35–6.

for Morris the touchstone of élitist poets;⁶⁴ a similar point may be made about the problems in classifying Mimnermus in this schema.⁶⁵ Notwithstanding the damaging flaws in his use of the evidence, at least in so far as Morris calls attention to a variety of tones and relationships to the civic whole – the spectrum of opinions – expressed within sympotic poetry, he makes some contribution to exploring the relationship of an archaic élite to the developing polis. But – and this is a substantial methodological flaw – by assuming an implicit (and sometimes explicit) direct correspondence across such diverse categories as poets, poems, genres of poetry, the social conceptions expressed therein and particular groups within an élite, he uses distinctions across poems to posit straightforward distinctions between the world-views of those who sing them.⁶⁶ On the interpretation of martial exhortation elegy given above, it is however no less possible for its sympotic performances to contribute to the creation of an ‘immanent élite’ such as Morris describes. The flexibility of the language of our extant poetry renders the contexts and groups in which the poetry was invoked crucial for creating its meaning for its audiences and thereby also renders a direct connection with a section of the élite impossible to determine and unlikely to have existed.

Behind Morris’ thesis lies a simplistic rendering of the relationship between members of an élite to their developing *poleis* as either positive or negative. But those in the archaic period

⁶⁴ Morris (1996) 32 and cf. (1986). On the similarity between Homer and the elegists see Latacz (1977) 229–38. Morris seems to have overlooked the less-cited and ‘heroic’ Tyrtaeus 19–23a and Callinus 5. One is left to infer that he classifies these martial elegists as ‘middling’ on the basis of his considering ‘phalanx warfare’ to be a different type of war scene, 35, but the overwhelming reason seems to be formal, and related to his reliance on Nagy ((1990) 270), 30.

⁶⁵ Morris (1996) 32. While Morris dismisses the threat to his classification of elegy posed by the heroicising battle fragment of Mimnermus – ‘only one [*sic*] martial fragment (14W) survives from Mimnermus’ (32) – he later places him in the elitist tradition without explanation, 34.

⁶⁶ Without basis Morris seems to assume that lyric and elegy could not be sung at the same symposium. On problems between perhaps the least difficult of these correspondences, between poets and types of poetry, see Davies (1988) esp. 61.

who considered themselves as belonging to an élite no doubt had several different relationships to their various *poleis*, finding themselves in a plurality of contexts that in turn evoked a spectrum of responses and degrees of connection to their polis: panhellenic competition, war, political struggles, one's *oikos* ('household'). It seems far likelier that given poets, groups, individuals, or bodies of poetry had different faces and modulating functions in the different contexts in which they appeared, and that these faces were to a certain extent dependent upon features defining or implicit in these contexts: whether the context was a circumscribed one within the polis, such as the symposium; or panhellenic, such as athletic competition; or one involving other *poleis* or members of other *poleis*, such as *xenia* ('guest-friendship') or war. Certain analogies between sympotic poetry and its audience are here significant: sympotic poetry travelled among, and in part served to create and maintain, a panhellenic aristocracy, and, similar to the élite performing it, sympotic poetry found itself both in groups within a city, and in panhellenic contexts through recitation in symposia outside its native city, whether the symposia in panhellenic sanctuaries, or those in the home cities of other aristocrats. The potential for multiple 'faces' to this poetry, multiple meanings in its several contexts, must therefore be recognised.

Belonging to a polis defined and mediated the existence of any member of an élite, and therefore of necessity entailed a complex relationship. It is probable that charged terms – particularly political ones – such as polis or *patris* evoked a different set of ideas in different contexts. Statements of identification with, or obligation to, one's polis were no doubt conditioned by the context of their expression. To put it simply, what is said in the symposium may not be what is said in other contexts, or may not mean the same thing or function in the same way when spoken elsewhere. This point forms a corollary to the point made above, that identification with one's polis can be simultaneously strong *and* excluding. Expressions that appear inclusive may in fact have been an instrument for protecting the interests of a particular group or

reinforcing a separate and élite status for that group within its community.⁶⁷

IV Conclusion

I have argued that when performed in the aristocratic symposium martial exhortation poetry represents a type of heroic self-fashioning, an attempt to claim for its singers a status within a wider community equivalent to that of epic heroes. Such self-positioning can be viewed from a series of vantage points from within and outside the polis, each governing the way the poetry is understood. On one level, the meaning of expression is governed by its circumscribed context of the symposium within the polis. And yet, because this poetry makes a claim for something external to the symposium, a certain status within the community, there is an intricate negotiation between the poetic tradition and social constraints upon the poetry. No less does it function to define a wider élite context outside a given polis. Not only is the polis a given with which one must come to terms, necessary in the construction of one's status, as well as on some level representing a fall from the heroic times in which position was enjoyed without challenge the glory of which one recoups in heroic recitation in private symposia,⁶⁸ but the polis is also an important and positive feature of self-representation in other contexts which involve other *poleis* or their members, such as panhellenic competitions, *xenia* and war. Simple distinctions between, roughly, those aristocrats in favour of the developing polis and those against, would clearly be wrong under these circumstances. Considerations of this kind demand a more nuanced picture of the social dynamics of the period, and these considerations lead to considering elegy in another context: archaic verse inscriptions.

⁶⁷ As Theognis 53 shows, an aristocrat may identify with his polis without identifying himself with all its elements: Κύρνε, πόλις μὲν ἔθ' ἥδε πόλις λαοὶ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι ('Cyrrus, the city is still the city, but the people indeed are different').

⁶⁸ The *Iliad* addresses similar tensions. See Rose (1997).

CONTEXTUALISING THE CITY: ARCHAIC VERSE INSCRIPTIONS AND THE 'RISE' OF THE POLIS

I

A fundamental premise of my approach to martial elegy is that the content of this poetry needs to be considered in combination with its performance context in order to assess its meaning and contribution to social and historical discussions. If this premise is valid, then it should be illuminating to examine another form of elegy – another form of heroicising verse – which participates in a different context: that is, the genre of archaic verse inscriptions. The questions this chapter addresses are these: what light does the inscribed archaic epigram shed on the function of context in determining the meaning of its content; and can the combined consideration of sympotic and epigraphic verse, particularly epigrams involving the theme of death in war, clarify our understanding of aristocratic attitudes towards the archaic city? I explore these issues by looking at the stones that exhibit the greatest similarity to martial exhortation elegy, inscriptions for dead warriors. I then examine the wider genre of archaic epigram for expressions about the city, and conclude by proposing an explanation for the observations contained in this chapter.

II Methodological points

Certain differences in the genres of archaic sympotic and epigraphic verse suggest that their comparison would be desirable in a discussion of how the context – one might say for both genres the 'performance' context – of poetry contributes to its meaning.¹

¹ On the 'performance' aspect of inscribed monuments see Day (2000) esp. 42–5. See also Thomas (1992) 61–5 for a survey of the issue.

First, the fixed outdoor, always potentially public, setting of an inscribed monument stands in contrast to the private performance space of the symposium. Second, the inscribed epigram reaches us with what seems like far fewer prejudices. Extant sympotic elegy has survived the sifting of successive generations' tastes, preoccupations, and needs, and the contexts in which such fragments are preserved have had a great influence on our interpretation of them. In contrast, there is something comparatively unmediated about the corpus of inscribed epigrams: post-depositional factors are in certain respects less intrusive and more random than the processes of textual transmission.²

At the same time there are three good reasons why it is not just desirable, but in fact appropriate to compare these genres. First, like sympotic elegy, epigram is identifiable as a panhellenic genre. As Friedländer has shown, comparison of verses shared across monuments makes it clear that while the stone monument itself is fixed, the content of the inscription transcends the physicality of its specific performance context. The 'internationality' or circulation of epigrammatic motifs therefore renders epigram in important ways analogous to extant sympotic poetry.³ Related to this is the second point, particularly apparent in inscriptions for dead warriors, that sympotic and inscribed elegy share language and formulae.⁴

² Raubitschek (1968) 3–5, Häusle (1979) 39–40. If not less mediated, then certainly differently mediated (and, apart from becoming illegible or disappearing, also immutable), and on that basis inscribed epigram provides another distinctive and therefore valuable coordinate by which to plot the élite culture of the archaic period. See also Mickey (1981) 39 and Scodel (1992) 57–8 on the kinds of unique access to archaic culture provided by inscribed verse.

³ See Friedländer and Hoffleit (1948) 125–7 in which they compare *CEG* 13.2–3 (Attica; 575–550?), 136.3 (Argos; 525–500?), 117.4 (near Pharsalus; 480–450?). See also Scodel (1992) 72–3. Inscriptions will be cited by their *CEG* number (Hansen [1983]). A number from Friedländer and Hoffleit (1948) (abbreviated FH) will be supplied in cases where the commentary provided there is of particular interest for the discussion. Approximately 200 epigrams are considered in this chapter (i.e. all that are legible), 95 funerary and over a hundred dedicatory, dating not later than c. 480 BC.

⁴ These inscriptions will be discussed below, but see also the use of the formula $\pi\alpha\iota\delta\iota\ \chi\alpha\rho\iota\zeta\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu$ —as the final half of the pentameter, in *CEG* 169 = FH 63 (Erythrae; 525–500?) and Theognis 774. See also *CEG* 68 = FH 81 (Attica; 500?). *CEG* 27 = FH 82 (Attica; 540–530), *CEG* 158 = FH 90 (Thasos; 525–500?) and Friedländer and

The third point concerns epigram's relationship to epic. Like martial exhortation elegy, epigram demonstrates close linguistic and thematic connections with epic poetry. Not only are burial and monuments clearly prominent features of the Homeric epics,⁵ but many epigrams also demonstrate an epicising tendency, as is obviously the case in the inscription for Arniadas (*CEG* 145 (Corcyra; 600?)):

σῆμα τόδε Ἀρνιάδα· χαροπὸς τόνδ' ὄλε|σεν Ἄρες
 βαρνάμενον παρὰ ναυσὶ|ν ἐπ' Ἀράθιοιο ρηφαῖσι,
 πολλὸν ἀριστεύ<F>οντα κατὰ στονόφεσαν ἀφύταν.

This is the monument of Arniadas, him flashing-eyed Ares destroyed as he fought around the ships by the streams of Aratthus, showing himself the best amid the groans and cries of battle.⁶

But as with sympotic elegy, the temptation to construct for epigram a simple model of derivation from epic must be avoided, regardless of how early the Homeric epics are traditionally dated. For the insistence on a linear chronological sequence for epic and epigram undermines the importance of the intertextuality between poetic forms that in fact flourished contemporaneously.⁷ A juxtaposition of two descriptions of erecting a σῆμα ('marker'), one epic and one epigrammatic, demonstrates the necessity of recognising their relationship as neither simple nor unidirectional.⁸ In Book 7 of the *Iliad* Hector imagines what would happen if he were to win the duel. He would dedicate the armour of the defeated to Apollo and return the body:

Hoffleit (1948) *ad loc.* On the recognised affinities see among others Raubitschek (1968) 16–26, Di Tillio (1969), Giannini (1973), and Mickey (1981) 42–3.

⁵ The examples are too numerous to cite. The Homeric epics codify the importance of the στήλη ('stele'), σῆμα ('marker', 'monument') and τύμβος ('funeral mound') as instruments of memory and preserving κλέος. Note for instance the emphasis on Sarpedon's σῆμα, *Il.* 16.456–7, 674–5, the importance of σήματα as landmarks on the Trojan plain (see Hainsworth [1993] *ad Il.* 11.166, 371–2 and Nagy (1990) ch. 8) and the fact that the *Iliad* ends with the erection of Hector's σῆμα (24.799). See Ecker (1990) 12–44, Scodel (1992) and Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 108–40.

⁶ On the epic character of this epigram see Lumppp (1963) and Skiadas (1972) 75–8.

⁷ Furthermore, the fluidity of the oral tradition suggests that the poems were open to reshaping in the period when our extant monuments were inscribed, thus leaving the Homeric epics open to the same influences as other supposedly later genres.

⁸ See Day (1989) 27.

ὄφρα ἐ ταρχύσωσι κάρη κομόωντες Ἀχαιοί,
 σῆμά τε οἱ χεύωσιν ἐπὶ πλατεῖ Ἑλλησπόντῳ.
 καὶ ποτέ τις εἴπῃσι καὶ ὀψιγόνων ἀνθρώπων,
 νηὶ πολυκλήϊδι πλέων ἐπὶ οἶνοπα πόντον·
 “ἀνδρὸς μὲν τόδε σῆμα πάλαι κατατεθνηῶτος,
 οἷν ποτ’ ἀριστεύοντα κατέκτανε φαίδιμος Ἔκτωρ.”
 ὥς ποτέ τις ἐρέει· τὸ δ’ ἐμὸν κλέος οὐ ποτ’ ὀλεῖται.

In order that the long-haired Achaeans may pay him his funeral rites, and might heap up a marker on the wide Hellespont. And one day someone of future men may say, sailing a many-benched ship on the wine-dark sea, ‘This is the marker of a man who died long ago whom as he was proving his valour famous Hector killed.’ Thus will someone in the future say. And my fame will never perish. (7.85–91)

The scene Hector describes has obvious similarities with the actions of ἐταῖροι of Praxiteles as described in *CEG* 139 (Troezen; 500?):

Πραξιτέλει τόδε μῆμα φίσον ποίησε θανόν[τι],
 [τ]οῦτο δ’ ἐταῖροι | σῆμα χέαν βαρέα στενάχοντες
 ἐργον ἀντ’ ἀγ[α]θὸν κέπάμερον|ἐξετέλεσα[ν].

For Praxiteles when he died Wison made this monument; and this mound his companions heaped up, groaning heavily, in exchange for his worthy deed and they accomplished this on a single day.⁹

While it would be essentially correct to claim that the inscription is thoroughly epic in colour, this simple pronouncement would overlook the complexity of the intertextual relationship of these verses. The phraseology of Hector’s imagined statement (89–90)

⁹ FH 29. Epic phraseology pervades this inscription: see *Il.* 24.799, 13.423; see FH *ad loc.*, Ecker (1990) 120–31. Friedländer and Hoffleit (1948) 34 suggest that ἐπάμερον (‘in one day’) refers to funerary legislation that limited the time spent on erecting a monument and therefore also the monument’s size (cf. Cic. *Leg.* 2.26.64). But the phrase also suggests Odysseus’ advice for the proper attitude toward the burial of the dead, *Il.* 19.228–9 (cf. Apollo in *Il.* 24.48–9), which is immediately followed by lamentation for the dead Patroclus:

ἀλλὰ χρὴ τὸν μὲν καταθάπτειν ὅς κε θάνῃσι
 νηλέα θυμὸν ἔχοντας, ἐπ’ ἥματι δακρύσαντας·

But we must bury the man who has died, keeping our hearts hard and having wept over him for a day.

is typical of actual inscriptions,¹⁰ and thus produces a striking complementarity between the *Iliad* passage and Praxiteles' epigram: the epic speech in which a heroic character describes the activity of erecting a funerary monument in a language which seems to reflect actual contemporary inscribed practice provides the perfect poetic counterpart to Praxiteles' μνημα ('memorial'), an actual inscribed monument upon which is recorded an epic-style description of ἑταῖροι ('companions') erecting it. But one might turn instead from the question of origins – is the poet 'der erste Gestalter dieser Gattung', or, as is more probable, is our Homeric poem already reflecting contemporary practice? –¹¹ to the cultural context which renders the dialogue between these genres salient for its members, a dialogue that replicates in crucial respects the interaction between sympotic exhortation elegy and martial epic.

III War dead and martial elegy

Six inscriptions in the corpus of archaic epigrams explicitly commemorate men who died in war.¹² The language, themes and underlying values of these inscriptions have much in common with extant martial exhortation elegy, and epic. Epic-style descriptions, such as perishing at the hands of Ares or fighting among the πρόμαχοι and being the best, characterise all three

¹⁰ For the frequency of the formula in line 89 see Peek (1955) 21–47 (nos. 52–166). For line 90, compare *CEG* 145 (Corcyra; 600?), 27 (Attica; 540–530?) and 112 (Thisbe; 500?), and see Tyrtaeus 12.33. See Scodel (1992) and Létoublon (1995) on the relationship between such passages of Homer, epitaphs and funerary practice.

¹¹ See Skiadas (1972) 63–4, 'diese Verse 89–90 sind, im Hinblick auf Gestalt wie auf Inhalt, ein vollständiges Grabepigramm'; see also 66. Scholars seem to agree on this: see Kirk (1990) *ad loc.*; Lumpp (1963) 212–15, Raubitschek (1968) 6–7, cf. 9 n. 37; Day (1989) 27. Skiadas further discusses the sophisticated manipulation of the conventions of epigram in commemorating not so much the man being the best as the man who killed him, 64–6. See also the detailed discussion of Scodel (1992) 58–67, and Létoublon (1995) 9.

¹² *CEG* 13 (Attica; c. 575–550?), 27 (Attica; 540–530?), 47 (Attica; 525–500?), 112 (Thisbe; c. 500?), 136 (Argos 525–500?), 145 (Corcyra; 600?). If inscriptions which describe the dead as ἀγαθός are interpreted, as is frequently the case, in a martial sense (Stecher [1981] 64 n. 26, cf. Verdenius [1969] 338–9), the observations discussed below become all the more valid. Given the content of the inscription Praxiteles' ἀγαθὸν ἔργον (above) was likely to have been death in battle.

genres.¹³ Furthermore, κλέος and the τύμβος are important to all, as well as the beauty and youth of the dead.¹⁴

While it is clear that epigraphic verse shares many themes and much phraseology with literary verse, both elegy and epic, and that the epigrams commemorating dead warriors are aligned closely with the same values and world-view, there is in fact one startling divergence: archaic epigrams do not describe death in war in terms of fighting for the city, land or fatherland (πόλις, γῆ, πατρίς; 'city', 'land', 'land of one's fathers'), as George Robertson has astutely observed.¹⁵ Death on behalf of the πατρίς or γῆ, the benefits of such behaviour for the collective and the esteem of one's fellow citizens are pervasive themes in the elegists, as well as prominent in the *Iliad*,¹⁶ yet, this topos is strangely missing from the inscriptions. Moreover, such a silence is striking in comparison with fifth-century inscriptions: the reference to one's land or πατρίς which one expects from sympotic elegy does in fact frequently and proudly appear there.¹⁷

How do we explain this silence? Robertson judges it surprising 'given that the fallen soldiers commemorated in these epitaphs were, presumably, precisely that class of men to whom sympotic martial elegy is addressed', but concludes that 'in the epitaphs, which are public expressions of private mourning, the soldiers' status as citizens, so important to poets like Kallinos, Tyrtaios and Solon, takes second place to their status as heroes'.¹⁸ What does this explanation offer and

¹³ Ares: Tyrtaeus 12.34, 19.4, 20.15; *CEG* 27 (Attica; 540–530?), 145 (Corcyra; 600?). Fighting among the πρόμαχοι ('fore-fighters'): 7× in Tyrtaeus; *CEG* 27 (Attica; 540–530?), 112 (Thisbe; 500?). 'Ἀριστεύ– ('be the best'): Tyrtaeus 12.33; *CEG* 112 (Thisbe; 500?), 145 (Corcyra; 600?).

¹⁴ Κλέος ('fame') and the τύμβος ('burial mound'): Tyrtaeus 12.29–32; *CEG* 136 (Argos; 525–500?), see also 139 (Troezen; 500?). Beauty and youth of the dead: Tyrtaeus 10.27–30; *CEG* 13 (Attica; 576–550?), 136 (Argos; 525–500?). These themes also pervade the funerary epigrams of those who are not, or not explicitly, warriors.

¹⁵ Robertson (1997).

¹⁶ Fighting for the γῆ ('land'), πατρίς ('land of one's fathers'), πόλις ('city'): Callinus 1.6; Tyrtaeus 10.1–2, 13; 12.15–6, 33–4. Esteem of one's city, fellow citizens, λαός ('people'): Callinus 1.16–21; Tyrtaeus 12.23, 27–32, 37–44. See Greenhalgh (1972) on the *Iliad*. Cf. also pp. 26–9.

¹⁷ *CEG* 82 (Attica; 450–425?), 101 (Attica; 400?), 118 (Thessalia; 475–450?), 142 (Acarnania; 475–450?).

¹⁸ Robertson (1997) 151.

what are its limitations? Robertson seems right to play down the apparent conflict between sympotic elegy and epigram, and to explain this conflict both explicitly through the desire to heroicise the dead, and implicitly by the public context of verse inscription. And yet he does not make explicit the reasons why this public context should make a difference, nor does he explore how this apparent tension between sympotic poetry and verse inscriptions may contribute to an understanding of aristocratic self-representation. In addressing the ‘surprising’ absence of the sentiments of dying for one’s land, he attributes the importance of these sentiments to the poets themselves (‘the soldiers’ status as citizens so important to poets’), *not* to their sympotic audience, and therefore is not forced to account for the seeming contradiction in both reciting martial elegy *and* commissioning or being commemorated by such epigrams as are preserved. The issue at hand is how to explain this apparent contradiction and thereby formulate a stronger conclusion. A first move is to place the silence in the epitaphs of dead warriors within the context of the larger genre of verse inscriptions, both funerary and dedicatory.

IV Contextualising the silence: the corpus of private archaic verse inscription

Funerary inscriptions

Analysis of archaic funerary epigrams shows an interesting and suggestive dichotomy in how the inscriptions situate the dead. As a general introduction, one may say that the dead are praised for attributes of a particularly aristocratic nature.¹⁹ *Ξενία* (‘guest-friendship’) is a prominent theme: the dead individual is said to be *φιλόξευος* (‘a friend to guests’), or *ξενικός* (‘hospitable’, ‘a man with friends in foreign places’), known for his *ξενία* or one whose death is to register with *ἄστοι*

¹⁹ Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 170–1 comments in detail upon the aristocratic ideology expressed in archaic epigram. See also Johansen (1951) 109–11, and Scodel (1992) 68 and 72.

and ξένοι ('townsmen and foreigners') alike.²⁰ Birth appears also in the function of praise.²¹ The dead are praised for their ἀρετή ('excellence') and for being ἀγαθός ('good', 'noble').²² Likewise, the heroic vocabulary used to describe dead warriors is an important part of aristocratic praise.²³ Furthermore, athletic achievement is praised: one warrior killed in war is also praised as ἀεθλοφόρος ('a prize-winner') and said to be buried near the ἵπποδρομος ('racecourse'),²⁴ another man is praised for his skill in ἵπποσύνη ('horsemanship'),²⁵ a third is described as πότης 'Ολυμπιονίκης ('one-time Olympic victor').²⁶ The various qualities cited are often combined in one epigram, thus contributing in their totality to the overall impression of the social status of those commemorated in these verses.

Amid this wealth of detail, however, epigrams standing within the polis of the dead are almost completely silent about any larger civic context for the dead in the expression of praise.²⁷ In contrast, such references figure prominently in the

²⁰ φιλόξεινος: *CEG* 140 (Aetolia); ξεινικός: *CEG* 67 (Attica; 500?); known for ξείνια: *CEG* 111 (unknown, now in Tanagra; 500?); ἀστοὶ καὶ ξένοι: *CEG* 13 (Attica; 575–550?), 112 (Thisbe; 500?).

²¹ *CEG* 52 (Attica; 510?), *CEG* 78 (Attica; 480?). See also γενεά ('family', 'stock') in a dedicatory context: 207 (Athenian Acropolis; 510–500?).

²² Stecher (1981) 64 n. 26.

²³ *CEG* 27 (Attica; 540–530?), 112 (Thisbe; 500?), 145 (Corcyra; 600?), 30 (fr., Attica; 535–530?).

²⁴ *CEG* 136 (Argos; 525–500?). No doubt the location of his μνήμα ('memorial') constitutes a high distinction, as is clear from its position in the first line of the epigram together with the essential information of commemorated and commemorator. Cf. Stecher (1981) 27.

²⁵ *CEG* 111 (unknown, now in Tanagra; 500?). ²⁶ *CEG* 43 (Attica; 525?).

²⁷ I have defined 'civic' in the widest imaginable sense to include any reference to the city, πατρίς, fellow inhabitants as a collective, even the notion of good repute (εὐδοξος), since it may suggest one's fellow citizens as audience or source. Of all the inscriptions the only possible exceptions are five out of 200 (for the sample see n. 3). *CEG* 69 (Attica; 500?) is the only instance of the dead being called εὐδοξος. While *CEG* 13 (Attica; 575–550?) and 112 (Thisbe; 500?) mention ἀστοί in the phrase ἀστὸς καὶ ξένος, it is telling that when one of the pair is missing it is always the ἀστὸς (ξείνια and ξεινικός being frequent, see *CEG* 67 [Attica; 500?], 111 [unknown, now in Tanagra; 500?], barring the fourth exception, *CEG* 172 (Apollonia Pontica; c. 490) (Δεινῆ|ς δ|οκίμ|ώτατος ἀστὼγ, 'Deines, most reputed of the townsmen'). Only *CEG* 128 (Locrii Opuntii; 525–500?) poses a real exception (ἀνδρὶ ποθεινῷ | δάμοι, 'a man longed for by the demos'), but its fragmentary state makes it impossible to determine whether it is a private or public inscription.

extant stones for those who have died abroad, as for instance Pleistias, whose monument declares Σπάρτα μὲν πατρίς ἐστιν, ἐν εὐρυχόροισι <δ> 'Ἀθάναις | ἐθράφθε, θανάτο δὲ ἐνθάδε μοῖρ' ἔχισε ('Sparta is his fatherland, but in Athens of the spacious dancing-places he was buried when the fate of death overtook him here').²⁸ This persistent pattern of presence and absence suggests that an important determining factor in how the dead are represented is the location of the stone.

Dedicatory inscriptions

This same home/abroad dichotomy is likewise reflected in private dedicatory inscriptions.²⁹ Silences and status-related choices similar to those apparent in funerary inscriptions characterise stones located within the city.³⁰ The only exceptions to this pervasive silence are *CEG* 416 (Thasos; 525–500?); and 301 (Attica; 550?), where references to a civic context seem explained by the fact that these dedications were made by men who explicitly distinguish themselves as current or past holders

²⁸ *CEG* 77 (Attica; 500–475?). See also *CEG* 52 (Attica; 510?), 58 (Attica; 510–500?), 66 (Attica; 500?).

²⁹ Despite their difference in function, there are important grounds for discussing dedicatory and funerary epigrams together. It is almost certain that the same stratum of people are making and commissioning both forms of inscribed monuments. Furthermore, both genres share the same physical medium, poetic metres, vocabulary and syntax. On the similarity of form and formulae see Geffcken (1969) 24. A thorough discussion of dedications is, however, outside the scope of the present study.

³⁰ See for instance the impressive inscriptions which list victories: *CEG* 362 (Cleonae; 560?), 364 (Argos; 500–480?), 372 (Olympia; 550–525?), 374 (Sparta; 530–500?), 379 (unknown, now in Tegea; saec. VI ex.), (with chariots) 302 (Attica; 540?). See also *CEG* 195 (Athenian Acropolis; 525–500?): Ἀλκίμαχος μὲν ἀνέσθηκε Διὸς κόρει τῶδ' ἄγαλμα | εὐχολὲν ἐσθλὸν δὲ πατὴρ ἧς Χαίριονος ἐπέυχεται <ε>ναῖ (Alcimachus dedicated me, this statue, as a vow to the daughter of Zeus; and he boasts of being the son of a noble father, Chairion). Friedländer (1948) 50–1 may over-interpret when he writes on this inscription, but his comments are in the right direction: 'His pride of family expresses itself in an epical formula like υἱὸς δ' αὐτὲ Λυκάονος εὐχεται εἶναι ["who claims to be the son of Lycaon"], E 246*, but the words ἐσθλοῦ δὲ πατὴρ ὅς ["son of a good/noble father"] heavily overload the hexameter, containing as they do the excessive pretension of an Athenian aristocrat shortly before the establishment of democracy.' In this example the monument itself – a fluted marble column with ionic capital, probably supporting a votive image – contributes to the overall impression of the status and wealth of the dedicator.

of public offices.³¹ In contrast, as Table 1 shows, dedications from Olympia, that is, dedications outside one's native city, show one's polis or civic identity to be an impressively prominent theme.³²

In short, when studied along a temporal axis, archaic epigrams in general are found deficient in references to the polis or a wider civic community in any sense. That is, compared with the sympotic elegy – Tyrtaeus, Callinus, Solon – of the seventh and sixth centuries, and the epigrams of the fifth century, in which references to the polis and civic identity are frequent, the archaic epigrams appear anomalous in their lack of such references. That silence, however, is neither complete nor random. Analysis of the evidence shows that when such references do appear, they overwhelmingly do so in contexts where the

³¹ Both are superlatively public figures. Alciphron (CEG 301: Attica; 550?) is an archon who built a racecourse at Eleusis:

δέμοι'Αθηναίων ἄρχον | στέλας καδέθηκεν [sic]
 Ἀλκίφρον|καὶ τόνδε δρόμον ποίεσεν|έραστὸν
 Δέμετρος τε χάριν|[καὶ Φερσεφόνες τ]ανυπέπλο.

As archon Alciphron dedicated these *stelai* to the people of Athens, and he made this lovely race course in honour of Demeter and long-robed Persephone.

The Thasian Akeratos (CEG 416: Thasos; 525–500?), in turn, claims in his inscription to be the only man to have held office in both Paros and Thasos, and to have represented one or both abroad:

Ηρακλεῖ μὲν ἀνέθηκεν'Ακήρατος, ὃς Θασίοισιν
 καὶ Π[αρίοις] ἤρχσεν μόνος ἐν ἀνφοτέροις, |
 πολλὰς δ' ἀνγελίας πρὸ πόλεως κατὰ φύλα διῆλθεν
 ἀν[θρώπων], ἀρετῆς ἕνεκεν αἰδίης.

Akeratos dedicated me to Heracles, a man who alone held office among the Thasians and the Parians, and on behalf of the city travelled on many missions among the tribes of men, because of his excellence that is everlasting.

It seems highly significant that no civic references appear in what is likely to be the same Akeratos' μῆμα, CEG 162: see Launey (1934) and FH 168. Notice too that references to the δῆμος and πόλις are more than balanced by other interests: the Odyssean portrayal of Akeratos and the eroticising description of Alciphron's élite offering. In contrast, the mention of civic elements in the only other inscriptions with civic references, CEG 143 (Corcyra; 625–600?) and 415 (Thasos; saec. VI ex.), are due to their being public dedications.

³² The inscriptions from other panhellenic sanctuaries are too few to allow generalisations.

Table 1. *References to the victors' cities in the inscriptions of Olympia (CEG nos.), archaic and classical.*

	Explicit reference to victor's city	Reference to the victor's city: too fragmentary to determine	No reference to the victor's city
Archaic	372 371 398 419 420	387 (but ἀπ' may suggest a city was named)	350
Classical	367 390 380 381 382 383 386 388 393 399	384 (but probably no reference to a city)	385 389

stone stands outside the native city of the dedicator or commemorated – as in cases of death abroad, or panhellenic dedications³³ – while those within one's own city are most often and oddly silent.

One may compare this silence to the way in which the dead are actually situated in epigraphic verse: the representation of

³³ The Olympic dedications of Pheidolas and his sons suggest the hierarchy of family over city (only attested in the literary tradition, but *Anth. Pal.* 6. 135 is plausibly epigraphic (father) and Paus. 6.13.9 (sons) explicitly so; FH 97 and 151). Pheidolas' epigram states prominently his city, while his sons' refer only to their father. This seems odd, but Pausanias tells us Pheidolas' victory had some notoriety: although the horse threw her rider and won the race alone, the Eleans nevertheless awarded Pheidolas the victory. An explanation for the absence of civic reference in the sons' epigram may well be that the ability to identify themselves at Olympia by means of their family rendered their city an inessential detail, thus suggesting the priority of the familial connection over the civic.

individuals in epigrams of monuments standing within their city privileges family, φίλοι ('intimates'), ἑταῖροι ('companions') or age classifications, rather than one's larger polis identity, fellow citizens, or other related terms. The polis or civic references are rarely used to construct the identity of dedicator or commemorated, and they are rarely used in order to praise; the cases in which they appear seem dependent precisely upon the location of the monument in a city other than that of the commemorated. In the midst of a period of which scholars explain almost all phenomena as due to an overwhelming and continuously growing importance of the city this absence certainly deserves explanation.

V A significant silence?

Is this then a significant silence? Given the expectations of reference to the city raised by sympotic martial exhortation elegy and by the subject of dying in war, inscriptions for dead warriors may be seen as a limit case in which it becomes possible to claim that a silence is significant. That the city is absent from inscriptions for dead warriors is an observation that in fact relates to a much wider phenomenon. Archaic funerary epigrams in general seem to locate the reception for the dead in these ways: on the one hand, smaller groups or individuals are the focus of grief; while, on the other, the representations of the dead warrior or ἀγαθός ('nobleman') seem to portray the dead in heroic terms that exclude a civic context.³⁴

What then is the explanation for these silences and the choices made for the content of the inscriptions? One might

³⁴ Even in the case of women, *CEG* 24 (Attica, c. 540):

σῆμα Φρασικλείας· κόρε κεκλέσομαι|αἰεί,
ἀντὶ γάμο|παρὰ θεῶν τοῦτο|λαχὸς ὄνομα.

I am the *sema* of Phrasikleia. I shall be called (have the *kleos* of) a maiden always, instead of marriage I have been apportioned from the gods this name.

On this inscription see Svenbro (1988).

argue that the emphasis on the family is perhaps justified in the context of grief, a seemingly private matter. And yet, such an interpretation is undermined by the evidence for funerary legislation in the archaic period indicating the role of the polis in regulating public manifestations of grief and by the extravagance and visibility of many of the monuments themselves.³⁵ It is also in contrast to the content of fifth-century inscriptions.³⁶

Perhaps only a simple explanation is necessary: the ‘inter-textual frames’ provided by martial sympotic elegy allow us to read a death on behalf of the πατρίς even though it is not explicitly mentioned; or, more generally, the context of the stone, its place within a polis, allows this entity to be ‘read’ into the inscription, to be physically present, rather than verbally so. The underlying premise of both these arguments is that information needs to be, or rather, is expected to be supplied to the epigram, and that the actual absence of explicit references is to be discounted.

Certain characteristic features of archaic epigram, however, oppose these arguments. The archaic epigram is a very explicit genre, including or stressing the elements that are ‘conceptually important’.³⁷ Gragg has shown, for instance, that a fundamental feature of all inscribed archaic epigrams is the explicit reference to the actual grave monument, even though this would in most cases be obvious to the viewer.³⁸ The concept of σῆμα, μνῆμα, implicit in the monument, is one of its most important features, its *raison d’être*, and as such is not left to the vicissitudes of non-verbal inference, and this it makes explicit despite the other well-known feature of the epitaph, its economy.³⁹ Therefore if some dimension of the physical location of the inscription was conceptually important for the monument, we would expect an explicit reference. Consider CEG 136 (Argos; 525–500):

³⁵ For archaic funerary legislation see Plut. *Sol.* 21, Cic. *Leg.* 2.59–64; Eckstein (1958), Humphreys (1980) 99–100, Seaford (1994) 74–8 and Parker (1996) 49–50.

³⁶ See n. 113. ³⁷ Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 379.

³⁸ Gragg (1910) 16–17. See also Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 147.

³⁹ On the economy of epitaphs see for instance Kirk (1990) ad *Il.* 7.89–90.

ροσίνα ηυσεμάταν θάψα [π] | έλας ηιποδρόμοιο
 άνδρα α [γα]θ[ό]ν, πολοῖς μνᾶμα καὶ | [έσ]ομένοις,
 έν πολέμοι [φθ]ίμενον, νε|αρὰν ήέβεν όλέσαντα.
 σό|φρονα, άε<θ>λοφόρον καὶ σ|οφόν ηαλικίαι.

I, Kosina, buried Husematas beside this racecourse as a memorial for the many men to come of a man who being good perished in war, destroying his tender youth, a man of self-control, a prize-winner and wise among his age-mates.⁴⁰

Clearly the dedicator, Kosina, did not choose to leave the burial of Husematas by the ιππόδρομος ('racecourse') and the status implicit in such a location to the chance inference from location.⁴¹

As for the issue of whether warrior inscriptions exploit an intertextual frame in order to evoke the idea that the death was γῆς πέρι ('for one's land') or had meaning within a civic context, it must be argued that even were the warrior epigrams to be engaging implicitly with such frames (and indeed they well may be), in a genre as economical as the inscribed epigram, the material which the erectors choose to make explicit must be held to have some status, some privileged position, above what is only to be inferred. The monuments function as instruments of praise,⁴² and the inscriptions are designed to include information that is both essential and essential to praise (not just for the dead but also for the erectors of the monuments). It must be reasoned, therefore, that if elements that, one would suppose, would supply praise are not included, then it is likely that in this context these elements are not considered to be *as* essential to praise or the construction of the identity of the dead as what *is* included, or possibly not even essential *at all*.⁴³

To illustrate this from the inscriptions: a choice is made for Husematas (above) about what information would elevate him most effectively. He has died in war, but what is important is

⁴⁰ On the publication of this inscription see Daly (1939).

⁴¹ See Friedländer and Hoffleit (1948) 126.

⁴² On the importance of praise see Geffcken (1969) 26, Skiadas (1972) 71, Stecher (1981) 14–15, Day (1989) 16–20.

⁴³ The strong formulation is unverifiable, but the softer argument would be difficult to discount: to rule out the silences, the choices for omission, is to 'corrupt the discourse', as Sourvinou-Inwood (1995) 133 well notes.

not that he was protecting his πατρίς ('land of one's fathers') or his memory among the citizens, but the loss of his youth, his future reputation, the élite location of his burial, and that he was ἀθλοφόρος ('prize-winner').⁴⁴ One might imagine him making a dedication at Olympia in which he would include his city; but at home, and despite death in war, this element is entirely absent. More extreme is Arniadas' inscription (*CEG* 145, quoted above), which makes no reference to his life prior to his death in war, and instead its grand epic style all but transports him directly to the Island of the Blessed.⁴⁵ But even the 'simple' inscription for Kroisos (*CEG* 27 (Attica; 540–30?)) demonstrates clearly the choices made in praise, epic glory over civic context:⁴⁶

στῆθι καὶ οἴκτιρον Κροῖσο | παρὰ σῆμα θανόντος
 ἰόν | ποτ' ἐνὶ προμάχοις ὄλεσε | ἥθρος Ἄρες.

Stand and weep by the tomb of Kroisos who died, whom rushing Ares did once destroy when he was amid the fore-fighters.

What conclusion then can be drawn from the choices made in archaic epigram? What can be said more generally about aristocrats and their verse, both at home and abroad?

VI Aristocrats and their verses, at home and abroad

The monuments themselves are a testimony to what was apparently essential for praise. The divergence between their emphases and those of martial elegy therefore requires some explanation. Apart from Robertson's explanation, which

⁴⁴ One must suppose that the athletic theme is important since it is present both at the beginning and end of the epigram; cf. Stecher (1981) 27–8.

⁴⁵ On the epicising features of the Arniadas inscription, see Lump (1963) and Ecker (1990) 51–88, an example for the latter of the *erzählende Epigramm*. When this inscription is compared with another Corcyran, contemporaneous and also in hexameters, it becomes apparent just how strong the contrast in the content of epigram *could* be. *CEG* 143 (Corcyra; 625–600?), the Menekrates inscription, shows how and when the δῆμος does occupy the stage of epigram: a public inscription commemorating a foreigner.

⁴⁶ A similar choice is made for the fallen warrior Gnathius in *CEG* 47 (Attica; 525–500?), but this time with the addition of a homoerotic element (see FH 59).

renders the poets alone responsible for these civic sentiments, how can a picture be constructed in which it makes sense for the same person to enjoy sympotic martial exhortation and commission or be commemorated by epigram?⁴⁷ This question is of course impossible to answer conclusively, and yet there is value in the concerns that emerge from its exploration.

In beginning to formulate an answer, it is appropriate to search for an explanation in the major distinguishing features between the two bodies of poetry, that is, their context and function. The feature of public viewing is implicit in the inscribed monument. The audience of its verse is not identical with that assumed by and in sympotic verse; access is not restricted, and in contrast to that of sympotic verse its privileged performance context is a public one. This public dimension of the epigram exerts a great influence on the representation of the dead or the dedicator: the epigram seeks to determine how the monument and its erector and/or recipient are, and are to be, received.⁴⁸ Its aim is to elicit or command a particular response from a large social context. Monuments within one's city are arguably, owing to their position, primarily for consumption by the members of one's polis. In the case of inscriptions for the dead, this suggests that, before this potentially wide audience, it was deemed more important and desirable for an ἀγαθός ('noble') to situate himself within a context comprising family, φίλοι ('friends'), ἐταῖροι ('companions'), and an epic or heroicising ideal, and, moreover, that it was not necessary, and perhaps not even desired, to couch such elements in a civic context beyond whatever the existence of the stone itself might have implied.⁴⁹

The dearth of any expression of such sentiment in private inscriptions that, owing to their location, are available for domestic consumption provides a telling contrast to sympotic elegy. While martial exhortation elegy *appears* to align

⁴⁷ On the presence of the symposium in archaic funerary monuments, see Steinhölkenskamp (1989) 113.

⁴⁸ On the future orientation of the epigram see Stecher (1981) 21, 27–8.

⁴⁹ See Scodel (1992) 69 for the claim on common memory that the family lays through the inscribed memorial.

strongly its performer/listeners with their polis and their civic identity, the consumption of elegy, though widespread in the panhellenic sense, is in its sympotic performance context limited to groups of φίλοι ἑταῖροι ('dear companions'). Although the polis is explicitly presented in such poems as the arena and instrument for honour and praise, it is done among a select group of like-minded ἑταῖροι. Therefore, the group united by each performance of this poetry through expressions of their common attachment to their polis is exclusive and not identical with the entire civic body. The two genres seem complementary: sympotic elegy's inclusive language is performed in a private, exclusive, environment, while the exclusive language of the epigram appears on public display, that is to say, in a potentially inclusive environment.⁵⁰ The oppositions inherent in these differing performance contexts are likely to be the cause of their differences in content: what is publicly expressed is not inclusive of a wider civic context, while what is privately performed only *seems* to be.⁵¹

Sympotic elegy, however, presents on some levels a dichotomy in its performance context analogous to that of epigram. Like its inscribed counterpart, this poetry is performed within the symposiast's own city and its content acquires meaning from this context. Simultaneously and no less importantly, it has a panhellenic function, bearing some analogy with dedications at panhellenic sanctuaries. Poetry travels – an explicit feature of it from as early as Homer, Hesiod and Archilochus – and finds itself in contexts beyond the polis of original composition. Even when expressing sentiments relevant to a given polis at a given time, there seems to be an eye to the greater

⁵⁰ And if access to literacy is factored in, then another level of exclusivity may compound that already expressed in the content of the epigrams. On the issue of literacy and audience of inscriptions see Hurwitt (1990), Scodel (1992) 70–4 and Day (2000) 43.

⁵¹ A less likely explanation for this pattern would be that the polis (or individual *poleis*) placed restrictions on what could be inscribed on a monument (or less institutionally the public audiences of inscriptions might read certain (aggrandising) claims involving the city unfavourably) in which case it would still remain significant that the singers of martial elegy claimed in the symposium what they could not in inscriptions.

audience. On this model, elegiac exhortation sentiments – on the one hand – may be seen both as instrumental in the construction of identity among distinct private groups within a polis, thereby elevating and distinguishing its audience, *and* – on the other hand – during their travels, including those through time (particularly to modern scholars), as creating an image of the polis and its citizens as a unified front to outsiders. Again, dedications provide a suggestive analogy in the case of monuments for athletes in panhellenic games: though athletic victory creates stratification within the victor's home city through the elevated status his victory brings⁵² the inscribed monument dedicated at the panhellenic site masks this division, conveying with pride only the victor's attachment to his city.⁵³ Likewise, the elegies of Tyrtaeus and Callinus, because they are both composed around a theme that potentially embraces the entire citizen body – war – and have an eye to wider audiences, would have conveyed uniformly to outsiders a deceptively straightforward relationship between those reciting this poetry and their respective *poleis*, Sparta and Ephesus, were it not the case that some within its audiences, namely the ἀγαθοί of other cities, were using poetry in similar ways.

VII Conclusion

These observations on patterns in the inscribed epigrams, particularly the *topos* of death in war περὶ πατρὸς (‘for the land of one’s fathers’), bring into high relief the issue of how the context in which poetry is found and performed may have functioned in the creation of its meaning. But they also belong to a larger archaic phenomenon shared by both epigraphic and

⁵² See, for instance, Hdt. 5.47, 71, and 6.36. Cf. Xenophanes 2 and Diog. Laert. 1.55–7.

⁵³ Kurke (1993) demonstrates this as central to narratives of κῦδος (‘glory’, ‘renown’). But if that same victor were to die, even in war, the σῆμα in his city would most likely convey his epic or ‘nikephoric’ status and familial ties, leaving unexpressed his civic context and the ‘patriotic’ cause of his death. Cf. CEG 136 (Argos; 525–500?) for Husematas.

sympotic verse: that of the mobilisation of a poetic tradition to an end beyond that of mere literary allusion. The stones participate in a process of political appropriation of epic poetry analogous to and the complement of that which they have helped to highlight in sympotic elegy. In both contexts it is martial valour that provides a standard by which excellence is measured; and in both contexts this self-representation is exclusive and excluding, whether in performance at the exclusive sympotic occasion, or by the publicly inscribed epigram that tacitly excludes any reference to the civic context to which the commemorated of necessity continues to belong. In the chapters to follow, this reading of martial *paraenesis* will find further confirmation in the political exhortation elegy of Solon, to which I now turn.

PART II

POLITICAL POETICS: SOLON'S *EUNOMIA*

INTRODUCTION

The three chapters of Part II offer a close analysis of the elegiac exhortation of Solon, and in particular focus on the detailed reading of one poem, 4, ἡμετέρα δὲ πόλις ('our city'), also known as 'Solon's *Eunomia*'.¹ There are several reasons for choosing this poem. Solon 4 invites discussion of the interface between poetry and politics: though the poem is general in its expression,² the strong introduction, 'Our polis', as well as his heart's injunction to teach 'the Athenians' in line 30 clearly ground the poem in a political context. Moreover, Solon 4 invites in-depth analysis in relation to Callinus and, especially Tyrtaeus: not only is it the longest of Solon's political poems and in elegiacs, but it assumes a hortatory stance that situates it within a wider context of archaic exhortation elegy. Beyond its generic relationship to elegy, Solon 4 contains extended appropriations, both obvious and subtle, of hexametric poetry. But its choices of alignment and opposition to these influences show significant differences from the other elegists. And it is precisely these choices, it will be argued, that reflect more clearly than perhaps any other early poem how the poet's engagement with poetic tradition provides at the same time a

¹ Jaeger (1966) coined this name in his influential article, 'Solons Eunomie' (orig. published 1926). On the labels applied to this poem and a summary of scholarly approaches see Mülke (2002) 88–102; see also Noussia (2001) 234. Though I use West's edition of Solon 4, I follow Gentili–Prato in not emending the transmission of –α for –η in Solon 4 as each of the three instances (against –η in six places) seem significantly Attic: the first instance and in fact the first word, ἡμετέρα ('our'), refers to Athens, while Εὐνομία (32) and Δυσνομία (31) immediately follow a direct invocation to the Athenians. Although understandably motivated, West's argument (1974) 77–8 that 'we shall come nearer the truth by regularizing [Solon's] dialect than by committing ourselves to the vagaries of the tradition' risks occluding on the grounds of our own limitations the possibility of dialect being another means whereby elegy created and sustained its dialogue between the panhellenic and the local. Cf. Noussia (2001) 349–50.

² Adkins (1985) 110, 123–5.

dynamic reading of it, and one that involves the concerns – thematic and linguistic – of his contemporary audience.

In this poem Solon flags his debts and responses to his poetic predecessors in what scholars consider a transparent manner.³ The world-view is seen to owe much to Hesiod, while elements of Homer are apparent throughout the poem. And yet, these evocations are not random: the conspicuous contrast of types of ἑπεὰ ('hexameter poetry') effected in the first lines,⁴ and pursued throughout the poem belongs in fact to the design of the poem. The chapters of this Part respond to this design of the poem, analysing in turn the relationship Solon 4 strikes with each of these poetic traditions: martial epic and elegy, the *Odyssey* and the Hesiodic poems. Together they argue that the poet carefully and consistently situates his poem within these traditions, forming a composite response to them that suggests certain political implications. These implications will be pursued in Part III of this book.

The chapters of Part II focus primarily on a single poem in order to draw out the full potential of Solon's language, as well as to reveal more accurately the interplay between themes that, as part of the same poem, were composed to be performed together on the same occasion. Interpretations stitched

³ Spira (1981) 177 calls Solon's poetry, 'Gedanken Hesiods in der Sprache Homers' ('the thoughts of Hesiod in the language of Homer').

⁴ The question whether we have the poem's beginning has been much disputed. That the connective δέ appears in the first line of our fragment has been thought to argue against it being the first line of the poem. Campbell (1982) 240 and 140–1, however, summarises the grounds for doubting the certainty of this belief and is followed by Adkins (1985) 111 and 225 n. 4. See also Voemel (1862) *ad loc.* and Masaracchia (1958) 248, Stahl (1992) 386–7. Even the most recent commentators disagree on the philological point: in contrast to Mülke (2002) 100–2, an inceptive δέ poses no difficulty for Noussia (2001) 236–8. Others have argued on less technical grounds that these are in fact the first lines: for example, Jaeger (1966) 81; Ziegler (1954) 383; Gerber (1970) 131; Siegmann (1975) 267–281. I see no good reason on philological grounds to doubt this as the opening line and find it difficult to imagine what could have preceded these lines other than a short description, as a contrast to Athens, of a famous city that has fallen by the Gods' will (Nestle (1942) 134–5), but an explicit contrast would not necessarily be any more powerful than the present implicit one. Although I maintain in the following chapters that ἡμετέρα δὲ πόλις are the first words of the poem, were new first lines to appear, much of the discussion would still be able to stand, albeit in a modified form. That we have the end of the poem is generally accepted (see Wilamowitz (1893) 306).

together from several poems in order to develop a composite picture of the poet's 'philosophy' assume that consistency is a priority or even a virtue for the archaic poets.⁵ Such interpretations overlook not only the likelihood that individual poems may have had different intended audiences or been composed at different times, but also overlook the certainty that single poems of necessity will speak to their different audiences differently, and that each performance of a single poem constituted a new occasion, a new audience (even if composed of the same people), and new potential for emphasis and interpretation. These are important considerations for any archaic poet, but particularly for Solon, who seems, by his own and other ancient testimony, to have courted a wide audience.⁶

As both poet and lawgiver, Solon represents the ideal figure through which to analyse the political implications of poetic expression in the archaic period. And yet, scholarly focus has tended to privilege the lawgiver at the expense of the poet: the poetry of Solon is almost always subordinated to his historical significance. Scholars largely interpret his poetry in ways that correspond to the general reception of Solon conveyed in the ancient authors who preserve our fragments.⁷ While this mutually collaborating approach to the sources provides neat narratives for early Athenian history, its circularity threatens to predetermine or at least to stifle further interpretation of the poetry. The full potential of Solon's expression is left unexplored, precisely because it is irrelevant for teleologically driven discussions of archaic history and poetry. A further unwelcome by-product is that such a narrow perspective on the function of Solon's poetry leads to an unfavourable (modern)

⁵ See Griffith (1990) 185–207 on the fallacy of requiring consistency over the *œuvre* of a poet. See also Adkins (1985) 110, 'Whether or not Solon had a political philosophy, he was a practicing politician; and even practicing politicians who possess political philosophies do not use language publicly solely to give dispassionate expositions of their theories.'

⁶ See Solon 5, 36.22–4, and 37 and see also Ch. 7.

⁷ The main sources of the fragments, [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* and Plut. *Solon* inevitably influence modern accounts. Solon 4 does however provide a unique opportunity to interpret a substantial poem that has *not* been transmitted in these texts.

assessment of his poetic ability: 'Great laws, shame about the poetry.'⁸

This Part focuses on the poetry. Rather than reading the poetry through the biographical tradition, it begins by interpreting the poetry in order to see in what directions we are taken and what conclusions about archaic political discourse can emerge from poetic analysis. Although writing 'history' from poetry is a precarious activity, such an approach has the potential to be more fruitful: it can overcome the biases of Solon's later reception and shed new light on the testimony preserved in the biographical tradition, advancing an approach that neither dismisses nor embraces these traditions wholesale, but rather attempts to hear what these stories are trying to tell. At the very least, the results of this approach challenge the traditional accounts of Solon that should not be considered secure simply for having been repeated so often. Although descriptions of his career are less idealised, discussion of Solon in modern scholarship underwent comparatively few changes in the twentieth century.⁹ There is too much 'history' for those sceptical of biographical traditions of poets to play with Solon to the extent they do, for instance, with Archilochus.¹⁰ Historians, in turn, have focused their attention on legal issues, or on the fifth- and fourth-century reception of the figure.¹¹ The kind of scrutiny applied to Cleisthenes, honoured for a time as the 'father of Democracy', has not been applied to Solon;¹² and a mysterious veil of silence separates interpretations of Peisistratus and

⁸ The tension in Gerber's recent comments (1997) 113–16 demonstrates this tendency: see for instance, '... I think it can be said that his undoubted importance as a historical figure and the political nature of much of his poetry ... have contributed to an *undeservedly* low opinion of him as a poet. Often too his verses have been treated simply as historical sources, with little account taken of their poetic quality. *It would certainly be unjustified to include him among poets of the first rank, but it is more unjustified to denigrate or ignore his poetic output*' (116, italics mine). For an antidote to this apologetic tone, see Noussia (1999) and (2001).

⁹ See, for instance, Anhalt (1993) and McGlew (1993) ch. 3. But see Vox (1983, 1984).

¹⁰ For a flexible approach to the biographical tradition see Irwin (1998), (1999), (forthcoming a) and Graziosi (2002).

¹¹ Hansen (1989), Thomas (1994).

¹² On the 'cynical realist' view of Cleisthenes see Lewis (1963) and the recent survey of evaluations by Hansen (1994) and Ober (1993).

Solon despite their probable temporal overlap in careers, their shared polis, and their appeal to the δῆμος.¹³

The chapters of Part II explore, through a close reading, how contemporary political concerns are mediated through traditional poetry. They will also mark for discussion in the final Part of the book those startling instances in which contemporary politics seems to jar with traditional poetic usage. Significant fissures appear that provide access to the linguistic (and poetic) dimensions of contemporary political discourse, and to Solon's relationship both to this discourse, and to others engaged in its use.

¹³ The almost total absence of Solon in the recent edited volume by Sancisi-Weerdenburg (2000) on Peisistratus demonstrates the gulf separating these two figures in scholarly discussions.

SOLON 4 AND MARTIAL POETRY

I

Chapter 3 adduced funerary epigram as evidence in support of the view that the claims of martial exhortation may not simply and idealistically represent a ‘patriotic’ attachment to the city. Solon 4 confirms, from another angle, the function of martial elegy for which Part I argued. This poem effects a distinctive response to martial poetry, both epic and elegiac: the first four lines effectively contain and dismiss the imagery and themes of martial epic in order to make space for the dominant theme of the poem, civic turmoil and injustice. Moreover, these lines are programmatic: not only does Solon appropriate the language and imagery of war epic in order strikingly to depict stasis as virtual πόλεμος within the polis, he also inverts and subordinates the imagery of elegiac parænesis and in the process undermines the claims inherent in that form of poetry. Such poetic appropriation will be seen to have a political content, and will lead to discussions of the differing stances to other forms of ἔπεια that are presented in the next chapters.

II ‘Containing’ martial epic: lines 1–8

ἡμετέρα δὲ πόλις κατὰ μὲν Διὸς οὐποτ’ ὀλεῖται
αἶσαν καὶ μακάρων θεῶν φρένας ἀθανάτων·
τοίη γὰρ μεγάλθυμος ἐπίσκοπος ὀβριμοπάτρη
Παλλὰς Ἀθηναίη χεῖρας ὑπερθεῖν ἔχει· (Solon 4.1–4)

Our city will never perish by the dispensation of Zeus or the intentions of the blessed gods, who are immortal. For such a stout-hearted guardian, daughter of a mighty father, Pallas Athena, holds her hands over it in protection.

These lines form a powerful introduction and are on several levels programmatic for the poem that ensues. The polis occupies a central position. The poet has situated himself and his audience within the polis through the possessive adjective, ἡμετέρα ('our'), placed strongly in first position.

Linguistically and thematically, the first four lines owe much to epic language. The preponderance of Homeric language and formulae in these lines, particularly in comparison with the remainder of the poem is striking.¹ The phrase κατὰ μὲν Διὸς ... αἶσαν has affinities with expressions in the *Iliad*. The αἶσα Διὸς ('dispensation of Zeus') appears in *Il.* 17.321, where the Achaeans would have seized glory καὶ ὑπὲρ Διὸς αἶσαν ('beyond the dispensation of Zeus') and *Il.* 9.608, where Achilles asserts that he is honoured Διὸς αἴσῃ ('by Zeus's dispensation').² κατ' αἶσαν ('according to due measure') appears in *Il.* 3.59. The phrase οὔποτ' ὀλεῖται ('never will it perish') is a Homeric line ending.³ And as in line 2, epic poetry frequently refers to the gods as θεοὶ μακάρες ... ἀθανάτοι ('blessed immortal gods')⁴ and uses φρένες in descriptions of divine intention.⁵

Linguistic resonances at the same time convey and are confirmed by thematic similarities. The notion of the gods playing a part in the destruction of cities is a central concern in the *Iliad*.⁶ One recalls the vivid scene at the beginning of *Iliad* 4, where quite literally Hera and Zeus are negotiating the destruction of cities that are otherwise blameless or favoured. Solon asserts firmly that this situation, so common from epic and expressed in epic language, will never occur in 'our' case.⁷

¹ As recognised most recently by Mülke (2002) 103–7 and Noussia (1999) 75–8 and (2001) 236–9. See also Campbell (1982) 240, (1983) 92 and Fowler (1987) 46.

² See Hes. fr. 204.126 for reference to the αἶσα Διὸς in what appears to be a metaphor describing the Trojan war. For further parallels see Mülke (2002) 103. On αἶσα Διὸς more generally see Bianchi (1953).

³ E.g. *Il.* 2.325, 7.91. ⁴ E.g. *Il.* 4.127–8. ⁵ E.g. *Il.* 15.194.

⁶ See *Il.* 2.66–70, 111–18, 9.19–26, etc.

⁷ See also Adkins (1985) 225 n. 5. The strong epic colouring of this material led Nestle (1942) 135 to argue that lines preceding those extant must have described the fall of a famous city such as Troy, and Ziegler (1954) 383 to see Troy implicitly evoked in lines 1–4.

In the following couplet, divine patronage, likewise a theme with a good epic pedigree, counters the threat of divinely sanctioned destruction. The image of the god's hand held above the city as a sign of favour and protection is thoroughly at home in the *Iliad*. Agamemnon's exhortation in 4.247–9 uses this figure:

ἦ μένετε Τρῶας σχεδὸν ἐλθέμεν ἔνθα τε νῆες
εἰρύατ' εὐπρυμνοὶ πολιῆς ἐπὶ θινὶ θαλάσσης,
ὄφρα ἴδῃτ' αἶ κ' ὕμιν ὑπέρσχη χεῖρα Κρονίων;

Or do you wait for the Trojans to come near where the strong-sterned ships have been hauled up on the shore of the grey sea in order that you may see whether the son of Cronus holds his hand above you?

Likewise, in *Iliad* 9.417–20, Achilles advises the Greeks to return home, μάλα γάρ ἐθεν εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς | χεῖρα ἐῖν ὑπέρεσχε, τεθαρσῆκασι δὲ λαοί ('For certainly Zeus of the wide gaze holds his hand over [Troy], and the people have been made bold'). The god's hand symbolises his protection or encouragement in military conflict.⁸ As will be discussed later, it is significant for the response of Solon 4 to martial exhortation elegy that these Iliadic passages belong to contexts of martial encouragement.

But there are differences. Whereas Zeus is the *only* god whose hand protects collectivities in the *Iliad*,⁹ Solon employs the hand of Athena. This is in itself not a surprising change given Athena's special relationship with Athens, but the change is nevertheless significant: it suggests the ways in which poets and their audiences may have appropriated panhellenic epic material for themselves and their own cities. Line 3, moreover, is not just 'thoroughly Homeric'; it is more specifically Odyssean. *Odyssey* 4.826–8 describes Athena: τοίη γάρ οἱ πομπὸς ἄμ' ἔρχεται ... | Παλλὰς Ἀθηναίη ('For such is the escort that attends him ... Pallas Athena').¹⁰ Furthermore, Athena is the only deity to be qualified by *μεγάθυμος* ('great-hearted') in Homer, and she receives this description only in

⁸ See also *Il.* 5.433, 9.686–7 and 15.695. ⁹ The hand is also Zeus's in Thgn. 757.

¹⁰ Campbell (1982) 240. For more on the epic precedents of this description of Athena see Noussia (1999) 77–8.

the *Odyssey*.¹¹ Such specificity may suggest that the predominantly Iliadic imagery or, more generally, the imagery of martial epic of the first couplet, is being tempered by references to a different tradition of epic, a specifically Odyssean one; a change articulated through Athena's divine patronage.

Solon carefully balances the suggestion of divine threat with that of divine patronage. The fragility of cities due to divine whim is met by strong affirmation of 'our' city's safety under the tutelage of its patroness.¹² Divine destruction is countered by divine protection, and thus gives way to the need to address other factors that threaten the welfare of the city. These lines have a programmatic function, suggesting in condensed detail the stance that poet and poem will take. Moreover, the subject of these lines is 'contained': the two types of divine intervention neutralise one another, or as Jaeger aptly commented, 'What matters most to Solon is that men bear the burden of full responsibility; the complementary negation that the gods are free from guilt ... appears only at the beginning of Solon's poem, as if it were a marginal boundary stone.'¹³ As if gem-encrusted with epic formulae and with allusions to the themes of martial epic, this 'marginal boundary stone' evokes a world like that of the *Iliad* at the same time as it is fixed in its function and placement as foil for the poem's main themes.

Maximum contrast is attained in lines 5–8 through the expression of the actual threat to the city, the main theme of this poem:

αὐτοὶ δὲ φθείρειν μεγάλην πόλιν ἀφραδίῃσιν
 ἄστοι βούλονται χρήμασι πειθόμενοι,
 δήμου θ' ἡγεμόνων ἄδικος νόος, οἷσιν ἐτοῖμον
 ὕβριος ἐκ μεγάλης ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν.

¹¹ And with significance: *Od.* 8.520 and 13.121; see below pp. 115–16, 123–5.

¹² Even the noun ἐπίσκοπος ('guardian') suggests this dual function. Adkins (1985) 112 points out that this word is used only once in Homer of a protector of a city, of Hector in *Il.* 24.729. He concludes however that this is 'a passage which Solon evidently does not wish to recall, for it refers to the dead Hector'. But allusion to a mortal protector, such as Hector, may be precisely the point: Athens need not fear the fall of the city through war when their guardian is no human (however heroic), but the goddess herself.

¹³ Jaeger (1966) 88.

But it is the citizens themselves who in their senselessness are willing to destroy a great city, persuaded by money; and the mind of the leaders of the people is unjust, and they are certain to suffer much grief from their great hybris.

Through emphasising in line 5 the great stature of the city to be destroyed, Solon conveys the magnitude of the threat. *κατὰ μὲν Διὸς οὔποτε* ('never by [the dispensation] of Zeus') is answered by *αὐτοὶ δέ* ('They themselves'): here will follow the 'real' answer. Having dismissed the gods as the cause of such destruction, however, Solon leaves us waiting for the culprits. The revelation comes in line 6: they are *ἄστοί* ('those of the city', 'citizens'). Solon subordinates the external threat to the city to an internal one: not war nor divine wrath, but the corruption of citizens is the danger. Troy, the destroyed city *par excellence*, may well be lurking behind these lines as a powerful image for the present and actual threat to the polis of Solon's poem,¹⁴ and, as will be seen, the ensuing description of civic turmoil derives strength from the imagery of war. But to render Troy a mere (implied) foil for the main subject of this poem, to contain and thereby dismiss the epic content of the first four lines may well be polemical: this strategy subordinates not just a theme, but also a genre and its connotations.

The structure of the opening lines of the poem is instrumental to articulating its content, and therefore deserves attention. This passage 'advances by antithesis' as is apparent in lines 1–4 and 5–8: safety as regards the gods is balanced by destruction at the hands of the citizens.¹⁵ But this balance is illusory: the poem at once suggests a palpable structure in which lines 1–4 are a foil for, a stepping-stone to, the main issues of the poem; their themes are left behind or 'contained' as the poet embarks upon his central theme. The ensuing poem suggests an ultimate imbalance between the first four lines and the rest, implying that concern for the actual threat from within, by the *ἄστοί*, actually outweighs and outlasts any discussion of a potential threat from without.

¹⁴ See pp. 122–6.

¹⁵ Henderson (1982) 26. See also Fränkel (1975) 519, 525–7. Moreover, there is a step-wise progression in each section from the more general (1–2 and 5–6) to the specific (Athena of 3–4, and the *ἡγεμόνες* ('leaders') of 7–8).

And yet while elements of the first four lines are ‘contained’ in their function as foil, they play a role in the development of the poem, introducing multiple poetic traditions and genres, and situating the poet therein. One such tradition is martial elegy.

III War within the city

The introduction to Solon 4 is indeed programmatic: martial themes throughout the poem play a continuous subordinate role analogous to their initial function as foil. Allusions to war and to the external threats to the city and its members make vivid the internal dangers to the city that arise from the transgression of *δίκη* and the greed of its own citizens.

Solon proceeds from a Hesiodic description of the violation of δίκη and her response, to the consequences of such behaviour for the entire city.¹⁶ While this passage (13–29) evokes several poetic traditions, the present chapter focuses on the debt of Solon's description of injustice and stasis in lines 17–29 to the language of war and its poetic genres. Solon depicts internal crisis using a language and imagery of war which is at home in both martial epic and exhortation elegy. Lines 17–29 describe the results for the city whose members do not preserve δίκη:

τοῦτ' ἤδη πάσῃ πόλει ἔρχεται ἔλκος ἄφυκτον,
 ἐς δὲ κακὴν ταχέως ἤλυθε δουλοσύνην,
 ἢ στάσιν ἔμφυλον πόλεμόν θ' εὖδοντ' ἐπεγείρει,
 ὃς πολλῶν ἐρατὴν ὤλεσεν ἡλικίην· 20
 ἐκ γὰρ δυσμενέων ταχέως πολυήρατον ἄστυ
 τρύχεται ἐν συνόδοις τοῖς ἀδικέουσι φίλους·¹⁷
 τὰυτὰ μὲν ἐν δήμῳ στρέφεται κακά· τῶν δὲ πενιχρῶν
 ἱκνέονται πολλοὶ γαίαν ἐς ἀλλοδαπὴν
 πραθέντες δεσμοῖσί τ' ἀεικελίοισι δεθέντες 25

¹⁶ See Hesiod, *Op.* 217–47. For a discussion of this passage and Sol. 4.9–16 see pp. 180–3.

¹⁷ Codd. φίλοις QY φίλους F *post correctionem*. Bergk emends to φίλαις, and is followed by Gentili–Prato. See Linforth (1919) 202–4, who accepts Bergk’s emendation, for a full discussion, and see now Mülke (2002) 138–9, who defends φίλους. I find it appropriate that the difficulty in reading actually centres on what is in fact a theme of sympotic poetry, the ambiguities inherent in determining who or what are φίλοι.

οὕτω δημόσιον κακὸν ἔρχεται οἴκαδ' ἐκάστω,
 αὖλαιοι δ' ἔτ' ἔχειν οὐκ ἐθέλουσι θύραι,
 ὑψηλὸν δ' ὑπὲρ ἔρκος ὑπέρθορον, εὔρε δὲ πάντως,
 εἰ καὶ τις φεύγων ἐν μυχῶ ἦ θαλάμου.

This already is coming to the entire city, a wound inescapable, and swiftly it has come into base slavery,¹⁸ a slavery, that wakens civil strife and sleeping war, war that destroys the lovely youth of many. For at the hands of enemies is the lovely city swiftly consumed in gatherings by those who wrong their friends. These evils redound upon the citizen body: but many of the poor arrive in foreign lands, having been sold and bound in unseemly chains. In this way does a public ill come to the home of each, and the courtyard doors refuse any longer to hold it back, and it leaps over the high wall, and it surely finds him, even if he flees into the innermost recess of his room.

The passage can be read on two levels. The first involves an obvious blurring of the distinctions between war and stasis, and their effects: stasis is virtual πόλεμος within the city. The second level involves the exploitation of poetic representations of war, in particular martial elegy, in order to further the poet's aim. Although carefully interwoven, these levels can be discussed separately.

Solon breaks down the distinction between stasis and war, and their consequences.¹⁹ In line 19 he speaks of an 'inbred stasis' (στάσιν ἔμφυλον)²⁰ and 'sleeping war' (πόλεμόν θ' εὔδοντα) being awakened ultimately as a result of the requital of a violated Δίκη. The phrase may seem to name two things, internal and external conflict, and in isolation, it might be understood to suggest that the inner turmoil of the polis ultimately weakens it to outside enemies, resulting in enslavement, the consequence of defeat in war.²¹ But in their context, it becomes clear that stasis and πόλεμος name the same

¹⁸ On the difficulties of translating lines 17–18 and the political utility of their vagueness see Adkins (1985) 118.

¹⁹ See Loraux (1984), Anhalt (1993) 72–9, and Balot (2001) 80–2.

²⁰ Cf. Herodotus' contrast of στάσις ἔμφυλος ('civil strife') with πόλεμος ('war') in 8.3.3.

²¹ This is in fact the line Tyrtaeus takes in fr. 4, believed to be his *Eunomia* (van Wees (1999) 11–12): the reward of obedience, the absence of internal struggle will lead to military success that the city as a whole will enjoy. For more on the relationship of Solon 4 and Tyrtaeus see p. 110 and Ch. 6 pp. 191–3.

condition.²² ἐπεγείρει ('awakens') recalls the Homeric ἐγείρειν ('to awaken') of which war and battle – external conflicts – are most commonly the objects.²³ Solon applies it to stasis, indicating the equivalence of this condition to war. In a thematically related passage, Alcaeus employs a similar strategy for depicting civic turmoil as war, using a verb with similar literal and metaphorical usage: ἐμφύλῳ τε μάχας, τάν τις Ὀλυμπίων | ἔνωρσε ('internecine battle, which someone of the immortals incited').²⁴ Alcaeus talks of the 'inbred battle', allowing the adjective to indicate clearly the metaphorical use of 'battle'.²⁵ Solon's image is far more striking: the adjective, 'sleeping', applied to war reanimates the image inherent in this common metaphor, while at the same time insinuating the latent quality of the threat of stasis.²⁶

The exploitation of war continues. δουλοσύνη ('slavery'), which is normally the consequence of war, here in fact appears as its cause. The natural antecedent of the relative pronoun of 19, this 'slavery' that results from the violation of justice, leads to stasis and the awakening of 'sleeping' war.²⁷ δουλοσύνη ('slavery') is not therefore literal slavery, the outcome of conflict between two cities, but a metaphorical description of the civic body as enslaved.²⁸ The theme of slavery recurs with more elaboration in lines 23–5. The perpetrators of this slavery are called δυσμενέες ('enemies'), a term more applicable to external foes, but which here names a group comprising citizens.

²² See also Loraux (1984) 203. ²³ See, for instance, *Il.* 2.381, 440, 7.531, 11.836.

²⁴ Alcaeus 70.11.

²⁵ The *Iliad* (9.63–4) uses πόλεμος to describe stasis, but, as with Alcaeus, allows the adjective to reveal the metaphor: ἀφρήτωρ ἀθέμιστος ἀνέστιός ἐστιν ἐκείνος | ὃς πολέμου ἔραται ἐπιδημίου ὀκρυόεντος ('Unworthy of belonging to a phratry, outside the law, and without a hearth is that man who loves horrible war between his own people').

²⁶ Campbell (1982) 242: '[I]n *Iliad* Homer has ἐγείρειν with πόλεμον (20.31), μάχην (13.788), φύλοπιν (5.496 etc.), Ἄρηα (2.440 etc.). Solon's εὔδοντα ("sleeping") makes the metaphor more telling.' See Linforth (1919) 201–2, Noussia (2001) 251, Mülke (2002) 132–3.

²⁷ As taken by West (1993) 75, Miller (1996) 66, Campbell (1982) 242, Edmonds (1931) 119, Linforth (1919) 201, Gerber (1999).

²⁸ Such a formulation is an important step towards the abstraction requisite for political theory. See Cartledge (1998) 379–99. Actual enslavement through debt, as suggested by fr. 36, may have prompted the development of this war metaphor and its attendant slavery.

That they are not enemies of war, but citizens, is clear from the context of their destruction of the city: ἐν συνόδοις τοῖς ἀδικέουσιν φίλους ('in gatherings by those who do injustice to their friends', 22), a phrase which evokes the uncontrolled feasting of the ἡγεμόνες ('leaders') expressed in lines 9–10.²⁹ Furthermore, the verb τρύχω ('consume') suggests domestic ruin, the destruction or consumption at the hands of those familiar. It is the verb that characterises what befalls Odysseus' household in the *Odyssey*: in its active use, the suitors are the subject of the verb with οἶκος ('the household') as the object (1.248, 16.125, 19.133); while in the passive as a participle it modifies Telemachus, describing his suffering at the hands of the suitors (1.288, 2.219).³⁰ Moreover, τρύχω ('consume') is conceptually related to Alcaeus' δάπτω ('devour'), a verb used to describe the effects of civil war and a tyrant on the polis.³¹ Stepping outside this poem, it is clear in fragment 36 that Solon uses the concept of slavery in civic contexts, applying it both to the state of the land before his measures and also to citizens.³²

The effect Solon creates with 'slavery' is parallel to that described above with 'war'. Solon uses the powerful imagery of war and its consequences to describe or rename the situation within the city. Lines 21–25 can be seen to be a more vivid elaboration of 15–20: the generalised description of the violated Δίκη ('justice') and the ensuing suffering in lines 15–20 is replaced by the perpetrators of this violation in 21–2; the consequences of this lawlessness and the group affected by it narrows: the inescapable wound for the entire city (τοῦτ' ἤδη πάσῃ πόλει ἔρχεται ἕλκος ἄφυκτον, 17) becomes more

²⁹ On the social and political associations of συνόδος see Mülke (2002) 137–8.

³⁰ Cf. κατατρύχω ('thoroughly consume'), *Od.* 15.309, 16.84 and (with further significance) *Il.* 17.255; and cf. the related τρυχώω with subject οἶκος in Mimnermus 2.2 (οἶκος | τρυχοῦται, 'the household is consumed'). See also *Op.* 305 and Noussia (2001) 252 and Adkins (1985) 119. Mülke (2002) 136 points out that Solon provides the first appearance of the verb in connection with the polis.

³¹ *Alc.* 70.7, 129.23–4, in both cases with the object, polis; cf. δαρδάπτουσιν ('devour') in *Od.* 14.92 and 16.315.

³² Of the land, Solon 36.7: πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρῃ (–a as transmitted) ('before enslaved, now free'). Of the Athenians, Solon 36.8–9, and 13–15 (apparently literal).

specifically the clear evils for the δῆμος (ταῦτα μὲν ἐν δήμῳ στρέφεται κακά, 'These evils redound upon the citizen body', 23); finally, the succinctly expressed δουλοσύνη ('slavery') of 18 becomes vividly elaborated, its victims are specified and more fully described (23–5). It becomes clear that the action of the ἡγεμόνες ('leaders'), itself a term most common to leaders in epic battle,³³ produces a virtual war within the city, and while the results are disastrous for the entire city, they are specifically damaging to a subset of it.

IV Inverting martial elegy

In describing the fear from within, Solon derives poetic strength from images of warfare and therefore follows the programme of his introductory lines in which language and images evocative of war and its poetic representations were rapidly replaced by issues of social concern. He subordinates the threat of war to that of stasis and civil strife, and at the same time he subordinates poetic representations of war to his own poetic representation of civil strife. This sophisticated manipulation of martial epic in the first four lines of the poem invites us to consider the poetic influences behind Solon's war-like depiction of civil strife.

Yet discussion of intertextuality in orally derived poetry, whether specific or generic, is no easy matter: the risk of over-interpreting verbal similarities, so common in earlier scholarship, is now well known.³⁴ But perhaps more dangerous and certainly more prevalent recently, is that of under-valuing verbal resonances and thereby implicitly circumscribing the potential for allusion between archaic poets and genres by our own difficulties in assessing it.³⁵ Given both the

³³ *Il.* 2.365, 3.1, 4.429, 5.38, 9.85, 12.87, etc.

³⁴ See pp. 22–6; for a full discussion of this topic in relation to Hesiod see below pp. 155–64.

³⁵ Hinds (1998) and Conte (1986) are excellent and eloquent on all the issues surrounding allusion and intertextuality, and, *mutatis mutandis*, no less relevant here despite their focus on Latin literature. Such a systematic theoretical treatment of the subject in archaic Greek poetry is sorely lacking: this is due both to an overemphasis on the

sophistication of poetic borrowing and manipulation, and the wealth of elegy lost in transmission, one must try to hear the echoes of an active poetic world, where poetry is not only influenced by its antecedents and its own political environment, but also responds to and competes with other contemporary or near-contemporary poets responding to, and thereby attempting to (re-)define, those influences.³⁶ Solon demonstrates in frs. 20 and 21 his willingness to respond explicitly to the poetry of other poets, and there is no reason to ignore the possibility that such responses may be at play when he is not so kind as to name explicitly the poets or poetry to which he responds. Beginning with those passages which are most allusive, and then discussing the less immediately obvious resonances, I argue that if this latter group demonstrates similarities with the former group in its approach to martial elegy, then we are justified to analyse and discuss their combined response to martial elegy.

Various elements evoking a shared discourse with martial exhortation elegy can be detected in Solon 4. The presence of Zeus and his role in determining the safety of a group, and the image of the god performing a gesture that conveys favour or displeasure are features common to the introductions of both Solon 4 and Tyrtaeus 11.³⁷

ἀλλ', Ἡρακλῆος γὰρ ἀνικῆτου γένος ἔστέ,
θαρσεῖτ'· οὐπὼ Ζεὺς ἀνχένα λοξὸν ἔχει.

Come now, be bold, for you are the race of invincible Heracles. Not yet does Zeus turn his neck away from you.

obstacles that the orality of this poetry has been perceived to present to such analysis, and to the narrow (and justified) focus on Homer in the work of those who address the issue. See however Sacks (1987).

³⁶ On the attempt of poets to redescribe tradition, see Hinds (1998) 123–9.

³⁷ It is, however, uncertain whether these are the actual introductions of either poem. See Part II, Introduction n. 4. As Campbell (1983) 92 noticed, Solon 4.1–2 is also reminiscent of the strong presence of Zeus in other fragments of Tyrtaeus, such as his *Eunoμία*, fr. 2. See pp. 110 and 191–3 for discussion of Solon's response to Tyrtaeus. One might also compare the presence of this image in Theognis 757–64 where the fear of war is intimated through its explicit denial.

While Tyrtaeus uses this image in military *paraenesis*, Solon 4 applies his divine epic gesture in a context of explicit moral and political exhortation.

Evocations of martial poetry appear in lines 26–9, in the description of the public ill from which there is no escape, even in one's home:

οὕτω δημόσιον κακὸν ἔρχεται οἴκαδ' ἐκάστω,
 αὐλαιοι δ' ἔτ' ἔχειν οὐκ ἐθέλουσι θύραι,
 ὑψηλὸν δ' ὑπὲρ ἔρκος ὑπέρθορεν, εὖρε δὲ πάντως,
 εἰ καί τις φεύγων ἐν μυχῶ ἦ θαλάμου.

In this way does a public ill come to the home of each, and the courtyard doors refuse any longer to hold it back, and it leaps over the high wall, and it surely finds him, even if he flees into the innermost recess of his room.

Such imagery is evocative of Homeric war similes in which a lion attacks domestic animals in the fold, such as *Iliad* 5.136–42 describing Diomedes during his *aristeia* when death for his opponents is inevitable.³⁸ If this is the main association, it would represent a general appropriation of epic battle imagery for depictions of civic strife. A more pointed parallel has been drawn with Callinus 1.14–15, where inevitability (this time of death) is depicted through the image of pursuit into the very home of the one attempting to flee it:

πολλάκι δηϊοτήτα φυγῶν καὶ δοῦπον ἀκόντων
 ἔρχεται, ἐν δ' οἴκῳ μοῖρα κίχεν θανάτου.³⁹

Many times it happens that a man flees the hostilities and the thud of missiles only to have the fate of death overtake him in his home.

If there is an allusion to Callinus here, this depiction of inevitability through the intimate image of a penetrated home would suggest a polemically different theme. While sharing a stance of exhortation with Callinus, Solon uses the image to exhort his audience not to proper military behaviour, but to proper social behaviour. This posture of exhortation is borne out by

³⁸ Adkins (1985) 121. See also Aesch. *Ag.* 827–8 for a tragic version of this image.

³⁹ Campbell (1982) 243 and (1983) 92. See also Degani-Burzacchini (1977) 111 on the rare omission of ἄν shared with Callinus 1.13. See also Noussia (2001) 253.

the formal epic phrase of public speaking which immediately follows (30): ταῦτα διδάξαι θυμὸς Ἀθηναίους με κελεύει ('These things does my heart bid me to teach the Athenians').⁴⁰ Furthermore, the inevitable success of both pursuers, that is, death and the common evil that results from the violation of δίκη within the city, forges an analogy between what each poem advocates, martial ἀρετή ('excellence') and civic ἀρετή.⁴¹

A third image is that of the enslaved members of the δῆμος travelling to foreign lands described in lines 23–5. This theme of the enslaved citizens is taken up again in Solon 36, but the image is one that belongs to the sphere of war and is therefore comparable with Tyrtaeus 10. Tyrtaeus states categorically that it is beautiful to die in war, and in substantiating this point he recounts the horror of being forced to leave one's city and wander:

τὴν δ' αὐτοῦ προλιπόντα πόλιν καὶ πῖονας ἀγροὺς
πτωχεύειν πάντων ἔστ' ἀνιηρότατον,
πλαζόμενον σὺν μητρὶ φίλῃ καὶ πατρὶ γέροντι
παῖσι τε σὺν μικροῖς κουριδίῃ τ' ἀλόχῳ.
ἐχθρὸς μὲν γὰρ τοῖσι μετέσσειται οὓς κεν ἴκηται,
χρησιμοσύνη τ' εἰκὼν καὶ στυγερὴ πενίη.⁴²

A man having left behind his native city and his rich fields to go about as a beggar, *this* is the most grievous thing of all – him wandering with his dear mother and aged father, and with his small children and beloved wife. For he will be an enemy to those at whose home he arrives having succumbed as he has to his need and hateful poverty.

The poet continues by emphasising the shame and dishonour involved. The passage shares with Solon 4 the image of the loss

⁴⁰ Hector in *Iliad* 7.68 = 349 = 369. See pp. 193–6.

⁴¹ One may even see a polemical contrast between Solon's δημόσιον κακὸν ('public ill', 26) and Tyrtaeus' assertion that martial exertions are a ξυγὸν ... ἐσθλὸν ... πολὴν τε παντὶ τε δῆμῳ ('a common good for both the city and the entire people', 12.15). See also Adkins (1985) 121 for his discussion of how class-specific Solon's depiction of the house is: 'for the poor are not likely to suppose that their households can withstand a civic disaster, and their houses are unlikely to have had courtyard gates, fences, and recesses to which Homeric language could appropriately be applied'. See also Murray (1990a) 142.

⁴² Tyrtaean exhortation shares this view with martial epic: see Rose (1992) 107 n. 27 for the wretchedness of the vagabond in the *Iliad*: he cites *Il.* 9.648, 16.59, 24.531–3.

of one's polis, the poverty of such a state, and its shamefulness – Solon describes the fetters as 'unseemly' (ἀεικελίους).⁴³ This vivid image of enslavement fits within a consistent picture: Solon uses war itself and its poetic depictions as the means of prioritising what he considers the more significant threat to the city, stasis.⁴⁴ The issue is then whether the poet merely derives strength for his position by drawing on war and its rich poetic tradition, or whether the appropriation of this material also entails a critique of his 'models', both 'literary' and social.

V Poetic or political?

The evidence implies critique. The elegy of Callinus and particularly Tyrtaeus argues for a certain world-view: Tyrtaeus explicitly privileges martial ἀρετή ('excellence'); all other ἀρεταί ('forms of excellence') are foils for it. Not only does such poetry narrowly depict social harmony within the city as following from valour in battle, but this harmony is seen from the perspective of the war-hero: the city's response to the hero is united, the hero's children maintain an important position in the city, and the grounds for hierarchy or privilege are clear and respected – the hero deserves better seats, which young and old are glad to give.⁴⁵

In stark opposition to martial elegy's emphasis in appropriating both martial epic and its values, Solon composes a poem in which the defining virtue in martial poetry – both epic and elegiac – is subordinated to his message, namely, the warning of the disasters awaiting those who disregard justice, and the suffering such behaviour lays on the larger community. Unlike one prominent Iliadic picture in which Sarpedon-style martial

⁴³ There may be some greater significance in this adjective. When Hector says in 15.494–500 that it is not unseemly (ἀεικές) to die fighting for the fatherland, one implication is that other outcomes (apart from returning home victorious) are unseemly; among these enslavement, precisely Solon's image, would be a prominent one.

⁴⁴ As will be seen in the next two chapters, this is also done through alignment with two other poetic traditions.

⁴⁵ Consider Callinus 1.17–21 and Tyrtaeus 12.29–30, 37–42. The benefits are largely private – personal and familial.

excellence ensures the harmony and correct order within a system where leaders justify, through their prowess, the position they hold, Solon maintains from the outset an approach that, as will be discussed in Chapter 6, is heavily influenced by a Hesiodic world-view where the protection and maintenance of justice by leaders and δῆμος alike ensure internal harmony, safety from external foes, and the prosperity of the community.⁴⁶

Against the backdrop of the heroic role-playing implicit in martial exhortation elegy, Solon's inversions of the tropes of this form of elegy become extremely pointed. In a social environment where martial elegy is performed to justify or assert an elevated status within the community, to undervalue or neutralise the external threat to the city is to undermine this elevated status. To subordinate the imagery of martial exhortation to civic exhortation is to subordinate the message of the former to the latter.

But it is not only a subordination that Solon performs, it is an inversion of norms. Stasis is πόλεμος ('war'), and the enslavement of citizens, normally a consequence of war, exists *within* the city. The group that through its own heroic pretensions is meant to protect the city from external threats, from war, is in fact, through its mistreatment of justice and greed, introducing what is essentially war within the city and enslaving fellow citizens. The pretence of martial exhortation is unmasked and renamed for what it is. As described in lines 9–10, these ἡγεμόνες ('leaders') cannot even keep their feasting in order (κοσμεῖν). With κοσμεῖν, as Adkins and Linforth point out, 'the full sense of "order, rule, discipline" must be present'.⁴⁷ The martial associations of the verb κοσμεῖν suggest that the pretence of this group's martial prowess is further undermined by their inability to control their feasts, precisely

⁴⁶ *Op.* 225–47.

⁴⁷ Adkins (1985) 115, Linforth (1919) 198–200. Both authors rightly object to associating this usage of κοσμεῖν with the one Homeric appearance of this word in conjunction with meals in *Od.* 7.13. But see also Hes. *Op.* 306 for a usage of κοσμεῖν which scholars have overlooked in this discussion. On archaic usage of κόσμος and κοσμεῖν see Diller (1956) esp. 55. On sympotic κόσμος see Ford (2002) 35–7.

the setting in which, by means of elegiac exhortation, such prowess and its utility to the larger polis are asserted.⁴⁸

Tyrtaeus 11.9–10 urges the young men to fight:

καὶ μετὰ φευγόντων τε διωκόντων τ' ἐγέ<νε>σθε
ὦ νέοι, ἀμφοτέρων δ' ἐς κόρον ἡλάσατε.⁴⁹

Indeed you were in the midst of those in flight and those pursuing, young men, and you sated yourself with both.

Solon, using the same phrase, addresses the rich in a section of a poem quoted in the *Constitution of the Athenians* (Solon 4c):

ὑμεῖς δ' ἡσυχάσαντες ἐνὶ φρεσὶ καρτερόν ῥτορ,
οἱ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐς κόρον [ἡ]λάσατε,
ἐν μετρίοισι τίθεσθε μέγαν νόον· οὔτε γὰρ ἡμεῖς
πεισόμεθ', οὔθ' ὑμῖν ἄρτια τα[ῦ]τ' ἔσεται.⁵⁰

You who sated yourself with many good things, having quieted the strong heart in your breast, keep your great mind within measure. For neither will we obey, nor will these things be fitting for you.

In the context of what has been argued above, these lines can be read as a kind of 'spade-calling'. The addressed audience of Tyrtaeus, the aristocratic symposiasts, who assert their entitlement to status based on their self-fashioning as heroic warriors are identified for who they really are: those who strive to get their fill of much wealth – 'Heroic fighters? Ha! Heroic gluttons is more like it', so to speak. Solon uses heroic phraseology to describe this group, ἐνὶ φρεσὶ καρτερόν ῥτορ ('strong heart in your breast'),⁵¹ thus ironising their own self-representation,

⁴⁸ This use of κοσμεῖν in marshalling troops is frequent in the *Iliad*; see also the formula κοσμήτορε λαῶν ('marshallers of the people', *Il.* 1.16, 375, 3.236). On the martial associations of κοσμεῖν see Adkins (1985) 115 and Diller (1956). δαῖς ('feast') and εὐφροσύναι ('festivities'), of course, connote elevated contexts of feasting and festivities: see Noussia (1999) 84 and Mülke (2002) 116–18 for parallels. The couplet effectively captures its subjects' attempt to fuse the epic and symposiastic in their festivities.

⁴⁹ The translation of κόρος is discussed in detail below, pp. 207–20.

⁵⁰ *Ath. Pol.* 5 ἡσυχία already smacks of a politically-charged term in Solon; see Thuc. 6.34.4 and 38.3 for politically contested definitions of ἡσυχία ('quiet') in the fifth century.

⁵¹ For the Homeric phraseology see, for instance, *Il.* 17.111: ἐν φρεσὶν ἀλκιμον ῥτορ ('courageous heart in the breast'). ῥτορ is a frequent Homeric line ending, often in combination with ἐν φρεσὶ (e.g. 8.413, 19.169). On traditional usage see Mülke (2002) 173–5. See, in contrast, the positive and martial use in Tyrtaean elegy, 10.17.

while revealing their ‘true’ identity, as far as Solon and his implied audience (ἡμεῖς, ‘we’, 3) are concerned, in the pentameter.⁵²

Solon may further respond to martial exhortation and the world-view expressed therein with the striking line, πάσῃ πόλει ἔρχεται ἔλκος ἄφυκτον (‘to the entire city comes an ineluctable wound’, 17) which appears significantly at the beginning of the section characterised by its inversion of war imagery. There is a passage in Tyrtaeus (12.28) which also personifies πᾶσα πόλις (‘the entire city’). There the dead warrior is said to be mourned by the entire city: ἀργαλέῳ δὲ πόθῳ πᾶσα κέκηδε πόλις (‘the whole city is distressed by grievous longing’). For Tyrtaeus the entire city is lamenting over the death of one individual – *he* is the recipient of the wound; for Solon, however, the wound is the city’s. The contrast seems characteristic of the two poets and their respective brands of poetry. In Tyrtaeus, the assertion of the all-encompassing aspect of this grief, that for this one (aristocratic) warrior’s death the whole city is moved with longing, is typical of the self-representations inherent in this genre. Solon, conversely, personifies the *entire* polis as the *recipient* of the wound: the city replaces the single (élite) warrior. Furthermore, the assertion of line 20 that civil war πολλῶν ἐρατὴν ὤλεσεν ἡλικίην (‘it destroys the lovely youth of many’) may respond to the Tyrtaean-style representations of the beauty of the νέοι who perish in war (10.27–30, esp. 28 ὄφρ’ ἐρατῆς ἥβης ἀγλαὸν ἄνθος ἔχῃ, ‘when he has the lovely flower of youth’).⁵³ If Tyrtaean poetry aims at an élite

⁵² The stark contrast between the antecedents of the pronoun ὑμεῖς in Solon 4 and Tyrtaeus’ same poem (11.35) may be significant: Tyrtaeus addresses the lowly figures, the γυμνῆτες (‘the naked ones’, with that same pronoun, while Solon addresses the ἀγαθοί (‘the good’). See the discussion of this passage, pp. 37–41 and Appendix I.

⁵³ This is a topos of élite funerary inscriptions – see, for instance, *CEG* 13.3 (Attica; 575–550?) and 136.3 (Argos; 525–500?), ἐν πολέμοι [φθ]ίμενοι νεαρὰν ἥβην ὀλέσαντα (‘perishing in war he lost his youth’), and Hansen (1983) index s.v. ἥβη – and one appropriated by the city for fallen war dead in fifth-century Athens (a move Solon seems to anticipate): see the *tituli publici*, *CEG* 4 (Attica; 458–7) and 6 (Attica; 447?). On funerary inscriptions see Ch. 3. On the polis in Solon 4 displacing more typical subjects of heroic poetry, one might return to the first lines of the poem: in line 1 the typical subject of the Homeric line ending οὐποτ’ ὀλείται (‘never will it perish’), κλέος (*Il.* 2.325, 7.91, *Od.* 24.196, etc.), gives place to the πόλις, and it is to this collectivity, not a heroic individual, that Athena’s support is given.

group, then Solon's assertion that war destroys the beautiful youth of *many* must be pointed: the eroticising element of the symposium is extended to the πολλοί ('many').⁵⁴

The phrase *πάσα πόλις* ('entire city') needs exploring. It has the ring of a politically charged term, subject to competition over its usage and meaning. Theognis indicates both that the city and its occupants are not necessarily synonymous – Κύρνε, πόλις μὲν ἔθ' ἦδε πόλις, λαοὶ δὲ δὴ ἄλλοι ('Cyrnus, the city is still this city, but indeed the people are different') – and that judgements about who 'the city' represents are issues of perspective.⁵⁵ In Tyrtaeus a claim is made about the reaction of the 'entire city' to the warrior who dies in battle. Such an expression raises several questions: does it simply describe the succession of events and reactions which naturally ensue on the occasion of such a man's death, or is it in fact prescriptive, representing rather a kind of wish-fulfilment for the audience enjoying this poetry and affirming for themselves the kind of role they possess in the community? Another line of inquiry might deal with who in fact the 'entire city' is. Is it literally every occupant of the city, or does the phrase refer to some subset, those who are essentially 'the city', everyone who is someone, so to speak?⁵⁶ The deceptive simplicity of this term, one of its most important features, hides its underlying ambiguities, leaving unexplored the crucial issue of who constitutes the city and therefore whose reaction is important.

Solon brings this point out more clearly. He speaks of the wound that affects the entire city. The sentence may mean that even though those who abuse justice may profit in the short term, ultimately the *entire* city, literally every member, suffers. And yet, as the poem continues, the δῆμος is identified as the body which suffers: ταῦτα μὲν ἐν δήμῳ στρέφεται κακά

⁵⁴ See also the tension with Callinus 1.21 where the deeds of the single warrior are contrasted with those of the many: ἔρδει γὰρ πολλῶν ἄξια μῶνος ἑών ('For he does deeds worthy of many, although a single man').

⁵⁵ Thgn. 53. See also 191–2, where ἀστοί ('those of the city') clearly do not represent the entire citizen body. See Adkins (1985) 226 n. 12.

⁵⁶ Bowie (1990) 227 makes a similar point, in a different context, about the ambiguities implicit in the adjective *πᾶς*.

(‘These evils redound upon the people’, 23). Likewise, the slavery of line 18, following immediately after the image of the wound afflicting the entire city, is a condition which actually afflicts members of the δῆμος alone (23–5),⁵⁷ thus suggesting that the term πᾶσα πόλις (‘entire city’) is being closely aligned with the δῆμος.⁵⁸ The identity of the δῆμος is then at issue. While δῆμος can name the entire population, in hexameter poetry it usually excludes the leaders, and Solon 4 seems to maintain this epic separation of the δῆμος (‘people’) from the ἡγεμόνες (‘leaders’).⁵⁹ Elsewhere, in Solon 4c, the division of groups within the polis is distinctly felt through the opposition of the highly charged personal pronouns, ‘we’ and ‘you’.⁶⁰ Such a division potentially marginalises the latter group in cases where the δῆμος is asserted to be essentially the polis, just as the δῆμος, or the lower end of this body, may have been

⁵⁷ Cf. Aristotle, *Ath. Pol.* 5 which supports this interpretation: καὶ τῶν πολλῶν δουλεύοντων τοῖς ὀλίγοις, ἀντέστη τοῖς γνωρίμοις ὁ δῆμος (‘And when the many were enslaved to the few, the *demos* rose up against the wealthy’).

⁵⁸ *Contra* Donlan (1970) 390, who thinks that for Solon, ‘The combination of δῆμος (‘people’) and ἡγεμόνες (‘leaders’) equals the concept of the πόλις’, but without substantiating this claim. On one level, this is no doubt true: Solon followed contemporary usage, the polis was composed of its citizen body. More important is, however, the issue of representation: Solon describes the entire polis as afflicted, but elaborates on his statement by describing the suffering of the δῆμος (23); he calls the oppressive group, *δυσμενέες* (‘enemies’), a term more appropriate to enemies who are not part of the polis; and finally, he does not start the poem with a neutral expression denoting the entire city, but uses the very charged and oppositional term, *ἡμετέρα* (‘our’). If there is any thematic continuity with 4c, then this possessive pronoun would gesture towards an exclusion of the ἡγεμόνες (‘leaders’) from the polis, and this on the basis of their own behaviour. The question would not be whether they are actually part of the polis – of course, they are – but whether they are being represented as such. The representation of social groupings – their delineation, definition, and description – is one of the most persistent, and elusive features of Solon’s poetry. See Adkins (1985) 113 on the ambiguities in the presentation of groups in Solon 4; and see Ch. 7.

⁵⁹ See Donlan (1970) 383–5. Page (1955) 177 extends this point to Alcaeus and Alcman. On social and political divisions in Homer see van Wees (1992) 80–1 and 325 n. 20.

⁶⁰ Solon 5.1 begins δῆμῳ μὲν which is followed by 5.3 οἱ δ’ εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγῆστοι (‘Those who had power and were stunning in their wealth’), thus setting the two groups in opposition. The second person plural suggests a confrontational term: Solon opens 4 with *ἡμετέρα* δὲ πόλις, ‘our city’. In 4c (quoted above) he addresses the wealthy as *ὑμεῖς*, ‘you’, and asserts that *ἡμεῖς*, ‘we’, will not obey. On the use of these pronouns and possessive adjectives in Solon see Melissano (1994) 50–6. On *deixis* in early Greek poetry see Rösler (1983); cf. Meier (1998) 173 n. 234.

excluded in cases where the ἀγαθοί ('good') were asserted to 'be' the city. Moreover, the separation of the leaders from the δῆμος which in martial epic typically elevated them, in this poetic context threatens instead to isolate them. The shifting of meanings implicit here suggests debate about who the polis is, who constitute it. It also suggests that poetry both reflects and is a tool for such contests over meaning.

Numerous elements open further speculation on the relationship of Solon's poetry and poetic stance with that of Tyrtaeus. Most obviously, Solon 4 concludes with a hymn to Εὐνομία, thus inviting its dubbing as 'Solon's Εὐνομία' based on the existence of a poem of Tyrtaeus by this name.⁶¹ Solon's emphasis on Εὐνομία may well be a response to a poem of Tyrtaeus already known by this title.⁶² In addition to the critique implicit in the inversions of martial exhortation generally, and of elements of Tyrtaean poetry particularly, one might also detect a critique by Solon of the entire stance of that earlier poet, and witness conflicting versions of the poet's role within the city, and of the interests which he ought to represent.⁶³

⁶¹ Jaeger's formulation, see Part II, Introduction n. 1 and also Ehrenberg (1946) 81 n. 2.

⁶² *Eunomia* is not, however, attested as a title of a Tyrtaean poem before Arist. *Pol.* 1307a1 (though *eunomia* is already seen in Herodotus 1.65 as a defining feature of archaic Sparta). There are consequently difficulties in ascribing the extant fragments to this poem: see Strab. 8.4.10, quoting fr. 2 in this context. The recent discussion of Tyrtaeus' *Eunomia* by van Wees (1999) makes interesting comparisons with Solon 4. Van Wees revives the importance for archaic Sparta of a Spartan proverb/oracle ascribed by Bergk to Tyrtaeus – ἀ φιλοχρηματία Σπαρτάν ὀλεῖ, ἄλλο δὲ οὐδέν ('Love of money will destroy Sparta, nothing else', Diod. Sic. 7.12.6) – seeing it as a product of the same circumstances that engendered Tyrtaeus' *Eunomia*. While van Wees shies away from Bergk's ascription of the line to Tyrtaeus on the grounds that the Doricisms present too great an obstacle to the fragment being Tyrtaean (28 n. 10), there is some room to disagree on the point of dialect (cf. above Part II, Introduction n. 1). The similarities with the first lines of Solon's 'Εὐνομία' are certainly tantalising. If the line was Tyrtaean certain implications would follow: while both poets would agree that greed was a threat to the city, but they would significantly disagree as to who was responsible and also about the nature of the threat these circumstances posed, destruction from without through weakness to external enemies (cf. n. 21 above with van Wees (1999) esp. 23–4) or from within through stasis. To a certain extent these points follow with even an indefinite archaic Spartan ascription to the oracle/proverb. See Ch. 6 for further discussion of Solonian and Tyrtaean *Eunomiai* pp. 191–3.

⁶³ See Munding (1984) and (1993) on Tyrtaeus' polemical stance against Hesiod.

VI Conclusion

Solon's relationship to martial exhortation elegy, particularly Tyrtaeus' poetry, does not just represent, then, an example of poetic one-upmanship, but also questions the very foundations of political definitions, and the perspectives upon which they are based. The content of Solon's poetry subordinates the threat from without to that which is more dangerous, the threat from within. In terms of poetics, the tactics of this subordination represent a harnessing of the tropes and images of one type of elegy for other aims. But political and poetic aims cannot be easily separated: rather than registering a mere conflict over poetic debts – a simple assertion of one tradition over another – these appropriations have social and political implications; a critique of the function of poetry in society emerges in Solon 4. As far as martial exhortation is concerned, Solon's appropriations and inversions seem to challenge the social function of this form of elegy, unveiling the self-representations implicit within it for what they 'truly' are.

Whether Solon (and the tradition which he represents) criticises uniformly martial epic, such as the *Iliad*, when he inverts poetry which draws so heavily upon it, or whether he challenges a particular 'reading' or use of this genre, that is, the way martial exhortation elegy appropriates epic to serve certain social and political ends, remains unanswered. This is an issue to which the following chapters will return.

SOLON'S *ODYSSEY*

I Odyssean overtures

From the earliest scholarship onwards the programmatic introduction of Solon 4 has invited comparison with general themes and specific passages of the *Odyssey*, and in its strongest formulation has led critics to posit a close dependence of Solon's poem on the epic. Jaeger long ago connected the first 6 lines with Zeus's speech in the very first scene of the *Odyssey*:

ὦ πόποι, οἷον δὴ νῦ θεοὺς βροτοὶ αἰτιόωνται·
 ἐξ ἡμέων γάρ φασι κάκ' ἔμμεναι· οἱ δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ
 σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίῃσιν ὑπὲρ μόρον ἄλγε' ἔχουσιν,
 ὥς καὶ νῦν Αἰγισθος ὑπὲρ μόρον Ἀτρεΐδαο
 γῆμ' ἄλοχον μνηστήν, τὸν δ' ἔκτανε νοστήσαντα,
 εἰδὼς αἰπὺν ὄλεθρον· ἐπεὶ πρό οἱ εἶπομεν ἡμεῖς,
 Ἑρμείαν πέμψαντες, ἐὺσκοπον ἀργειφόντην,
 μήτ' αὐτὸν κτείνειν μήτε μνάσθαι ἄκοιτιν·
 ἐκ γὰρ Ὀρέσταο τίσις ἔσσεται Ἀτρεΐδαο,
 ὅππότε' ἂν ἠβήσῃ καὶ ἥς ἰμείρεται αἴης.
 ὥς ἔφαθ' Ἑρμείας, ἀλλ' οὐ φρένας Αἰγίσθοιο
 πεῖθ' ἀγαθὰ φρονέων· νῦν δ' ἀθρόα πάντ' ἀπέτισε.

(*Od.* 1.32–43)

Oh dear, how indeed do mortals blame us gods. For they say that from us come evils, but they themselves by their own recklessness also cause their own misery beyond what was given.¹ This was just now the case with Aegisthus who, beyond what was given, married the wedded wife of the son of Atreus, and killed him on his homecoming, although he knew this would be sheer disaster. For we told him in advance – we sent Hermes, the sharp-sighted slayer of Argos – not to kill Agamemnon, nor to woo Agamemnon's wife. For from his son Orestes there would be vengeance as soon as he came of age and desired his own country. This is what Hermes

¹ Lattimore's elegant translation (1965) of ὑπὲρ μόρον.

said, but he did not persuade the mind of Aegisthus, although he advised him well. And now he has paid for it all in one lump sum.

Not only is Zeus made to express 'an almost philosophical reflection on mankind's own responsibility for human misery', the very point of the first six lines of Solon 4,² but, as Jaeger further commented, there is the same antithesis of gods and humans, and the same misattribution by mortals of the cause of their suffering to gods, and these thematic similarities are simultaneously verbal: compare, for instance, the force of αὐτοί in *Od.* 1.33–4 and in Solon 4.5.³ Jaeger also saw 'Solon's ἀφραδίησιν' ('senselessness') as 'a direct imitation of the resonance of the *Odyssey*'s σφῆσιν ἀτασθαλίησιν' ('by their own recklessness').⁴ And Adkins contributed the point that ὑπὲρ μόνον ('beyond what was given') of the Odyssean passage corresponds in meaning to κατὰ ... Διὸς οὐποτ' ... αἴσαν ('never by the dispensation of Zeus'), in 4.1–3.⁵ Solon's use of φρένες ('intentions') may also be seen as pointed: in the Odyssean passage, the poet says that Hermes could not persuade the φρένες of Aegisthus (42), therefore the cause lies in the φρένες of mortals, a point made in Solon 4 through the negation of divine causality expressed in terms of their φρένες – the cause is οὐποτ' ... κατὰ ... θεῶν φρένας ἀθανάτων ('never as a result of the intentions of the immortal gods').

The points of contact between these two passages are striking, but, conditioned by recent decades of scholarship, one has become more cautious of too freely ascribing a model of strict allusion to Solon's Odyssean resonances. Questions regarding the circulation and popularity of the *Odyssey* (and its form) at the time of Solon, the understanding of allusion in orally derived poetry, and the selective view of archaic poetry produced by the meagreness of our extant sources all rightly challenge how one conceptualises the relationship between poetic texts in the archaic period.⁶

Even so, these caveats, particularly as they derive from our own limitations, do not allow the similarities between Solon 4

² Jaeger (1966) 83. ³ Adkins (1985) 114. ⁴ Jaeger (1966) 84, Adkins (1985) 114.

⁵ Adkins (1985) 114. ⁶ See pp. 22–6, 100–1.

and the *Odyssey* to be dismissed as insignificant. There is clearly the need to create an interpretative space between the traditional verdict of strict allusion and the countervailing view that reduces all repeated themes, such as human accountability, simply to the category of moral and poetic clichés.⁷ In the case of Solon 4, one can demonstrate a strong and significant intertextual relationship with the *Odyssey*. The poems thematically share a common perspective, expressed in comparable language. Moreover, if a definitive verdict is rendered impossible by the limitations of our evidence, following the design of the poem itself one can still demonstrate how it is distinctly situated within a range of poetic traditions, of which we have what may be deemed (among) the most important representatives.

Returning, then, to the introduction of Solon 4, it can be seen as significant that in theme, language and emphasis this poem strongly resonates with elements of the *Odyssey*: it opens with, and therefore privileges, precisely the issue that is a central concern of the *Odyssey*, as clearly stated in Zeus's programmatic speech. Other aspects suggest that the first lines of Solon 4 have a 'situating' function, aligning its content with the poetic tradition and world-view to which the *Odyssey* belongs. Differing from the Iliadic hand of Zeus, Athena's gesture in line 4 is evocative of a dominant feature of the *Odyssey*, Athena's instrumentality and protection.⁸ Moreover, Athena's presence has a double function: she is more relevant to the Athenian context of this poem, *and* her role as the central deity of the *Odyssey* may well evoke a poetic tradition whose philosophy is more relevant to Solon's message.⁹

Μεγάθυμος ('great-hearted') may have served as a flag for particular traditional associations of Athena. Solon's use of

⁷ Hinds (1998) 51. This interpretive space is especially needed in the case of archaic lyric because each of these positions tends to underplay the interaction of poetic texts with their wider cultural context – the former renders the relationship too narrowly textual and the latter renders it so diffuse as to be meaningless.

⁸ See pp. 93–4.

⁹ And for another approach to the link between the *Odyssey* and Athens see Cook (1995). On the importance of Athena in the *Odyssey* see Clay (1997).

this epithet belongs to what might be deemed distinctly Odyssean usage of this adjective. The word is used in hexameter poetry to describe warriors and nations, *except* in the *Odyssey*, where it is used also to describe Athena.¹⁰ Athena is the only deity to receive this appellation in Homer, only in the *Odyssey*, and only twice. Moreover, these two appearances punctuate the defining moments of Odysseus' epic career, referring to Athena precisely when she aids Odysseus in effecting his two most famous exploits, the sacking of Troy and his successful homecoming. Demodocus concludes his account of the fall of Troy in *Od.* 8.517–20:

αὐτὰρ Ὀδυσσῆα προτὶ δῶματα Διϊφόβοιο
βήμεναι, ἥϊτ' Ἄρηα, σὺν ἀντιθέῳ Μενελάῳ.
κεῖθι δὴ αἰνότατον πόλεμον φάτο τολμήσαντα
νικῆσαι καὶ ἔπειτα διὰ μεγάρυμον Ἀθήνην.

But Odysseus went like Ares to the house of Deiphobus, with god-like Menelaus. And there, he said, Odysseus braved the most terrible fighting and was victorious then again through the aid of great-hearted Athena.

Likewise, at 13.120–1, Athena is so called in the context of her bringing Odysseus home with honour by means of the Phaeacian gifts: ἃ οἱ Φαίηκες ἀγαυοὶ | ὥπασαν οἴκαδ' ἰόντι διὰ μεγάρυμον Ἀθήνην ('[gifts] the proud Phaeacians bestowed upon him as he returned home through the aid of great-hearted Athena'). It is also useful to recall that the epithet appears in a Solonian line otherwise linguistically evocative of an Odyssean description of Athena, τοίη γάρ οἱ πομπὸς ἄμ' ἔρχεται ... | Παλλὰς Ἀθηναίη ('For such is the escort that attends him ... Pallas Athena', *Od.* 4.826–8).¹¹

¹⁰ Adkins (1985) 112. See pp. 93–4.

¹¹ The concept of 'traditional referentiality' provides a useful way of understanding the intertextuality of Solon's and the *Odyssey*'s use of this epithet, the dynamics of which are outlined in Foley (1997). Linguistic units in orally-derived poetry, among which epithets are paramount, function as metonyms evoking a larger, traditional backdrop. Understanding their meaning 'depends crucially upon apprehending the formula in traditional context, on being aware of the prolepsis onto which the sign institutionally opens' (64). Bacchylides' use of σεμνὰ μεγάρυμος Ἀθάνη ('august, great-hearted Athena', 13.162) in connection with Pytheas' Athenian trainer suggests that there is something particularly elevated and Athenian about calling

Beyond the privileging of specific themes and the suggestive handling of Athena, the main body of Solon 4 shares a common outlook with the *Odyssey*. Most striking are the parallels with Odysseus' advice to Amphinomus in Book 18.130–50.¹² After describing the precariousness of man's ὄλβος,¹³ the disguised Odysseus says:

καὶ γὰρ ἐγὼ ποτ' ἔμελλον ἐν ἀνδράσιν ὄλβιος εἶναι,
πολλὰ δ' ἀτάσθαλ' ἔρεξα βίῃ καὶ κάρτεϊ εἴκων,
πατρί τ' ἐμῷ πίσυνος καὶ ἐμοῖσι κασιγνήτοισι.
τῷ μὴ τίς ποτε πάμπαν ἀνὴρ ἀθεμίστιος εἴη,
ἀλλ' ὃ γε σιγῇ δῶρα θεῶν ἔχοι, ὅττι διδοῖεν. (138–42)

For I too once was likely to be fortunate among men. But I did many reckless acts, yielding to violence and force, and relying upon my father and my brothers. May no man ever be lawless, but let him possess his gifts from the gods, whatever they may give, in silence.

The similarities between this passage and lines 5–6 of Solon 4 are striking. ἀτάσθαλα in line 139 conveys the same point as ἀφραδίαι ('senselessness') in Solon 4.5.¹⁴ In both passages a form of πείθω ('persuade') modifies the agents committing these acts, expressing the cause of their actions, the reliance upon a presumed power base that induces them to commit unlawful acts: in Solon the citizens are χρήμασι πειθόμενοι ('induced by wealth'), while Odysseus says he was πατρί τ' ἐμῷ πίσυνος καὶ ἐμοῖσι κασιγνήτοισι ('induced by my father and brothers'). Furthermore Solon 4.9–10 is evocative of Odysseus' characterisation of his adopted persona in 18.140–2: the idea of (not) maintaining or restraining one's good fortune without

Athena μεγάρθυμος ('great-hearted'), as well as confirming this adjective's use in contexts where Athena's support is confirmed. See also Mülke (2002) 105 on the connection of this epithet with Athena.

¹² Nestle (1942) 113–39 also identified a close connection between Solon 4 and *Odyssey* 18.

¹³ An awareness of the precariousness of man's ὄλβος ('prosperity') characterised fifth-century representations of both Solon (Hdt. 1.30–3) and Odysseus (Soph. *Ajax* 121–6).

¹⁴ The word ἀφραδίαι appears overwhelmingly in the *Odyssey* in contexts where the characters themselves suffer, alone or with others, on account of their ἀφραδίαι: the suitors, 17.233, 22.288; Polyphemus, 9.361; Odysseus and his men, 10.27. See also *Od.* 14.481, 19.523. The word operates also in the *Iliad* with the same range of meaning: 10.350, 5.649, 16.354.

lawlessness is central to both passages.¹⁵ Odysseus exhorts his audience not to be lawless (ἄθεμίστιος) and to maintain their prosperity (δῶρα θεῶν) 'in silence'/'quietly' (σιγῇ), while Solon emphasises the lawlessness or lack of δίκη of these people who have an ἄδικος νόος ('unjust mind')¹⁶ and ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθόμενοι ('trusting in unjust acts') do not protect the σεμνὰ Δίκης θέμεθλα ('august foundations of justice', 7, 11 and 14), and, moreover, do not know how to restrain their prosperity or their 'fill' (κόρος) 'in silence'/'quietly' (ἡσυχίῃ). The stance implicit in these passages further extends their degree of similarity: both poet and character assume roles of admonition. Solon not only describes actions analogous to those performed by the group Odysseus exhorts, but takes a stance of exhortation later in the poem (line 30). This parallelism of the stance of both Odysseus and Solon is strengthened by their warnings of retribution that follow immediately in both passages.¹⁷

The themes of *Odyssey* 18.130–50 appear elsewhere in Solon's poetry, for example in 13.33ff., and there are several other details of Solon's poetry which invite comparison with Odyssean passages, both in language and theme.¹⁸ While it remains always open in such instances to consider these poetic reflections as commonplaces of early Greek poetry and

¹⁵ And in Solon more generally, as in 13.71–3:

πλούτου δ' οὐδὲν τέρμα πεφασμένον ἀνδράσι κέϊται·
οἱ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλείστον ἔχουσι βίον,
διπλάσιον σπεύδουσι· τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας;

Of wealth no limit lies revealed to men. For those of us now who have the greatest livelihood, are twice as keen to increase it. Who could satisfy them all?

¹⁶ If one takes this passage of Solon as very closely related to *Odyssey* 18, then one may wonder about the phrase ἄδικος νόος ('unjust mind') in relation to Odysseus' chief opponent Ἀντίνοος, for whom the recipient of Odysseus' advice, Ἀμφινόμος, flagged by his name, functions as a foil.

¹⁷ Solon 4.14–16 and *Od.* 18.143–50. On Solon's stance in this poem see pp. 193–6 in Ch. 6.

¹⁸ One may compare *Od.* 17.243–6 with Solon 4.5–6, 9–10 and 13.16–9, both for the particular use of φθεῖρω ('to destroy', used only here in the active in Homer) and for the image of scattering (διασκεδάσ-) as a description of retribution for hybris.

thought,¹⁹ they are never 'merely' such: it must still be considered significant which clusters of 'commonplaces' appear in which texts.²⁰ Or rather, there are circumstances in which it is 'more important to affirm the existence of a shared discourse than to classify the individual voices which make up that discourse', as Hinds rightly points out. And yet, Solon 4 and the *Odyssey*, I will argue, seem to demand more: the density of this shared material in a short elegy, coupled with the shared handling of Athena, invites one both to explore the implications of the common ground between the poems, and not to exclude out of hand a closer, even intentional, relationship between the two texts.

II Adopting an Odyssean stance?

Discussion of the similarity of the themes and outlook of the *Odyssey* and Solon 4 leads to questions about the possibility of a more direct relationship between the *Odyssey* and the stance adopted by Solon. Under this and the following section heading, analysis of several different types of material suggests a stronger connection between Solon, Odysseus and the *Odyssey*. Though parts of this discussion must remain speculative, owing to the nature of the material, in itself the attempt to recover a rich and interactive poetic culture is not without value.²¹ At the very least, such a discussion explores the potentialities for the intertextual relationship the poetry of Solon and the *Odyssey* may have enjoyed in an archaic Athenian context;

¹⁹ To dismiss resonances simply on the grounds that they are 'commonplaces' is simplistic. A commonplace can be expressed so influentially in a given work as to shape the way it is for ever after formulated. Furthermore, sentiments may simultaneously be commonplaces *and* closely associated with certain figures or types of poetry. See also Hinds (1998) 17–51 on the dangers of an 'essentialism of a firm distinction between allusion proper and participation in a *topos*' (34), among which most destructive is the tendency to see identifying commonplaces or *topoi* as 'the end of interpretation' rather than as an 'invitation to interpret' (51).

²⁰ Hinds (1998) 50–1.

²¹ The most difficult being the precise dating of *our Odyssey* and what is meant by 'our': for a measured survey of the issues see S. West (1988) 33–40; see also Jensen (1980). On the intertextuality between the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* see Pucci (1987), Edwards (1985) and the remarks of Cook (1995) 3–5.

but it may well also reveal the kind of role played by both bodies of poetry in the articulation of archaic (Athenian) politics.

There are three levels at which Solon 4 may be seen to adopt an Odyssean stance.

Response to martial epic

Solon's critique of martial epic discussed in Chapter 4 – the use of that genre's imagery and language as a foil for internal strife and the violation of δίκη – recapitulates in elegy a prevalent and frequently discussed feature of the *Odyssey*, namely, its response to martial epic. As Charles Segal comments, in the *Odyssey* the epic tradition is 'held up for reflection, examination, criticism'.²² Odysseus' first and disastrous martial exploit after his victorious departure from Troy, the sack of the Cicones, initiates this dominant theme of the poem (*Od.* 9.39–61). Next, Odysseus' naïve expectation that reference to his reputation at Troy will be meaningful to Polyphemus (*Od.* 9.259–71), followed by his ruinous urge to assert his heroic identity (as, in fact, 'sacker of cities', 504) to his opponent, an act which is part and parcel of receiving fame (*Od.* 9.500–5), implies the unviability of martial epic patterns and values, at least in particular contexts. Most striking is the 'deeply ironic contrast' of Odysseus' encounter with Scylla:²³ despite Circe's warning (σχέτλιε, καὶ δὴ αὖ τοι πολεμήϊα ἔργα μέμλε | καὶ πόνος· οὐδὲ θεοῖσιν ὑπεῖξαι ἀθανάτοισιν; | ... οὐδέ τις ἐστ' ἀλκή· φυγέειν κάρτιστον ἀπ' αὐτῆς, 'Stubborn one, always are the works of war and toil foremost in your mind. Will you not even yield to the immortals? ... For there is no place for battle valour; to flee from her is best', 12.116–20),²⁴ Odysseus arms

²² Segal (1996) 204. This is a much-discussed feature of the *Odyssey*: see for instance Reinhardt (1996) 74, Edwards (1985), Clay (1997) 96–111, Pucci (1998) 1–10.

²³ Reinhardt (1996) 74: 'The clash between the heroism of the *Iliad* and that of fairy tale is nowhere else represented with such a fantastic sense of horror.'

²⁴ Note the dramatic contrast of this advice with the exhortation of *Il.* 5.532: φευγόντων δ' οὐτ' ἄρ κλέος ὄρνυται οὐτέ τις ἀλκή ('When men are in rout, there is neither fame, nor any valour').

for encounter (*Od.* 12.228–9) only to realise, as his men horrendously perish, that his efforts are completely useless. Moreover, this trumping occurs also on the level of poetics: with the inclusion and framing of the Sirens' Iliadic song, as Pucci observes, 'the *Odyssey* appropriates the *Iliad* with a gesture of disavowal'.²⁵

Although it subverts the imagery and values of martial epic, the *Odyssey* nevertheless draws on this genre in order to privilege its own values, the most dominant of which is proper social behaviour, conveyed through patterns of commensality.²⁶ Given the prominence in the *Odyssey* of this polemical relation to martial epic, articulated at the level of theme and poetics, it would not be surprising for a poetic alignment with the *Odyssey* to bring in its train a similar relationship to martial epic. This, as seen in the last chapter, is exactly the programme adopted in the introduction of Solon 4 and executed throughout the poem: Solon recapitulates in elegy this Odyssean programme through his use of martial epic and elegiac imagery as foil. In doing so, he reiterates the intertextual dynamic between elegy and epic apparent between the martial poetry of both genres, while simultaneously providing a critique of martial elegy's particular form of participating in it.

Let us return to the adjectives describing Athena in line 3 of Solon 4. Adkins finds Solon's use of ὀβριμοπάτρη ('she of a mighty father') odd. Although seeing it as significantly strong in contrast with the adjectives μακάρες and ἄθάνατοι of the previous lines (a strength matched by Athena's appearance in the nominative in contrast to the other gods in the genitive), he writes,

The daughter of a mighty sire is presumably herself powerful; but unless she is *more* powerful than Zeus (which even the most patriotic Athenian might be chary of asserting), Zeus's might seems *prima facie* an inappropriate theme at this point.²⁷

²⁵ Pucci (1998) 6. See also the encounters in the *Nekuia* (11.84–575), particularly with Achilles, and Edwards (1985) 43–70, Clay (1997) esp. 106.

²⁶ See for instance, Saïd (1979), Rundin (1996). On the ethics of commensality in the *Odyssey*, see Bielohlawek (1940), Slater (1990), Fehr (1990), van Wees (1992, 1995b), Ford (1999a).

²⁷ Adkins (1985) 112.

The verdict 'inappropriate' may be countered by a consideration of the Homeric pedigree of this adjective.²⁸ Of its 5 appearances, 2 in the *Iliad* and 3 in the *Odyssey*, 3 are in a formulaic passage, *Il.* 5.745–7 = 8.391–3:

ἐς δ' ὄχρεα φλόγεια ποσὶ βήσετο, λάζετο δ' ἔγχος
βριθὺ μέγα στιβαρόν, τῷ δάμνησι στίχας ἀνδρῶν
ἥρώων, οἷσιν τε κοτέσσεται ὀβριμοπάτρη.

And she mounted her gleaming chariot, and she was taking hold of her spear, heavy, huge and thick, with which she overcomes the ranks of heroes, against whom she of a mighty father is angry.

The description clearly belongs to a martial context.²⁹ It is then significant that when the *Odyssey* first employs the word ὀβριμοπάτρη it is in this epic formula and at the moment when Athena leaves Olympus in order to exhort Telemachus to address the dysfunctional social situation in Ithaca:

εἴλετο δ' ἄλκιμον ἔγχος, ἀκαχμένον ὀξέϊ χαλκῷ,
βριθὺ μέγα στιβαρόν, τῷ δάμνησι στίχας ἀνδρῶν
ἥρώων, τοῖσιν τε κοτέσσεται ὀβριμοπάτρη. (1.99–101)

She seized her stout spear, tipped with sharp bronze, heavy, huge and thick, with which she overcomes the ranks of heroes, against whom she of a mighty father is wroth.

By using an epithet belonging to Athena's capacity in martial contexts, an analogy is made between exhorting heroes to battle and the exhortation of Telemachus within a social and civic frame, as the assembly of Book 2 will show.³⁰ This analogy remains important in the final 'battle scene' inside the house of Odysseus, in which Athena plays her marshalling role, and in the confrontation with the relatives of the

²⁸ As Mülke (2002) 105 comments, this adjective appears 'in Homer exclusively for Athena and always in this place in the hexameter'.

²⁹ See Kirk (1990) 135.

³⁰ The other two Odyssean appearances of ὀβριμοπάτρη ('she of a mighty father') are in contexts of retribution or reconciliation as in *Od.* 3.135, when Athena punishes the Achaeans in their homecomings (within the speech of Menelaus) and *Od.* 24.540 when she ends the warlike conditions in Ithaca. For a related discussion of the specificity of the use of Iliadic language in the *Odyssey*, see Pucci (1998) 1–11.

suitors who are termed πρόμαχοι ('forefighters').³¹ One notes the distinctly 'Iliadic turn'³² that the poem takes at 22.116–25, when Odysseus exchanges bow for shield, and when Athena appears, commanding them to end the conflict: ἴσχεσθε πτολέμου, Ἰθακήσιοι, ἀργαλέοιο ('Cease from grievous war, men of Ithaca').³³ A comparison is forged between Solon's striking portrayal of citizens as in fact δυσμενέες ('enemies') and the 'othering' of the suitors (and by extension their relatives) effected by the *Odyssey*.³⁴ The use of this imagery is closely related to Solon's own appropriations of martial material. The warlike conditions within Athens mirror a theme explored with sophistication in the *Odyssey*.

Structural analogies

However one imagines the reception of this detail by members of an audience, the rarity of applying μεγάλθυμος ('great-hearted') to a god and its placement in the *Odyssey* do appear to have a precise function in the articulation of a striking feature of the poem, its structure.³⁵ μεγάλθυμος first appears in Demodocus' song (8.520, see above), evoking Athena's epic role in helping Odysseus νικῆσαι ('to prevail') precisely at the moment when both song and Troy reach their end, but with his travels yet to begin (chronologically and narratively). The poet then describes Athena with this adjective at the moment of Odysseus' arrival in Ithaca (13.121, οἴκαδ' ἰόντι διὰ μεγάλθυμον Ἀθήνην, 'going home with the aid of great-hearted Athena'): his travels finished, but his struggles at home yet to come. In punctuating the completion of two phases of Odysseus' pre-homecoming life – the war, and the

³¹ πρόμαχοι ('forefighters') 24.596. The language of martial conflict is pervasive; see 20.47–51 and 22.224–32; and see Noussia (2001) 253.

³² Haubold (2000) 123.

³³ 24.531. Lines 528–30 further trade in the language of war.

³⁴ On the portrayal of the suitors in the *Odyssey* see Haubold (2000) 100–45.

³⁵ The significance of structure to the interpretation of the *Odyssey* is an immense subject: see most recently the study by Loudon (1999) and Slatkin (1996). For a basic overview of the subject see Hölscher (1991) and Tracy (1996).

adventures – the placement of this epithet of Athena presents numerous thematic analogies between these chapters of Odysseus' epic career, and structurally frames Odysseus' own narrative which he delivers in Scheria.

If *μεγάθυμος* seems significantly deployed in the *Odyssey*, at once to bring to an end both Troy and the bard's performance of a song about that end, Solon's use of this adjective seems likewise marked and Odyssean, appearing at the very moment in which the poet is evoking both war and its poetic genres only as a point of departure for his poem, one that will be characterised by the themes that occupy the *Odyssey*. Such a containment of martial themes and its poetry effected by structure is in fact a strategy shared by the *Odyssey*. In Solon 4, the external threat of war expressed in epic language is dealt with and shut off from the rest of the poem, returning only in the inversions of its tropes for the description of stasis. Similarly, two layers of Odysseus' epic past are effectively contained through the structure of the poem: his martial exploits in Demodocus' song of Book 8 and his adventures in which he learns to contain his Iliadic self in *Odyssey* 9–12. When the themes of martial epic do return in the *Odyssey*, they are harnessed for the reinstatement of proper social norms: Solon may be said to describe the internal situation of Athens as a war, the *Odyssey* to dramatise this in Ithaca.

Could Solon 4 be exploiting an Odyssean structural design? This would be difficult to prove, but some striking, if inconclusive, parallels should be noted. Structure articulates central themes of both poems. Odysseus' tales open with and are characterised by the themes of human causality and the disastrous excess in feasting.³⁶ Immediately following a vivid description of the encounter with the Cicones, Odysseus says,

ἔνθ' ἧ τοι μὲν ἐγὼ διερῶ ποδὶ φευγέμεν ἡμέας
ἡνώγεα, τοὶ δὲ μέγα νήπιοι οὐκ ἐπίθοντο.

³⁶ See Solon 4.9–10. This theme operates also in the scene involving the cattle of the Sun (12.260–419): just as Hermes' approach to Aegisthus, narrated in the opening of Book 1, underscored Aegisthus' responsibility for his own fate, so Circe's and Teiresias' advice to Odysseus (11.104–13, 12.135–41) isolate men as fully accountable for their own deeds.

ἔνθα δὲ πολλὸν μὲν μέθυ πίνετο, πολλὰ δὲ μῆλα
ἔσφαζον παρὰ θῖνα καὶ εἰλίποδας ἔλικας βοῦς. (9.43–6)

I then urged them to flee with a nimble foot, but they in their great foolishness did not obey. But at that moment much wine was being drunk and they were slaughtering many flocks and shambling curved-horned cows on the beach.

It is then not only the entire *Odyssey* and Solon 4 that foreground the themes of human accountability and recklessness as recognised by Jaeger, but so too does Odysseus' own performance.³⁷

These structural and thematic similarities with Odysseus' self-narrated account also seem to share a common language. Odysseus begins his tales by narrating a situation in which the recklessness of his men leads to disaster, but before describing the entire consequences of their behaviour, he says in 9.52–3: τότε δὴ ῥα κακὴ Διὸς αἴσα παρέστη | ἡμῖν αἰνομόροισιν, ἵν' ἄλγεα πολλὰ πάθοιμεν ('Then indeed evil was the dispensation of Zeus that befell us ill-fated ones, so that we would suffer many hardships'). Verbal similarities with Solon 4.1–2 Διὸς αἴσα and line 8 ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν ('to suffer many hardships') are evident.³⁸ The surface contradiction with the sentiment of Solon 4.1–2, in so far as Odysseus seems to be attributing their disasters to the gods, is dissipated by the elaborate alternative human causality which Odysseus himself has already expressed and by the fact that the rest of Odysseus' account, as well as the events in his house, will make clear the role of individual human ἀτασθαλίαι ('recklessness') in suffering.³⁹

³⁷ One might push farther: the fallen city, suggesting Troy, stands threateningly at the beginning of Solon 4, yielding to, while strengthening, the main themes of the poem – proper behaviour, *hybris*, *δίκη* and stasis; likewise Demodocus' song stands prior to Odysseus' account, an account in which the themes of heroic epic are subordinated to issues of social concerns, proper behaviour and human accountability. On the function of Demodocus' song in the *Odyssey* see Anderson (1997) 88.

³⁸ Campbell (1982) 241.

³⁹ As indeed the seventh line of the *Odyssey* emphasises. A comparison of Odysseus' narrative with Menelaus' of Book 3 shows the gulf lying between these characters in the extent to which they attribute their misfortunes to the gods: see *Od.* 3.130–75, esp. 132, 134, 145–6, 152, 158, 160, 173–5.

Verbal parallels between Solon 4 and *Odyssey* 9 continue. Recognised even in antiquity to have long been a 'purple passage'⁴⁰ and forming an important moment in the *Odyssey*'s narrative, Odysseus' address to Alcinous is both verbally and contextually suggestive for Solon 4:

Ἀλκίνοε κρείον, πάντων ἀριδείκετε λαῶν,
 ἦ τοι μὲν τόδε καλὸν ἀκουέμεν ἐστὶν ἀοιδοῦ
 τοιοῦδ' ὅλος ὅδ' ἐστί, θεοῖς ἐναλίγκιος αὐδήν.
 οὐ γὰρ ἐγὼ γέ τί φημι τέλος χαριέστερον εἶναι
 ἢ ὅτ' εὐφροσύνη μὲν ἔχῃ κατὰ δῆμον ἅπαντα,
 δαιτυμόνες δ' ἀνὰ δώματ' ἀκουάζωνται ἀοιδοῦ
 ἡμενοὶ ἐξείης, παρὰ δὲ πλῆθωσι τράπεζαι
 σίτου καὶ κρειῶν, μέθυ δ' ἐκ κρητῆρος ἀφύσσων
 οἶνοχόος φορέῃσι καὶ ἐγχείῃ δεπάεσσι.
 τοῦτό τί μοι κάλλιστον ἐνὶ φρεσὶν εἶδεται εἶναι.

Lord Alcinous, exalted among all the people, truly it is a fine thing to listen to a bard, and one of such talent as this man is, his voice similar to the gods'. For I for my part think that there is no more sublime accomplishment, than when gladness prevails throughout the entire people, and feasters throughout the house listen to the bard, sitting side by side, and the tables beside them teeming with bread and meat, and drawing sweet wine from a mixing bowl the steward brings it and fills the cups. This seems to my mind the finest thing. (*Od.* 9.2–11)

This passage has overwhelming significance for the narrative of the *Odyssey*, providing a description of the powers of the bard within the larger community, at the very moment when Odysseus is about to assume the bard's role. Although this passage ostensibly describes positive social dynamics and harmony, its function as foil for Ithaca, where such responses to the bard and socially correct feasting do not occur, draws it closer in theme and subject to Solon 4.⁴¹ The presence of

⁴⁰ The *Certamen* (90–4 Allen) claims of this passage: οὕτω σφοδρῶς φασὶ θανμασθῆναι τοὺς στίχους ὑπὸ τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὥστε χρυσοὺς αὐτοὺς προσαγορευθῆναι, καὶ ἔτι καὶ νῦν ἐν ταῖς κοιναῖς θυσίαις πρὸ τῶν δέλτων καὶ σποιδῶν προκατεύχεσθαι πάντας ('They say that these verses were so exceedingly admired by the Greeks that they called them "golden", and even now still in the public sacrifices before the meal and the libations they all offer these as a prayer'). On dating the contents of the *Certamen* see Richardson (1981) 1–10 with bibliography. On the significance of this passage in antiquity, its placement and function in the *Odyssey*, and its sympotic quality see Ford (1999a).

⁴¹ The function of this passage as a foil is not only one inferred by the reader/listener, but one to which Odysseus makes reference in his own introduction, 9.21–38.

εὐφροσύνη (9.6) and the part feasting plays as a symbol of proper social order resonate with Solon 4: lines 9–10 describe the dysfunctional leaders, οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον οὐδὲ παρούσας | εὐφροσύνας κοσμεῖν δαιτὸς ἐν ἡσυχίῃ ('For they do not know how to restrain their excess, nor how to maintain with order the present festivities of the feast in peace').⁴² Moreover applying the term δαῖς ('feast') to the gatherings of Solon's contemporaries configures these in epic terms, evocation of, yet a foil to, the Phaeacian δαιτυμόνες ('feasters', 9.7).⁴³ The commonality of the εὐφροσύνη ('good cheer') prevailing in Scheria (κατὰ δῆμον ἅπαντα, 'throughout the entire demos') and the orderly way in which they feast and drink while listening to their αἰδός stand in stark contrast to the lack of ἡσυχίη ('calm') at the feasts of Solon's ἀστοί. If there is an intertextual relation between the two passages, Odysseus' praise of Scheria as a foil for the situation in Ithaca would resonate in Solon 4.9–10 as a foil for the situation at Athens, which Solon has already described in evocative Odyssean terms (5–8).

Stepping back from the level of linguistic detail, the performance contexts of these elegiac and epic expressions seem to reach toward one another. If δαῖς ('feast') of line 10 represents elegy configuring contemporary forms of commensality in epic terms – not least the symposium – Odysseus' address to Alcinous and more generally these feasting scenes in Scheria have been seen by several scholars as epic reflecting the contemporary symposium. In this connection, Ford has analysed 9.2–11 as part of a 'tradition of sympotic song', while Slater has argued persuasively that 'sympotic ethics' are a central concern of the *Odyssey*, particularly in Book 8.⁴⁴ In both scholars' accounts, Odysseus emerges in performance as the

⁴² For the close connection of εὐφροσύνη with the symposium see Murray (1983a) 262, Melissano (1994) 56–7. See for instance Xenophanes 1.4: κρητὴρ δ' ἔστηκεν μεστός εὐφροσύνης ('the crater stands full of *euphrosune*').

⁴³ See Führer, *LfrgrE* II 202ff. s.v. δαῖς. See also Mülke (2002) 116–17, who comments on its rarity in early Greek lyric: the only other elegiac or iambic use of this word is Thgn. 563.

⁴⁴ Ford (1999a), acknowledging his debt to Bielhlawek (1940). Ford connects Odysseus' speech to the philosophical and verbal game characteristic of the

model symposiast, if not also sympotic poet, and, one might add, this he does at that moment when he is about to modulate into epic singer. The points of Ford and Slater may be taken further to show how Odysseus' speech of 9.2–11 functions, in the style of Xenophanes (among others),⁴⁵ to change the subject of song at the present festivities from quarrels and war (*Od.* 8.72–95 and 8.499–520) and the adultery of the gods (*Od.* 8.266–366) to the proper conduct at the feast and its relationship to wider social harmony (9.2–11), and then, perhaps less nobly but Solon-like, to himself.⁴⁶ Such a characterisation of Odysseus' performance among the Phaeacians might function as a valid description of certain aspects of Solon's own poetics: if Odysseus influences the entertainment of the feast, modulating the traditional subjects of song from the erotic and martial to himself, the singing of Solon 4 at the symposium has a similar effect: its performance prioritises the themes and the 'I' of this poem, altering as each poetic performance will do the overall composition of that symposium, and excluding, at least for the duration of its performance, other competing forms of sympotic poetry – the more straightforwardly epicising martial and the erotic – and, of course, the 'I' of other poets.

Poets and heroes

Whether as sympotic participant or heroic narrator, the poetic stance of Odysseus in Book 9 offers further food for thought in this context. In a passage of great significance for both the

sympotic verse termed by Fränkel ((1950) 407–8) *καλλίστον τὸ δεῖναι* ('the best thing is "x"'). Slater (1990) in turn demonstrates how Odysseus' second day among the Phaeacians provides a demonstration of Odysseus as 'the master of sympotic *charis*' and how the '*charis* of song and story triumphs in the ideal *symposion* over strife' (219).

⁴⁵ The preference of pleasant topics over those of war and strife was a topos of sympotic poetry that implies the prevalence of these subjects at the symposium at the moment when the present singer subordinates them (on moralising grounds) to his own preference for song; in elegy, see for instance Anacreon 2 W with Ford (2002) 42–3.

⁴⁶ Cf. Bowra (1938b), Ford (1999a) 119. For a wider discussion of Odysseus' careful management of the infelicities of the social environment in Scheria see Rose (1969).

themes and poetics of the *Odyssey*, several lines describe the poet and his powers. Odysseus describes it as καλόν to hear such a singer as Demodocus, elaborating the point with a full description of domestic and civic harmony (κατὰ δῆμον ἅπαντα, 'throughout the entire people'). The poet reciting the *Odyssey* thus makes a statement through his central character about the powers of his poem, a poem that makes its central theme the championing of social order. At the same time, Odysseus himself is in the process of becoming such a singer for his fellow diners, and is therefore about to create or participate in the situation that he himself has just described, recounting tales in which proper social behaviour is the focus.⁴⁷

This stance of Odysseus in Scheria has suggestive analogies with the stance created by Solon. Odysseus describes the powers of the singer in connection with domestic harmony, characterised by the orderly meal, in terms at home in archaic sympotic poetry. In narrating his own tales, he becomes singer and subject of his own song. His song is one in which although divine beings operate, men create ἄλγεα ('hardships') for themselves and others through their ἀτασθαλίας ('recklessness') and ἀφραδίαι ('senselessness'). It is an account where martial ἀρετή affords little help, and restraint of desires is the key to successful survival. In turn, Solon, lawgiver and political figure, sings a song destined for the symposium about Athenian politics of which he is a chief figure:⁴⁸ he is, like Odysseus, singer and subject. He sings about ἄλγεα ('hardships') which result from human recklessness while containing and subordinating the ἀρετή of martial epic and exhortation elegy to the theme of restraint in social contexts (κατέχειν κόρον, 'to restrain their

⁴⁷ And of course, the doubling of Odysseus as bard is one explored to great effect in the *Odyssey*: see *Od.* 19.203, ἴσκε ψεύδεα πολλὰ λέγων ἐτύμοισιν ὁμοῖα ('He knew how to speak many false words that were like true sayings'), a description capable of characterising (some) poets, Hes. *Theog.* 27–8. Consider Rose's comment (1992) 113 that the consciousness of the poet of the *Odyssey* about 'his own activity and the status of poets in heroic society ... corresponds quite closely to the more obvious self-consciousness of Hesiod about poetry'; cf. Nagy (1990) 71. The bibliography on this subject is extensive: Segal (1996) 202 and Rüter (1969) 273–4, Pucci (1987), Nagy (1990) 44–5, Goldhill (1991) 65–6 and 95–7, Rose (1992) 99 and Slatkin (1996).

⁴⁸ His role in politics features more explicitly in other poems, such as 36.

satiety'), and describes how the survival of the city is dependent upon this. The differences of tone could be attributed to differences in context: Solon speaks in warning, while Odysseus speaks with a positive tone to his Phaeacian audience, although the external listener senses the tension between the content of his speech and the circumstances in Ithaca. Even Odysseus' praise of Ithaca, that there is no place he'd rather be (οὐ τοι ἐγὼ γε | ἦς γαίης δύναμαι γλυκερώτερον ἄλλο ἰδέσθαι | ... ὥς οὐδὲν γλύκιον ἦς πατρίδος, 'I, for my part, can't think of anything sweeter to look on than this land ... as nothing is sweeter than the land of one's fathers', 27–8, 34), following less than 10 lines after his description of the bard, seems captured in Solon's ἡμετέρα δὲ πόλις ('our city'): the expression of deep attachment despite the knowledge of the social problems in the polis.⁴⁹

Thematic, structural, verbal resonances with the *Odyssey* and particularly with *Odyssey* 9–12 are suggestive of the possibility that Odysseus stands behind the poetic persona implicit in Solon 4. That the several parallelisms between Solon 4 and the *Odyssey* are not just generally evocative of the *Odyssey*, but also more particularly of Odysseus' speeches, his 'performances', within the *Odyssey* may contribute to the possibility that Solon's poetic stance was constructed from the *Odyssey*'s Odysseus who is both poet of, and leader in, the narrative that he tells.

Again, the coincidences are striking, rather than conclusive. If one was not convinced of the priority of the *Odyssey* as we have it, the argument might well be turned around and the similarities adduced in Solon 4 seen as valuable in suggesting how an epic shaped by these central concerns came to emerge or be popular in a time (and quite likely a location) almost shared with Solon.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ A further irony lies in the fact that at the moment when these lines are spoken not only does the audience of the *Odyssey* know the conditions which prevail at Ithaca, but Odysseus the character also knows since he learned this in the underworld, and yet the audience does not know that Odysseus knows until later in his narrative (*Od.* 11.115–20).

⁵⁰ For a lengthy, if not entirely convincing, discussion of the importance of the *Odyssey* at Athens see Cook (1995). See also pp. 284–6 and Appendix II.

That Odysseus may be lurking beneath Solon's poetic stance is not incredible: other archaic poets seem to have likewise found Odysseus good to appropriate. Not only has Bernd Seidensticker argued the same point persuasively for Archilochus, but the poetry of Theognis furnishes a closer analogy for Solon.⁵¹ Gregory Nagy has highlighted the importance of νόος, the centrality of poverty as a stance and the emphasis on versatility in linking Theognis with Odysseus: the poet describes himself in terms of the πολυπλόκος πουλύπους ('crafty octopus'), while Odysseus defined as πολύτροπος ('of many turnings') in the *Odyssey* shares the image of the πουλύπους ('octopus').⁵² Beyond the thematic resonances, Theognis explicitly likens himself to Odysseus in 1123–5:

μή με κακῶν μίμνησκε· πέποιθά τοι οἶα τ' Ὀδυσσεύς,
ὅς τ' Ἀΐδew μέγα δῶμ' ἤλυθεν ἐξαναδύς.
ὅς δὴ καὶ μνηστῆρας ἀνείλετο νηλεῖ θυμῷ.

Don't remind me of my misfortunes. Indeed I have suffered in the same way as Odysseus, who went to the great house of Hades and came back again. Odysseus who also killed the suitors with his pitiless heart.

While dating the fragments preserved in the corpus of the *Theognidea* can be problematic, more important here is the fact that an elegiac poet explicitly alludes to similarities between his circumstances and those of Odysseus. Such explicit identification in elegy encourages one in thinking allusion to be present in those passages that seem closely associated through themes or imagery. The questions for the remainder of this chapter are whether these elusive suggestions of an Odyssean stance for Solon find confirmation elsewhere in traditions surrounding him, and what the political consequences for

⁵¹ Seidensticker (1978), who sees the same relationships to the *Iliad* and *Odyssey* in the stance of Archilochus as argued here for Solon. See also Lloyd-Jones (1971) 37–40 and, with caution, Stanford (1954) 90–1. In the iambic tradition, the poetry of Hipponax provides a later striking – if fragmentary – parallel: explicit textual references to the *Odyssey* (especially the Phaeacian segment, frs. 74–7) and other details of Hipponax's biographical tradition suggest identification with the Odysseus of the *Odyssey*: see Rosen (1990).

⁵² Nagy (1985) 74–6. Thgn. 215–18 and *Od.* 1.1, 5.432, 10.330. On poverty see Thgn. 649–52 and *Od.* 17.387, 18.15–19. See Nagy (1985) 75 and (1979) 228–37 on Odysseus as beggar.

this poetic stance might be. Discussion of the latter question will provide the basis for Part III of this book.

III Πολύτροπος Οδυσσεύς: *Odysseus as a political stance*

Reaching beyond Solon 4, aspects of Solon's 'biography' draw us into the world of the epic Odysseus: the story of Salamis, that of his travels, and his interaction with Peisistratus. These stories demand nuanced evaluation in light of the apparent Odyssean stance adopted in Solon 4; but the difficulties in maintaining their historicity require at the outset a discussion of the methodology one must employ in approaching these traditions.⁵³

Some preliminary remarks need to be made regarding how the biographical tradition has been handled in recent scholarship, and how it will be handled in the discussion to follow. Historians and literary critics have often inadvertently conspired to leave the biographical tradition of Solon under-explored. From the literary side, extreme positions on biographical traditions of poets as derived from their own poetry and on the non-autobiographical nature of the poet's 'I' have implicitly sanctioned neglect of the traditions surrounding Solon: too much history is at stake in Solon's poetry to treat his 'I' and his biographical tradition in the same way as those of Archilochus, and therefore he is generally avoided in such discussions.⁵⁴ In contrast, the traditional historical approach has tended to trim away the 'fantastic' in these accounts, the obviously biased, and (sometimes) the obviously generic, and

⁵³ Both Noussia (2001) 228–9 and Vox (1984) 17–48 have also recognised an Odyssean stance in the Salamis story, with different emphases. A version of this section will appear in Irwin (forthcoming a).

⁵⁴ Lefkowitz (1981), for instance, becomes more contradictory when it comes to Solon. Although she argues that the biographical tradition cannot be trusted because it derives from the poet's own work, she then says in the case of Solon, 'If more of Solon's poetry survived we could distinguish with more confidence between the real events in his life and the accretions of tradition' (47), as if the poems could ever be treated simply as historical documents. On dealing with the biographical tradition of poets, see Irwin (1998) with bibliography.

repeat (with caution) a story that is in the end not far from a rationalised version of ancient accounts. These strategies are not entirely without merit, but approaches that dismiss out of hand the rich details of the biographical tradition cannot be considered ideal, not least because, as Dougherty and Kurke so well observe, such narratives can sometimes retain 'metaphors or systems of signification that correspond to archaic ones', particularly visible in those details that are 'anomalous or obscure within the text in which they are embedded'.⁵⁵

In response to these approaches to the traditions, I make three points. First, one can engage with the details of the biographical tradition without passing judgement on its historicity. Studies that identify the common *topoi* within legendary narratives, such as those of wise man, lawgiver or poet, are of course valuable, but they do not eliminate the need to deal with the specific elements and logic of the individual narratives from which we derive these patterns.⁵⁶ Second, precisely because these traditions are derived largely from their poetry (sometimes lost to us), the biographical traditions of poets can contain important and often early evidence for the reception of both the poets and their poetry.⁵⁷ A corollary of this is that given the explicit awareness about the power of poetry to control reception, the poet may not have been an entirely passive victim. The possibility that the poet may have been not only proactive, but even occasionally successful, in controlling his own reception through his poetry certainly cannot be excluded. The fragments of Solon's poetry contain numerous attempts to manipulate the reception of its 'I'.⁵⁸ Finally, in those cases where it is as arbitrary to deny as to affirm the (however limited) access which these accounts may have to archaic tradition, one should try to pursue the consequences of both positions.⁵⁹ This is a difficult strategy, but does the

⁵⁵ Kurke and Dougherty (1993) 6. The *pilidion* of the Salamis story, I will argue below, is just such a detail.

⁵⁶ See Martin (1993) and Szegedy-Maszak (1978).

⁵⁷ Graziosi (2002) has refined this methodology in relation to Homer.

⁵⁸ See for instance frs. 4a, 5, 10, 19, 32, 34, 36, 37.

⁵⁹ A strategy admirably adopted by Stehle (1997) 61–3.

most justice to the evidence and runs less risk of imposing upon antiquity our own criteria of plausibility. Scholars today are willing to analyse seriously the exploits of Peisistratus, such as his entrance into Athens with Phye, as if they may well have occurred, and valuable discussions have emerged from such analysis.⁶⁰ And yet, despite the temporal and spatial proximity of Solon to Peisistratus, accounts of Solon, his travels, and his assumed madness, are almost uniformly deemed legendary and supposed to offer little of specific use for thinking about the politics of archaic Athens. In contrast, I suggest here and in Part III that attention to these 'legendary' traditions may actually place the careers of Solon and Peisistratus on a continuum, allowing each character to illuminate the career of the other with significant consequences for how the history of this period is constructed.⁶¹ I begin with a focus on the issue of Solon's heroic stance.

What's in a hat? Solon, Odysseus, and the Salamis

Solon's own attempt at martial exhortation elegy complements on several levels the analysis of Solon 4. While political appropriations of Homer figure in accounts of Solon's activities in the dispute with Megara over Salamis through the supposed use of the *Catalogue of Ships* as proof of Athenian ownership,⁶² the relationship of Solon, Salamis, and Homeric poetry is far more involved and brings into focus the issue of

⁶⁰ See Connor (1987) 40–50 (42 n. 11 and n. 12 provide a survey of scholarly positions on the veracity of this story), and Dougherty and Kurke (1993) 2 on the influence of Connor's approach. See also Else (1965) and (1957) 17–46. While caution must be applied, a dismissal of accounts of the archaic period as *a priori* too fantastic to be probable risks refashioning different cultures according to our own image. I leave aside certain modern, but equally unfathomable, historical events, such as certain senior members of Oxford University processing down 5th Avenue in full academic regalia in order to announce the opening of a New York branch of OUP. Was there ever a time when the publicity stunt was out of fashion?

⁶¹ See also Conclusion.

⁶² Strabo 9.1.10 says Solon used Homer as a 'witness' (cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1375 b32) and mentions, as do Diog. Laert. 1.48 and Plut. *Sol.* 1.10, a tradition of interpolation. See pp. 277–80.

the interrelationship between political and poetic stances. Plutarch provides the fullest narrative.⁶³

Ἐπεὶ δὲ μακρόν τινα καὶ δυσχερὴ πόλεμον οἱ ἐν ἄστει περὶ τῆς Σαλαμινίων νήσου Μεγαρεῦσι πολεμοῦντες ἐξέκαμον, καὶ νόμον ἔθεντο μήτε γράψαι τινα μήτ' εἰπεῖν αὐθις ὥς χρὴ τὴν πόλιν ἀντιποιεῖσθαι τῆς Σαλαμίνος, ἢ θανάτῳ ζημιοῦσθαι, βαρέως φέρων τὴν ἀδοξίαν ὁ Σόλων, καὶ τῶν νέων ὁρῶν πολλοὺς δεομένους ἀρχῆς ἐπὶ τὸν πόλεμον, αὐτοὺς δὲ μὴ θαρροῦντας ἄρξασθαι διὰ τὸν νόμον, ἐσκήψατο μὲν ἔκστασιν τῶν λογισμῶν, καὶ λόγος εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐκ τῆς οἰκίας διεδόθη παρακινήτικῳ ἔχειν αὐτόν· ἐλεγεία δὲ κρύφα συνθεῖς καὶ μελετήσας ὥστε λέγειν ἀπὸ στόματος, ἐξεπήδησεν εἰς τὴν ἀγορὰν ἄφνω, πιλίδιον περιθέμενος. ὄχλου δὲ πολλοῦ συνδραμόντος, ἀναβάς ἐπὶ τὸν τοῦ κήρυκος λίθον, ἐν ᾧ δὴ διεξῆλθε τὴν ἐλεγείαν ἧς ἐστὶν ἀρχή·

αὐτὸς κήρυξ ἦλθον ἀφ' ἱμερτῆς Σαλαμίνος,
κόσμον ἐπέων ᾧ δὴν ἀντ' ἀγορῆς θέμενος.

τοῦτο τὸ ποίημα Σαλαμὶς ἐπιγέγραπται καὶ στίχων ἑκατὸν ἐστὶ, χαριέντως πάννυ πεποιημένων. τότε δ' ἄσθέντος αὐτοῦ, καὶ τῶν φίλων τοῦ Σόλωνος ἀρξάμενων ἐπαινεῖν, μάλιστα δὲ τοῦ Πεισιστράτου τοῖς πολίταις ἐγκελευομένου καὶ παρορμῶντος πείθεσθαι τῷ λέγοντι, λύσαντες τὸν νόμον αὐθις ἤπτοντο τοῦ πολέμου, προστησάμενοι τὸν Σόλωνα.⁶⁴

When those in the city were exhausted from a long and difficult war against the Megarians over the island of Salamis and they laid down a law that no one was to urge by motion or in speech that the city should assert its claim to Salamis, or they should suffer the penalty of death, Solon did not bear the ill-repute easily and saw that many of the young wanted an incitement to war, but they were not bold enough to start it themselves because of this law, so he feigned a leave of his senses, and a story was circulated in the city from his home that he was disturbed. And having composed some elegiacs in secret and having practised so he could perform them from memory, he bounded into the agora very suddenly, wearing a *pilidion* on his head, and when a huge crowd had gathered, he leapt up on the herald's stone, and sang the elegy of which this is the beginning:

A herald I come from lovely Salamis | composing a song, a marshalling of words, instead of a speech.

⁶³ For the sources see Martina (1968) 122–30. For a full discussion of the Salamis affair see Linforth (1919) 249–64, French (1957), Hopper (1961) 208–17, Piccirilli (1978), Rhodes (1981) 199–200 and 224, Taylor (1997) 21–47; and, with commentary on the fragments, Noussia (1999) 61–72 and (2001) 223–33 and Mülke (2002) 73–88.

⁶⁴ Plut. *Sol.* 8 Ziegler. The remaining fragments are preserved in Diog. Laert. 1.47 (2–3).

This poem is entitled, *Salamis*, and it is composed of 100 very delightfully written lines. Then, when the song had been sung, and his friends were beginning to praise him – Peisistratus especially incited the citizens and urged them to heed Solon's words – they rescinded the law and began war, placing Solon in charge.

This story receives most attention from scholars interested in debating whether this testimony proves that elegy was performed in public contexts such as the agora, or whether the story ultimately arises from the poem itself, and the stance of herald that Solon has assumed in it.⁶⁵ Within these polarised positions of 'belief' and 'disbelief',⁶⁶ the rich details of the tradition are left regrettably under-explored. While these stories are late in the form they reach us and likely to be constructed in large part from the poetry itself, their creation and preservation indicate important elements about the audiences of the figure Solon and his poetry: the tradition is worth analysing in detail because at the very least it reveals crucial aspects of ancient reception.

First of all an explicit connection was made in antiquity between the martial exhortation of Solon and of the Iliadic Odysseus, suggesting heroic role-playing implicit in elegiac martial *paraenesis*. A scholion to *Il.* 2.183, relying on the authority of Aristotle, provides a connection between Solon's behaviour and a Homeric portrayal of Odysseus:

ἀπὸ δὲ χλαῖναν βάλε· ἀπρεπὲς εἶναι δοκεῖ τὴν χλαῖναν ἀποβαλόντα μονοχίτωνά θείν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα διὰ τοῦ στρατοπέδου, καὶ μάλιστα οἷος Ὀδυσσεὺς εἶναι ὑπέληπται. φησὶ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης, ἵνα διὰ τοῦτο θαυμάζων ὁ ὄχλος ἐπιστρέφεται, καὶ ἐξικνῆται ἡ φωνὴ ὡς ἐπὶ μείζονα ἄλλον ἄλλοθεν συνιόντος, οἷον καὶ Σόλων λέγεται πεποιηκέναι, ὅτε συνῆγε τὸν ὄχλον περὶ Σαλαμῖνος.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Most recently Bowie (1986) 18–21 *contra* West (1974) 12. See Tedeschi (1982) 33–46. The tide does seem to be turning: Stehle (1997) 61–3 at least entertains the possibility of the performance of Solon's elegiacs in the agora, while, most recently, Kurke (1999) 26 n. 64 *contra* Bowie is 'inclined to put more stock in the traditions about their performance'.

⁶⁶ Irwin (1998).

⁶⁷ Arist. fr. 143 Rose from Porphyry. Ὅμηρ. ζητήμ. It is uncertain from the phrasing whether the last two clauses (from οἷον) should also be attributed to Aristotle.

'He threw off his *chlaina*.' It seems to be inappropriate for Odysseus to run through the camp wearing only his *chiton*, having cast off his *chlaina*, and most of all inappropriate for someone of the sort Odysseus is supposed to be. But Aristotle says that he did it so that the crowd might turn back in amazement and his voice might reach a greater area and people would gather from all directions as also Solon is said to have done, when he was gathering the crowd on account of Salamis.

The role of shame in both accounts is telling: rebuked by Athena to stem the tide of men rushing to the ships, Odysseus exhorts the Achaeans to remain (*Il.* 2.166ff., esp. 190–1), while Solon in frs. 2–3 exhorts his audience to thrust away the shame of losing Salamis.⁶⁸ This passage demonstrates at the very least an ancient reading of the Salamis tradition that associated the stance of Solon with that of Odysseus in Book 2. It may however be the case that Solon's poem was proactive in creating this reception, whether or not an actual performance in the agora also influenced it.

Plutarch includes a telling detail: he recounts that Solon donned a *πλίδιον* ('small felt cap') before running out into the agora. That the *πλίδιον* is an early feature of this story seems confirmed by a fourth-century BC incident of political mud-slinging between Demosthenes and Aeschines.⁶⁹ Representations of Solon are the currency of this vehement exchange. Aeschines claims to be a veritable Solon of modesty: unlike the antics of his opponent Timarchus, Aeschines carries himself as Solon, speaking with his hand in his cloak just as one can see Solon do in the famous statue in Salamis.⁷⁰ Demosthenes in turn seizes on Aeschines' Solonian self-fashioning. He retaliates by criticising Aeschines' behaviour during the embassy to Philip, likening it to Solon's behaviour over Salamis:

⁶⁸ Diogenes Laertius' account (1.46) shares even more with *Iliad* 2 (50–2, 184 and 442–4) in that Solon, although mad, has a herald with him to recite his poem. See also Demosthenes 19.252 for emphasis on shame.

⁶⁹ Demosthenes 19.255. The emendation of Plut. *Sol.* 8 to *πλίδιον* by Bryan is on the strength of Demosthenes. The manuscripts of Plutarch preserve *πλιυθιον* and *πλιον* for Solon's cap. See Mastrocinque (1984) 31 n. 15; Flacelière (1947) 237. For wider discussion of this exchange and its terms see Easterling (1999) and Ford (1999b).

⁷⁰ *Against Timarchus* 25–7.

Οὐ λέγειν εἶσω τὴν χεῖρ' ἔχοντ', Αἰσχίνη, δεῖ, οὐ, ἀλλὰ πρεσβεύειν εἶσω τὴν χεῖρ' ἔχοντα. σὺ δ' ἐκεῖ προτείνας καὶ ὑποσχὼν καὶ κατασχύνας τούτους ἐνθάδε σεμνολογεῖ, καὶ λογάρια δύσθηνα μελετήσας καὶ φωνασκήσας οὐκ οἶει δίκην δώσειν τηλικούτων καὶ τοσοούτων ἀδικημάτων, κἄν πιλίδιον λαβὼν ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν περινοστής καὶ ἐμοὶ λοιδορῇ; (19.255)

You should keep your hand inside, Aeschines, not when making a speech; no, you should keep it inside when going on an embassy. When you were in Macedonia, you stretched it out and held it open and were a disgrace to Athens; but here you pontificate, and because you've rehearsed some wretched phrases and trained your voice do you think you won't be punished for all these terrible crimes, if you put a felt cap on your head and walk around and criticise me?⁷¹

Demosthenes' reference to the πιλίδιον turns Aeschines' Solonian stance against him. Solon becomes less the figure of old-fashioned restraint (a stance which Demosthenes further deflates by recalling that the statue in question is recent (2.251–2)) than the clever politician, donning a costume in which he contrives to speak with impunity. The verb περινοστέω ('to go around') may well evoke Solon's travels, and in particular Solon 19, in which he sings of his own νόστος ('home-coming'), a theme itself evocative of Odysseus.⁷² In referring to Solon in this way, Demosthenes counters his opponent's attempt to appropriate the figure of Solon with two alternative, and seemingly less positive, representations of him.⁷³

⁷¹ MacDowell's text and translation (2000) 164–5.

⁷² Odysseus is the hero of the νόστος epic *par excellence*. While it is more common in later writers, particularly Christian (but see also Lucian), to connect περινοστέω with substantial travel and wandering (with objects such as Ἑλλάδα, γαίαν, οἰκουμένην – see also the Suda s.v. περινοστέω), Plato, *Rep.* 558a8 (περινοστέῃ ὥπερ ἦρος, 'he wanders as a hero') demonstrates that the epic νόστος element of περινοστέω was available for exploitation in classical writers. Although late it is suggestive that Lucian, *Hermotimus* 59.25 connects περινοστέω with Odysseus' wanderings and the Suda's *Vita Homeri* describes the poet of the *Odyssey* thus. See below for discussion of an Odysseus stance implicit in Solon 19 and in the traditions of Solon's travels.

⁷³ As Lowry (1991) 165 also recognises, 'Solon as delineated by Demosthenes would not be the entirely admirable contrast to Timarchus that Aeschines would have him be.' Does Aeschines' description of Timarchus (ῥύψας θοιμάτιον γυμνὸς ἐπαγκρατίαζεν ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ, 'And having thrown off his himation he practised his gymnastics naked in the assembly', *Tim.* 26) in terms comparable with the scholion discussed above suggest that Aeschines' own appropriation of (a version

What then is the significance of the *πιλίδιον* in the Salamis incident? Analysis of its occurrences shows that the *πιλίδιον* is almost invariably associated with travel,⁷⁴ and the traveller's cap is certainly an appropriate accoutrement for Solon, who assumes the stance of the herald returning from Salamis, as it would also be for Aeschines returning from his embassy.

And yet, travel is not the only association of the *πιλίδιον* relevant to interpreting this story. Aristophanes provides a further clue for uncovering the significance of Solon's *πιλίδιον*. In the *Acharnians*, the *πιλίδιον* is used in conjunction with Telephus, famous, like Odysseus, both as traveller and as disguised beggar. Before addressing the assembly, Dicaeopolis asks Euripides for the costume of Telephus:

κάκείνᾳ μοι δὸς τὰκόλουθα τῶν ῥακῶν,
τὸ πιλίδιον περὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν τὸ Μύσιον
δεῖ γάρ με δόξαι πτωχὸν εἶναι τήμερον.
εἶναι μὲν ὅσπερ εἰμί, φαίνεσθαι δὲ μή.⁷⁵

Give to me the props that go with the rags, the Mysian *pilidion* for my head,
'For today I must seem to be a beggar, to be the very man who I am and yet
appear not so.'

The text and its scholia emphasise that an important element of this scene is Euripides' own depiction of Telephus, a depiction which included the *πιλίδιον*.⁷⁶ Commenting on current performance practice, the scholiast says πρὸς τοὺς νῦν ὑποκριτὰς, ὅτι

of) the lawgiver was prompted by Timarchus' claiming some similarity between himself and Solon? For less positive representations of Solon's travels see the discussion below.

⁷⁴ The word is rare in Greek literature, appearing only once each in four classical authors (Dem. 19.255, Ar. *Ach.* 439, Antiphanes 35 KA (quoted in Ath. 12 544f), Pl. *Rep.* 406d), in scholia to these passages, twice in Plutarch (Plut. *Mor.* 1127b and *Sol.* 8), and in the Suda. Flacelière's view (1947) 247 that the *πιλίδιον* in Solon's story evokes illness (cf. *RE s.v.* 'πῖλος' 1332) is based on a misinterpretation of the sources, as Lowry has demonstrated (1991) 169–73. For other scholars who recognise the association of this cap with travel see Else (1965) 40, West (1974) 12, Flacelière (1947) 238 and Lucian, *Anacharsis* 16 where πῖλος appears humorously in a conversation between Anacharsis and Solon.

⁷⁵ *Ach.* 438–41. Mastrocinque (1984) actually argues that Dicaeopolis' stance in the *Acharnians* is modelled upon Solon's Salamis story.

⁷⁶ See Foley (1988) 41 n. 31, who mentions two vases which depict Telephus with a πῖλος (a Campanian bell krater in Naples, 350–25 bc, and an Attic *pelike* 350–325 bc *ARV*² 1473), thus confirming 'the strong association of the cap with the role'. See also Taplin (1992) 37–8 and *LIMC s.v.* 'Agamemnon'.

χωρὶς πῖλου εἰσάγουσι τὸν Τήλεφον. τὸ δὲ τοῦ Τηλέφου πιλίδιον, τὸ νῦν λεγόμενον καμαλαύκιον ('This is of relevance to the actors today because they bring Telephus on stage without a *pilos*. The *pilidion* of Telephus, what we call today the *kamalaukion*'). Another scholion tells us that lines 440–1 in fact repeat two lines from Euripides' *Telephus*,⁷⁷ which only serves to confirm the obvious, that parody of the *Telephus* is a pervasive feature of the *Acharnians*.⁷⁸

The *Acharnians* and its scholia introduce two new lines of investigation, both of which lead toward Odysseus: the substitution in the scholion of πῖλος for πιλίδιον and Euripides' portrayal of Telephus. To begin with the latter, it is certain that Euripides' Telephus owes much to Odysseus.⁷⁹ Fr. 715 of the *Telephus* explicitly draws a connection between Telephus and Odysseus: οὐ τ' ἄρ' Ὀδυσσεύς ἐστιν αἰμύλος μόνος. | χρεία διδάσκει, κἂν βραδύς τις ᾗ, σοφόν ('Odysseus is not the only wily one. Need teaches one, even if he is slow, to be clever.') Moreover, Telephus resembles Odysseus not only in his rhetorical skill, but also in the action of Euripides' drama: Telephus' appearance disguised as a beggar is likely to have been shaped by portrayals of Odysseus in the *Odyssey* and the *Cypria*.⁸⁰ The scholia to the *Clouds* imply that Euripides was the origin of Telephus' appearance as a beggar, and they further describe how Telephus placed himself as a beggar with a leather wallet at the door of Agamemnon, a role evoking the depiction of Odysseus in the *Odyssey*.⁸¹ Euripides no doubt employed an

⁷⁷ Eur. *Telephus* fr. 698. *Telephus* fragments are from Collard, Cropp et al. (1995). See the schol. Ar. *Ach.* ad loc.

⁷⁸ Foley (1988) and Heath (1987). For a recent detailed discussion of the *Telephus* and commentary on the fragments see Preiser (2000).

⁷⁹ See Collard, Cropp et al. (1995) 19, 23–4 and Jouan (1966) 251.

⁸⁰ In addition to returning to Ithaca in disguise, Odysseus also enters Troy with this ploy: *Od.* 4.242–64; Procl. *Chrest.* 224–7 Sev. and Eur. *Hec.* 239–50. Another connection with narratives involving Odysseus is the threat to the baby Orestes which evokes Palamedes' threat to the baby Telemachus recounted in the *Cypria* according to Procl. *Chrest.* 119–21 Sev.

⁸¹ Schol. ad *Nubes* 922b: οἷον πτωχὸν Εὐριπίδης συσκευάζει τὸν Τήλεφον στρατηγὸν ὄντα Μυσίας μετὰ πηριδίου ἐλθόντα προσαίτην εἰς τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τῆς Ἀγαμέμνονος αὐλῆς μάλιστα ποτὲ πτωχὸν γεγονότα· δι' ὃν καὶ κωμωδεῖται ('Just as Euripides equips Telephus, when he was leader of Mysia, as a beggar with a leather wallet coming to Greece and finally ending as an attendant at the door of Agamemnon. On account

irony involving temporality: Odysseus, in ignorance of future events, faces a character behaving as he himself will later be forced to do. No doubt the play took advantage of the rich dramatic possibilities of pitting two rhetorically gifted characters against one another, and having the master speaker, Odysseus, meet his match.⁸²

Second, the substitution in the scholion of *πίλος* for *πιδίδιον* opens up connections to numerous literary and artistic representations of Odysseus wearing a *πίλος*, or *πιδίδιον*, a more common diminutive for *πίλος* than *πιδίδιον*.⁸³ The scholia retain comments on this process of association. The word *πίλος* appears only once in Homer, in the *Doloneia*, where Odysseus dons a *πίλος* from which the scholia to 10.265 tell us that ζωγράφοι καὶ πλάσται *πιδίδιον* ἐπέθεσαν τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ ('the painters and sculptors placed a *pilion* on Odysseus'). The feature is so strongly attached to Odysseus that it elicits frequent comment and two dominant reactions: an assertion that

of this he is parodied in comedy'). For Odysseus as a beggar at the door, *Od.* 17.239, 356–63, 412–3, 466–7; cf. also 17.221 and Collard (1995) 23–4. For mention of his wallet see 17.197 (= 18.108), 357, 411, 466–7.

⁸² Euripides is certainly the poet spoken of in the scholion on Ael. Arist. *In Defence of Oratory* (vol. III, p. 376.3–5 Dindorf): τις τῶν ποιητῶν εἰσάγει τὸν Τηλέφον ἐλέγχοντα τὸν Ὀδυσσεῖα ἐκ τῶν αὐτοῦ λόγων, οὗς πρὸς τὸν Τηλέφον εἶπε ('Some one of the poets brings Telephus on stage censuring Odysseus with those words that Odysseus spoke to Telephus').

⁸³ Ancient testimony for Odysseus and the *πίλος*: Lucian, *De saltatione* 83.14 tells of an actor playing Odysseus who was struck so hard on the head by his Ajax that he would have died were it not that he was wearing his *πίλος*. See also schol. *Il.* 10.265a, Eustathius, *Comm. ad Il.* ad loc., Lucian, *Menippus* 8.3, Soranus, *Vita Hippocratis* 12.2. For the *πιδίδιον* and Odysseus, see schol. *Il.* 10.265a, Plut. *Cato Major* 9.3.8, Plb. *Historiae* 35.6.4.3. For visual representations of Odysseus in his *πίλος* see *LIMC* s.v. 'Odysseus'. For modern acknowledgement of the link between *πίλος* and Odysseus see for instance Burkert (1983) 133. While Brommer's caution ((1983) 110–11) that the *πίλος* is neither an entirely exclusive nor constant attribute of Odysseus in the archaic period is justified, his narrow approach leaves no room for an archaic development of a typology which would later become exclusive, and moreover privileges too much the literary sources giving a late fifth-century date. At any rate, his identification of the *πέτασος* as the most frequent headgear in archaic visual representations of Odysseus may lend further support to Solon's Odyssean role: if those scholars who argue from fr. 1 (Freeman (1926) 171 n. 2 followed by Flacelière (1947) 247) that Solon was originally depicted as wearing a *πέτασος* are correct, the replacement of the *πέτασος* with the *πίλος* may affirm an early identification of Solon's role with Odysseus: it is possible to argue that as the *πίλος* became exclusively characteristic of Odysseus by the end of the fifth century, its popularity exerted influence on the hat of the Salamis tradition, despite the poem's actual reference to herald.

the wearing of a *πίλος* was actually not distinctive despite its singular mention in the *Iliad*, or an identification of the first artist to isolate the attribute as unique to Odysseus, usually Apollodorus.⁸⁴ This claim, however, for a late fifth-century origin does not upset the possible associations of Solon's *πλίδιον* with Odysseus' *πίλος* or *πλίον*. While there may have been some new popularity in this feature of Odysseus or more exclusivity in its usage, numerous representations of Odysseus exist from the late seventh to mid-fifth century in which he already wears a *πίλος*.⁸⁵

The detail of the *πίλος* in the Salamis narrative evokes a compound picture of Odysseus – Odysseus as effective in martial exhortation, and the traveller *par excellence* – and complements the recognition of similarity between Solon and Odysseus seen in the Aristotle fragment.

Generic situations: Solonian-style martial exhortation

But what about Solon's feigned madness? Is it a misunderstanding of this scene, a later interpretation given in order to explain how an otherwise wise figure behaved in an apparently unusual irrational manner: his behaviour simply must be 'feigned'? If that were the case, one might expect a version of the story to the effect that 'Solon was temporarily driven to distraction by the Athenians' inaction and ran into the streets . . .' But the element of 'feigning', assumed behaviour, seems an important feature,

⁸⁴ Schol. *Il.* 10.265. Eustathius (*ad loc.*) reflects this pattern of reaction: ἰστέον δὲ καὶ ὅτι πάσῃ μὲν περικεφαλαίᾳ κατὰ τοὺς παλαιοὺς συμβέβηκε πῖλον ἔχειν ἐντός, οἱ δὲ νεώτεροι ὡς ἰδίον τι ἀκούσαντες ἐνταῦθα τὸ τοῦ πῖλου ἔπεισαν τοὺς ζωγράφους πῖλον περιτιθέναι τῷ Ὀδυσσεῖ. καὶ τοῦτο πρῶτος, φασίν, ἐποίησεν Ἀπολλόδωρος ὁ σκιαγράφος ('Let it be understood that according to the ancients it was normal to have a *pilos* in every helmet. But the *neoteroi*, having heard the bit about the *pilos* as something unique, persuaded the painters to place a *pilion* on Odysseus and the first to do this, they say, was Apollodorus the scene-painter'). But Apollodorus does not have a unanimous claim: both Pliny, *HN* 35. 108 and Serv. Verg. *A.* 2.44 attribute this innovation to Nicomachus. On these attestations and the *neoteroi* see Severyns (1967) 424–5.

⁸⁵ Earliest is the bronze relief from Olympia (c. 620; Olympia B 3600). Certainly if the *πλίδιον* of Euripides' *Telephus* was influenced by Odysseus, this would indicate a consciousness of this attribute's associations with Odysseus predating even Apollodorus.

and the reception of it in antiquity was not enthusiastically positive. Cicero calls the feigning of madness, a *versutum et callidum factum* ('a cunning and clever deed'), placing Solon in the same class as Themistocles, and excusing such deceit as done both to protect himself and for the good of the city.⁸⁶

Although the earliest allusion to the *πιλίδιον*, that of Demosthenes, does not explicitly mention the feigning of madness (though it may be implicit in the impunity which Demosthenes seems to suggest the *πιλίδιον* brings), this may still be an early element, and it is therefore worth exploring this feature in connection with Solon's stance as Odysseus. Odysseus is above all the character *par excellence* of assumed roles, including the feigning of madness. Odysseus' use of this pretence to avoid the Trojan War was told as early as the *Cypria*, according to Proclus, and seems to have been a popular theme, as one of Sophocles' titles, *Ὀδυσσεὺς μαινόμενος* ('Odysseus mad'), suggests. If the associations of Solon with Odysseus were not only made by some of his readers and audiences,⁸⁷ but were actually encouraged by Solon through his poetry and possibly also through his actions, then it would be possible to see the rich potential for exploitation offered by this role. One might wonder whether an Odysseus-stance along the lines described by Agamemnon in Aeschylus' play of the same name was being drawn upon: *μόνος δ' Ὀδυσσεύς, ὅσπερ οὐχ ἐκὼν ἔπλει | ζευχθεὶς ἔτοιμος ἦν ἐμοὶ σειραφόρος* ('Odysseus alone, the very man unwilling to sail, when once in harness proved to me a ready tracehorse', 841–2). Odysseus was the character reluctant to go to war, but when there was no choice, he became the most reliable and committed to its

⁸⁶ Cicero, *Off.* 1.30.108 (cf. Phaenias of Eresos fr. 20 Wehrli, quoted in Plut. Sol. 14, for another case of attribution of ἀπάτη ἐπὶ σωτηρίῃ τῆς πόλεως – 'deception for the safety of the city' – to an act of Solon). Even Cicero's wording points in an Odyssean direction: 'versutus' was immortalised as a translation of πολύτροπος by Livius Andronicus in his *Odusia* (fr. 1), 'virum mihi, Camena, insecce versutum'; see Hinds (1998) 58–62.

⁸⁷ Consider the scholion to *Il.* 17.265 describing Solon as μιμησάμενον τὴν Ὀμήρου ποίησιν ἐν ᾗ πᾶσιν ('Solon imitated the poetry of Homer in everything') and also Diog. Laert. 1.57 μάλλον οὖν Σόλων Ὀμηρον ἐφώτισεν ἢ Πεισίστρατος ('But Solon did more to illuminate Homer than Peisistratus'). For comment on the latter passage see Piccirilli (1975) 29–36.

completion. Such a position fits well the comparison of Solon with the Odysseus of *Iliad* 2 quoted above. In terms of a political position, the stance of a reluctant warrior, rather than warmonger, would be a valuable one for convincing an otherwise unwilling citizen body and for courting the largest possible audience.

Polyaenus says of Solon's *Salamis*, τὰ δὲ ἐλεγεία ἦν Ἀρήϊα ἄσματα. τούτοις ἤγειρεν Ἀθηναίους ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην ('These elegiacs were songs of Ares. With these did Solon rouse the Athenians to battle', *Strat.* 1.20.1), thus placing it firmly in the tradition of martial exhortation elegy. Solon's assumption of an Odyssean role in the *Salamis* may be seen as entirely concordant with the heroic role-playing integral to martial exhortation elegy argued for in Part I. And yet, if this is true, the arguments of Part I must have consequences for Solon's heroic role-playing: the deeply aristocratic nature of this type of poetry, as well as the negative response of Solon 4 to its pretensions, discussed in Chapter 4, would seem to complicate Solon's use of this mode of elegiac poetry. And while it is not necessary for there to be continuity in any area across the poems of a poet's *œuvre*, apparent discontinuities are worth investigating.

On the one hand, the *Salamis* belongs to martial *paraenesis*, and the ancient accounts recalling Solon's part in this affair do suggest certain elements characteristic of Tyrtaean-style martial exhortation. Class elements are present in the event as recorded by Plutarch. While Plutarch says first that the νέοι ('the young') were intent on war, and attributes to Solon the noble motivation of finding it difficult to bear the ἀδοξία ('ill-repute') of losing Salamis, later he speaks of the instrumentality of Solon's φίλοι in inciting the πολῖται ('citizens') to war. νέοι (significantly the addressees of Tyrtaean exhortation) and φίλοι ('friends') belong to sectional language (particularly in contrast to the civic grouping, πολῖται), naming the typical participants in the aristocratic symposium.⁸⁸

⁸⁸ Compare the speech of Athenagoras in Thuc. 6.38–9 for the contrast between a reluctant citizen body and aristocratic νέοι eager for war.

And yet, at the level of ancient reception the political dimension of this Solonian exhortation is articulated far differently from, for instance, that of Tyrtaeus. While Lycurgus (*Leocr.* 107) may recall how the early Spartans placed such a high value on Tyrtaeus, making a law that it be recited on campaign, νομίζοντες οὕτως ἂν αὐτοὺς μάλιστα πρὸ τῆς πατρίδος ἐθέλειν ἀποθνήσκειν ('considering that thus would they be willing to die on behalf of their fatherland'),⁸⁹ Solon's elegiac exhortations find themselves embedded in an elaborate ancient account of a very different nature, and in particular one involving cunning. Such differences at the level of ancient reception suggest it is worth exploring what Solon may have done with this form of elegy. In particular, the account of the poem's performance suggests discontinuity with the genre of elegy. The performance of the *Salamis* in the agora, whether real or derived from the poem, provides a contrast to the typical sympotic performance context of elegy, and it is clear that this feature of the story was both crucial and considered unusual. I would suggest that part of the madness implied by the performance would have to do with the unusual performance setting.⁹⁰ Diogenes Laertius is telling in this regard. He omits the detail of the πλίδιον, saying rather that Solon rushed into the agora garlanded (1.46). The garland and recitation of poetry are the typical elements of the symposium.⁹¹ Performance of this exhortation elegy in the agora then suggests a travesty of performance context. In using the term ὄχλος ('crowd', 'throng') for the target of this exhortation, the fragment of Aristotle further emphasises, somewhat derogatorily, the general audience of this exhortation, certainly not the *philo*i of the symposium. Taken together, the story surrounding the *Salamis* portrays Solon as participating in the

⁸⁹ For discussion of this passage see Bowie (1990); tempered by Kurke (1999) 26 n. 64.

⁹⁰ As Lowry (1991) 168 observes, the several versions localise the insanity in the agora, no doubt owing at least in part to the phrase ἀντ' ἀγορῆς in fr. 1; for this phrase see Noussia (1999) 63 and 69, (2001) 226 and 231, and Mülke (2002) 74–5 and 81–2. Cf. Lefkowitz (1981) 40 and Herington (1985).

⁹¹ The assumption of roles is likewise a feature of sympotic poetry and behaviour. See, for example, Thgn. 257–60, 579–80, 861–4, Alc. 10, Anacr. 40 (385 *PMG*) and Bowie (1986) 16–20. See also Ch. 2 pp. 49–50.

heroic role-playing of exhortation elegy, but at the same time transgressing the boundaries of its appropriate context and audience, literally or metaphorically, using, moreover, Odysseus, who was unlikely to have been a typical figure for aristocratic appropriation.⁹²

The law prohibiting speech about the loss of Salamis, which may be inferred from Demosthenes to be an early feature of the story, may also have significance. As a narrative element, this detail explains why Solon assumed such a stance, why in some sense he simply *could not* directly address the people. But the impunity desired from this poetic or dramatic role may actually be interpreted as relating to his own ambitions. It may be seen as a strategy simultaneously to push an aim that was essentially sectional – though presented otherwise – or similar enough to other élite ventures without compromising his relationship, already developed or inchoate, to the demos.⁹³ Such ambiguities in his position – a transgressor of sympotic norms, yet advocating war – would help to explain how Solon came to be accepted as νομοθέτης ('lawgiver'). But quite apart from the politics implicit in inciting renewed war over Salamis, the detail of the law introduces the notion of transgression and in this respect may be read more generally as a critical evaluation of the content and function of Solonian elegy. It represents Solon as transgressor, extending the boundaries of sympotic elegy, either through content or through the implied audience addressed within his poetry, or both.

⁹² See Pucci (1997) 53–5, Rose (1992) ch. 2; and more generally on 'Odysseus and the genus "hero"' Finkelberg (1995). See also pp. 248, 284–5 and 305.

⁹³ The Salamis affair may viably be conceived on the model of private warfare made public argued by van Wees (1992) 191–9 and 249–58 to be a historical reality reflected in the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. Solon's twist may be that this war was essentially popular, as French (1957) 241–2 argues, followed tentatively by Hopper (1961) 214–16, because it aimed at undermining those who exported grain to Megara. But the relationship between these plausible elements is far from certain: sectional interests can be couched in evocative collective terms, and popular interests can be drawn upon in sectional conflicts. The problems of reconstructing Athenian internal politics around this affair are notorious, as well acknowledged by Hopper (1961) 208–17, and not addressed by Taylor (1997).

Odysseus' travels and Solon 19

In discussing Solon's stance as Odysseus, it is difficult to avoid the thorny subject of Solon's travels. While nothing historical can be safely drawn from material so obviously legendary in its dimensions, the possible connection of Solon's travels with the character of Odysseus raises certain important questions about the story patterns that characterise biographical traditions. Travel features prominently in narratives of archaic lawgivers and wise men (whether these figures are wise and travel or made wiser through their travels),⁹⁴ an element at the least providing a superficial connection with Odysseus, traveller *extraordinaire*. One may further note that the *Odyssey* explicitly links travel and wisdom in its first lines, suggesting that Odysseus participated in, if he did not form the basis of, the motif of the travelling wise figure. Without giving a verdict on the origins of this motif, one can safely say that later generations repeated stories, both consciously and otherwise, that cast Solon in a role similar to, and to some extent shaped by, that of Odysseus.

In the case of Solon, it is not enough to dismiss out of hand the accounts of his travels as produced by the needs or concerns of later generations:⁹⁵ not only does Herodotus already record accounts of Solon's travels, demonstrating them to be among our earliest testimony for Solon, but a poem of Solon, fr. 19, which Herodotus mentions (5.113.2) and Plutarch and the *Vita* of Aratus preserve, suggests the poet's *instrumentality* in the creation of this tradition:

νῦν δὲ σὺ μὲν Σολίοισι πολλὸν χρόνον ἐνθάδ' ἀνάσσω
 τήνδε πόλιν ναίοις καὶ γένος ὑμέτερον·
 αὐτὰρ ἐμὲ ξὺν νηϊ θοῇ κλεινῆς ἀπὸ νήσου
 ἀσκηθῆ πέμποι Κύπρις ἰοστέφανος·
 οἰκισμῷ δ' ἐπὶ τῷδε χάριν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάζοι
 ἔσθλὸν καὶ νόστον πατρίδ' ἐς ἡμετέρην.

⁹⁴ See Szegedy-Maszak (1978) and Martin (1993) on the legends of the Greek lawgivers. See Montiglio (2000) 86–91 on the archaic antecedents for the wandering philosophers of the classical period.

⁹⁵ As for instance Lefkowitz (1981) does.

Now ruling Soloi in this place, long may you dwell in this city and your offspring thereafter. And may violet-crowned Cypris send me unscathed with my swift ship from this renowned island. And on this settlement may she grant grace and noble glory, and a homecoming into the land of my fathers.

The ostensible occasion of the poem is the poet's leave-taking of the king of Cyprian Soloi; its tone is akin to that adopted by Odysseus departing from the Phaeacians, and in fact Solon speaks prominently of his own νόστος ('homecoming').⁹⁶ As for the poem's wider narrative, Plutarch and the *Vita* of Aratus preserve the poem in an account of Solon helping the Cyprian king to refound his city and of its renaming in Solon's honour, an account in which Solon becomes the city's *oikistes*; and while this story is not told in Herodotus, he at least confirms that the detail of Solon's meeting with the king, whom he names, was early.⁹⁷

For the purposes of this discussion, one may avoid straightforward questions about the history, *wie es eigentlich gewesen ist*, behind the tradition of Solon's travels,⁹⁸ and instead treat them as suggestive, but fictional, evidence that beyond Solon 4 Solon adopted a stance in his poetry that could with its evocations of travel be considered Odysseus-like by his earliest audiences, for whom Odysseus was a figure already available to influence their reception of Solon. But this may place too much emphasis on reception, to the exclusion of Solon's agency: if Odysseus was already available as an early archetype for the clever travelling figure *and* as a master of controlling his own reception, it is plausible – and likely given Solon 19's explicit theme of νόστος – that the epic figure could be manipulated by Solon to perpetuate his own self-representation. Whether Solon travelled or not, it is certain that his poetry shaped his later reception, and possible that he actively took

⁹⁶ Alessandri (1997/80) also detects an epic tone to this poem, but likens Solon to Telemachus. See n. 72 on the use of περινοστέω ('to go around') in Demosthenes 19.255.

⁹⁷ Solon's travels, Hdt. 1.29–34; poem to Philocyprus, Hdt. 5.113.2, quoted in Plut. *Sol.* 26 and *Vita Arati*. Although Sykutris (1928) attempted to athetise the last two lines of this poem, the poem's overall authenticity is generally undisputed. *Contra* Sykutris, Wilamowitz (1929) and Alessandri (1977/80) defend the lines, and Wilamowitz the plausibility of the entire narrative.

⁹⁸ For this approach see Martin (1993).

part in this process, assuming and exploiting an early or inchoate role of the travelling figure, Odysseus, a figure who is also a model in the art of controlling one's own reception. At the very least, Solon 19 may be seen as part of a wider set of Odyssean associations identifiable within and created by his poetry.

Solon's travels may in this way be fairly safely dealt with at the level of narrative, and even to a certain extent at the level of history, insofar as the creation of a fictional self-representation – an Odyssean stance – through poetry would be a historical phenomenon in itself. One might, however, wish at least to face the riskier question, the historicity of the travels themselves. While of course the forces of narrative patterns and centuries of manipulating Solon's story will continue to leave most historical questions about Solon unresolved and unresolvable, the fact that a certain positivism and homogeneity characterises modern discussions of Solon's career legitimates, at least as a corrective, an invitation to speculate on other means of handling the evidence. For instance, while one may point to inaccuracies and impossibilities in the details of the tradition, it is certainly not *a priori* unlikely that an archaic figure of considerable standing would travel, particularly if his own circumstances and those of his native city should 'favour' it. That possibility granted, a question may be raised about the reception that act is to receive by contemporaries and future audiences: how does such travel come either to be viewed at the time or remembered later; what forces are at play in the reception of such an event?

These questions are all the more pressing, even as their answers remain elusive, with a figure like Solon who composed poetry that did, and probably was intended to, control his reception. Why is Solon remembered through one narrative pattern rather than another; what makes him remembered as enjoying the *ξενία* ('guest-friendship') of *ἀγαθοί* ('the élite') in other cities, as opposed to engaged in any other activity?⁹⁹ There were other ways of remembering an archaic figure who

⁹⁹ Herodotus' narrative already raises questions about the motivation of Solon's travels: he calls *θεωρία* ('seeing the sights') a *πρόφασις* ('pretext') for another, political, reason

left his city, and the most frequent of which – as a disgruntled victim of a changed political climate who leaves to become an οἰκιστής ('founder') of another city – is actually a narrative antiquity frequently told of Solon: so much so that the colony had two different locations, Cilicia and Cyprus. It is, however, a story of which modern audiences are now no longer fond. But each narrative has its politics (and, of course, its sources their problems). On the one hand, numerous sources depict a politically uncomfortable Athens under Peisistratus as the cause of Solon's departure from it to found his own colony in Cilicia.¹⁰⁰ On the other, although the Cyprian tradition suggests no political agenda on Solon's part, the parallels between the story of Solon's trip to Cyprian Soloi and that told by Herodotus of Miltiades, who departs from an Athens made politically uncomfortable by Peisistratus (Hdt. 6.35.3–38.1), are somewhat disturbing: both Solon and Miltiades cause an existing city to move to another location, [re]found a colony, and therefore become its *oikistes*.

Did Solon travel, did he go to Cyprus (or Cilicia), was he involved in (re)founding a colony, were other Athenians involved? No answers are forthcoming: the obstacles to getting at the 'history' beyond this tradition are insurmountable.¹⁰¹ But it is not clear we should escape the polyphony of sources by fleeing to the false security of our own constructed sense of the 'probable'. And at the very least, even should not only the details of each tradition but also the core be somehow absolutely confirmed as entirely fiction, the point would still remain

(albeit a benign one, 1.29). Moreover, given the importance of Solon's role in Book 1 of the *Histories* and of the concept of *θεωρία* to the work itself, one should question the assumption that Herodotus neutrally reflects a univocal popular tradition.

¹⁰⁰ Diog. Laert. 1.51, schol. Plato, *Rep.* 599E, Suda s.v. Σόλων; schol. Dionysius Thrax 1.446.31–447.3 Uhlig; Eustathius on Dionysius Periegetes 875 (Müller (1861) 371–2), *Etym. Magn.* s.v. σόλοικοι ('those who speak Greek poorly'); *Etym. Gud.* s.v. σολοικισμός ('solecism'), Steph. Byz. s.v. Σόλοι. The desire to provide an aetiology of solecism from Solon's *oikismos* renders this tradition especially problematic. See the dispute between Wilamowitz (1929) and Sykutris (1928). For a discussion of the patterns in the sources see Irwin (1999); see also Gallo (1976).

¹⁰¹ The deficiencies in our knowledge of the full scope of fifth-century Athenian interest in Cyprus (cf. Meiggs (1972) 92–3, 125–8, and 477–86; cf. Plut. *Per.* 26) are among our biggest obstacles to ascertaining the archaic significance of Solon's sojourn there. A full discussion is outside the scope of this chapter; see Irwin (1999).

that when one asks why certain *topoi* prevail over others when remembering Solon, the answer must lie to a great extent in his own poetic self-representations, the influence of them over contemporary and later audiences and the use they allowed later audiences to make of them. And as self-representations, their bias is the one thing at least of which there can be certainty.

Role models: Odysseus, Solon and Peisistratus

Plutarch's *Life of Solon* provides further material for discussing the assumption of roles in archaic politics. Peisistratus' ploy of self-injury in order to procure from the Athenians a bodyguard evokes from Solon the comment, οὐ καλῶς, ὦ παῖ Ἱπποκράτους, ὑποκρίνη τόν 'Ομηρικόν 'Οδυσσέα· ταὐτὰ γὰρ ποιεῖς τοὺς πολίτας παρακρούμενος, οἷς ἐκεῖνος τοὺς πολεμίους ἐξηπάτησεν αἰκισάμενος ἑαυτόν ('Not nobly, son of Hippocrates, do you play the Homeric Odysseus; for by that same ploy do you mislead your fellow citizens by which he deceived his enemies when he disfigured himself').¹⁰² While it is of course impossible to ascribe authenticity to the story related here, Solon's identification of Homer's Odysseus as Peisistratus' model remains significant. Either it reports accurately that in Solon's period, political figures could be described as trying on a part from epic, in this case – significantly – that of Odysseus, or just as important, it shows that reception of the tradition surrounding Solon could connect political activity with the trying on of a role, again notably that of Odysseus.¹⁰³ It also may suggest a connection between Odysseus and tyranny.

Peisistratus' famous entrance into Athens becomes more significant when placed in this context of political appropriations of epic. While asserting the goddess's support, Peisistratus' return to Athens in a chariot with 'Athena' also claims a heroic identity for

¹⁰² Plut. *Sol.* 30 Ziegler (cf. Diog. Laert. 1.60). This story is closely connected in Plutarch and Diogenes with a confrontation between Solon and Thespis: see Manfredini and Piccirilli (1977) 271–3, and below pp. 274–5.

¹⁰³ In his famous study, Stanford (1954) 91 states tantalisingly that Odysseus 'was enlisted as a partisan in the conflicts' of sixth-century politics, but does not substantiate this point beyond reference to Theognis. See pp. 128–32 and Appendix II.

the tyrant.¹⁰⁴ Whether Peisistratus fashioned himself on a specific epic character remains uncertain, but given Odysseus' status as Athena's favourite, associations with him are unlikely to have been absent.¹⁰⁵ Even were Peisistratus here not fashioning himself exclusively on the figure of Odysseus, the dramatisation of the heroic, which his audience would know through poetry, may be seen as one step beyond the adoption of a poetic stance from epic poetry: Peisistratus' dramatisation of an epic scene would represent continuity with the kinds of poetic appropriations of epic characters performed both by martial exhortation elegy, as argued in Part I, and by archaic poets, such as Archilochus and Theognis, and Solon, the latter having performed such an appropriation in the recent past and in poetry with a political content and context. In this light Solon's accusation against Peisistratus becomes more pointed, as if suggesting about Solon that it takes one to know one, so to speak.

IV Conclusion

While several aspects of Solon's poetry and his biographical traditions point in the direction of Odysseus, Odysseus seems, as is fitting for his character, to *lurk* beneath the surface of Solon's poetry and career. The allusions seem qualitatively different from those we will see in connection with his Hesiodic stance: they are oblique rather than obvious. As if a leitmotif, suggestions of Odysseus occur so frequently, and yet implicitly, at least in the *extant* evidence, that one is left

¹⁰⁴ Hdt. 1.60.3, *Ath. Pol.* 14.4, Polyaeus, *Strat.* 1.21.2, Cleid. *FGrHist* 323 F 15. Boardman identified this stance with Heracles, generating much academic debate: see Huttner (1996) 25–42 and Blok (2000) 19–24 for the most recent critical survey with bibliography; see also Lavelle (1991) 319. Heracles may well have been a part of Peisistratean self-representation (see Irwin (2005)), but this need not exclude other appropriations of mythic figures.

¹⁰⁵ See Else (1965) 36–7: 'Surely it depends integrally upon the *Odyssey* and upon the *Odyssey* being well known to the whole population of Athens at the time.' See also Connor (1987) 42–7, Catenacci (1993) and most recently Blok (2000) 40–4. Given the schol. *Il.* 2.183 quoted above, one should note the prominence of Athena's connection to Odysseus in *Il.* 2, particularly at line 182.

wondering whether an Odysseus-stance functions as an αἶνγμα ('riddle'), there to be read for those who know.¹⁰⁶ One is therefore also left wondering what associations for the character of Odysseus and the *Odyssey* might already have been available for Solon to draw upon. This subject will return in the next chapters, but the similar recurrence of Odysseus and the *Odyssey* in connection with the tyrant Peisistratus have already begun to suggest political connotations to the figure of Odysseus.¹⁰⁷

The discussions of the next Part will demonstrate that despite Solon's explicit protestations in poetry it is not at all clear that he would have distanced himself from an appropriation that may have had tyrannical or proto-tyrannical associations. Modern reception of Solon has not applied the cynicism to the character of Solon to which figures like Cleisthenes have been subject, although ancient accounts suggest a figure who was clearly a practised political operator. Solon's explicit and aggressive protestations that he did not become a tyrant raise important questions about the necessity of such claims and possible ambiguities in his political position. These issues will be the focus of Part III, but first Solon's strong affinity with Hesiodic poetry needs examination.

¹⁰⁶ For αἶνγματα ('riddles') in political elegy see Thgn. 681–2 and Nagy (1985) 23–4.

¹⁰⁷ In addition to the connection with Odysseus in Plutarch's story quoted above and possibly also the Phye episode are Peisistratus' alleged interpolation of the *Doloneia* (introductory schol. T *Iliad* 10) and various manipulations of the text of the *Odyssey* attributed to him such as interpolation in *Od.* 11.631 and the inclusion of Nestor's younger son, Peisistratus, a character who appears neither in the Hesiodic *Catalogue* with the sons of Nestor (fr. 35) nor in the *Iliad*; see S. West (1988) 38 and her note at *Od.* 3.36 for a rehearsal of the apparent Athenian 'touches' to the poem.

SOLON 4 AND HESIOD

I

Examination of the affinities of Solon 4 with the Hesiodic tradition completes the project of analysing how Solon effectively situates himself within poetic traditions. Above all, the sheer *pervasiveness* of Hesiodic material in this poem demands consideration of the implications of such a marked relationship, particularly when this positive relationship is contrasted with Solon's treatment of martial epic and elegy. But before the Hesiodic element of this poem and its role within the overall strategy of the poem can be analysed, certain potential difficulties need to be confronted at the start. These difficulties are all related to the theme of reception.

II Thoroughly Hesiodic?

What does it mean to say Solon 4 is or is not thoroughly Hesiodic? Prevailing scholarly debate has defined this question in a particular way, focusing almost entirely on whether Solon had the same conception of δίκη as Hesiod.¹ While this is an important concern, a host of equally important but underexplored questions lie behind assessing whether Solon was or was not thoroughly Hesiodic. One may ask first of all what status Hesiod had in the first two quarters of the sixth century and what it might have meant at that time to be 'Hesiodic'. At the same time, one may ask how we are to talk about allusion in a culture of (predominantly) oral poetry and to imagine the reception of

¹ Wilamowitz and Jaeger (Jaeger (1966) 40 and 90–4), Solmsen (1949) 112–14, Lloyd-Jones (1971) 44–5. More recently Manuwald (1989) and Almeida (2003).

such allusion. Finally, one may look at modern reception of Solon's poetry and ask how definitions of what is Hesiodic, most notably shaped by Jaeger and Solmsen, have circumscribed the boundaries of the debate and determined the range of conclusions to be drawn from Solon's relationship to this poet.

The most influential scholarship in the earlier part of the twentieth century on the relationship of Solon and Hesiod, and more generally on the relationship between lyric and hexameter poetry, did not concern itself with the problem of assessing the impact of Hesiod in the first half of the sixth century. It was taken for granted that Homer and Hesiod preceded the lyric poets and were well known to them, and from such premises far-reaching conclusions about generic and conceptual evolution ensued. In contrast, recent tendencies to bring down the traditional dates of Homer have had consequences for how scholars think about allusion in early Greek poetry, and have ultimately introduced a certain scepticism and reductivism into discussions.² In response to this scepticism, I reconstruct the possible contemporary reception of the Hesiodic element of Solon's poetry before discussing it in detail.

By the time of Xenophanes and Heraclitus, it is clear that Hesiod possessed considerable panhellenic authority, and their formulations imply that this had long been the case.³ Heraclitus fr. 57 retrojects that authority into the past, suggesting that Hesiod had been already enormously influential for some time: διδάσκαλος δὲ πλείστων Ἡσίοδος ('the teacher of most men').⁴ From the upper limit, there seem to be some allusions to Hesiod in seventh-century poetry, showing at least that by then his poetry had some common

² See West (1995), Fowler (1987).

³ Xenophanes frs. 10, 11 DK, Heraclitus frs. 40, 57 DK, and see fr. 80 DK on the equivalence of δίκη and ἔρις. While the earliest explicit references to Hesiod seem related to the *Theogony*, there are several possible, but unattributed, allusions to *Works and Days* (see note below). Another saying attributed to Heraclitus (fr. 106 DK) seems to complain about the *Works and Days*. Of course, although it is not clear when exactly this influence became acutely felt, one ought never to forget the *degree* of influence attributed to Hesiod and Homer by Herodotus (2.53).

⁴ For somewhat later testimony for the immense influence of Hesiod see also Pind. *Isth.* 6.66–71, composed sometime before 480 BC, which both names Hesiod and echoes Hesiodic language.

currency.⁵ Furthermore, the extent of Solon's affinity with Hesiod in poem 13, which no scholar doubts, suggests the influence and general circulation of the Hesiodic poems at an early date. Moreover, given the oral culture in which archaic poetry was performed, Solon's allusions imply a currency and accessibility of Hesiod for his audience.

While Xenophanes and Heraclitus testify that for a late sixth-century audience (and at least one generation earlier) Hesiodic poetry had an authority of a moral, theological and general kind, it is difficult to know exactly what his poetry meant for Solon's audience. If scholars are right to see the *Works and Days* as representing an anti-aristocratic tradition,⁶ then one might be justified in suspecting right away that there may be something political in the appropriation of this material for (sympotic) elegy.⁷ Taking a more conservative position, one can at the very least point out the kinds of readings which the Hesiodic poems invite, and show how a political appropriation was available for Solon and accessible to his audience. For instance, one may with Lamberton call lines 38–41 of the *Works and Days*, 'at once one of the most satisfying and most shocking moments in the corpus'. He explains, 'You cannot imagine the Homeric narrator ... calling kings "bribe-eaters" and "suckers" ... [Hesiod's] espousal of the victim's perspective is one of the great surprises of archaic Greek literature.'⁸ And as will be seen, such a description of the *Works and Days* is completely compatible with Solon's stance in poem 4.

⁵ For Hesiodic resonances in early Greek poetry, see West (1978) 61, who argues that by 600 the *Works and Days* was known 'right across the Aegean'. He mentions Alc. 347 and *Op.* 582–9, Sem. 6 and *Op.* 702–3. For Hesiod and Archilochus see Irwin (1998) on Arch. 177 and *Op.* 274–80. Later sources connect the Seven Sages with Hesiodic material (e.g. Diog. Laert. 1.75, Plut. *Mor.* 157e–f), but such connections are more likely to be generic and therefore problematic as evidence.

⁶ Griffiths (1995) 95–8 argues this, mentioning the saying attributed to Kleomenes I, 'Homer for Spartiates and Hesiod for Helots' (Plut. *Spartan Sayings* 223a).

⁷ It must be noted, although it is quite possibly an accident of transmission, that prior to Solon, the poetry with the greatest affinity to the *Works and Days* does not seem to have been in elegy, but in iambic and epodic metres, see Arch. 177 and Sem. 6 and 7. For elegiac antagonism towards Hesiod see Munding (1984) and (1993).

⁸ Lamberton (1988) 115.

Yet it is important to note that the *Works and Days* can be read somewhat paradoxically both as a poem of political disaffection and as one of accommodation. One can see it as a harsh critique of kings and abuses of power, an appropriate sentiment for a poem which seems to reflect developments in political awareness concurrent with the growing polis, but at the same time one must acknowledge that the pervasive theme, 'keep your head down and work', falls somewhat short of a mass exhortation to revolt. For instance, the adjudicator of the *Certamen* chooses Hesiod over Homer because he writes about farming and peace, which is perhaps not how we would now choose to summarise the Hesiodic corpus.⁹ Therefore, in considering Solon's appropriation of Hesiod in poem 4 it is important to note his distillation of the more aggressively political elements of Hesiod.¹⁰

The *Certamen* dramatises the potential social and political dimensions implicit in the Homeric and Hesiodic traditions. When the poets match their best passages, Homer chooses a battle scene, suggesting that this feature, at least in contrast to Hesiod, could be seen to characterise Homeric poetry. While the crowd's response indicates that he obviously knew his audience, Homer loses:

ὁ δὲ βασιλεὺς τὸν Ἡσίοδον ἐστεφάνωσεν εἰπὼν δίκαιον εἶναι τὸν ἐπὶ γεωργίᾳ καὶ εἰρήνῃ προκαλούμενον νικᾶν, οὐ τὸν πολέμους καὶ σφαγὰς διεξιόντα.

The king awarded the crown to Hesiod, saying that it was right for the poet advocating farming and peace to win, not the poet who narrated wars and slaughter.¹¹

⁹ Furthermore, on another level, it may be surprising that someone entitled, ὁ βασιλεὺς (207 Allen), should favour Hesiod over Homer. For a recent discussion of the competing characterisations and evaluations of Hesiod and Homer see Graziosi (2002) 168–80.

¹⁰ The ancient testimony for a Solonian νόμος περὶ ἀργίας (Plut. *Sol.* 22 and 31; Diog. Laert. 1.55, Hdt. 2.177) provides interesting evidence for a Hesiodic reception of the figure Solon. For discussion see Aly (*RE* s.v. 'Solon' 960), Manfredini and Piccirilli (1977) 239–40 and Wallace (1985) 62–4. If actually Solonian it would provide insight into how Hesiod may have further operated in the lawgiver's political (as well as poetic) agenda (see Lloyd (1975, vol. 1) 55–6).

¹¹ *Certamen* 207–10 Allen. It may be a Hesiodic joke/pun that the king says it is δίκαιον for Hesiod to win, given the prominence of δίκη in the *Works and Days*.

Rather than being exclusively about poetry, the contest seems to have been about generic reception, about competition between forms of ἔπεα, and even about the endorsement of certain social values that these competing forms are construed as representing, inherent in their very modalities of expression: the contrast between the moral purpose of προκαλούμενον ('advocating') and the more straightforwardly entertaining function of διεξιόντα ('narrating') is particularly telling.¹² Tzetzes' version of the contest provides a variant interesting for this discussion, according to which Homer's supporters were not 'the Greeks' but a select group: οἱ παρεστῶτες πάντες τῶν ἐλλογίμων καὶ στρατιωτῶν τὸν Ὅμηρον ἔστεφάνουν ('All those present of social standing and soldiers were awarding the crown to Homer').¹³ While the *Certamen*'s comparatively late date renders its evidence as only suggestive, the various versions of the *Certamen* are nevertheless interesting in their recapitulation of the dichotomies between forms of ἔπεα in Solon 4 to which this discussion has arrived independently.¹⁴

Nearly all of the themes of Solon 4 appear in Hesiod's poetry, primarily the *Works and Days*, but also the *Theogony*. Solon 4 is characterised by the same nexus of thought that pervades the *Works and Days*. The excesses of leaders, the instrumentality of greed in the creation of injustice and communal suffering, the detailed focus on δίκη and the consequences for the city of its behaviour towards δίκη are dominant themes in both texts, and although a body of justice poetry no doubt existed to which both belong and to which Solon may also be responding, the correspondence of so many themes with the Hesiodic text, and Hesiod's prominence in

¹² For generic reception see the *Certamen*, Ar. *Frogs* 1033, and esp. Proclus: εἰσὶ δὲ οἵτινες ἀνεψιὸν αὐτὸν Ἡσιόδου παρέδωσαν, ἀτριβεῖς ὄντες ποιησέως. τοσοῦτον γὰρ ἀπέχουσι τοῦ γένει προσήκειν, ὅσον ἡ ποίησις διέστηκεν αὐτῶν, 'There are those who record that he was a cousin of Hesiod, but they are not those schooled in poetry. For they are as far from being related to one another as their poetry is different' (Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1916) 27).

¹³ Wilamowitz-Moellendorff (1916) 49. It is unclear whether the passage names two groups or one, and if this description has been influenced by Tzetzes' own Byzantine context.

¹⁴ Richardson (1981) *contra* West (1967), however, argues persuasively for a sixth-century basis to the *Certamen*.

early Greek poetry, justify both close analysis of this poem's relationship to Hesiod, and the use of the term 'Hesiodic allusion'.¹⁵

One may then ask about the 'thoroughly Hesiodic' element of this poem. Inevitably, the discussion of archaic reception must also involve modern reception, and here I will begin to suggest a gap between the traditional concerns of scholarship regarding this question, and the possible reception of this poem by Solon's audience. Though frequently analysed, the 'thoroughly Hesiodic' aspects of Solon 4 cannot be, I will argue, as unilaterally or straightforwardly analysed as the parameters of the debates have suggested. Jaeger's reminiscence over the reception of his 1926 article 'Solon's *Eunomia*' illustrates the poles of opinion: 'I can never forget how after I had presented my interpretation of Solon's poem on Athens, Ἡμετέρα δὲ πόλις, Wilamowitz casually remarked to me, "Really, there is nothing here that needs to be explained; linguistically all is very simple. Solon and Hesiod have exactly the same idea of Justice." This is in fact roughly what he had previously stated in his *Aristoteles und Athen*. Yet I had gone to no end of trouble to show how it is precisely the changing concepts of the divine δίκη that reveal the characteristic difference between the mind of the eighth and that of the sixth centuries.'¹⁶ Jaeger, however, need not have been too disappointed. Not only have many scholars explicitly or implicitly followed his argument, but those who disagree still tend to analyse the poems in terms he laid down so long ago.¹⁷

Discussions tend to be located at two poles: scholars talk about what Solon thinks, feels, or believes – his 'philosophy'

¹⁵ For nuanced discussion of intertextuality in archaic Greek poetry see Nagy (1990) 72, and more generally see Pucci (1994) 24–5 and Hinds (1998) esp. chs. 2 and 5, and Conte (1986).

¹⁶ Jaeger (1966) 40.

¹⁷ For instance, over a half century later another scholar, Bernd Manuwald (1989) 7, in discussing Hesiod's and Solon's conceptions of justice manages to agree with both giants, Wilamowitz and Jaeger, arguing, 'so hat Jaeger unbewusst und mit falscher Begründung ebenfalls etwas Richtiges gesehen'. This is also the case in one of the most recent books on Solon, Almeida (2003). Of those opposing Jaeger's formulations, Lloyd-Jones (1971) 44–5 provides perhaps the most extended critique.

or ‘theology’ – in comparison and contrast with Hesiod, and they discuss or dispute what the relationship of Solon to Hesiod means in terms of a developmental story. While pursuit of the history of the development of certain ideas and concepts is not an inherently flawed endeavour (although likely to encounter serious difficulties in this period),¹⁸ it should not exclude other approaches to the relationship between the works of these two poets. A different approach would be to ask how the audience made sense of such allusions.

One might ask why the poet chose to align himself so obviously with a tradition. While scholars tend to concentrate on the *strength* or *degree* of a poet’s attachment to a given tradition, drawing conclusions about the personal values of the poet that this attachment suggests or about the social and political development that it conveys, this chapter will suggest an overlooked area in which one may ask how the audience of this poetry made sense of the allusions. When the allusions are so strong maybe the main point is that *they are there*. In some cases, then, it would be more fruitful to think about the larger issue of why a poem may evoke so strongly the impression of adherence to a tradition, and how in the process that poem also potentially shapes reception of the original. This takes us more into the public realm of the audience and leads us to ask questions about the kind of reception the poem attempts to effect through the transparency or obscurity of its relationship with a poetic tradition. This is a crucial concern, as the dual career of Solon suggests a political dimension to how this poet and his poetry were received.

Such a change of focus shifts the emphasis of analysis somewhat from the producers of our text (or rather makes explicit what must not be forgotten as actually implicit in this perspective), whether the individual poet, Solon, or societal developments such as the ‘rise’ of the polis, to its ‘consumers’, and challenges traditional approaches in two ways. First, *Geistesgeschichte* must take into account the possibility that a poetic text in an oral culture may be simultaneously both traditional *and* current. It is therefore sometimes more

¹⁸ See pp. 24–5 and Ch. 7 esp. pp. 205–6.

important to ask how appropriation of this traditional but current text is made sense of rather than *only* to analyse the exact differences between these texts. This is particularly true when the genres of the two texts are different, as in the case of Solon's use of Hesiodic material. Second, discussions of poetic allusion couched in terms of what the poet feels, thinks or believes or how s/he uses traditional forms to express her/his new ideas or feelings eclipse the role played by the audience, as consumers of this poetry, in influencing the type and manner of allusion. Discussion of allusion in archaic Greek poetry is pervaded by the image of the archaic poet struggling to fit 'new wine in old wine skins',¹⁹ thereby rendering the poet's problem personal. Instead, more emphasis should be placed on the kind of response a poet may have hoped to evoke by the manipulation of a poetic tradition from an audience for whom this poetry is both traditional and current.

Deciding whether Solon was or was not thoroughly Hesiodic may well have been a question that presented itself to his archaic audience. Solon's use of explicitly Hesiodic material is significant not only in how it does or does not differ from its predecessor but in the marked way in which the act of comparison suggests itself. In appropriating Hesiodic poetry, his ends may be the appropriation of what *this* tradition actively means for its audience. And yet, at the same time, I would suggest, the interface between the explicitness of his appropriation and the differences which may exist is a more complex one to negotiate than scholars have previously seen, and one which Solon is likely to have exploited actively, creating occasions on which the outward signs of straight assimilation of Hesiod, what one might call the Hesiodic 'façade', may simultaneously obscure and highlight (a clever political as well as poetic ruse) some important differences from the tradition. This chapter analyses this relationship primarily from a poetic perspective, while Part III of this book will pursue the political consequences of poetic appropriation, showing how a political stance may be created by, or rather be implicit in, a poetic one.

¹⁹ Jaeger's formulation (1966) 90, of which Mitchell (1997) seems unaware.

With the exception of the introductory four lines of the poem, one is hard-pressed to find an element of Solon 4 that cannot be matched with a passage of the *Works and Days*, albeit in various degrees of linguistic echo and emphasis. But rather than immediately comparing and contrasting the details of these connections as is traditionally done, some more ‘macroscopic’ features of this relationship deserve attention. First, the condensation of thought from an extended hexameter poem to a smaller elegy should be considered an important feature of the poem, no less than its specific linguistic resonances.²⁰ Second, this discussion will show how generic comparison is embedded within the structure of the text. Finally, although since the work of Wilamowitz and Jaeger various Hesiodic elements of this poem have been identified and analysed, it has not been simply stated that the overwhelming majority of Hesiodic resonances in Solon 4 are derived primarily from two sections of the *Works and Days*: lines 213–326 and the Hymn to Zeus (1–10).²¹ The Hesiodic resonances actually amount to a focus on two ‘purple’ passages – a certain image of Hesiod is thereby fashioned –²² and, together with the structural design of the poem, thus suggest that an important feature of Solon’s use of Hesiod is its obvious or seemingly transparent quality, and yet it is this quality that has the potential to (re)create Hesiod in a Solonian image.²³

As will be seen, the most striking or obvious differences are in the immediacy and politicised nature of Solon’s treatment. These features are usually explained by a simple narrative of historical and conceptual developments, but, I will argue, owe at least as much to the appropriation of hexameter poetry into elegy and to the use of panhellenic material for a (more) specific polis-context. What follows is a linear discussion of the presence of Hesiod in Solon 4, attempting to indicate where

²⁰ As we have noted above in Ch. 2 in the context of Tyrtaeus’ and Callinus’ selective elegiac use of epic material.

²¹ Jaeger (1966) 96. See below n. 78.

²² This focus suggests that Hesiod is already by the early sixth century a definitive authority on δίκη. See Arch. 177 and nn. 5 and 7.

²³ See Hinds (1998) ch. 5 on what he calls ‘Do-it-yourself literary tradition’.

Solon's sentiments correspond to and diverge from Hesiod's, exploring the nature of this relationship, while marking certain larger implications of this analysis for discussion in Part III.

III Situating ourselves: lines 1–8

ἡμετέρα δὲ πόλις κατὰ μὲν Διὸς οὐποτ' ὀλείται
 αἴσαν καὶ μακάρων θεῶν φρένας ἀθανάτων·
 τοίη γὰρ μεγάλθυμος ἐπίσκοπος ὀβριμοπάτρη
 Παλλὰς Ἀθηναίη χεῖρας ὑπερθεν ἔχει·
 αὐτοὶ δὲ φθείρειν μεγάλην πόλιν ἀφραδίησιν
 ἀστοὶ βούλονται χρήμασι πειθόμενοι,
 δήμου θ' ἡγεμόνων ἄδικος νόος, οἷσιν ἐτοῖμον
 ὕβριος ἐκ μεγάλης ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν·

Our city will never perish by the dispensation of Zeus or the intentions of the blessed gods, who are immortal. For such a stout-hearted guardian, daughter of a mighty father, Pallas Athena, holds her hands over it in protection. But it is citizens themselves who in their senselessness are willing to destroy a great city, persuaded by money; and the mind of the leaders of the people is unjust, and they are certain to suffer many pains from their great hybris.

One must feel the sheer impact of these lines. As seen in Chapter 4, the first four lines of Solon 4 are characterised by Homeric allusion and language. Little room exists for explicit Hesiodic allusion; instead, the emphasis on Hesiod will be felt through the poem's structure that 'confines' martial epic to its first four lines in order to privilege the main themes of the poem, themes which are characteristically Hesiodic and Odyssean.²⁴

In contrast, not only are lines 5–8 essentially a barrage of Hesiodic themes, but they display an identifiably and emblematically Hesiodic configuration: the destructive power of wealth, the role of ἀφραδία ('senselessness', whose companion concept is ἀτασθαλία, 'recklessness') in suffering, the abuses of leaders, ὕβρις, and the certainty and all-embracing nature of

²⁴ See pp. 113–19 and Jaeger (1966) 88. See Rosen (1996) for the relationship between Hesiod and the *Odyssey*. And see below n. 117.

retribution.²⁵ In addition to content, Solon also takes a stance characteristic of Hesiod, that of a poet remonstrating with those in power and warning them of ensuing disaster if they persist in their unjust behaviour.²⁶

The structural design of the first eight lines encapsulates and articulates the thematic aims of the poem. Tightly compressed references to Hesiodic material strongly mark the transition from the first lines of the poem to its main themes. At the same time, summary meets, and replaces, summary: corresponding to the essence of martial epic in the first 4 lines, we have the emblematically Hesiodic in the next. The juxtaposition itself is significant, and provides a programme for the ensuing poem. Unlike Solon 13, where Hesiodic resonances are strong from the first line,²⁷ in Solon 4 comparison and contrast are essential to the meaning of the poem, and are therefore embedded in its very start. The first eight lines provide an introduction not only to the Hesiodic themes of this poem, but also to the manner of presenting the ‘Hesiodic’ within this poem: juxtaposition enhances the clarity, and therefore importance, of the poet’s alignment with Hesiod. The associations of Hesiodic poetry are thus evoked for the audience, and they are thereby encouraged to respond accordingly. This strategy of generic imitation and juxtaposition is one which will be repeated again to powerful effect in the concluding section of the poem.

IV Introduction to Hesiod: 5–8

As the ornate lead-in of the Hesiodic procession which is Solon 4, lines 5–8 repay careful analysis. The image of citizens χρήμασι

²⁵ Hesiod’s first address to Perses in *Works and Days* dwells on the issues of ill-gotten gain, abuses perpetrated by kings, and the foolishness which allows greed to influence the administering of δίκη. See especially lines 35–41. These themes are prominent in lines 202–69 and will be discussed in more detail below.

²⁶ This stance becomes more explicit in lines 30–1, but Solon has already written himself into the introduction through the use of ἡμετέρα in line 1. See *Op.* 202, 263.

²⁷ Solon 13.1–2: Μνημοσύνης καὶ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἀγλαὰ τέκνα, | Μοῦσαι Πιερίδες, κλυτὲ μοι εὐχομένῳ (‘Beautiful children of Memory and Olympian Zeus, Pierian Muses, hear me as I pray’).

πειθόμενοι ('persuaded by money') in lines 5–6 is one central to Solon and shared by both poets. Solon is fond of the participle *πειθόμενος*, using it three times as a line ending in conjunction with wealth and its illicit acquisition. Although *πειθόμενος* appears frequently in Solon, its translation is unusually difficult to fix: the dependent datives quickly slip from expressing simple instrumentality to becoming animate, or even personified, entities that the subject 'trusts in', is 'persuaded by', or 'obeys'.²⁸ In 13 the participle appears in an extended personification of wealth:

πλοῦτον δ' ὃν μὲν δώσει θεοί, παραγίνεται ἀνδρὶ
 ἔμπεδος ἐκ νεάτου πυθμένος ἐς κορυφήν·
 ὃν δ' ἄνδρες τιμῶσιν ὑφ' ὕβριος, οὐ κατὰ κόσμον
 ἔρχεται, ἀλλ' ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθόμενος
 οὐκ ἐθέλων ἔπεται, ταχέως δ' ἀναμίσγεται ἄτῃ. (9–13)

Wealth that the gods give, it abides by a man, constant, from lowest foundation to the highest point. But wealth which *hybris* prompts men to honour comes in no orderly fashion, but complying with unjust deeds, unwillingly it follows, and straightaway it is mixed with ruin.²⁹

This extended description of wealth suggests that animation or personification may be implicit in 4.6, and is comparable to Hesiod's own depiction of a personified *κέρδος* ('profit', *Op.* 320–6), capable of deceiving men:³⁰

χρήματα δ' οὐχ ἀρπακτά· θεόσδοτα πολλὸν ἀμείνω.
 εἰ γάρ τις καὶ χερσὶ βίη μέγαν ὄλβον ἔληται
 ἢ ὁ γ' ἀπὸ γλώσσης λήισσεται, οἷά τε πολλά
 γίγνεται, εὖτ' ἂν δὴ κέρδος νόον ἐξαπατήσῃ
 ἀνθρώπων, Αἰδῶ δέ τ' Ἀναιδείῃ κατοπάσῃ·
 ῥεῖα δέ μιν μαυροῦσι θεοὶ, μινύθουσι δέ οἴκον
 ἀνέρι τῷ, παῦρον δέ τ' ἐπὶ χρόνον ὄλβος ὅπηδεῖ.

²⁸ See Adkins (1985) 113, Jaeger (1966) 82 n. 1, and Solmsen (1949) 112. Compare the usage in Thgn. 194, where a man takes a wife *χρήμασι πειθόμενος*; and cf. Theognis' other uses of this participle in this position in the pentameter: Thgn. 1152, 1238b, 1262 and Mülke (2002) 109–10.

²⁹ All citations of Hesiod are from the editions of West (1966) and (1978).

³⁰ Cf. Thgn. 203. On *κέρδος* in relation to *hybris* and *δίκη* in archaic poetry see Cozzo's study (1988) 48–71.

Wealth is not to be stolen, it is much better when god-given. For if someone seizes great good fortune in his hands by violence or carries it off by the spoken word,³¹ as often happens, whenever profit deceives the mind of men and Shamelessness drives away a sense of Shame, the gods easily blot him out, and cause the household of that man to diminish and the good fortune attends him only for a short while.

While Solon 13 more closely evokes the animation of wealth in the Hesiodic passage (particularly line 320) than the brief χρήμασι πειθόμενοι of 4.6, the additional presence of νόος in 4.7 suggests the Hesiodic image of κέρδος deceiving the ‘mind of men’ (νόον ἀνθρώπων) is not far away.³²

Solon’s stance towards the ἡγεμόνες (‘leaders’) in lines 7–8 is further evocative of Hesiod’s stance in the *Works and Days*.³³ But while the injustice of the leaders and the poet’s role in making this explicit recalls more generally the Hesiodic stance, a more concrete connection is provided by the words ἄδικος νόος, itself Hesiodic. It is said of the personified Δίκη (258–60):

καὶ ῥ’ ὅπότ’ ἂν τίς μιν βλάβῃ σκολιῶς ὀνοτάζων,³⁴
αὐτίκα παρ Διὶ πατρὶ καθεζομένη Κρονίῳ
γῆρύετ’ ἀνθρώπων ἄδικον νόον ...

³¹ West’s formulation (1978) *ad loc.*

³² Though the text of Solon 4 is lacunose at this point, it must be noted that there are indications of how Solon may be using the participle πειθόμενος with sophistication. In each Solonian usage three elements are present or implicit – wealth, illicit means, and men – but they vary in their syntactical function as subject of the participle or dative. Used in the context of line 11 (πλουτέουσιν δ’ ἄδικοις ἔργμασι, ‘they grow rich trusting in unjust deeds’), the dative ἄδικοις ἔργμασι may be read as a corrective to the passivity of the men suggested in line 6 (χρήμασι πειθόμενοι) and in Hes. *Op.* 323 (κέρδος νόον ἐξαπατήσει) who act under the influence of gain; the more ‘obviously’ Hesiodic Solon 13.12–13 would then appear a more subtle but similar corrective in that it renders πλοῦτος, the subject of πειθόμενος, almost the victim of the ἄδικοις ἔργμασι, and attributes instead to ἄνδρες the ‘persuasive’ compulsion it is traditionally said to exert over men.

³³ As, for instance, West (1978) 23–4 argues, or more strongly Havelock (1978) 259: ‘There are several points of comparison which taken together can hardly be accidental.’

³⁴ The treating scornfully of Δίκη consists in passing crooked judgements (σκολίαι δίκαι) or apportioning blame in a crooked fashion; see West (1978) and Verdenius (1985) *ad loc.*

And whenever someone harms her, treating her in a scornful fashion immediately she takes a seat beside her father Zeus, son of Cronos, and tells of the unjust mind of men.³⁵

Solon's ἡγεμόνων ἄδικος νόος ('unjust mind of the leaders') echoes Hesiod's ἀνθρώπων ἄδικον νόον ('unjust mind of men'), and occupies the same metrical position in the hexameter. The apparent tension between the specificity of Solon's 'leaders' and the generality of Hesiod's 'men' is quickly resolved in the full context of the Hesiodic passage (260–2):

γῆρύετ' ἀνθρώπων ἄδικον νόον, ὅφρ' ἀποτείσῃ
 δῆμος ἀτασθαλίας βασιλέων, οἳ λυγρὰ νοέοντες
 ἄλλῃ παρκλίνωσι δίκας σκολιῶς ἐνέποντες.

She tells of the unjust mind of men in order that the demos may pay for the recklessness of kings, who devise baneful deeds and speaking their judgements in crooked fashion turn them astray.

For Hesiod, ἀνθρώπων ἄδικον νόον ('the unjust mind of men') is not opposed to the ἀτασθαλίας βασιλέων ('recklessness of kings'). The generalising force of line 260 is quickly replaced by the behaviour of kings. As Hesiod's ἄνθρωποι ('men') gives place to the βασιλεῖς ('kings') as the real and more precise target of criticism, so too Solon replaces the more general group of ἀστοί ('townsmen') of line 6 with ἡγεμόνες ('leaders') of line 7 who, if the *Ath. Pol.*'s assertion is correct, were Solon's prime target.³⁶ As Havelock puts it, 'Hesiod's syntax first allowed δίκη to complain against mankind, and then substituted the δῆμος who suffered for the sins of their princes: Solon first reproaches the townspeople, but then substitutes the "leaders of the δῆμος," thus reproducing the ambiguity of this prototype as well as reusing the formula "unjust mind".'³⁷ Whether Solon's relabelling of these groups represents historical development between the

³⁵ West (1978) *ad loc.* defends ἄδικον against Solmsen's choice of ἀδίκων.

³⁶ *Ath. Pol.* 5.3 καὶ ὅλως τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς στάσεως ἀνάπτει τοῖς πλουσίοις ('Indeed entirely was Solon ascribing blame for stasis on the wealthy'). The force of lines 5–6 is shared with Hesiod's accusations of the βασιλεῖς who should be rendering straight δίκαι: αὐτοὶ ... ἀστοί makes it clear that those responsible for the city's ruin are those who least ought to be.

³⁷ Havelock (1978) 259–60.

two poems,³⁸ or, as I prefer, a ‘generic’ gloss on Hesiod’s groups, the effect of these labels is one of immediacy, creating a more politicised version: in apposition to – and falling between – Hesiod’s ‘mankind’ and ‘kings’ as the ultimate rulers, Solon places ‘citizens’ and ‘leaders of the δῆμος’. Yet in both Solon 4 and *Op.* it is the δῆμος who suffer: in *Op.* 261 the δῆμος pay for the recklessness of the kings; likewise in Solon 4 the δῆμος of line 7 return in lines 23–6 as the recipients of the resulting κακά (‘evils’).³⁹

V Δίκη, in person

The stage is set for the entrance of Δίκη:

πλουτέουσιν δ’ ἀδίκους ἔργμασι πειθόμενοι
 * * * * *
 οὐθ’ ἱερῶν κτεάνων οὐτέ τι δημοσίων
 φειδόμενοι κλέπτουσιν ἀφαρπαγῇ ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος,
 οὐδὲ φυλάσσονται σεμνὰ Δίκης θέμεθλα
 ἢ σιγῶσα σύνοιδε τὰ γιγνόμενα πρό τ’ ἐόντα,
 τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ πάντως ἦλθ’ ἀποτετισσόμενη,
 τοῦτ’ ἤδη πάσῃ πόλει ἔρχεται ἔλκος ἄφυκτον,
 ἐς δὲ κακὴν ταχέως ἦλυθε δουλοσύνην,
 ἢ στάσιν ἔμφυλον πόλεμόν θ’ εὗδοντ’ ἐπεγείρει,
 ὃς πολλῶν ἐρατὴν ὤλεσεν ἡλικίην·

They grow rich relying on their unjust deeds ... Sparing nothing of sacred nor public property they steal, pillaging from one another, and they do not watch over the solemn foundations of Justice, who in silence bears witness to

³⁸ Historical development can never provide the entire answer. It was certainly within the poet’s power to ‘archaise’, as tragedy does. In contrast to fr. 4, Solon 13 is in fact far more straightforwardly Hesiodic. If Solon 4 seems more immediate and more politicised, I prefer to attribute this to poetic design influenced no doubt by historical context, rather than to see it as a passive reflection of a change in political context or of conceptual development. See Csapo and Miller (1999) 92.

³⁹ It may be significant, too, that the λυγρά (‘ruinous deeds’) which Hesiod’s kings contemplate in line 262 seems to be picked up by the λυγρά which Solon’s addressees suffer in 11.1. These λυγρά are δι’ ὑμετέρεην κακότητα (‘through your own badness’) in line 1, but are further explained by Solon in lines 3–4 as befalling them at the hands of their leaders: αὐτοὶ γὰρ τούτους νῦξήσατε ῥύματα δόντες, | καὶ διὰ ταῦτα κακὴν ἔσχετε δουλοσύνην (‘For you yourselves caused them to gain power, giving them protection, and on account of this you acquired your base state of servitude’).

both the things taking place and those that were before, and in time does certainly come exacting retribution. This already comes to the entire city, a wound inescapable, and swiftly the city falls into base slavery that wakens civil strife and sleeping war, war that destroys the lovely youth of many.

Lines 11–20 elaborate the destructive consequences of greed and stupidity (ἀφραδίησιν, line 5): having no regard for what is public or sacred, these people (the ἡγεμόνες, unless the lacuna hides a change of subject) steal for their own private gain; they have no regard for Δίκη, who comes to exact requital, and suffering ensues for the city.

While this passage has an overwhelmingly Hesiodic flavour, an iron-clad demonstration of its allusiveness is somewhat elusive in so far as justice certainly must have figured in a substantial body of non-extant archaic poetry that may well have exerted influence on Solon's treatment of Δίκη.⁴⁰ And yet despite the potential for other (irretrievable) intertexts, a strong connection between the treatment of Δίκη by Solon and Hesiod is nevertheless apparent. Beyond particular elements evocative of Hesiod's personification of Δίκη, lines 5–20 in fact replicate an entire progression of thought in a prominent passage of the *Works and Days* (202–85).⁴¹ The extent to which Solon's personification is shared with his Hesiodic model will be outlined in order to demonstrate how very recognisable his allusion to this tradition would have been. At the outset, the appropriateness of this particular section of the *Op.*, in which the city is prominent (225–47, 269), for a poem beginning ἡμετέρα δὲ πόλις should be noted.

This passage of the *Op.* to which Solon 4 is most indebted represents a distinctly recognisable unit of the poem,⁴² one that would arguably have been identifiable to an audience familiar

⁴⁰ See, for instance Martin (1984) who posits a shared genre of instruction to kings behind the strong intertext of *Theog.* 79–93 and *Od.* 8.166–77.

⁴¹ Hesiod's personifications of Δίκη: 220–4 and 256–62. The unjust city: 238–47. See Jaeger (1966) 89–90. See also Nagy (1990) 64–7. On δίκη in Hesiod see Claus (1977) and Dickie (1978).

⁴² As Heath (1985) 249 and Claus (1977) 75 also recognise. Pace West (1978) 41 who sees less system in the poem.

with it through performance.⁴³ A strong natural division is created at line 202, when the poet makes the transition from the extended λόγος of the five ages of men (106–201) to the αἶνος ('fable') addressed to kings (202–11). Delayed until lines 274–85, the moral of the αἶνος both frames Hesiod's excursus on Δίκη, and creates a ring structure at the heart of which lies the diptych of the two cities.⁴⁴ Furthermore, Havelock points out the overwhelming density of occurrences of δίκη and its forms in this section: 28 instances in 83 hexameters.⁴⁵

Analogous combinations of themes immediately precede both poets' personifications of Δίκη and their focus on δίκη and the city. The opposition of hybris and δίκη characterises both (*Op.* 213, 217; Solon 4.7–8), as does the focus upon the behaviour of those in power. For while Hesiod addresses Perses, the content and phrasing of his warning provide a tentative denouement to his fable (213–18):⁴⁶

ὦ Πέρση, σὺ δ' ἄκουε Δίκης, μὴδ' ὕβριν ὄφελλε·
 ὕβρις γάρ τε κακὴ δειλῶ βροτῶ· οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλὸς
 ῥηιδίως φερέμεν δύναται, βαρύνθει δέ θ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς
 ἐγκύρσας Ἄτησιν· ὁδὸς δ' ἐτέρηφι παρελθεῖν
 κρείσσων ἐς τὰ δίκαια· δίκη δ' ὑπὲρ ὕβριος ἴσχει
 ἐς τέλος ἐξελοῦσα· παθὼν δέ τε νήπιος ἔγνω.

Perses, listen to justice, and don't cause hybris to thrive. For hybris is baneful for a base man, and not even is the noble man able to bear it well, but overburdened by it he meets with Ruin. But better is the path that goes another route to the things that are right. And Justice overtakes hybris in the long run. But it is the fool who understands this through suffering.

Hesiod's warning to Perses to avoid hybris is succeeded by comments concerning the ἐσθλός ('noble') and the Ἄτη ('ruin') to which even he is prone. More specifically, lines

⁴³ Perhaps this section would even have been excerpted for recitation (cf. Aeschin. *Ctes.* 135). This passage seems to be lurking behind Thuc. 3.81–5.

⁴⁴ The structure is as follows: fable (202–11), address to Perses and personified Δίκη (212–24), just city (225–37), unjust city (238–47), address to kings and personification of Δίκη (247–73), moral of the fable (274–85).

⁴⁵ See Havelock (1978) 194–5, who further contrasts this density with the rest of the poem.

⁴⁶ As noted by Nagy (1990) 64–7, who ingeniously sees the poem as dramatising 'the actual passage of time required for the workings of *Dike*' (66). See also Daly (1961) 49–50.

216–18 contain verbal and thematic echoes which potentially turn the tables on the ominous threat of the hawk uttered in 210–11:⁴⁷ ἄφρων δ' ὅς κ' ἐθέλη πρὸς κρείσσονας ἀντιφερίζειν· | νίκης τε στέρεται πρὸς τ' αἰσχεσιν ἄλγεα πάσχει ('It is a fool who wishes to contend with those who are stronger. He finds himself deprived of victory and added to the humiliation he suffers pains as well'). As if a κληδών ('presage contained in a chance utterance'), the generalised gnomic language of the hawk, allows for ambiguity as to who will suffer (πάσχω), who/what the stronger is (κρείσσων) and who is in fact senseless (ἄφρων), an ambiguity that Hesiod then exploits: the road ἐς τὰ δίκαια is better (κρείσσων, 217), δίκη surpasses hybris, and the stupid one (νῆπιος, 218) realises only after having suffered (πάσχω, 218). Stupidity (ἄφραδίησιν), injustice (ἄδικος νόος) and the certainty of requital (οἷσιν ἐτοῖμον | ὕβριος ἐκ μεγάλης ἄλγεα πολλὰ παθεῖν, 'they are certain to suffer much grief from their great hybris') are of course all themes distilled into Solon 4.5–8.

Following hard upon this sequence of ideas, personifications of δίκη appear in the poems of both Solon and Hesiod. Hesiod's passage establishes a pattern of personification, mistreatment and vengeance that Solon 4 recapitulates:

αὐτίκα γὰρ τρέχει Ὅρκος ἅμα σκολιῇσι δίκησι,
τῆς δὲ Δίκης ρόθος ἐλκομένης, ἧ κ' ἄνδρες ἄγῳσι
δωροφάγοι, σκολιῆς δὲ δίκης κρίνωσι θέμιστας·
ἧ δ' ἔπεται κλαίουσα πόλιν καὶ ἦθεα λαῶν,
ἥερα ἐσσαμένη, κακὸν ἀνθρώποισι φέρουσα
οἳ τέ μιν ἐξέλασσωσι καὶ οὐχ ἰθεῖαν ἔνειμαν.

For at once does the god of oaths, Horkos, keep pace with crooked judgements, and there is a clamour when Dike is dragged to wherever bribe-consuming men lead her as they make their decisions with crooked judgements. But weeping she pursues the city and tribes of people, shrouded in mist, bearing evil for men who drove her out and did not deal out justice that was straight. (219–24)

As in Solon 4, a description of what happens to a city which perpetrates such offences against Δίκη follows in the Hesiodic

⁴⁷ Cf. McGlew (1993) 58.

text. A second personification in *Op.* 256–62, framing Hesiod’s depiction of the two cities, underscores a link between the descriptions of the personified Δίκη and of her relationship to the city:

ἡ δέ τε παρθένος ἐστὶ Δίκη, Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖα,
κυδρὴ τ’ αἰδοίη τε θεοῖς, οἳ Ὀλυμπον ἔχουσιν·
καὶ ῥ’ ὅπ’ ἂν τίς μιν βλάπτῃ σκολιῶς ὀνοτάζων,
αὐτίκα παρ Διὶ πατρὶ καθεζομένη Κρονίῳ
γῆρύετ’ ἀνθρώπων ἄδικον νόον, ὅφρα ἀποτείσῃ
δῆμος ἀτασθαλίας βασιλέων οἳ λυγρὰ νοέοντες
ἄλλῃ παρκλίνωσι δίκας σκολιῶς ἐνέποντες.

There is a virgin, Dike, begotten of Zeus, august and revered of the gods who hold Olympus, and whenever someone harms her, treating her in a scornful fashion, immediately she takes a seat beside her father Zeus, son of Cronos, and tells of the unjust mind of men in order that the demos may pay for the recklessness of kings, who devise baneful deeds and speaking their judgements in crooked fashion turn them astray. (256–62)

As in Solon, this second personification of Δίκη is followed immediately by a depiction of the ills which befall the city and δῆμος in which δίκη is not guarded (φυλάσσεσθαι).⁴⁸ ἀποτεισομένη (‘exacting retribution’) in line 16 of Solon’s poem is comparable with ἀποτείσει (‘may pay in requital’) of line 260. In addition, Solon uses φυλάσσω (‘guard’, ‘watch over’) in line 14 in the same sense as Hesiod does in line 263 and in a similar context of greed and the resulting violation of δίκη: ταῦτα φυλασσόμενοι, βασιλῆς ἰθύετε μύθους | δωροφάγοι, σκολιῶν δὲ δικέων ἐπὶ πάγχυ λάθεσθε (‘Watching over these things, bribe-devouring kings, make straight your words, and forget entirely your crooked judgements’).⁴⁹ While these verbal resonances may be expected in poetry dealing with thematically similar material – itself an important indication of connection, albeit less immediate – the identical contexts of personifications of Δίκη suggest that the relationship is more direct.⁵⁰

⁴⁸ Lines 260–4 compare with φυλάσσονται (‘they watch over’) in Solon 4.14.

⁴⁹ See Adkins (1985) 116 on the similarity with Hesiod of Solon’s use of φυλάσσεσθαι. Voice is significant: Hesiod uses the active when he speaks of the spirits who watch over the δίκαι of men, but the middle in the case of humans performing this action for themselves. Compare *Op.* 124 and 254.

⁵⁰ Adkins (1985) 116.

But as several have noted, differences do exist.⁵¹ Solon seems to avoid the element of vulnerability present in Hesiod's depiction of Δίκη. While the silence of Solon's Δίκη may be ambiguous (σιγῶσα, 'in silence'), she does not cry like Hesiod's maiden. In fact her silence contrasts with both descriptions of Hesiod's justice for whom there is a ῥόθος ('clamour') when she is dragged away and who complains to her father (γῆρύετ' ἀνθρώπων ἄδικον νόον, 'she tells of the unjust mind of men', 260) when she is wronged. Moreover, Hesiod's justice flits about, shrouded in mist, whereas Solon's Δίκη has rather permanent-sounding σεμνὰ θέμεθλα ('august foundations'). Further still Solon's Δίκη does not seem to need Zeus: she can herself exact τίσις ('requitall').⁵²

These differences do exist, but their exact significance is open to debate. Jaeger and Solmsen, among others, argue for a changed conception of δίκη and the consequences of punishment, particularly the immanence of retribution that the absence of Zeus facilitates.⁵³ But while these conclusions may have some validity, other possibilities need to be explored. First of all, the notion of Hesiod's δίκη being more vulnerable is only partially true. Clearly, vulnerability may be suggested in Hesiod's depiction, but nevertheless her effectiveness is unimpeded at lines 217, 223 and 258–62. Similarly, Hesiod's depiction of Δίκη as a daughter of Zeus does not compromise the immediacy of the retribution, as αὐτίκα ('straightaway') in lines 259 and 219 shows. One must note that Solon, like Hesiod, has both time-frames of punishment: in Solon 4 retribution comes, τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ ('in time', 16), but it is also depicted as immediate, ἤδη ('now', 'already', 17). That retribution from Solon's justice seems more immanent is important, but this

⁵¹ Jaeger (1966), Solmsen (1949) 113–14. Several, however, have disputed Jaeger's claims, beginning with Wilamowitz (n.197). Masaracchia (1958) 258 points out the similarity of lines 15–16 with Hesiod. Likewise Adkins (1985) 117 says, despite differences between the poets, 'we are in the same world of thought'.

⁵² In Solon 4.16 ἦλθ' ἀποτεισομένη ('she comes, exacting retribution'), but in Hesiod (*Op.* 259–61), she complains to Zeus ὄφρ' ἀποτείσῃ | δῆμος ἀτασθαλίας βασιλέων ('in order that the demos may pay for the recklessness of kings').

⁵³ Jaeger (1966) 88–94, Solmsen (1949) 113–14. For a critical approach to over-emphasising the differences see Lloyd-Jones (1971) 44–5.

may be better understood in terms of generic differences than through an unambiguous account of evolving conceptions.

Likewise, accounting for Zeus's absence may lead in several directions. It need not passively reflect a changed conception of the power and independence of δίκη nor imply that Solon forged a new vision of δίκη. No doubt conceptions of δίκη were evolving over this period, but our extant texts are limited and ought not to be seen as representing a simple linear chronological narrative: as contestation of meaning is an endemic feature of political language, our extant texts may be championing their own meaning in the face of contrary claims; it is such contests that give rise to the changes visible over time. Solon's own poetry provides a concrete argument against simple chronological narratives: in Solon 13, instead of Δίκη, the figure portrayed as exacting τίσις is Zeus. This is not to use fr. 13 to clarify fr. 4, but merely to point out that treatment of Solon as a conceptual 'visionary' may need qualification. This is all the more true in that both our poet and his society could and did make sense of and repeat the Hesiodic poems; a tidy picture of conceptual progression threatens to elide the complexities of the relationship between poetry and society.

Yet Zeus *is* missing from Solon's personification of Δίκη. Solon gets the best of both poetic worlds: he evokes the personification briefly for the force of that image, while having the punishment rendered by Δίκη as if it were an inevitable consequence. But this strategy may not be so simple: the *Theogony* and the *Works and Days* are poetic tributes to Zeus's power and supremacy, so to be Hesiodic without Zeus verges on the oxymoronic. Solon's 'thoroughly Hesiodic' poem chooses a depiction of δίκη which both is, and is not, obviously and thoroughly Hesiodic, depending on what are considered to be the essential elements of Hesiod.

There are poetic consequences to this 'allusion with absence'. In the Hesiodic poems a close connection is forged between the poet and Zeus. In the *Theogony* this is effected through the Muses, by the similarity of the poet's song to that of the Muses.⁵⁴ In the *Works and Days* this alignment with

⁵⁴ *Theog.* 43–52, a point recognised by Clay (1988) 329 and others, see her n. 26. The claim to sing 'truth' further aligns poet and Muses, see *Theog.* 27–8 and *Op.* 10.

Zeus is mediated by δίκη. Zeus is both father and guardian of Δίκη and the poet has access to straight δίκαι in so far as he can recognise them, and at times treats his own song as nearly synonymous with δίκη.⁵⁵ It is of further significance that in the *Works and Days* the poet grants Muse-like attributes to his Δίκη. The poet exploits the status shared by Δίκη and the Muses as Zeus's daughters: Δίκη makes pronouncements to her father (αὐτίκα παρ Διὶ πατρὶ καθεζομένη Κρονίῳ | γηρύετ' ἀνθρώπων ἄδικον νόον, 'straightaway, sitting beside her father Zeus, son of Cronus, she tells of the unjust mind of men', 259–60), using the verb used by the Muses of themselves in their self-defining description of their inspiration of *Theogony* 28 – ἴδμεν δ', εὖτ' ἐθέλωμεν, ἀληθέα γηρύσασθαι ('and we know, when we want, how to tell things that are true') – and in an act analogous to their role in the *Theogony* (36–7 Διὶ πατρὶ | ὑμνεῦσαι, 'singing to Zeus, their father'). This depiction has consequences for the poet in the *Works and Days*: while Δίκη is described as singing to Zeus of her violation, the poet sings of a violation of δίκη (by his brother and the gift-devouring kings) and his song itself is the singing of δίκη (213, 275).⁵⁶ As he sings δίκη, so Δίκη sings to Zeus.⁵⁷

Solon seems to draw upon this nexus of ideas in his depiction of Δίκη.⁵⁸ He ascribes to his Δίκη an attribute of the Hesiodic Muses (*Theog.* 38, cf. 32), repeating the same line-ending: σύνοιδε τὰ γιγνόμενα πρό τ' ἐόντα ('she bears witness to both

⁵⁵ A claim to have access to straight δίκη is implicit in *Op.* 35–6. For the analogous relationship between the poet's song and δίκη see 213, 248–9, 275. The poet's connection to Zeus is further illustrated in 9–10 and 661–2. See also Nagy (1990) 63–4.

⁵⁶ These references occur in close proximity to the αἶνος where the poet makes reference to his bardic role with αἰδός ('bard', 208). Moreover the application of the verb ἄγω ('lead') to the nightingale (ἦ σ' ἂν ἐγὼ περ ἄγω καὶ αἰοδὼν ἐοῦσαν, 'to wherever I lead you, singer that you are', 208) and to Dike (ἦ κ' ἄνδρες ἄγωσι, 220) furthers the analogy between poet and Dike. See West (1978) ad 220. In this light the *Works and Days* itself can be interpreted as the ῥόθος that arises when justice is abused: on ῥόθος as 'the murmur of protest that spreads among the people' see West (1978) ad 220 with Aesch. *Th.* 6–8, Soph. *Ant.* 259 and 289–90, etc.

⁵⁷ There is a parallelism between this strategy and that of the *Theogony*: in the *Theogony* the Muses delight Zeus with a song of the theogony (40–51), precisely the song that Hesiod is about to sing.

⁵⁸ This nexus appears in fact in the passage of the *Op.* to which Solon seems most to allude.

the things happening now and that which was before').⁵⁹ The intertextuality of the passages links poetry closely and subtly to Δίκη, evoking (however actively) the more elaborately wrought Hesiodic strategy.⁶⁰

This strategy is crucial. Both poets occupy a position of knowing and (in actuality) singing δίκη. Both poets furthermore address the problem of perverted or violated δίκη,⁶¹ whether one considers this problem to be social or poetic. In Hesiod, the problem has a certain shape. Regardless of the social and political realities of Hesiod's contemporary audience, poetically at least the connection of Zeus with kings is a strong one, and therefore a problem in human justice arises: the δίκη of kings ought to come from Zeus, and yet δίκαι from kings can be crooked. Hesiod's *Works and Days* negotiates a position between the special relationship between kings and Zeus, and their frequent miscarriage of justice. The strategy of the *Works and Days* is to assert the poet's place *vis-à-vis* both Zeus and δίκη. The poet has access to and can speak δίκη, and he has a special connection to Zeus. While kings may render crooked judgements, the poet who sings ἐπῆτυμα ('true things') can sing δίκη, and thereby occupy a position closer to Zeus than his human political counterpart. In adopting this crucial function of the king's role and performing it more 'straightly', the special relationship between these figures βασιλεῖς and Zeus (both poetic and political) is brought into

⁵⁹ See also the *Certamen* 97 where this formula τὰ τ' ἔοντα τὰ τ' ἔσσομένα πρό τ' ἔοντα ('that which is, will be, and was before') is repeated. The reappearance of this description of the Muses' song is significant both because it emphasises the attributes of the Muses and because the *Certamen* may be seen through its selection of passages to render a verdict upon what is essentially Hesiodic (and Homeric). The only other appearance of this line describes Calchas in *Il.* 1.70. While Solon's description of Dike makes no reference to the knowledge of the future that Hesiod attributes to his Muses (an attribution that merges poetry and prophecy, on which see Lonsdale (1989) and Buxton (1980) 27–30, quoting Dodds (1951) 81), this does not detract from Solon's muse-like portrayal of Dike: while West (1966) 166 comments that 'in practice, the Greek poet concentrates almost exclusively upon the past', it is also true that knowledge of the future is implicit in Dike's very workings, in her inexorable response to the past and present as revealed in Solon 4.

⁶⁰ One might want to explore whether an analogy exists between the relationship and complementarity of the Muses and Δίκη in the two Hesiodic poems with that shown by Solon 13 and 4. This is however outside the scope of this chapter.

⁶¹ See Solon 4.36.

question.⁶² Here Pucci's observations about the analogy between true words and straight δίκη emphasise the poet's claim to a wider jurisdiction or expertise.⁶³

In Solon 4, while the depiction of Δίκη in terms evocative of the Muses takes a Hesiodic shape, the poet addresses a similar problem of violated δίκη, particularly by leaders, through a different but related strategy. He bypasses the entire problem of divine patronage of political power, not by asserting the poet's direct access to Zeus via his relationship to δίκη, but by simply leaving Zeus out. The Hesiodic connection of poet and δίκη remains firm, while in the space of this poem a claim to Zeus's authority is neither possible nor necessary to make. This absence confirms the internal consistency of the poem. In lines 1–2, Zeus appeared only in a nominal role in what may be best described as his 'epic' capacity, thereafter disappearing to make room for a poem concerned with social behaviour.

Such a manoeuvre could be described as reflecting political and social developments, but the force of this manoeuvre may also lie in the reception by its archaic audience: lines 1–2 and possibly, as will be discussed, the concluding 'hymn' to Εὐνομία, render the absence of Zeus programmatic in this poem and potentially noticeable to an audience. The 'manifest' quality of this absence may reveal something about the combined poetic and political dimensions of appropriating Zeus, which is implicit, however obscurely, in Tyrtaeus frs. 2 and 11, or the *Iliad's* description of Agamemnon's sceptre (2.100–9): such an absence counters the prominence and authority which Zeus and the poetic genres in which he is evoked bestow reciprocally upon one another, as is demonstrated within the *Iliad* and the poetry of Tyrtaeus.⁶⁴

⁶² See Pucci (1977) 72–3. While the good king may have muse-like, poet-like qualities (*Theog.* 79–93), in the *Op.* the phrase δίκας σκολιῶς ἐνέποντες ('speaking his judgments in crooked fashion', 262) with its verb ἐνέπω ('tell') in this context may figure the unjust king in terms of a bad poet. On epic usage of the word see *LfrgrE* s.v. ἐν(ν)έπω and Fournier (1946) 47–8.

⁶³ Pucci (1977) 45–54, 66, 69–71.

⁶⁴ See van Wees (1999) 24 and Thommen (1996) 36–7 on the importance of Zeus for Tyrtaeus; on sceptre-bearing kings see Mondì (1980). It is important to note

While traditional readings of Solon's Δίκη emphasise the immanence that the removal of Zeus bestows on her workings, no one mentions the potential arbitrariness of the Hesiodic Zeus which is thereby also removed. In *Op.* 267–73, the eye of Zeus sees *if* he wishes (καί νυ τάδ' αἶ κ' ἐθέλῃς ἐπιδέσκειται, οὐδέ ἐ λήθει, 'And indeed he sees these things if he wishes, and it does not escape his notice').⁶⁵ Moreover, Hesiod can imagine a world where δίκη is all wrong, although he asserts, ἀλλὰ τὰ γ' οὐ πω ἔολπα τελεῖν Δία μητιόεντα ('But I do not expect that Zeus, wise in counsel, will bring these things to pass', 270–3).⁶⁶ With its striking simile, Solon 13.25–6 seems to suggest that definitions of Zeus are contested and that his (or rather his human agents') potential arbitrariness is at issue: τοιαύτη Ζηνὸς πέλεται τίσις· οὐδ' ἐφ' ἐκάστῳ | ὥσπερ θνητὸς ἀνὴρ γίγνεται ὀξύχολος ... ('Such is the requital that comes from Zeus. Not indeed sharp-tempered at every instance, as a mortal man ...')⁶⁷ On the view that kings are arbitrary in their judgments, compare *Od.* 4.691–2: ἦ τ' ἐστὶ δίκη θείων βασιλῆων· | ἄλλον κ' ἐχθαίρησι βροτῶν, ἄλλον κε φιλοίῃ ('This is the *dike* of *god-like* kings, one man he would hate, another he would love'). In contrast to the good king Odysseus, the traditional manner (but surely *dike* is pointedly polysemous) of kings is to be arbitrary. Returning to Solon, a corollary to his negative simile is that if Zeus does not act as

however that *Iliad* 2 (as indeed the entire *Iliad*) explores the extent to which human manifestations of authority are truly derived from or endorsed by Zeus, or rather faultlines in the assertion that they are, such as the irreconcilability of competing claims to this authority. See Rose (1992) 43–91 (esp. 64–77) and the discussion in the Conclusion.

⁶⁵ *Op.* 268. Solon 13.27–8 αἰεὶ ἐ οὐ ἐλέλθε διαμπερές, ὅστις ἀλιτρὸν | θυμὸν ἔχει may 'correct' Hesiod, firmly replacing the uncertainty of Zeus's response with αἰεὶ, while transferring the indefinite element to the relative clause, and therefore to a different subject.

⁶⁶ Pucci (1977) 73–4 discusses this passage, pointing out the extent to which it already reveals tensions in the relationship between Zeus, Δίκη and the poet.

⁶⁷ ὀξύχολος is a striking and new formulation: Mülke (2002) ad loc. Solon's assertion at 13.27–8 forcefully contrasts with Hesiod's depiction of Zeus at 268 and 273: αἰεὶ δ' οὐ ἐλέλθε διαμπερές, ὅστις ἀλιτρὸν | θυμὸν ἔχει, πάντως δ' ἐς τέλος ἐξεφάνη ('That man who has a sinful heart never escapes Zeus's notice, of a certain he is revealed in the end'), a contrast underscored by the shared language. The heroic temper implicit in ὀξύχολος ἀνὴρ ('sharp-tempered man') renders this description all the more pointed when integrated with the discussions of pp. 48–62 and Ch. 4 on heroic role-playing and Solon's adversarial response to this genre.

a sharp-tempered man in his role as overseer of justice, then the man who is ὀξύχολος in overseeing justice cannot be said to be acting like Zeus, or – by extension – be said to be representing Zeus appropriately.⁶⁸

VI Δίκη and the city

Solon 4 continues by following a structural pattern similar to that of the *Works and Days*: like Hesiod's, Solon's personification of δίκη is followed by a description of the consequences for the city, and its members, of their relationship to Δίκη (17–29).⁶⁹ Jaeger was the first to argue that Solon 4 imitates Hesiod's diptych of the just and unjust cities, but in reversed order, with the concluding section to Εὐνομία occupying the position of the just city.⁷⁰ While 'imitates' is, as will be seen, perhaps too narrow a description the interrelationship between the passages, Solon 4 nevertheless does advance with a progression of thought that is quintessentially Hesiodic, and it is legitimate to suppose that at the level of reception a dialogue between these texts presented itself to contemporary audiences.

Again focusing on the absence of Zeus in Solon's poem in comparison with the pervasiveness of Zeus in Hesiod's diptych, Jaeger and Solmsen emphasised the immanent quality of Δίκη's retribution, even the rationality of it, particularly in comparison with the ills befalling Hesiod's unjust city. Jaeger comments:

⁶⁸ On the frequent use of θνητὸς ἀνὴρ in opposition to the gods in Homer and Hesiod see *Il.* 20.41 and 265–6, *Od.* 10.306, 16.196, *Theog.* 967, etc. and Noussia (1999) *ad loc.* This gives some concrete political motivations behind Solon's choice to draw on the impersonal inevitability of natural phenomena for his conception of *dike*; on Solon and Anaximander in this connection see Jaeger (1966) 92–4. Compare Blaise (1995) on fr. 36, who persuasively argues that Solon assimilates himself – implicitly – to Zeus.

⁶⁹ Hesiod actually frames his diptych of the two cities (225–47) with his personifications of Δίκη (220–4 and 256–62).

⁷⁰ Jaeger (1966) 89, whom others have followed: see Solmsen (1949) and, more recently, Manuwald (1989) 7.

[C]onsider Hesiod's picture of the divine punishment for injustice in the 'unjust city': failure of crops, famine, plague, barrenness of women, distress of war, distress at sea – these are the terrors which heaven sends. Although Solon also enumerates the evil consequences of injustice, they are all essentially immanent, in fact, they are nothing but social diseases ...⁷¹

One might, however, give these points a different emphasis. Reaching beyond simple comparisons, one might take into account generic differences. The balance of the particular and the universal differs in each poet. Despite similarities in the stance of Hesiod and Solon, their position with respect to the cities they describe is different. Solon's depiction has a vividness and immediacy deriving from the precise specificity of ἡμετέρα πόλις: the speaker is situated within the city he describes, and therefore the particularity of this city's suffering competes with the universalising potential of the depiction. In contrast, Hesiod's particular target of Perses and the kings is not so thoroughly integrated with his description of the cities, and so rather than attributing some clear and present common misfortune to a generalisable pattern of causality, he warns that this generalised pattern will occur in actuality unless his addressees take heed.

The relationship of individual to group also becomes important here. Hesiod says πολλάκι καὶ ξύμπασα πόλις κακοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἀπήρᾳ ('many times indeed an entire city suffers on account of an evil man', 240). Thematically similar is Solon's assertion that suffering afflicts the whole as a result of injustice:

⁷¹ Jaeger (1966) 92. Adkins (1985) 118 takes umbrage at Jaeger's association (and Linforth's [1919] 201) of disease with ἔλκος ἄφυκτον ('an ineluctable wound'), and indeed whether this phrase, and later τρύχω in line 22, evokes disease or injury is greatly debated. But asserting an exclusivity to the evocations may be problematic. While Adkins is right to assert that 'ἔλκος at this period is used of wounds inflicted from without by persons or animals', the fact that the poem exploits distinctions between external and internal afflictions to the city may invite associations of disease. In particular, the description of Δίκη as σιγῶσα can be read doubly: while Jaeger and Solmsen would argue that this description highlights how Δίκη clinically and immanently performs her retribution, it may in fact imply something more frightening and invidious, and disease-like, as in Hesiod's description of the νοῦσοι who move σιγῇ ('in silence', *Op.* 104). If Solon's phrase evokes both associations of wounds and disease, then ἔλκος ἄφυκτον would elegantly and effectively fuse the imagery of two genres, epitomising Solon's larger strategy: the inversion of martial exhortation implicit in the city as recipient of the wound would be complemented by an evocation of the disease and ills which afflict the city in *Op.* 243–4.

τοῦτ' ἤδη πάσῃ πόλει ἔρχεται ἔλκος ἄφυκτον ('this wound comes inescapable upon the entire city', 17). And yet while Hesiod focuses on the single agent, describing the individual as causing either suffering for the entire city, or for himself (282–5, 321–6), Solon depicts a collective subset of the city causing suffering for the entire city. The suffering is described in a way that emphasises the individuality (as well as the general nature) of those who suffer. In between Hesiod's formulations of particular suffering for the individual – ῥεῖλα δέ μιν μαυροῦσι θεοί, μινύθουσι δὲ οἶκον | ἀνέρι τῷ ('easily do the gods make him obscure, and cause the home of that man to diminish', 325–6) – and collective suffering – ἀποφθινύθουσι δὲ λαοί· | οὐδὲ γυναῖκες τίκτουσιν, μινύθουσι δὲ οἶκοι ('And the people perish. Nor do the women bear children, and the households diminish', 243–4) – is Solon's depiction of collective suffering experienced at the level of the individual, particularly forceful to a sympotic audience:

οὕτω δημόσιον κακὸν ἔρχεται οἴκαδ' ἐκάστω,
 αὔλειοι δ' ἔτ' ἔχειν οὐκ ἐθέλουσι θύραι,
 ὑψηλὸν δ' ὑπὲρ ἔρκος ὑπέρθορειν, εὖρε δὲ πάντως,
 εἰ καὶ τις φεύγων ἐν μυχῷ ᾗ θαλάμου.

In this way does a public ill come to the home of each, and the courtyard doors refuse any longer to hold it back as it leaps over the high wall, and surely finds him, even if one fleeing is (hiding) in the innermost recess of his room. (4.26–9)

This is not to say that in his description Solon was interacting in so complicated a manner with Hesiod, but to show through contrast how it is that Solon's passage attains its force and immediacy: Solon's extended use of the singular, with elaborate description of the οἶκος penetrated as far as the μυχὸς θαλάμου ('innermost recess of his room'), hits home.

On another level, a comparison of the content of Solon's description of the ills which afflict the city with Hesiod's may demonstrate the interweaving of traditions. At the same time as inverting the tropes of martial exhortation to describe the warlike conditions which prevail within the πόλις,⁷² Solon's description corresponds to the diptych of the just and unjust city.

⁷² See Ch. 4, esp. pp. 102–3.

From the outset the Hesiodic model privileges peace and prosperity as the characteristics of the just city (225–9):

οἳ δὲ δίκας ξείνοισι καὶ ἐνδήμοισι διδοῦσιν
 ἰθείας καὶ μὴ τι παρεκβαίνουσι δικαίου,
 τοῖσι τέθλη πόλις, λαοὶ δ' ἀνθέουσιν ἐν αὐτῇ.
 Εἰρήνη δ' ἀνὰ γῆν κουροτρόφος, οὐδέ ποτ' αὐτοῖς
 ἀργαλέον πόλεμον τεκμαίρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς.

Those who give straight judgements to foreigners and fellow-citizens alike, and do not in any way depart from what is just, their city thrives, and the people within it flourish. And Peace who nurtures children pervades the land, and wide-seeing Zeus never assigns grievous war to them.⁷³

Solon's depiction of the unjust, dysnomic city as in a state of war provides a perfect opposition to Hesiod's just city, characterised as it is by peace.⁷⁴ Solon's picture of the unjust city as 'war-ridden' functions not only as a response to martial exhortation (an inversion of its tropes), but also as an elaborate and 'politicised' opposition to Hesiod's characterisation of the just city.⁷⁵

VII Εὐνομία (lines 30–9)

ταῦτα διδάξαι θυμὸς Ἀθηναίους με κελεύει,
 ὥς κακὰ πλείστα πόλει Δυσνομία παρέχει.
 Εὐνομία δ' εὖκοσμα καὶ ἄρτια πάντ' ἀποφαίνει,
 καὶ θαμὰ τοῖς ἀδίκοις ἀμφιτίθησι πέδας.
 τραχέα λειαίνει, παύει κόρον, ὕβριν ἀμαυροῖ,
 αὐαίνει δ' ἄτης ἄνθεα φυόμενα,
 εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς, ὑπερήφανά τ' ἔργα
 πραῦνει· παύει δ' ἔργα διχосτασίης,

⁷³ The absence of war as an important characteristic of the just city may be seen in the repetition of the phrasing of line 229 in the first couplet of the picture of the unjust city (238–9): οἷς δ' ὕβρις τε μέμλε κακῇ καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα, | τοῖς δὲ δίκην Κρονίδης τεκμαίρεται εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς ('The son of Cronus, wide-seeing Zeus, applies justice to those for whom evil hybris and reckless acts are all their care').

⁷⁴ In this manner Solon may exploit what is otherwise understated in Hesiod's own depiction of the unjust city: see lines 246–7.

⁷⁵ This is not to undervalue how 'politicised' Hesiod's own account may be, an account in which he reduces all the ills which may befall a city including military failures (246–7) to the kind of δίκη it harbours within.

παύει δ' ἀργαλέης ἔριδος χόλον, ἔστι δ' ὑπ' αὐτῆς
πάντα κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἄρτια καὶ πινυτά.

This is what my heart bids me tell the Athenians: Dysnomia furnishes the most ills for the city, but Eunomia makes all things well ordered and fit, and often it shackles the feet of the unjust. It smooths the rough, puts an end to excess, diminishes hybris, causes to wither the growing flowers of ruinous behaviour. It straightens crooked judgements, and makes gentle overweening acts. It stops the works of discord, and brings to an end the anger of grievous strife; under its guidance all things among men are both fitting and in proper accord.

The closing lines of Solon 4 are stylistically, thematically and even conceptually a Hesiodic *tour de force*. At the level of structure, the *Εὐνομία* passage balances the picture of the dysfunctional city through verbal resposnion with the main body of the poem, thereby completing the Hesiodic vision of two cities.⁷⁶ At the same time this balance is not struck in a form that simply mirrors the preceding poem. As several scholars have noted, the praise of *Εὐνομία* is multi-functional in its design, simultaneously responding to Hesiod's diptych of the cities, the proem of the *Works and Days*, and the Hesiodic genealogical relationship of the Ὀραί.⁷⁷ In contrast to the immediacy of Solon's depiction of the unjust city, his description of *Εὐνομία* seems to take Hesiod's timeless portrayal of the good city to a greater level of abstraction, representing *Εὐνομία* in tones most evocative of hymns. It is important to note that these differences from the Hesiodic diptych neither detract from nor diminish the Hesiodic flavour of the poem, but on the contrary augment it, multiplying and varying allusion, as if in a Hesiodic hall of mirrors.

In addition to providing a complement to the unjust city, Jaeger first argued that Solon's praise of *Εὐνομία* bears a strong relationship to the proem of Hesiod's *Works and Days* in both its formal structure and its thought:

⁷⁶ This has been discussed by Jaeger (1966) 92, Siegmann (1975) 278–80, Ostwald (1969) 67–8 (esp. 68 n. 1), Adkins (1985) 122–3, Halberstadt (1955), Manuwald (1989) 7. See also Mülke (2002) *ad loc.*

⁷⁷ As Jaeger (1966) first argued.

Μούσαι Πιερίηθεν ἀοιδῆσι κλείουσai,
 δεῦτε, Δί' ἐννέπετε, σφέτερον πατέρ' ὑμνεῖουσai
 ὃν τε διὰ βροτοὶ ἄνδρες ὁμῶς ἄφατοὶ τε φατοὶ τε,
 ῥητοὶ τ' ἄρρητοὶ τε Διὸς μέγαλοιο ἔκητι.
 ῥέα μὲν γὰρ βριάει, ῥέα δὲ βριάοντα χαλέπτει,
 ῥεῖα δ' ἀρίζηλον μινύθει καὶ ἄδηλον ἀέξει,
 ῥεῖα δέ τ' ἰθύνει σκολιὸν καὶ ἀγήνορα κάρφει
 Ζεὺς ὑψιβρεμέτης, ὃς ὑπέρτατα δώματα ναίει.
 κλύθι ἰδὼν αἰὼν τε, δίκη δ' ἴθυνε θέμιστας
 τῦνη· ἐγὼ δέ κε, Πέρσῃ, ἐτήτυμα μυθησαίμην.

Muses from Pieria, famous for song, come, sing of Zeus, hymning your father, by whom men are made both unknown and known, spoken of or without mention by great Zeus's will. For easily he makes a man strong, and easily he makes things difficult for the strong man; easily he makes small the illustrious man, and increases the prestige of the obscure man; and easily he makes straight the crooked man and causes the proud of heart to wither, Zeus the one who thunders from above, who inhabits the loftiest dwellings. Harken to me, seeing and hearing, and make straight judgements with justice, and I in turn would tell to Perses true things.

Adducing the presence of several shared stylistic devices – parallelism, antithesis, isocolon, anaphora – in the two passages, Jaeger commented, 'So striking is the relation of these two passages that I do not hesitate to hold that Hesiod's lines, the object of so much controversy in the history of philological criticism, were in fact Solon's model.'⁷⁸ The final lines of Solon's elegy contain several rhetorical figures: antithesis (32–3), asyndeton (34), parallel predications joined by δέ, parallelism marked by anaphora of the verb (αὐαίνει δέ, εὐθύνει δέ, παύει δέ, παύει δέ), and closure marked by the repetition of ἄρτια and πάντα which 'takes up the first line of this whole eulogy and brings the thought full circle back on itself again'. Jaeger saw these elements as characteristic of cult poetry and several scholars have followed his view.⁷⁹

⁷⁸ Jaeger (1966) 96–7. Mülke (2002) 149 points out that others preceded Jaeger in this identification: Croiset (1903) 588 first called the passage hymnic and Norden (1923) 259–60 connected it to the poem of the *Works and Days*.

⁷⁹ E.g. Gerber (1970) 133, Campbell (1982) 243, De Martino and Vox (1996) 752–3. Anaphora particularly belongs to the hymnic style: see Norden (1923) 149–50 and Versnel (1974) 368–9. See also Mülke (2002) 149.

A sceptic might of course argue that the link between the two passages may be entirely generic rather than specific. Given the paucity of surviving archaic poetry, such caution is not unwarranted, but it can be countered by the lack of similarity to the proems of any of the Homeric hymns, particularly with respect to the level of abstraction that both Hesiod and Solon achieve.⁸⁰ When this is coupled with the thematic affinity of the passages, the shared subject of both poems, δίκη and ἀδικία, the case becomes stronger.⁸¹ It must also be noted that Solon's vocabulary is strongly Hesiodic. In addition to the phrase εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς ('straightens crooked judgements'), which has numerous Hesiodic echoes,⁸² particularly in the passage to which Solon is most indebted, ἀμαυροῖ ('makes obscure') shows distinctly Hesiodic usage in the context of the consequences of unjust behaviour, and is furthermore unattested in Homeric poetry, even in the *Odyssey*, which otherwise displays a high degree of thematic similarity.⁸³

Jaeger's case is worth taking seriously even if in the absence of a wider body of archaic poetry we cannot be absolutely certain whether Solon's Εὐνομία is closer to generic similarity or to specific allusion. Such similarity, even if arising only from both passages partaking in shared genre or *topoi*, nevertheless still invites and requires interpretation.⁸⁴ Adkins is

⁸⁰ The *Homeric Hymn to Ge* (30) provides the only passage comparable to this pair. For an attempt to see a closer link between this hymn and Solon's poetry see L'Homme-Wéry (1995).

⁸¹ Jaeger ([1966] 98) comments, 'How could the striking similarities in form, of which we have no parallels from that time, in a poem dedicated to δίκη and ἀδικία, a poem modelled also in other ways on the Hesiodic *Works and Days* have appeared also by accident?' Although Jaeger has a tendency to pose his most controversial claims in the form of rhetorical questions, I find his conclusions here not without grounds.

⁸² See *Op.* 7, 219–24, 250, 259–64. Of course although such a phrase was no doubt appropriated many times over (see *Il.* 16.387–8), it is not necessary for it to have lost all of its seemingly distinctive Hesiodic feel.

⁸³ *Op.* 325: ῥεῖα δὲ μιν μαυροῦσι θεοί ('easily do the gods make him obscure'). See also the adjective in 284: τοῦ δέ τ' ἀμαυροτέρῃ γενεῇ μετόπισθε λέλειπται. Only the adjective ἀμαυρός ('dim') appears in Homer, where the context is unrelated (*Od.* 4.824, 835). In addition the vegetal imagery applied to arrogant behaviour (Solon 4.35, *Op.* 7) provides yet another thematic overlap; in relation to κορός and ὕβρις, see Michelini (1978) and discussion in Ch. 7, esp. n. 42.

⁸⁴ And there are of course many positions between these two extremes.

illuminating here. Emphasising in the main text of his commentary this passage's relationship to the earlier lines of the poem, Adkins relegates mention of Jaeger to a footnote: 'Jaeger's comparison of the style with Hesiod, *Op.* 3–8, does not significantly affect this judgment. Solon's verses are not an imitation of Hesiod's.'⁸⁵ Adkins' response to Jaeger epitomises his dilemma: it is difficult to dismiss Jaeger's connection, and yet Solon's use of Hesiod cannot merely be called 'imitation'. But it is entirely possible to accept Jaeger's analysis and still agree with Adkins. Imitation may be too narrow a term for the relationship of these passages, but it is clearly important that, at the same time as adhering to his own overall design, Solon is doing something which is recognisably Hesiodic.

Focusing on Solon's portrayal of *Εὐνομία* itself indicates more strongly the 'conceptual' affinities with the Hesiodic tradition. The entire presentation of *Εὐνομία* in this poem – the number of lines, style and position – convey its importance. In arguing that Solon elevated a political concept to religious dimensions through the use of the hymn-form, introducing a new level of rationality by substituting *Εὐνομία*, a desired human condition, for the role which Zeus occupies in the Hesiodic proem, Jaeger and his followers responded to the force and solemnity of this presentation.⁸⁶

And yet overlooked in these discussions is the *definitional* function of the passage: Solon has dedicated 8 of the 39 extant lines of this poem to describing the qualities and effects of *Εὐνομία*, and in this exercise brings to bear a series of moral terms and evaluative terms: it is associated with things that are *εὖκοσμα* ('well-ordered', 32), *ἄρτια* ('fit', 32 and 39), *πινυτά* ('sensible', 'rational', 39), with *δίκαι* that are *σκολιαί*; it does not, as *Δυσνομία* does, furnish *κακά* ('ills', 'evils', 31), stands opposed to the *ἄδικοι* ('the unjust', 33), and puts the brakes on

⁸⁵ Adkins (1985) 227 n. 29.

⁸⁶ Jaeger (1966) 94–9, Solmsen (1949) 116–17. Whether or not one accepts this strong formulation, it is significant that, as with Solon's treatment of *Δίκη*, Zeus is again left out of contexts where the strong allusion to Hesiod almost necessitates his presence. The first line of the poem is programmatic: although honourably dismissed, Zeus will assuredly not be operating in this poem.

κόρος ('excess', 34), ὕβρις ('hybris', 'outrageous behaviour', 34) ἄτη ('ruin', 35), the χόλος ('anger', 38) of ἀργαλέη ἔρις ('grievous strife', 37), ἔργα that are ὑπερήφανα ('overweening', 38) or belong to διχόστασις ('stasis').⁸⁷ The mere fact that the passage engages in a process of definition itself suggests that the poet is attempting to ensure a particular reception of this term, either to align himself with a particular understanding of the term and its application, and/or to forge his own for (those who can be induced into being) a like-minded audience in the face of other competitions of definition and connotation.⁸⁸ This observation is crucial in that the diachronic studies of political terms in the archaic period do not generally acknowledge the likelihood that our sources, rather than neutrally documenting a linear development in the meaning of key concepts in political language, are in fact engaged in – on one (or more) side(s) of – contests over their meaning. Seen in this way, Solon aligns himself with Hesiodic material both negatively, through the associations of Δυσνομία, and positively, in his portrayal of Εὐνομία.

Solon embarks upon his 'hymn' to Εὐνομία first by contrasting it with its opposing concept, Δυσνομία. While Hesiod does not develop the opposition between Δυσνομία and Εὐνομία, Solon's indebtedness to Hesiod's treatment has not been questioned. Ostwald notes: 'it is in fact only in Hesiod and Solon that Δυσνομία is found in classical literature'.⁸⁹ The *Theogony* gives genealogies for both these entities: Δυσνομία is a descendant of Strife and Night (*Theog.* 226–32), while Εὐνομία is the child of Zeus and Themis (*Theog.* 901–6).

⁸⁷ Several of these terms give the impression of being signature terms of Solon and/or political catchphrases of the day: ἄρτια suggests more the former (see 4c.4, 6.4 ; on the term more generally see Treu (1955) 274–6 and Calame (1977) 219–20), while εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς represents the latter. For a thorough survey of the archaic parallels for the terms of the *Eunomia* passage see Mülke (2002) *ad loc.* The influence of contemporary political discourse on Solon's poetry will be the subject of the next chapter.

⁸⁸ The same is of course also true of the *Op.*'s proem: it champions a particular understanding of Zeus that challenges the elevated status kings derive from their asserted connection with Zeus. On Zeus and political power see above pp. 175–80 and below p. 193.

⁸⁹ Ostwald (1969) 66.

Although Solon seems to avoid explicit reference to genealogical relationships, he nevertheless exploits them: the siblings of each concept are significant.⁹⁰ Although she herself is absent, Δυσνομία's siblings, such as Ἄτη ('ruin'), Λιμός ('famine'), and Ὀρκος ('oath') crop up again in the passage of *Works and Days* to which Solon 4 most alludes.⁹¹ The personification of Ὀρκος (*Op.* 219, *Theog.* 231), and repetition of formulae (*Op.* 282, *Theog.* 232) involving oaths make concrete the conceptual and thematic connections between Hesiod's passages.⁹² This link draws the poem of Solon into alignment with a certain conceptual configuration implicit in these interrelated passages: with the *Theogony*, through Δυσνομία, and with the *Works and Days*, by preoccupation with and allusion to its themes.

Turning to Εὐνομία itself, although it is not possible to determine the exact archaic associations of this political term, certain elements help to reconstruct the kind of debate that existed over its meaning.⁹³ That differing genealogies appear in two of its three occurrences prior to Solon – in the *Theogony* (902) and a fragment of Alcman (fr. 64 quoted below) – already suggests competing traditions. Further analysis will suggest two dominant and contrasting models represented, at least in part, by a Hesiodic and by an apparently Spartan tradition. Solon's own participation in this competition seems to

⁹⁰ A genealogy may be active without explicit reference to family ties. Gagarin (1974) 190 and Solmsen (1949) 117 see the absence of explicit reference as analogous to the absence of Zeus in Solon's handling of Δίκη. For later poetic representations of the Ὀραι see Bacchylides 15 and particularly Pind. *Olymp.* 13, in which the configuration of Δίκη, Εὐνομία, ὕβρις, and κόρος ('satiety', 'surfeit') is closely connected, whether directly or indirectly, with Solon 4, as demonstrated by the particularly 'Solonian', rather than Hesiodic, use of κόρος. κόρος will be discussed in the next chapter, pp. 207–20.

⁹¹ Solmsen (1949) 76 emphasises the strength of the connection between these passages.

⁹² See West (1966) 232.

⁹³ Competing claims on the definition of this word can be observed in later sources: contrast the view that certain constitutions are essentially incapable of attaining Εὐνομία (cf. [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.8–9 for the incompatibility of democracy and Εὐνομία) with that of Aristotle, who says that even obedience to bad laws is Εὐνομία, although obviously good laws are desirable (*Pol.* 1294a).

recapitulate his relationship to poetic traditions demonstrated in these three chapters on Solon 4.

Solon's *Εὐνομία* evokes Hesiodic and Odyssean associations of this word which are themselves compatible with each other. The only Homeric, and significantly Odyssean, reference to *Εὐνομία* is closely aligned with Hesiodic poetry. Antinoos' outrageous behaviour to the beggar Odysseus is seen as beyond the pale even to the haughty young suitors, any one of whom is prompted to remind him in warning (τις εἴρεσκε νέων ὑπερηνορέοντων, 482) that

καὶ τε θεοὶ ξείνοισιν ἐοικότες ἄλλοδαποῖσι,
παντοῖοι τελέθοντες, ἐπιστροφῶσι πόλης,
ἀνθρώπων ὕβριν τε καὶ εὐνομίην ἐφορώντες.

gods liken themselves to strangers from other lands; taking on all manner of forms, they range through the cities, and they take account of both the hybris and the *eunomia* of men.⁹⁴

This passage is strongly reminiscent of *Op.* 249–55, in which Hesiod describes the ἀθάνατοι Ζηνὸς φύλακες θιητῶν ἀνθρώπων | οἳ ῥα φυλάσσουσιν τε δίκας καὶ σχέτλια ἔργα ('The immortal guardians of Zeus over mortal men, who watch over the judgements and wicked deeds of men', 253–4). Moreover, the opposition between ὕβρις and εὐνομία parallels the opposition of ὕβρις and δίκη so prominent in the *Works and Days*, and suggests the sibling affinity between Hesiod's Ὠραι: Themis slept with Zeus and τέκεν Ὠρας | Εὐνομίην τε Δίκην τε καὶ Εἰρήνην τεθαυῖαν | αἱ τ' ἔργ' ὠρεύουσι καταθνητοῖσι βροτοῖσι ('She bore the Horai – Eunomia, Dike and thriving Peace – who watch over the deeds of mortal men').⁹⁵ Both the concern of Solon's *Εὐνομία* and his *Δίκη* with the deeds of men and their opposition to hybris reveal an affiliation with the Odyssean *Εὐνομία* and Hesiodic Ὠραι, and

⁹⁴ *Od.* 17.485–7. This passage closely recalls *Op.* 249–55 (cf. West (1978) *ad loc.*), where significantly it is δίκαι that are being observed (φυλάσσειν).

⁹⁵ *Theog.* 901–3. ὠρεύειν is glossed by Hesychius s.v. ὠρεύειν and Cornutus 29 as equivalent to φυλάσσειν (cf. also *Etym. Gud.* s.v. Ὠραι), a verb used frequently in connection with *Δίκη*: see Solon 4.15, *Op.* 254, 263 (cf. 124) and West (1966) 407.

suggest that the Hesiodic genealogy is not far from Solon's conception of Εὐνομία.⁹⁶

In contrast, a fragment of Alcman presents a genealogy for Εὐνομία so entirely different from that of Hesiod that it suggests an alternative contemporary tradition:

οὐ μὲν γὰρ ἀπειθής [sc. ἡ Τύχη], κατὰ Πίνδαρον, οὐδὲ δίδυμον στρέφουσα
πηδάλιον, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον Ἐυνομίας <τε> καὶ Πειθῶς ἀδελφὰ | καὶ Προμαθήας
θυγάτηρ, ὡς γενεαλογεῖ Ἀλκμάν. (Alcm. 64 = Plut. *De Fort. Rom.* 4, 318a)

For fortune is not unable to be persuaded as Pindar says, nor is she using a double steering paddle, but rather she is 'the sister of *Eunomia* and Persuasion, and daughter of Foresight' as in the genealogy Alcman gives her.

The meaning of this fragment is difficult,⁹⁷ but if Ehrenberg's verdict that 'there is a definite ethical and political meaning in [Hesiod's] family of four' is correct, then an alternative genealogy may well represent divergent political and social perspectives.⁹⁸ However one may interpret this fragment, it is certain that it does not explicitly privilege the associations of the Hesiodic Ὀραϊ: Δίκη does not appear to be a part of its conceptual configuration.

In addition to Alcman's genealogy, later evidence exists both for the importance of Εὐνομία in early Sparta and for its connection with Tyrtaeus. Two ancient sources, Aristotle and Strabo, attribute a poem entitled Εὐνομία to Tyrtaeus, and as Ostwald notes, 'although both are late authors in relation to Tyrtaeus, there is no reason to doubt their word that Tyrtaeus wrote an elegiac poem entitled, either by Tyrtaeus himself or by a tradition which is likely to go back to a time well before Aristotle, Εὐνομία.'⁹⁹ The appearance of Εὐνομία in Alcman at least indicates its currency in seventh-century Sparta. Furthermore, although Andrewes has shown that Εὐνομία does not name a specific constitution such as that of

⁹⁶ See n. 90.

⁹⁷ *Peitho* here seems to fall between the active concept of Persuasion, the capacity to induce compliance without force (βία), and the consequence of its successful application, 'Obedience'. See Weizsäcker in Roscher (1897–1909) s.v. *Peitho*, cols. 1809–10 (cf. 1795 and 1806 for her Hesiodic genealogy – an Oceanid, *Theog.* 349).

⁹⁸ Ehrenberg (1946) 70. For discussion of this fragment and its possible meaning in a Spartan context see Ehrenberg (1946) 77–80 and Ostwald (1969) 64.

⁹⁹ Arist. *Pol.* 1306b36ff., Strab. 8.4.10; see Ostwald (1969) 81.

Sparta,¹⁰⁰ a preponderance of this word and its related forms does occur in connection with Sparta, thus at least suggesting that *Eὐνομία* did have particular cachet in Sparta from an early date. Both Herodotus and Thucydides explicitly attribute the presence of *eunomia* in Sparta to the archaic period.¹⁰¹

Alcman's genealogy and certain tendencies in Tyrtaean poetry suggest a shared position in contrast to a Hesiodic world-view. For Alcman the family of *Eὐνομία* does not seem to include *Δίκη*, while in those fragments of Tyrtaeus possibly from his *Eὐνομία* (fr. 4) the weight of proper behaviour is placed on the *δημόται ἄνδρες* – the ones required to speak 'straightly' and for whom the obligation is to behave justly – leaving the kings and elders without instruction. This positive representation of the *βασιλεῖς* at the expense of the *δημόται ἄνδρες* is a far cry from a Hesiodic stance. As van Wees rightly observes, Tyrtaeus' point in his *Eὐνομία* 'is, surely, that the authorities' proposals are *by definition* "straight" and that the assembly must simply *accept* them'.¹⁰²

Such a position also stands in stark contrast to Solon 4.¹⁰³ Solon's response to martial exhortation, which included

¹⁰⁰ Andrewes (1938) 91. Although *Eὐνομία* and its forms are not exclusive to descriptions of Sparta, the frequency of the coincidence, *contra* Ostwald (1969) 75–85, is significant. See, for example, Diod. Sic. 7.12.1, Plut. *Lycurg.* 5.4. Moreover, the debate recorded in Plutarch *Lycurgus* 1.4 regarding whether Eunomos was the father or brother of Lycurgus (to which the poet Simonides is brought as evidence) is suggestive of the early importance of *Eὐνομία* in Sparta.

¹⁰¹ Thuc. 1.18.1, Hdt. 1.65.2, 66.1.

¹⁰² Van Wees (1999) 10; cf. 23–4. Tyrtaean references to *δίκη* are not in particularly favourable contexts (4.7 and 12.40). For the most recent discussion of the 'fiktive κράτος des Damos' see Meier (1998) 201–5. See also Andrewes (1938) 94 and Cartledge (1980) 102. For competition between Tyrtaeus and Hesiod see Munding (1984) and (1993) who argues that Tyrtaeus 12 disputes with *Op.* 286–92 over the definition of ἀρετή ('excellence').

¹⁰³ [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.8–9 is suggestive of this 'Solonian' response to Tyrtaean *Eὐνομίη*. Favourably describing *Eὐνομία* in terms evocative of the political design implied in Tyrtaeus 4, [Xen.] explains somewhat sarcastically that for the *δῆμος* such a state is tantamount to their enslavement (ἀπὸ τούτων τοίνυν τῶν ἀγαθῶν τάχιστα ἂν ὁ δῆμος εἰς δουλείαν καταπέσοι, 'indeed from such noble conditions the demos would straightaway fall into slavery'). The enslavement of the *δῆμος* by its leaders is reminiscent of Solon's inversion of martial exhortation in Solon 4 argued in Ch. 4, pp. 105–10: the instrumentality of *Eὐνομία* in this enslavement reads almost like a prose rendition of Solon's verdict on Tyrtaean poetry, both his martial exhortation and his *Eὐνομία*. Of the *Eὐνομία* offered by Tyrtaeus, van Wees (1999) 23–4 aptly comments, 'Far from having "a right to criticize", [the people] are told "not to counsel further", and the "power" which they enjoy is not popular

unfavourable linguistic allusion to Tyrtaean poetry, may well extend to a contrary stance on the meaning of Εὐνομία. Certain other aspects of Solon's treatment of Εὐνομία make greater sense when seen as a particular response to the Εὐνομία of Tyrtaeus. The prominence of Zeus both in the poetry of Tyrtaeus and in his relationship to kings – the latter itself a prominent feature in the poetry of Tyrtaeus¹⁰⁴ – may actually explain the side-lining of Zeus in Solon 4, despite this poem's otherwise strong Hesiodic connections (with passages in which Zeus's power is strongly asserted – e.g. *Op.* 1–10 and esp. 8, *Op.* 253 quoted above) and the authority that Zeus, one supposes, would have given both to his daughters and to the poet as their advocate. Where Jaeger was keen to emphasise Solon's introduction of a new level of rationality to this choice – certainly at least a by-product of the choice to side-line Zeus – one might shift the emphasis, detecting an attempt to undermine traditions, poetic and political, deriving their authority from the appropriation of Zeus.¹⁰⁵

VIII Synthesising poetic responses: the poet's stance

A final issue which Solon's praise of Εὐνομία evokes is that of the poet's stance. Traditional discussions have focused on the accuracy of Jaeger's claim that Solon assumes the role of divine warner which he argued followed from his comparison of lines 5–6 with *Odyssey* 1.32ff.:

By thus putting a human person in a divine role a further development follows: the prophetic warner does not speak as divine herald of the future, coming down from Heaven with an authority entrusted to him through the command of Zeus, but by the natural superiority of human knowledge, which springs from the depths of his own spirit. No Zeus, but his own soul 'commands' him to teach the Athenians what he knows.¹⁰⁶

sovereignty but the supremacy of their city over its enemies.' For Solon Tyrtaeus' Εὐνομία produces a war within the city, a danger far greater than any external threat (Solon 4.1–4).

¹⁰⁴ See n. 64. ¹⁰⁵ See n. 68.

¹⁰⁶ Jaeger (1966) 87. See the objections of Nestle (1942) 129–30 and Adkins (1985) 121–2. One may accept Jaeger's connection of Solon 4 with *Od.* 1 without his claim that Solon is a divine warner. See Ch. 5, pp. 113–14 and *passim*.

Responding negatively to Jaeger's interpretation that line 30, θυμός ... με κελεύει ('my heart bids me') is intended to express 'Solon's independence of divinely revealed truth of the Hesiodic or Homeric kind',¹⁰⁷ several scholars point out that, as a Homeric formula in itself, this line cannot sustain Jaeger's conclusions.¹⁰⁸

One option has been unexplored in these debates. In the context of our discussion, the generic juxtaposition of these lines must be recognised. Generic contrast, which ultimately performs a fusion of traditions, has been an important feature of this poem from its beginning, and the conclusion of the poem completes this strategy. Line 30 provides a version of a common epic formula of public speech,¹⁰⁹ while 32–9 offer Hesiodic material, in both style and content. The Homeric line echoed in line 30 is always used in the context of addressing assembled groups, constituting the typical form of rhetorical address in our epics.¹¹⁰ Solon chooses to speak in an epic (stylised and poetic) mode of oratory.¹¹¹

Solon 4 juxtaposes an epic rhetorical stance with the ensuing hymnic praise. Explicit address of any deity or claims to authority based on a connection with the Muses are absent, despite the hymnic element of the *Eὐνομία* praise.¹¹² If such an absence is as much a part of the poetic programme of this poem as the presence of the Muses in poem 13, Solon, as poet,

¹⁰⁷ Adkins (1985) 121–2. ¹⁰⁸ Adkins (1985) 122, Masaracchia (1958) 266.

¹⁰⁹ The precise Homeric formula is: ὅφρ' εἴπω τά με θυμός ἐνὶ στήθεσσι κελεύει ('in order that I may say that which my heart in my breast bids me'). It occurs at *Il.* 7.68, 349, 369, 8.6, 19.102 and *Od.* 7.187, 8.27, 17.469, 18.352, 21.276.

¹¹⁰ In Book 7 of the *Iliad* the line appears with some frequency (68, 349, 369) and is employed in addressing an assembly on the issue of ending the war. The other two Iliadic uses belong to Zeus when addressing the entire assembly of the gods (8.6, with perhaps some irony after the usage in human contexts in 7). In the *Odyssey* it is used in the context of the gathered Phaeacians. The other appearances are in addressing the suitors, whose gatherings, though not strictly speaking an assembly, do have political implications: κέκλυτέ μεν, μνηστῆρες ἀγακλείτης βασιλείης, | ὅφρ' εἴπω τά με θυμός ἐνὶ στήθεσσι κελεύει ('Hear me, wooers of the famous queen, in order that I may say those things my heart in my breast bids me'). The reference to Penelope as queen makes it clear what is at stake in their wooing.

¹¹¹ Solon 1 also seems to exploit a connection between the oratorical and poetic.

¹¹² This absence is all the more surprising given the Muses' prominence both in Hesiodic poetry, upon which Solon 4 so heavily draws, and elsewhere in Solon's poetry (13.1–2).

is placed rather neatly in a position similar to his Δίκη and Εὐνομία. The absence of divine inspiration through the Muses provides Solon with an independence analogous to his treatment of the Ὀραιοί, providing links with the poetic strategy implicit in Solon's Muse-like Δίκη. By singing this concept Solon gains both authority and independence, ultimately derived from Hesiod: he sings about a Δίκη, having the kind of knowledge that the Muses traditionally bestow.

And yet what is the nature of this independence? A 'Hesiodic'-style praise of Εὐνομία follows an introduction reminiscent of an epic-style address of assemblies. Pucci, in discussing allusion, writes, 'Through the reenactment, that is, through the mimesis of some generic features, the text makes it possible for the reader to recognise the "genre" from which it borrows.'¹¹³ The modified formula θυμός . . . με κελεύει evokes a generic feature of epic, the address to an epic assembly or assembled group, and may render Solon's ostensible stance, however informed by Hesiod, not that of poet, but of epic character embedded in an epic, or rather elegiac transformation of an epic, context.¹¹⁴ Through the appropriation of an epic line he may attempt to situate himself within a narrative, as effected also by the speaker-inclusive phrase ἡμετέρα δὲ πόλις: his stance is not distant, but from within.¹¹⁵ Solon's choice to render the singer of this poem a member of the community he addresses (ἡμετέρα, 1; Ἀθηναίους, 30) makes another aspect of his hymnic praise significant: while Solon's hymn to Εὐνομία performs a similar function to the proem of the *Works and Days* – providing a warning to those behaving arrogantly¹¹⁶ – Εὐνομία is, unlike Hesiod's Zeus, not made to

¹¹³ Pucci (1994) 24. See also Foley (1997) on the concept of 'traditional referentiality'.

¹¹⁴ Others have seen Solon as assuming an epic role in his poetry, but without fully exploring this view: see, for instance, Else (1965) 117 n. 28.

¹¹⁵ Indeed the references to the gods, particularly Athena and Zeus, in the first 4 lines of the poem are clearly more akin to those of epic characters than to those of a Muse-inspired poet. The syntax itself places speaker and audience closer together, both rendered objects (Ἀθηναίους, με) in relation to an (almost) impersonal force, θυμός.

¹¹⁶ The warning in Hesiod is implicit, but the kings are (among) the ones βριάοντες ('strong', 5), ἀρίζηλοι ('very conspicuous', 'illustrious', 6), σκολιοί ('crooked', 7), ἀγήνορες ('arrogant', 7) whom Zeus will see to.

target an individual, or class of individuals; by addressing destructive qualities rather than persons, it rectifies the divisions in the city narrated in the main body of the poem, at the same time as gesturing to the audience of the poem, creating an anthem, that if successful, no one has been excluded from rallying around or singing.

If the formula *θυμός . . . με κελεύει* brings in its train an epic stance, the speaker of this line is presented as an epic character before an assembled group to which he belongs, who then proceeds, in his praise of *Εὐνομία*, to expound thematically and stylistically material most akin to Hesiod.¹¹⁷ Seen this way, Solon's poetic strategy imitates at least the *process* of appropriation argued for martial elegy's appropriation of martial epic: although appropriating a different genre of *ἔπεια*, Solon, simply stated, does with Hesiodic poetry what Tyrtaeus and Callinus do with martial epic, claiming and distilling hexameter material into elegiac form. At the same time, in assuming an epic stance he might also be said to imitate the *type* of appropriation that martial elegy, as argued in Chapter 2, performs: Solon 4 adopts and transforms a stance derived from epic. As both the Hesiod and Odysseus of elegy, adopting at once a hymnic and epic stance, Solon with his *Εὐνομία* places within the city ('our city'), and passes judgement on, what might gloriously be called the Iliadic temper, the *ἀργαλέης ἔριδος χόλον* ('the anger of grievous strife'), but is in contemporary terms better understood in terms of *διχοστασίη* ('stasis').¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ This is of course a strategy familiar from the *Odyssey*: Odysseus is in a sense the Hesiodic hero of epic. See Nagy (1990) 71 on the generic implications of Odysseus' challenging Eurymachus to a contest of working the land (18.366–75). See also Martin (1984) for a shared stance in relation to princes: 'What is explicit in *Theog.* 86ff . . . is acted out in the *Odyssey*', 44.

¹¹⁸ On the epic resonance of *ἀργαλέης ἔριδος χόλον* ('the anger of grievous strife') see Mülke (2002) 158–9, citing Achilles in *Il.* 18.107–10 (cf. 20.251–5) and *Il.* 17.384–5, 21.385–6. On *διχοστασίη* first appearing here see Campbell (1982) 244; elsewhere in elegy see Theogn. 12, 78, 173; Mülke (2002) 158 is right to suggest a current *politisches Schlagwort*.

IX Conclusion

In conclusion one may synthesise the themes of Parts I and II. The poetry of Solon and traditions surrounding it confirm two fundamental aspects of martial exhortation: heroic role-playing and the political implications of such poetic appropriations.

The exhortation of Solon 4 responds pointedly to the tropes of martial exhortation elegy. Solon's poetic strategy imitates the *type* of appropriation that martial elegy, as argued in Chapter 2, performs: like the poetry of Tyrtaeus and Callinus, Solon 4 aligns itself with heroic epic, but differs in a fundamental respect, in its choice of epic and hero, and therefore also of theme and values. This response to martial elegy finds a complement in his poem of martial exhortation. While Solon's *Salamis* places him firmly in the tradition of elegiac martial *paraenesis* with its characteristic assumption of a heroic role, traditions around, and no doubt derived from, the *Salamis* narrate analogous discontinuities: again the importance of Odysseus appears, while accounts of performance in the agora suggest at least metaphorically that this poem somehow transgressed fundamental boundaries in its content and/or implied audience.

At the same time, Solon appropriates material and themes from Hesiodic, didactic hexameter poetry, and in this strategy he imitates a *process* of appropriation similar to that argued for martial elegy's appropriation of martial epic. Solon, however, appropriates a different genre of ἔπαια: simply stated, he does with Hesiodic poetry and Odysseus what Tyrtaeus and Callinus do with martial epic, claiming and distilling hexameter material into elegiac form. Solon and his audience would have found in hexameter poetry alternatives to the themes and values of the heroic war epic. I argue that the programme of Solon 4 is to appropriate for elegy these hexameter responses: this appropriation performs a critique of, and yet is analogous in process and in function with, martial elegy's own appropriation of martial epic. His poetic strategies are united in goal and in operation, and the genius of the poem lies in the ultimately integrated response both to the inherited poetic traditions and to their interrelationship with one another.

Informed by this close reading, Part III will *recontextualise* the figure of Solon and his poetry in his political and historical environment, moving outside the confines of elegy into other genres of his poetry and into a further analysis of aspects of the biographical tradition.

PART III

POETRY AND POLITICAL CULTURE

INTRODUCTION

The political issues raised in Solon's poetic appropriations provide the basis for the chapters of this Part. With these chapters, discussion of Solon will open out both to the language of a larger group of his poems, including those in metres other than elegiacs, and to ancient and modern evaluations of his career. The aim is to use the greater appreciation of his poetic stance developed in Part II in order to begin to re-evaluate traditional accounts of the relationship between Solon the poet and Solon the political figure and to reposition Solon and his poetry within their historical context.

Chapter 7 substantiates the political use of poetry through an analysis of some peculiarities in Solon's language, and provides a basis from which future investigation may proceed. By surveying five examples of Solon's striking use of language and imagery, I argue that not only does Solon's own political and poetic agenda help account for the choices he makes in his poetic appropriation – for example, his use of Hesiod with a punch – but that interesting twists on traditional language in Solon's poetry are best seen as reflecting and exploiting a larger nexus of contemporary political practice. In itself this ought not to be surprising: the repetition of particular words in Solon often gives them the ring of political catchwords,¹ and Solon's poetry represents a contemporary poetic description of the clash of groups and of the circumstances that could and did in fact give rise to a tyrant. Whatever Solon's own political motivations, his poetry provides insights into the linguistic dimension of archaic politics, and in particular into

¹ See Nagy (1983) 84. See, for example, ἄρπιος ('fitting', 4.32, 4.39, 4c.4, 6.4); διχοστασίη ('stasis', 4.37; see Ch. 6, n. 293); δουλοσύνη (4.18, 9.4, 11.4); κόρος ('satiety'/'surfeit', 4.9, 4.34, 4c.2, 6.3; see below); etc. See Ch. 6 n. 118.

the language surrounding archaic tyranny, the language by which it was both described and enacted. But Solon's poetry will be shown not only to reflect the language used both by and about tyrants in the archaic period, 'tyrannical discourse', but actually to *exploit* it. Solon's use of language both justifies modifying perceptions about his career, and demonstrates the degree of sophistication which archaic political discourse had already attained, thus providing a fitting precursor to the fifth century.²

Stepping back from Solon's poetry, Chapter 8 re-examines the ancient traditions surrounding Solon and Peisistratus in order to demonstrate several levels of continuity between these figures. The examination confirms what the tyrannical aspects of Solon's language already overwhelmingly suggest: a revised evaluation of the political career of Solon is needed, and this chapter provides some of the coordinates by which such evaluation might proceed. It also places Solon within a wider archaic culture of political appropriations of poetry.

While it has long been recognised that biographies of ancient poets were to a large extent derived from the poet's own poetry, the consequences of this point have rarely been explored in the case of Solon, despite the fact that an interest in his own reception is in fact a particularly explicit and persistent feature of the fragments of his poetry. If Solon's poetry had a key role in ensuring his later reception, then Solon's own anti-tyrannical poetry no doubt contributed to the prominence of the stance against tyranny that characterises the sources for his life. Seen in this way, the persistence of Solon's poetic assertions of steadfastly opposing tyranny raises questions about the necessity and desirability of such expressions. Solon makes it clear that periods of his political career contained opportunities to court tyranny. His repeated claims to have refused it can be read otherwise, whether as attempts to distance himself from behaviour which came too close to that of a tyrant, to ward off accusations of such, to make a virtue out of a missed opportunity, or – perhaps above all – to

² See Plut. *Sol.* 14–15 for an explicit description of Solon's cunning use of language.

attempt to secure his later reception.³ Such considerations invite attempts to assess the extent to which contemporaries would have recognised as significant the distance that Solon repeatedly proclaims to have existed between his own measures and those of a tyrant.

At the basis of both chapters of this section will lie two fundamental issues: how tyranny is to be defined in the archaic period and the process by which a political figure became remembered as a tyrant.⁴ Tyranny does not seem to have been in all cases the ‘either/or’ affair that later traditions have made it out to be: our sources suggest both that there are degrees of difference to the phenomenon and that the connotations, positive or negative, ascribed to tyranny are often a matter of perspective, both synchronically – between political factions – and diachronically through the biases of later generations.⁵ Overlaps in the traditions of lawgivers, wise men and tyrants that have survived in the sources may in fact preserve important aspects of archaic tyranny.

Three types of considerations bring Solon’s career closer to that of tyranny. I argue: first, that the difficulties in establishing

³ Otherwise stated, to avoid the fate of Pittacus at the hands of Alcaeus’ poetry.

⁴ Recent scholarship has begun to show renewed interest in these questions: see Salmon (1997), Parker (1998) esp. 172, McGlew (1993); but see earlier White (1955), Pleket (1969). The recognition of the overlap between traditions of lawgivers and tyrants is epitomised by Nietzsche: ‘Gesetzgeber sein ist eine sublimierte Form des Tyrannentums’, quoted in McGlew (1993) 111 n. 46.

⁵ Pittacus epitomises the problems: although he is clearly labelled a tyrant by Alcaeus, Aristotle instead singularly calls him an *aisymnetes* (3.1285a29-b1; see Salmon (1997) 62), while popular song could also recognise him as a βασιλεύς (Plut. *Sept.* 157e; cf. Pleket (1969) 22–4, Parker (1998) 169). On the one hand, without the poetry of Alcaeus Pittacus might never have been remembered as a tyrant; on the other, Aristotle seems to attempt to theorise away an embarrassing example of a good (and elected) tyrant by uniquely labelling him an *aisymnetes*, as Romer (1982) well demonstrates. Plut. *Sol.* 14.7–8 is suggestive of the vicissitudes of reception: it is said Solon’s friends upbraid him, εἰ διὰ τοῦνομα δυσωπεῖται τὴν μοναρχίαν, ὥσπερ οὐκ ἀρετῇ τοῦ λαβόντος εὐθὺς ἂν βασιλείαν γενομένην, καὶ γεγεννημένην πρότερον μὲν Εὐβοεῦσι Τυννώνδαν, νῦν δὲ Μιτυληναίοις Πιττακὸν ἐλομένοις τύραννον (‘if on account of the label he was averse to autocratic rule, as if tyranny would not straight away become kingship if a person of excellence took it, as had happened earlier in Euboea in the case of Tynnondas, and even now for the Mitylenaeans who chose Pittacus as a tyrant’). On the relative lack of archaic differentiation between king and tyrant see, among others, Andrews (1974) 30, Yerly (1992) 6–7 with n. 6, and most recently Parker (1998).

a strict taxonomy of autocratic figures of the archaic period – and the ambiguities that existed even for contemporaries (see, for instance, Pittacus) – challenge attempts to maintain clear distinctions between the tyrant and the lawgiver;⁶ second, that Solon's poetry itself exploits language more at home in tyrannical discourse (Chapter 7); and third, that numerous continuities between the careers of Solon and Peisistratus persist in the traditions of these figures despite the different functions their stories served for the later generations who preserved them, attesting to the fact that their activities were not always so easily distinguishable (Chapter 8). Such considerations may render Solon a politically shiftier figure than is usually allowed, but an appreciation of the sophistication of his language and of the complexity of his political position also paradoxically restores Solon and his poetry to the esteem of which previous centuries have found him worthy.

These chapters complete the project of this book, providing new directions for interpreting archaic poetic texts within their cultural and historical context as well as for understanding the political dimensions of poetry.

⁶ In addition to the difficulties of classifying Pittacus, scholars have frequently commented on the similarities in the careers of Solon and Pittacus: see Romer (1982) 37–8, Pleket (1969) 40, 48, White (1955) 2; cf. Salmon (1997) 69, who in my opinion fails to draw the full implications of his argument for the career of Solon.

SOLON AND THE LANGUAGE OF TYRANNY

I

In this chapter, I adduce five instances to demonstrate the degree to which Solon's poetry may be seen to exploit contemporary political discourse. With these examples, I focus on Solon's use of language associated with the tyrant: language which allows Solon not only to occupy a distinctive and explicitly positive relationship with the δῆμος, but also to delineate a powerful autocratic position ambiguously related to tyranny. This discussion will be informed by a particular understanding of the relationship between language and political change, namely that linguistic disagreements are also disagreements about the social world to which they belong. Certain political and social concepts, especially those with evaluative force, by their very nature defy perfect consensus amongst those who use them. Their meaning is an issue of continual contestation, whose implications extend far beyond the solely linguistic realm. Political vocabulary is especially dense with such 'essentially contested' concepts, and political debate is often characterised by different sides trying to champion their own meanings of key concepts with which to defend, legitimise and promote their own political programme. Moreover, such conflicts in meaning, already political in themselves, offer manifold opportunities for sagacious political actors to exploit.¹

¹ See Gallie (1955/6); Farr (1989); Skinner (1989); Connolly (3rd edn 1993); Freedman (1996) ch. 2, esp. 47–60. Skinner (1989) esp. 8–13 demonstrates the several levels upon which disputes occur, easily illustrated by the term 'liberal': the *sense* of the word – one may dispute what acts would cause one to be correctly called a liberal; its *referents* – one may dispute whether a given person ought rightly to be called a liberal; or, even agreeing upon both of these, one may still dispute what the *evaluative force* of the label is – is it meant to praise or is it derogatory?

Although this view of political and linguistic contest draws on the work of recent scholars, it is a point Thucydides had already explicitly recognised in his description of stasis in Corcyra.² How such instances of the influence of contemporary political discourse are to be identified, however, raises complex questions of method. In order to reconstruct such contests one needs to examine the contexts in which such key words are used;³ to compare the use of key words or imagery in Solon's poetry with that in other archaic poetry. Although such linguistic analysis is by no means new to philologists, traditional studies have often failed (despite Thucydides) to recognise that at any given time different meanings, different connotations of important concepts, may simultaneously be competing, and each extant text may only be reflecting one aspect of a larger debate.⁴ Maintaining a teleological perspective, studies that presume a smooth linear progression behind changes in language and conceptual meaning overlook the fact that continual contests between language users shape the direction of these changes. Such analysis has another pitfall: the meagreness of extant archaic poetry presents difficulties for the analysis of language in this period. In order to overcome this inevitable problem, I focus on a group of examples that superlatively and suggestively diverge from the poetic tradition to which Solon has manifestly demonstrated himself to be heir.

That the risks are outweighed by the benefits will be shown by the analysis of five instances from Solon's poetry: his use of κόρος ('satiety', 'surfeit'), δίκη ('justice'), γέρας ('award of

² Thuc. 3.82.4: καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιοῦσαι ('They changed their accustomed verbal evaluations of things according to a process of adjudication'; no translation is adequate, I follow in part Wilson (1982) with modification of τῇ δικαιοῦσαι that, however, falls short of capturing the force of Thucydides' abstraction). For further bibliography on these lines see Rhodes (1994) 236. For an excellent example in archaic poetry compare the use of δίκη and δίκαιος in Hes. *Op.* 270–3.

³ For the importance of such collocations in identifying competing political positions see Connolly (1993) 14 and *passim*, Freedman (1996) 48, Farr (1989) 38.

⁴ These contests have already been witnessed in the discussion of Εὐνομία, pp. 187–93, and in the discussion of πᾶσα πόλις ('entire city') and δῆμος in pp. 108–10. Donlon's work (e.g. (1970) 381–2) is good at recognising the inherent contestability of Greek political language, though I don't always agree with his application of the principle.

honour'), κλέος ('fame') and the image of the wolf (λύκος). Returning to Solon's poetry in this way affords a less mediated means for understanding the career of Solon. It also enables reconstruction and appreciation of the sophisticated linguistic dimension of archaic politics, and – more specifically – archaic tyranny. It is hoped that these examples provide a secure basis for future investigations of the linguistic subtleties of Solon's political poetry and the political discourse in which and against which it operated.

II When enough is enough: Solon's κόπος

Solon 4 provides the first example. Although dealing with the welfare of the city as a whole, this poem can be seen as supporting the assertion that Solon καὶ ὅλως αἰεὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς στάσεως ἀνάπτει τοῖς πλουσίοις ('And always he entirely ascribes the blame for stasis to the wealthy', *Ath. Pol.* 5.3). Here the ἡγεμόνες ('leaders') of the city, the leading citizens,⁵ are described as having an ἄδικος νόος ('unjust mind'). Moreover, Solon explains how they will suffer many pains as a result of their great hybris (lines 9–10):

οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον οὐδὲ παρούσας
εὐφροσύνας κοσμεῖν δαιτὸς ἐν ἡσυχίῃ.

For they do not know how to restrain their satiety, nor how to maintain with order the present festivities of the feast in peace.

While Part II showed how Solon's description of these offenders situated his own poetic and political stance in relation to three poetic traditions – elegiac, Homeric and Hesiodic – ⁶

⁵ I agree with Linforth (1919) 196–8, and more recently Forti-Messina (1956) 233–5, Donlan (1970) 381–94, Nagy (1983) 84 and Noussia (1999) 81 and (2001) 241 that ἡγεμόνες are not 'popular leaders'. It is clear from Solon 4 that wealth distinguishes these ἡγεμόνες and that when the δῆμος enters the poem it is purely as their victims, not as their deluded followers, as in Solon 11.6 (χαῦνος . . . νόος). For a full discussion with bibliography see Mülke (2002) 110–12.

⁶ Ch. 4 demonstrated that the ironic force of κοσμεῖν, with its martial associations, governing εὐφροσύνας contributed to a larger pattern of inverted martial themes and its poetry (pp. 105–6, cf. Adkins (1985) 115), while Chs. 5 and 6 showed Solon's stance against the ἡγεμόνες to be drawing upon, on the one hand, the *Odyssey* and its theme

those arguments did not draw on the truly startling linguistic features of Solon's use of language in lines 9 and 10. The use of the verbs κατέχειν ('restrain') with κόρος ('satiety') and κοσμεῖν ('order') with εὐφροσύνη ('festivities', 'good cheer') is nothing less than jarring, especially in light of the poetic traditions to which Solon is indebted.⁷ It is with examination of Solon's unusual use of εὐφροσύνη and κόρος that one may begin to see the many facets of Solon's relationship with contemporary political discourse.

The description of εὐφροσύνη in Solon 4 as having negative potential is unprecedented. In archaic poetry, εὐφροσύνη denotes festivities, good cheer, it names one of the Graces, and, as in Solon 4, is especially used of banquets.⁸ As expected, the connotations of such a word are overwhelmingly positive in archaic sources and even Solon adheres to this traditional usage elsewhere.

It is the *Odyssey* that provides the only appearance of the word in archaic poetry comparable to Solon 4, and this appearance can help us assess the language of Solon's couplet. In 20.7–8, Odysseus' servant girls are described, αἱ μνηστῆρσιν ἐμισγέσκοντο πάρος περ, | ἀλλήλησι γέλω τε καὶ εὐφροσύνην παρέχουσαι ('Women who were having sex with the suitors in the past, providing laughter and delight to one another').⁹ The sight of these girls prompts the famous simile of Odysseus' heart as a dog and his speech to his θυμός ('heart') to endure. The passage confirms the importance of perspective both as a theme of the *Odyssey* and as an important consideration in assessing meaning. Odysseus' reaction to the εὐφροσύνη of the servant girls demonstrates the possibility of a contrary perspective on that which typically denotes a pleasant experience

of improper social behaviour characterised by incorrect feasting, and, on the other, the stance assumed against the βασιλεῖς in the *Works and Days* albeit somewhat 'updated' in its language.

⁷ As others have commented. See Adkins (1985) 114–15.

⁸ Hes. *Theog.* 909, *Od.* 9.6, 10.465, 23.52 and in plural, 6.156 and Solon 26.2. See also Xenophanes 1.4 (with comments below) and the *Homeric Hymn to Hermes* (4) 449, 482 and *to Ge* (30) 13. See also Thgn. 766, 776, 1068, 1256, 1284, 1324. See also pp. 126–8 on the sympotic resonances of the word.

⁹ ἀλλήλησι of line 8 is striking and is perhaps explained as informed by assimilation of the servants to *hetairai*.

and otherwise has overwhelmingly positive connotations: what is εὐφροσύνη for the servant girls is outrageous to Odysseus, and he is significantly made to compare what he sees in his own house with the improper feasting of the Cyclops.¹⁰ In the light of the possibility for contrary perspectives on εὐφροσύνη, the prepositional phrase which modifies εὐφροσύνη in *Od.* 9.6, ἢ ὅτ' εὐφροσύνη μὲν ἔχῃ κατὰ δῆμον ἅπαντα ('than when good cheer prevails throughout the entire demos'), is not gratuitous, but actually crucial because it specifies the all-inclusiveness of those who enjoy it, necessary precisely because εὐφροσύνη from one perspective can, from another, be a source of hybris. It is simply not good enough for there to be εὐφροσύνη, the εὐφροσύνη must also involve the wider demos.

This issue of perspective is at the heart of Solon's negative description of εὐφροσύνη as not ordered: conflicting perspectives are central to Solon 4, as is apparent in the contrast of private gain with public ills (11–14), the assertion that such profit will in fact also eventually harm those profiting (26–9), and the shift from the inclusive first-person possessive adjective of line 1 (ἡμετέρα) to the third person plural which describes those guilty of wrong-doing.

By challenging a common trope of sympotic poetry and its implicit ideology, namely that the drinking party represents 'a microcosm and a model of the larger community', 'Solon's criticism reveals the inadequacy of the aristocratic symposium as a paradigm for political organisation', as Anhalt well observes.¹¹ Such criticism is analogous to Solon 4's response to the pretensions of sympotic *paraenesis* discussed in Chapter 4. This recognition is important, but raises the question of whether it belongs solely to the poet's vision, or is instead a reflection of wider contemporary debates that lie behind Solon's challenge. Even in the *Odyssey* the analogies between feast and city are implicitly problematised at the same time as

¹⁰ Odysseus's four-line exhortation consists solely in this comparison, *Od.* 20.18–21.

¹¹ Anhalt (1993) 82 and 93. See also Noussia (1999) 82–3 and Balot (2001) 88. Anhalt's comments are an important corrective to discussions that unreflectively subscribe to the ideology implicit in such an image; see for instance, Levine (1985), Nagy (1990), and Murray (1990a).

they are drawn. While the feast of the suitors functions as a microcosm of Ithaca, providing, on one level, a fitting metaphor for social chaos, it is, on another level, no metaphor because their assembled gathering has in fact replaced or subsumed its supposed analogue, the public assembly.¹² A space is left in which to question whether the feast can (ever) be (valid as) a metaphor at all.¹³

Solon's use of *κόρος* in this couplet emphasises these same points, but is in fact all the more striking considering the extent of its departure from traditional poetic usage. While in later usage *κόρος* comes to have the meanings both of 'satiety' and 'surfeit', it is in Solon that the word first appears with the negative associations of excess, as something which must be, or needs to be, restrained (*κατέχειν κόρον*).¹⁴ Several scholars have commented on Solon's usage, but few offer an explanation for its seeming novelty.¹⁵ I propose a new interpretation of Solon's usage and of the relationship of these two definitions of *κόρος* that centres on the issue of perspective. The argument consists in three steps: first, for Solon, *κόρος* is clearly a word with strongly articulated associations of social stratification; second, his negative presentation of *κόρος* comes from a shift in perspective on this state, or rather the two definitions of the word are based on two (largely class-based) conflicting perceptions of the same state; and third,

¹² *Od.* 2. 26. The address *κέκλυτέ μευ, μνηστῆρες ἀγακλειτῆς βασιλείης | ὄφρ' εἴπω τά με θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι κελεύει* ('Hear me, wooers of the famous queen, in order that I may say what the heart in my breast bids me') at *Od.* 17.468–9, 18.351–2, 21.275–6 suggests the language of assembly: the second line appears consistently in this context (*Od.* 7.187, 8.27, *Il.* 7.68, 349, 369, 8.6, 19.102). Note the studied abuse of this stance by Eurymachus in *Od.* 18.349–5; otherwise the line is reserved for serious leaders: Odysseus, Alcinoüs, Hector, Antenor, Priam, and Zeus.

¹³ The attempt in Xenophanes 1 to define the proper attributes of the symposium – the acceptable sort of *εὐφροσύνη* – may well be another response to similar tensions.

¹⁴ Or more accurately, it is around the time of Solon that the word first appears with negative associations: the phrase *κατέχειν κόρον* has been plausibly restored in Sappho 68(a).8 where as Nourissia (2001) 244 rightly comments the negative meaning seems already present.

¹⁵ Most recently, Anhalt (1993) 79–95, with whom I have considerable disagreement. Helm's study (1993) contributes nothing. Adkins (1985) 114 says rather laconically, '*κόρον* is evidently pejorative'. See now also Balot (2001) 91–3. The view I will put forward finds affinity with Defradas' all too brief comment, '*Celui qui est comblé éprouve de l'hybris et se montre plein de morgue*' (1962) 48. For further bibliography see Mülke (2002) 114–15.

rather than forging a new definition or understanding of *kóros*, Solon is best seen as reflecting a larger (political) debate about the meaning of this word. The evaluation of *kóros* is hotly contested, and Solon's use – the view of *kóros* from below, so to speak – is one which I suggest is advanced or embraced by tyrannical discourse.

While it is often difficult to choose between a translation of 'satiety' and 'excess' for *kóros*, it is generally clear whether it is employed in a positive or negative context. Solon consistently evokes negative connotations for the word *kóros*, particularly in the context of wealth and often with criticism directed at a particular section of society. In addition to a second appearance in Solon 4 (line 34), Solon 4c 'exhorts the wealthy not to be greedy':¹⁶

ὑμεῖς δ' ἡσυχάσαντες ἐνὶ φρεσὶ καρτερὸν ἦτορ,
οἳ πολλῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐς κόρον [ἡ]λάσατε,
ἐν μετρίοισι τίθεσθε μέγαν νόον· οὔτε γὰρ ἡμεῖς
πεισόμεθ', οὔθ' ὑμῖν ἄρτια τα[ῦ]τ' ἔσεται.

You who sated yourself of many good things, having quieted the strong heart in your breast, keep your great mind within measure. For neither will we obey, nor will these things be fitting for you.¹⁷

Moreover, in fragment 6 a causal connection is made between *kóros* and *ὑβρις*:

τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὑβριν, ὅταν πολὺς ὄλβος ἔπηται
ἀνθρώποις ὀπίσσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾖ.

Koros breeds *hybris*, when much wealth attends men whose minds are not fit.

Though *kóros* and indeed *ὑβρις* are words common to Homer and Hesiod, it is in Solon first (for us) that they are brought together in this relationship, one that represents a startling departure from the poetic tradition.

In Homer and Hesiod *kóros* is best translated by 'satiety' or 'one's fill'. Its verbal counterpart is *κορέιννυμι*, with the

¹⁶ *Ath. Pol.* 5: παραινῶν τοῖς πλουσίοις μὴ πλεονεκτεῖν. The quotation of 4c is followed by the comment: καὶ ὅλως αἰεὶ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς στάσεως ἀνάπτει τοῖς πλουσίοις ('And he always entirely ascribes the blame for stasis to the wealthy').

¹⁷ See pp. 106–7 for the ironic force of the heroic language in these lines.

corresponding meaning in the active, ‘to sate’, and in the middle ‘to have one’s fill’, ‘to have enough’. Solon’s one use of this verb, in 13.73, is in accordance with traditional usage. In Homer the word is used with food, drink, grief and war, and inherent in the Homeric use of κόρος is the notion of a natural limit which, when reached, results in cessation from the act.¹⁸ This is already at odds with Solonian usage in which people can be thus described: οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον (‘They do not know how to restrain their *koros*’).

Furthermore, in both the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* the notion of a limit is always implicit in the word κόρος. Menelaus, addressing Zeus with frustration and anger against the Trojans and the war, gives almost a programmatic description of κόρος:

οἶον δὴ ἄνδρεςσι χαρίζεαι ὕβριστῆσι
 Τρωσίν, τῶν μένος αἰὲν ἀτάσθαλον, οὐδὲ δύνανται
 φυλόπιδος κορέσασθαι ὁμοῖου πολέμοιο.
 πάντων μὲν κόρος ἐστί, καὶ ὕπνου καὶ φιλότητος
 μολπῆς τε γλυκερῆς καὶ ἀμύμονος ὀρχηθμοῖο,
 τῶν πέρ τις καὶ μᾶλλον ἐέλδεται ἐξ ἔρον εἶναι
 ἢ πολέμου· Τρῶες δὲ μάχης ἀκόρητοι ἔασιν.

How indeed you favour hybriistic men, Trojans, whose passion is always reckless, and they are not able to get their fill of destructive war! Of all things there is *koros*, both of sleep and of love-making, of sweet song and blameless dancing, for these indeed someone would expect there to be more of a desire than for war. But the Trojans are insatiate (without *koros*) of battle. (13.633–9)

The connection of ὕβρις, ἀτασθαλία (‘recklessness’) and a lack of satiety is vivid. While the moderation implicit in the passage shares the general outlook of Solon’s poetry, the idea of needing to restrain κόρος is far removed from the sense here, and unlike in Solon, it is the negation of κόρος in adjectival form, ἀκόρητος (‘insatiate’), that is connected with ὕβρις.¹⁹ There is

¹⁸ See Anhalt (1993) 82 for a similar definition; and see now Balot (2001) 88–93 and Mülke (2002) 114.

¹⁹ ἀκόρητος (*Il.* 7.117, 12.335, 13.621, 639, 14.479, 20.2) is most often used in the *Iliad* about one’s enemies as a term of abuse, ‘insatiate of war’ or ‘of threats’. That the panthers who gambol about Aphrodite in the *Homeric Hymn to Aphrodite* (5.71) are ἀκόρητοι is perhaps significant for explaining an element of Paris’ appearance in *Il.* 3.16–17: the beloved of Aphrodite is clad in a panther skin.

no suggestion in this passage that κόρος is negative: both pleasant and harsh activities have their κόρος;²⁰ and what is clearly bad is to be ἀκόρητος. The *Odyssey* mirrors this usage.²¹ Menelaus, for instance, describes his sorrow over those lost at Troy: ἄλλοτε μὲν τε γόῳ φρένα τέρπομαι, ἄλλοτε δ' αὖτε | παύομαι· αἰψήρως δὲ κόρος κρυεροῖο γόοιο ('One moment I indulge my thoughts with weeping, and then again I stop. Quick to come is one's fill of chilling sorrow', 4.102–3).

Hesiodic usage of κόρος corresponds with that found in Homer. Hesiod employs κόρος with the same sense of an implied limit. *Theogony* 593–4 speaks of women as a πῆμα μέγα ... | οὐλομένης Πενίης οὐ σύμφοροι, ἀλλὰ Κόροιο ('A great bane, no companions of destructive Poverty, but rather of Koros/satiety'). The contrast is one of poverty and the state of having ample provisions. Furthermore, *Works and Days* 368 and 593 also give the sense of 'having enough', without any negative or excessive connotations.

There is, however, a passage in Hesiod where elements of Solon's usage are suggested, although without seriously negative implications. In *Op.* 28–34, the poet advises Perses to get his priorities straight, and to avoid the quarrels of the agora until he has stored up enough provisions:

μηδέ σ' Ἔρις κακόχαρτος ἀπ' ἔργου θυμὸν ἐρύκοι
νεῖκε' ὀπιπεύοντ' ἀγορῆς ἐπακουδὸν ἔοντα.
ᾧρη γάρ τ' ὀλίγη πέλεται νεικέων τ' ἀγορέων τε,
ᾧ τιμὴ μὴ βίος ἔνδον ἐπηετανὸς κατάκειται
ῥαῖος, τὸν γαῖα φέρει, Δημήτερος ἀκτῆν.
τοῦ κε κορεσσάμενος νείκεα καὶ δῆριν ὀφέλλοις
κτῆμασ' ἐπ' ἄλλοτρίοις.

But I would that you not let evil strife keep your heart from work as you watch and listen to the quarrels of the agora. For of no concern are quarrels and speeches for one who does not have abundant livelihood stored away, gathered at the right time, which the earth bears, the bread of Demeter.

²⁰ This point is also shown, for instance, in Odysseus' speeches in *Il.* 19.167 and 221.

²¹ In the *Odyssey* occurrences of κόρος and its verbal forms appear overwhelmingly in conjunction with grief, food and drink: grief, 4.103, 541, 10.499, 20.59; food, 8.98 (with dancing), 10.411, 14.28, 46 (with wine), 456, 18.372. Otherwise it is applied to contests in 23.350. Cf. Anhalt (1993) 84 who omits 20.59.

Having acquired your fill of this you might increase the quarrels and contests over another man's possessions.

Hesiod does not say to his brother, 'were you to work harder, you wouldn't need to join in quarrels in the agora'. Instead he says that for someone without the means of livelihood, there is little concern (ὥρῃ ὀλίγη) for such activities, but having attained κόρος, one may then engage in disputes. Although Hesiod's overall displeasure with such quarrels is not expressed so strongly here, an indication of how satiety may breed strife appears in this passage.²² Important for interpreting Solon's usage is the implication that κόρος brings a kind of leisure which in turn opens up the opportunities for strife, strife which includes attempts to acquire more. This is a point to which I will return.

After Solon κόρος does not simply revert to its Homeric and Hesiodic usage. In Pindar, the word is almost always negative in its connotations, often modified by αἰανής ('wearisome') or said to be heavy.²³ Furthermore, the Solonian usage of 'excess' prevails in many appearances of the word. In *Olympians* 1 Pindar associates κόρος with disaster, saying Tantalus καταπέψαι μέγαν ὄλβον οὐκ ἐδυνάσθη, κόρῳ δ' ἔλεν | ἄταν ὑπέροπλον ('He was not able to digest his great fortune, and with his *koros* he seized excessive ruin', 56–7).²⁴ Likewise, in *Isthmians* 3.1–3, κόρος appears with the same verb as in Solon 4:

²² Fisher (1994) 187 also recognises this. The repetition of ὀφέλλειν later in line 213 (μηδ' ὕβριν ὀφέλλε, 'Don't increase hybris') suggests that Hesiod dangles this carrot before his addressee only to remove it after some instruction has safely sunk in.

²³ *Pyth.* 1.82, *Nem.* 10.20, *Isthm.* 3.1. *Contra* Anhalt (1993) 87, apart from *Nem.* 7.52–3 where the word is neutral in tone and implies limit, Pindar's usage has consistently negative connotations and therefore differs semantically from the κόρος of hexameter poetry. For an interpretation of κόρος in Pindar see Mackie (2003) 9–37, and see below.

²⁴ Anhalt (1993) 88–9 cites *Ol.* 1.56–7 as the only example in Pindar of Solonian usage, but proceeds in the same paragraph to cite *Isthm.* 3.1–3 and *Ol.* 13.10. She doesn't mention *Nem.* 1.62–6, which is both negative and suggests excessiveness or lack of limit in κόρος: among those whom Heracles will slay in his labours are beasts referred to as αἰδροδίκας ('not knowing right') and τινα σὺν πλαγίῳ ἀνδρῶν κόρῳ στείχοντα ('whomever of men proceeds with crooked *koros*') to whom will be ascribed τὸν ἐχθρότατον μόρον ('the most hateful fate').

εἴ τις ἀνδρῶν εὐτυχίῃσιν ἢ σὺν εὐδόξοις ἀέθλοισι
ἢ σθένει πλούτου κατέχει φρασὶν αἰαντὴ κόρον,
ἄξιός ἐστι λόγισις ἀστῶν μεμίχθαι.

If some man who has done well either in the games that bring good repute or in the strength of his wealth restrains hateful arrogance in his heart, he is worthy of mingling with the praise of the townsmen.

From the perspective of genealogy, Herodotus and Pindar relate ὕβρις with κόρος, albeit with the parenting reversed.²⁵ Moreover, the oracle recorded by Herodotus (8.77) includes δίκη in this nexus, in opposition to κόρος, thus suggesting closer affinities with Solonian formulations: διὰ Δίκη σβέσσει κρατερὸν Κόρον, Ὕβριος υἱόν, δεινὸν μαιμῶντα, δοκεῦντ' ἀνὰ πάντα πιθέσθαι ('Bright Justice will quash powerful Koros, son of Hybris, a terrible raging one, thinking to seduce every man'; cf. 3.80.4). It seems fairly clear that sixth-century usage of κόρος is well reflected in the fifth century and had marked influence upon the later connotations of this word.²⁶

What lies behind Solon's bold image of restraining κόρος? One might explain Solon's departure from Homeric and Hesiodic usage as based on his acknowledgement of 'an inherent interrelationship between satiety and insatiability'.²⁷ It is

²⁵ Hdt. 8.77, Pind. *Ol.* 13.10. Anhalt's view (1993) 89 that these reversals reflect 'the continuing influence of a pre-Solonian formula' and that Solon's was 'something of an unaccepted variant' is not justified by the evidence. Though there were likely to have been genealogies of κόρος prior to Solon (for their importance in archaic poetry cf. Griffith (1990) 194–6), no pre-Solonian genealogy of κόρος exists that could justify calling Solon's a 'variant', let alone an 'unaccepted' one. Furthermore, regardless of the order of parenting, the familial connection of ὕβρις with κόρος aligns these later passages closely with Solonian formulations (see Gildersleeve (1885) 229–30, MacDowell (1976) 16, Michelini (1978) 36 esp. n. 5 and 40 n. 16, Munson (2001) 200 n. 163), particularly as they share a nexus of language with Solon: in the oracle in Herodotus Δίκη opposes Κόρος (the latter described with seductive powers, cf. Solon 4.6 for the persuasive powers of χρήματα), and in Pindar all three Ὀραιοί, named, perform the same function. Finally, that the genealogy expressed in Solon had enormous cachet is reflected in the frequency with which it is quoted, see West (1992) 145. On the genealogies of ethical concepts see Doyle (1984) 35–48 and Abel (1943); cf. now Helm (2004).

²⁶ See Munson (2001) 199–200. Cf. Ar. *Plut.* 187–93 where two marked allusions to archaic passages dealing with κόρος – Solon 13.72–3 and *Il.* 13.633–9 – significantly replace κόρος with the more neutral μεστός ('full') and πλησμονή ('satiety').

²⁷ Anhalt (1993) 82.

true that the concept of ‘enough’ or ‘satiety’ is a fluid one: even in English, when one says ‘enough’, one often means ‘too much’.²⁸ From there one might apply this point to the individual’s relationship with wealth and conclude, as Anhalt does,

Solon suggests that the condition of satiety as perceived by the individual may only become apparent once the point has been reached – and passed. Moreover, in the view of others, an individual may appear to have reached satiety when the individual himself still feels unsatisfied.

More simply put, ‘Solon argues that the rich have satiety and do not know it.’²⁹ But there are problems with such a line of interpretation that sees Solon as merely commenting on the (mis)perception of individuals. In poem 4, Solon is not saying that the ἡγεμόνες can’t see they have enough (κόρος), but that they can’t exercise control over that κόρος: οὐ γὰρ ἐπίστανται κατέχειν κόρον (‘they do not know how to restrain their *koros*’) – that is, they can’t restrain themselves while possessing it, can’t control the excesses it induces in them. The problem isn’t whether κόρος is or is not attained or whether someone is capable of perceiving that they have it, but rather who actually has it and what possession of it is capable of engendering.³⁰

It fits the evidence better to see evaluations of the condition of κόρος, and therefore ultimately the wider meaning of κόρος, as the subject of contest throughout the sixth century (if not also earlier and, to a lesser extent, later). In Homeric and Hesiodic texts κόρος implies a natural limit and has mainly positive

²⁸ As in ‘Enough is enough’, ‘That’s enough out of you’, or ‘Enough of these examples!’ One might also think of the Lockean proviso of limiting one’s acquisition only to the point that there is ‘enough and as good left in common for others’ ((1946) *Second Treatise on Government* sec. 27) in order to see how shifty this concept can be. The English ‘satiety’ can show a similar duality in its connotations, denoting both the state of being gluttoned and of being pleasantly filled or fully gratified (*OED* s.v. ‘satiety’).

²⁹ Anhalt (1993) 92 n. 40.

³⁰ Similarly in Thgn. 693–4, the problem is not that men who are ignorant cannot recognise that they have κόρος, but that for ignorant men κόρος is dangerous because they are unable to know *measure* when so many good things are present: πολλούς τοι κόρος ἀνδρας ἀπώλεσεν ἀφραίνοντας· | γινῶναι γὰρ χαλεπὸν μέτρον, ὅτ’ ἐσθλὰ παρῇ (‘Indeed *koros* has destroyed men without sense. For it is difficult to know measure when fine things are all around’).

connotations.³¹ After Solon the word is in flux, more often suggesting negative associations and the concept of ‘excess’. The *Theognidea* is instructive in this respect. Nagy has convincingly argued that ‘the sharing of doublets in the textual tradition of two distinct elegiac poets, as also in that of a single elegiac poet such as Theognis, cannot be dismissed as merely a matter of textual transposition’,³² but rather is attributable to the dynamics of oral poetry and its performance. On that model, one may read those places where the texts deviate as suggestive of tensions in definitions and reflective of different audiences’ standpoints.³³ In the five passages of the *Theognidea* which repeat Solonian material, two refer to the issue of κόρος. Theognis 153–4 says, τίκτει τοι κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν κακῶ ὄλβος ἔπνηται | ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ ὅτῳ μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾗ (‘Indeed *koros* breeds hybris when it follows a base man and one whose mind is not fit’). The variations from the Solonian lines are telling. Solon’s text (6) runs: τίκτει γὰρ κόρος ὕβριν, ὅταν πόλυσ ὄλβος ἔπνηται | ἀνθρώποις ὀπόσοις μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾗ (‘*Koros* breeds hybris, when much wealth attends men whose minds are not fit’). κακῶ ... καὶ ὅτῳ μὴ νόος ἄρτιος ᾗ (‘a base man and one whose mind is not fit’) in the Theognis passage strikes a different chord from Solon’s more universalising ἀνθρώποις ὀπόσοις (‘to however many men’) and read against the Solonian formulation suggests special pleading, an attempt to salvage the possibility of successful possession of κόρος by a further modification of the sort of person for whom κόρος would engender ὕβρις. This is not to say that this idea is not implicit in the Solon lines, but those of Theognis articulate a further extenuation.³⁴

Such an interpretation of the relationship between these doublets moves the discussion away from a narrow focus on

³¹ See also Tyrtaeus 11.10 and Alc. 1.64–5 which seem to subscribe to the Homeric meaning.

³² Nagy (1983) 88.

³³ Nagy (1983) 89, ‘... phraseological variants will reflect an ongoing process of recomposition-in-performance’. This recomposition will have been in part a function of the audience for whom the poetry is performed. Cf. also 88–91 for further discussion of the oral aspects of the relationship of doublets in the *Theognidea*.

³⁴ See also Highbarger (1929) 345. The variations between Solon 13.71–6 and Theognis 227–32 are likewise telling: for further discussion see Irwin (forthcoming b).

poets, and the subsequent imperative to determine the priority of allusion – in this case an interpretive cul-de-sac – ³⁵ and instead focuses on poets and audiences, seeing them engaged within a larger social and political debate about the meaning of κόρος in which the very evaluative associations of the word may have been contested. That some form of debate existed seems already in evidence in the prescriptive quality of Menelaus' speech in the *Iliad* quoted above. At any rate the pointed definitional expressions in the *Theognidea* (595–8, 605–6, 693–4, 1173–4) as well as the philosophical interest in the term later in the century in Heraclitus (frs. 65.1, 66.1, 67.2, 111.2 DK) suggest that κόρος is neither a static concept nor had the contests over its meaning been settled. The coinage of the verb ὑπερκορέννυμι ('to glut'; a rare word, first appearing in Theognis 1158) suggests that the pressures which created a double meaning for the noun κόρος are also exerting themselves to coin a verb to convey correspondingly the idea of excess, 'to glut'.³⁶

What was likely to have been at the centre of this definitional debate? Solonian usage suggests that whether κόρος is 'enough' or 'too much' is not the chief debate. Rather what is contested is whether κόρος represents a positive or negative state: two contrasting perspectives on, evaluations of, the state of 'satiety' and what it engenders.³⁷ While certainly being fuelled by an 'inherent interrelationship' of these opposites, these two perspectives are

³⁵ As Anhalt (1993) 91 demonstrates: 'The close verbal parallels between Theognis and Solon suggest that at least one of the authors of the Theognidean corpus was familiar with Solon's poetry. Alternatively, it is possible that at a later date than Solon, other poets were thinking along the same lines as he. In any case, Theognis' statements indicate that Solon is not unique in his concern about the delicate relationship between satiety and insatiability.' A much better model – precisely because it incorporates the performative dimension of the poems – is sympotic capping songs: see West (1974) 14–18, Stehle (1997) 221–2, Węcowski (2000b) 351, Ford (1999a), Osborne (2001) 53.

³⁶ Although Solon only uses κορέννυμι with its traditional/epic meaning (13.72–3: οἷ γὰρ νῦν ἡμέων πλείστον ἔχουσι βίον, | διπλάσιον σπεύδουσι· τίς ἂν κορέσειεν ἅπαντας; 'For those of us who now have the greatest prosperity, they strive to double it. Who could satisfy them all?'), the instability of its linguistic context is apparent: it appears in a question whose implicit answer is negative: κόρος *qua* 'satiety' in its positive sense is therefore not to be found.

³⁷ See Skinner (1989) esp. 10–11, 17–19 for the importance of recognising that not only can the sense and referent of a word be disputed, but also the direction of its evaluative force, 'the nature and range of the speech acts it can be used to perform'.

best understood as belonging to political and social debate involving the issues of wealth and privilege, articulated through the conflicting connotations associated with this state. From a traditional, purely ‘aristocratic’, perspective, *κόρος* is a positive condition: namely, that which, when attained, engenders a ‘natural’ limit.³⁸ For those without a claim to have *κόρος* or for those exploiting the perspective of such ones, *κόρος* is that which gives those in possession of it the leisure to commit acts of *ὑβρις* as suggested by *Works and Days* 28–34 quoted above, but more forcefully asserted in Solon’s poetry.³⁹ Seen from a historical perspective, the state of having *κόρος* produces the circumstances in which aristocrats can be socially and politically active and, like Solon’s *ἡγεμόνες*, stir up stasis within the city.

This political reading of ‘Solonian’ *κόρος* may be situated within earlier and later debates surrounding material prosperity in the poets drawn upon above. Read against Hesiod, this view of *κόρος* expressed in Solon 6 can be seen to trump (or update) an older popular formulation about *ὑβρις*. For Hesiod, *ὑβρις* is the problematic concept, certainly bad for the *δειλός βροτός* (‘lowly man’), but, he asserts, οὐδὲ μὲν ἐσθλός | ῥηιδίως φερέμεν δύναται, βαρύθει δέ θ’ ὑπ’ αὐτῆς | ἐγκύρσας Ἀθησιν (‘and not even is the noble man able to bear it well, but meeting with ruin he is overburdened by it’, *Op.* 214–16). The genealogical formulation of *κόρος* breeding *ὑβρις* may polemically surpass Hesiod: it implicitly grants the obvious – that *ὑβρις* is a bad thing, heavy even for the *ἐσθλός*, – but adds that even to have *κόρος*, its engenderer and a constituent element of being *ἐσθλός*, may in fact also be itself bad. Turning to Pindar, one may see the *κόρος* of his poetics as

³⁸ These competing ideas about wealth are widespread in Greek literature, but one might consider the positive old – and extremely – aristocratic view put forth by Clytemnestra in Aesch. *Ag.* 1040–2 (in conjunction with the excess of wealth she claims in 958–60) in which she asserts, ἀρχαιοπλούτων δεσποτῶν πολλὴ χάρις (‘great is the *charis* from masters of old wealth’).

³⁹ As this *ὑβρις* is often performed in the attempts to procure more wealth, one can see how, as if in a cycle, *ὑβρις* would in turn engender *κόρος*. That material prosperity frequently gives rise to hybriatic acts is widely expressed: see, for instance, Eur. fr. 438, Hdt. 3.80.4, Xen. *Cyr.* 8.4.14, Arist. *NE* 1124a29, and MacDowell (1976) 16–17, esp. n. 8.

influenced by similar political struggles behind ‘Solonian’ κόρος. In performing praise for the victor, the epinician poet must also attempt to contain the φθόνος and hostility of the victor’s community arising from the κόρος upon which the victory (and its song) is predicated: poetic hesitations about engendering κόρος in his audience are related to anxieties over the communal reception of his patron’s (*qua* aristocrat’s) κόρος.⁴⁰ κόρος in one’s audience is then not only dangerous for the poet (μὴ κόρος ἐλθὼν κνίση, ‘Lest *koros* come and cause jealousy [lit., irritate, vex]’, *Pyth.* 8.32), but for his patron because it may imply his own κόρος (‘excess’) and bar him from the praise of his fellow citizens articulated in *Isthm.* 3.1–3 (quoted above).⁴¹

But to return to the cultural and political context of Solon responsible for ‘his’ κόρος, one may still ask about more particular contemporary influences on that conception of κόρος, both negative and positive. The view of κόρος as an entirely positive entity is one that I would argue belongs inherently to those who possess it. In contrast, Solon’s κόρος is best explained as a view of κόρος from below, a view of those who have no claims to κόρος, or a view which they are being encouraged to take – a view which would fit well with the phenomenon of tyranny. This phenomenon in Solon’s poetry will be pursued further below.⁴²

⁴⁰ See Kurke (1991).

⁴¹ See also Pindar’s bold metaphors in connection with κόρος that both resonate with Solonian usage, and suggest strong political connotations of the word. In *Ol.* 2.95–8 κόρος appears qualified by δίκη – ἀλλ’ αἶνον ἐπέβα κόρος οὐ δίκᾳ συναντόμενος, ἀλλὰ μάργων ὑπ’ ἀνδρῶν, τὸ λαλαγῆσαι θέλων κρυφόν τε θέμεν ἐσλῶν καλοῖς ἔργοις (‘But *koros* not joined with *dike*/a sense of right surmounts praise, but at the behest of greedy men it is willing to place its chattering as a concealment over the good deeds of noble men’ (trans. Kirkwood (1982) 77 with modification) – while in *Ol.* 13.11–12 Pindar’s description of the Ὀραι fighting off Ὑβρις, daughter of Κόρος, is followed by reference to his own τόλμα (‘daring’, ‘confidence’) as εὐθεῖα (‘straight’), a unique Pindaric use of an adjective having a prominent role in the discourse of δίκη. For the discourse of δίκη see pp. 227–9.

⁴² In her excellent analysis of the importance of vegetal imagery embedded in descriptions of ὕβρις, particularly in the causal link between κόρος (defined as πληθος τροφῆς – ‘an abundance of nourishment’ – cf. MacDowell (1976) 16) and ὕβρις, Michelinini uncovers a connection of relevance for archaic tyranny. She identifies how the typical cure for the plant ὑβρίζων (‘wild in its growth’), pruning (κολούω),

III ὁμοῦ βίην τε καὶ δίκην ξυναρμόσας

In chapter 12 of Aristotle's *Athenaion Politeia* several fragments of Solon's poetry are adduced to document aspects of his career. In the most extended of these, Solon makes a forceful claim about his means of delivering all that he promised to the δῆμος:

ταῦτα μὲν κράτει
ὁμοῦ βίην τε καὶ δίκην ξυναρμόσας
ἔρεξα, καὶ διήλθον ὡς ὑπεσχόμην·

These things with strength, combining force (*bie*) and justice (*dike*), I accomplished, and I carried out my promises. (36.15–17)

Claims about justice in archaic poetry are not unusual. They have a long poetic history extending all the way back to Hesiod's *Works and Days*, and Solon's poetry itself elsewhere draws heavily on this Hesiodic tradition of justice poetry.⁴³

And yet, from the point of view of poetic antecedents, Solon's formulation here is truly violent: the union of βίη and δίκη is unprecedented in the Homeric and Hesiodic tradition,⁴⁴ a fact which no doubt the poet underscores by the use of ὁμοῦ

provides the metaphor made literal in the famous tyrant fable of Thrasylbulus and Periander, where the former's action as he goes through the field (ἐκόλουε αἰεὶ ὅκως τινὰ ἴδοι τῶν ἀσταχύων ὑπὲρέχοντα, κολούων δὲ ἔρριπτε, ἐς ὃ τοῦ λήϊου τὸ κάλλιστόν τε καὶ βαθύτατον διέφθειρε τρώπῳ τοιούτῳ, 'He was habitually cutting back whichever ear of corn he saw surpassing the others, until by such means he destroyed the finest and tallest of the crop', Hdt. 5.92ζ.2) is taken as advice for how Periander κάλλιστα τὴν πόλιν ἐπιτροπεύει ('might govern the city in the finest manner'; note the paradoxical use of κάλλιστον/κάλλιστα). See Salmon (1997) 60 for a positive (non-aristocratic) interpretation of this story.

⁴³ See Ch. 6.

⁴⁴ As many scholars have commented: see for instance, Linforth (1919) 187, Gagarin (1973) 81–94, Vox (1983) 307–9, Blaise (1995), Mülke (2002) 386–7. See also Rhodes (1981) 176. His concession to Masarrachia ((1958) 348) however is unnecessary: all but one of Masarrachia's examples come from the fifth century, the political discourse of which will have been affected by its antecedents in the sixth, and even so, for some authors βίη appears consistently as a negative notion: see Herodotus 1.89.3 for contrast with δίκη, 3.127.2 for contrast with σοφία ('wisdom'), and 6.5.2 for contrast with πείθω ('persuasion'). See also Thuc. 1.77.4 for a clear opposition. The one example Masarrachia cites from Homer is a union of δίκη and σθένος ('justice and strength', *Il.* 16.542), not βίη, and this almost certainly pertains to Sarpedon's excellence in two different contexts, in civic matters and in war.

(‘together’).⁴⁵ This striking divergence from poetic tradition demands investigation.

A brief survey of Hesiodic and Homeric poetry again demonstrates Solon’s apparent independence from his predecessors. In Hesiodic poetry the opposition of δίκη to βίη is fundamental and carefully maintained. This is exemplified in Hesiod’s address to Perses whom he instructs, καὶ νῦν Δίκης ἐπάκουε, βίης δ’ ἐπιλήθεο πάμπαν (‘You, too, pay heed to justice, forget violence entirely’, 275).⁴⁶ Similarly, in the *Theogony* the separation of δίκη and βίη is even emphasised on a genealogical level: Βίη (‘Force’), as well as Κράτος (‘Power’), belongs among the offspring of Styx in *Theogony* 385, far removed from Δίκη, daughter of Themis and Zeus (902). βίη and δίκη even seem to punctuate the narrative of the *Theogony*. βίη is a characteristic feature of the narrative of the *Theogony* until its last appearance at the completion of Zeus’s final conflict with the Titans; thereafter Zeus’s authority is secured, and a new order ensues characterised by the birth of Athena and the Ὀραιοί, among whom is, of course, Δίκη (886–903).⁴⁷

⁴⁵ So Defradas (1962) 63–4: ‘Que βίην et δίκην soient encadrés par ὁμοῦ et συναρμόσας souligne mieux ce que cette conjonction présente d’exceptionnel et quelle autorité (κράτος) était nécessaire pour la maintenir.’ Against the alternative reading of νόμου on the basis of the London papyrus see Mülke (2002) 386.

⁴⁶ Line 275 actually answers line 213 – σὺ δ’ ἄκουε Δίκης, μὴδ’ ὕβριν ὀφείλλε (‘But you listen to justice, and do not advance hybris’) – both in content and function: they provide the transitions from the αἶνος of the hawk and the nightingale to the extended excursus on δίκη, and back again (see pp. 170–2). The similarities of the lines and their function underscore the closeness of ὕβρις and βίη, and their shared opposition to δίκη. On this opposition see West (1978) 210. For further negative representations of βίη see, for example, *Op.* 321, *Sc.* 480.

⁴⁷ This divide marks an important shift in the narrative of the *Theogony*, from the succession of Zeus to the guarantee of the continuation of his power, from theological past to present. The *Theogony* and *Works and Days* reflect their respective perspectives, divine and mortal, by maintaining fairly distinct areas of usage for βίη: as Hofinger (1975) s.v. βίη shows, the *Theogony* uses only the more neutral, ‘force, vigueur, usage de la force’, while the *Op.* has the morally-laden ‘violence, usage illégitime de la force’, and repeats the *Theogonic* usage only in the description of the Bronze race (148), who are clearly delineated as belonging to a time anterior to Hesiod’s own. By the same token, δίκη appears only two other times in the *Theogony* prior to the birth of the Ὀραιοί, both in human contexts: the description of the good king (*Theog.* 86) and the list of Hekate’s benefits for mortals (*Theog.* 434). See also Blaise (1995) 29–31.

The Homeric poems include this negative view of βίη. In the Hesiodic simile of *Iliad* 16, δίκη is opposed to βίη: οἱ βίη εἰν ἀγορῇ σκολιᾶς κρίνωσι θέμιστας, | ἐκ δὲ δίκην ἐλάσωσι, θεῶν ὄπιν οὐκ ἀλέγοντες ('Those who give crooked judgments in the agora, and drive out justice, paying no heed to the vengeance of the gods', 387–8).⁴⁸ The *Odyssey* takes an identical stance when it joins βίη and ὕβρις in the formulaic description of the reckless suitors τῶν ὕβρις τε βίη τε σιδήρεον οὐρανὸν ἵκει ('whose hybris and violence reach the iron sky', 15.329 = 17.565). Furthermore, βίη frequently denotes the actions of the suitors for which Odysseus will exact payment (ἀποτίσεται, 3.216, 11.118, 16.255, 17.540, 22.168, 23.31),⁴⁹ as well as characterising the Cyclops' behaviour (9.476, 12.210). More notable still, despite Odysseus' violent means of handling the suitors, his actions are *not* described as βίη.

Solon's claim to have joined ὁμοῦ βίην τε καὶ δίκην ('justice and force together') is therefore jarring from the perspective of poetic traditions upon which his portrayal of δίκη elsewhere heavily draws.⁵⁰ It is, however, not a claim without archaic equivalence. For although the collocation is apparently alien to the poetic tradition, the fusion of δίκη and βίη is completely at home in the discourse of tyranny. The relationship of βίη to tyranny is of course unsurprising, and one well established

⁴⁸ βίη is used against those unwilling (*Il.* 1.430, 15.186), and often involves impinging on another's rights. Compare Menelaus' fear that someone will say of him that he forced Antilochus with lies (Ἀντίλοχον ψεύδεσσι βηισάμενος, 23.576). While Solon may be drawing on epic's other, independent, use of βίη to describe the strength of the hero (see the discussion of the wolf in fr. 36 below), how he contextualises it is nevertheless striking and unusual: the *Iliad* never joins δίκη with βίη positively and instead repeats the oppositions found in Hesiod and the *Odyssey*.

⁴⁹ See also 13.310 and 16.189 for the suitors' actions as βίη. The frequently repeated formula describing Odysseus, βίας ἀποτίσεται/αι ἐλθὼν ('coming, he will avenge their violent acts'), which joins ἔρχομαι and ἀποτίσσαι, is intertextually suggestive for Solon's depiction of Δίκη in Solon 4.16 who ἦλθ' ἀποτερισμένη ('comes intending to exact vengeance'). Both participating in the language of requital, each passage is able to colour the other: Odysseus' vengeance will be as inevitable as justice ('when/if he comes' – the difference in participle and finite verb has some significance), but also, in light of Ch. 5, one may think about how Solon's δίκη may be modelled on Odysseus, or alternatively how a later *Odyssey* may have been shaded by Solonian poetics and politics. See Appendix II.

⁵⁰ And also in elegy, compare Thgn. 346 (βίη and ὕβρις), 677, 835 (cf. 371, 651).

even in Solon's own poetry.⁵¹ But as James McGlew has made clear, δίκη functions as an important feature of tyrannical narratives: a claim to bring δίκη, however harsh, was likely to have been the basis of the tyrant's appeal.⁵²

Several stories depicting the tyrant's rise to power illustrate just this. The tyranny of Deioces in book 1 of Herodotus is paradigmatic. Herodotus begins his narrative by calling Deioces a σοφός who ἐρασθεῖς τυραννίδος ('having conceived a desire for tyranny') made a reputation for his administration of δίκη (1.96.1–2). He is said to have understood that τῷ δικαίῳ τὸ ἄδικον πολέμιόν ἐστι ('injustice is hostile to justice'),⁵³ and despite the imputation of an ulterior motive for Deioces' behaviour, his career path ending in tyranny is actually characterised by his adherence to δίκη: ὁ δὲ δῆ, οἷα μνώμενος ἀρχήν, ἰθύς τε καὶ δίκαιος ἦν ('But indeed, because he was courting rule, he was both straight and just'); and from this people learned that Δηϊόκης εἴη ἀνὴρ μούνος κατὰ τὸ ὀρθὸν δικάζων ('Deioces was the only man who adjudicated cases in a straight manner', 1.96.2–3). Furthermore, this adherence to δίκη continues even after Deioces' position as tyrant is secure, ἐπεῖτε δὲ ταῦτα διεκόσμησε καὶ ἐκράτυνε ἑωυτὸν τῇ τυραννίδι, ἦν τὸ δίκαιον φυλάσσων χαλεπός ('When he had put these things in order and had secured himself in the tyranny, he was severe in his attention to justice', 1.100.1).⁵⁴

The tyranny of Cypselus provides another forceful example. The famous oracle foretelling Cypselus' birth and reign illustrates this fusion of violence and justice:

Ἡετίων, οὐπὶς σε τίει πολύτιμον ἔοντα.
 Λάβδα κύει, τέξει δ' ὀλοοῖτροχον· ἐν δὲ πεσεῖται
 ἀνδράσι μουνάρχουσι, δικαιώσσει δὲ Κόρινθον.

⁵¹ Frs. 32.2, 34.8 and 37.4; cf. Blaise (1995) 28–9.

⁵² See Arist. *Pol.* 1310b2–3; McGlew (1993) ch. 2. McGlew, however, falls short of drawing the full implications for Solon's career.

⁵³ This reads as a political slogan: cf. Solon's τὸ ἴσον πόλεμον οὐ ποιεῖ ('Equality does not make war', Plut. *Sol.* 14.4).

⁵⁴ Herodotus mentions particularly the ὑβρίζων ('person committing hybris') as the offender against whom the tyrant Deioces was vigilant (1.100.2). Compare the use of χαλεπός ('harsh') with Thgn. 1081–2 and 39–40; and cf. the litotes of Plut. *Sol.* 15.1.

Hetion, no one honours you though you are worthy of much honour. Labda is pregnant and she will give birth to a rolling stone. And it will fall on those men who rule alone, and will set straight Corinth. (5.92b.2)⁵⁵

The oracle associates the bringing of justice with the destructive force of the ὀλοοίπροχος. McGlew emphasises the significance of the phrase δικαιώσει ... Κόρινθον: a ‘phrase ... variously understood to mean “set Corinth right” or “punish Corinth”, but perhaps means both: Cypselus will set Corinth right by punishing it.’⁵⁶ Other sources confirm that violent adherence to δίκη was a feature of the tyrant’s self-image. In describing the famous Chest of Cypselus at Olympia, Pausanias records that one panel portrayed Δίκη beating Ἀδικία with a club (5.18.2).⁵⁷ Taken with the oracle, the image suggests that a major part of the tyrant’s self-presentation was a policy of harsh and exacting δίκη,⁵⁸ a platform potentially as attractive to the lower orders as it was fearful to the aristocratic section of Corinth, who may have had much to answer for.⁵⁹ As Salmon writes in his re-evaluation of tyrants, ‘it was precisely the arbitrary rule of aristocrats (*dorophagoi basilees*

⁵⁵ See McGlew’s analysis (1993) 63–72 of the three oracles regarding Cypselus to which my discussion owes much. For a detailed discussion of Cypselus’ tyranny and the evidence see Oost (1972) and Pleket (1969) 34–8.

⁵⁶ McGlew (1993) 67. The second oracle recorded by Herodotus, while containing no reference to δίκη, suggests the retributive function of Cypselus’ reign.

⁵⁷ This image also appears on a red-figure neck amphora, dated to 520. Clubbing recurs in the tyrant narrative of Peisistratus’ assumption of a club-bearing bodyguard (Hdt. 1.59.5): see Shapiro (1993) 39–44. See also the testimony for Cleisthenes of Sicyon (Poll. 3.83, 7.68; Steph. Byz. s.v. Χίος) with McGlew (1993) 74–8.

⁵⁸ As McGlew (1993) 73 notes, other evidence suggests that the persona of agent of justice was one not limited to the Cypselids, but likely to have been cultivated by several tyrants. He cites the story of Lygdamis recorded in a fragment of [Arist.] *Constitution of Naxos* (fr. 558 Rose (566 Gigon) = Athen. 8 348b–c) and the reciprocal retribution for the city’s injustice is apparent in the Orthagorid tradition, Diod. Sic. 8.24 and Plut. *Mor.* 553a–b, and McGlew’s discussion, 67–8.

⁵⁹ The story of Periander and Thrasybulus (Hdt. 5.92.ζ.2–η.1) illustrates the potential for different class-related experiences of a tyrant; see above n. 42. One can see the importance of δίκη in the archaic tyrant’s political platform in, for instance, the adherence to Solonian law attributed to Peisistratus and his travelling magistracies (*Ath. Pol.* 16.5, Thuc. 6.54.6, Hdt. 1.59.6). See also Aristotle on the Orthagorids at Sicyon: πολλὰ τοῖς νόμοις ἐδοῦλεον (‘It was very much the case that they were slaves to the laws’, *Pol.* 5.1315b15–6).

[bribe-consuming kings], in Hesiod's words) which tyrants ended'.⁶⁰

The testimony of the *Theognidea* also provides contemporary evidence for the association of the tyrant with *harsh* but *just* retribution, and confirms that severe administration of δίκη was likely to have been a central plank of the tyrant's platform. With foreboding the coming of the tyrant is thus described:

Κύρνε, κύει πόλις ἥδε, δέδοικα δὲ μὴ τέκη ἄνδρα
 εὐθυντήρα κακῆς ὕβριος ἡμετέρης.
 ἀστοὶ μὲν γὰρ ἔθ' οἶδε σαόφρονες, ἡγεμόνες δὲ
 τετράφεται πολλὴν εἰς κακότητα πεσεῖν.
 οὐδεμίαν πω Κύρν' ἀγαθοὶ πόλιν ὤλεσαν ἄνδρες·
 ἀλλ' ὅταν ὑβρίζειν τοῖσι κακοῖσιν ἄδη,
 δῆμόν τε φθείρωσι δίκας τ' ἀδίκοισι διδώσιν
 οἰκείων κερδέων εἵνεκα καὶ κράτεος,
 ἔλπεο μὴ δηρὸν κείνην πόλιν ἀτρεμίεσθαι,
 μῆδ' εἰ νῦν κείται πολλὴ ἐν ἡσυχίῃ,
 εὔτ' ἂν τοῖσι κακοῖσι φίλ' ἀνδράσι ταῦτα γένηται,
 κέρδεα δημοσίῳ σὺν κακῷ ἐρχόμενα.
 ἐκ τῶν γὰρ στάσιές τε καὶ ἔμφυλοι φόνοι ἀνδρῶν
 μούναρχοί τε· πόλει μῆποτε τῇδε ἄδοι.

Cyrnus, this city is pregnant, and I fear lest it give birth to a man who will be a straightener (εὐθυντήρ) of our evil hybris. For the citizens (ἀστοί) are still self-controlled, but the leaders are inclined to fall into great wickedness. In no way, Cyrnus, do good (ἀγαθοί) men destroy the city, but when it is pleasing to the base to commit hybris, and they destroy the demos and settle cases in favour of unjust men for private profit and power (κράτος), don't expect that city to remain unshaken for long – not even if now it lies very much in peace – whenever such things become dear to base men, that is, the profit that comes with public evil. From this arises stasis and internecine slaughter and solitary rulers. May this never please the city. (39–52)

This fragment is of great significance for discussions of archaic political and social language, and suggests an interesting inter-textual relationship with Solon 4.⁶¹ That line 41 makes a clear

⁶⁰ Salmon (1997) 63. Salmon continues (65), 'It is entirely plausible to suggest that the tyrants, or at least some of them, may have performed similar functions to other archaic lawgivers'; this is not only plausible but even likelier given the evidence collected by McGlew.

⁶¹ Nagy also remarks on the similarity of these poems (1983) 84. One might think of the relationship in terms of sympotic capping songs see above n. 35.

statement about accountability – *not* the ἀστοί, but the ἡγεμόνες – both highlights the studied ambiguity of Solon’s ἀστοί in 4.5–10⁶² and suggests a correction to such formulations. The firm assertion that good men (ἀγαθοί) do not destroy the city (οὐδεμίαν πω Κύρην ἀγαθοὶ πόλιν ὤλεσαν ἄνδρες) reads almost as a defensive response, ‘well don’t look at us’, to the forceful and yet implicit blame embedded in the averral of Solon 4.1–2 that it is not the gods who will destroy the city: ἡμετέρα δὲ πόλις κατὰ μὲν Διὸς οὐποτ’ ὀλεῖται | αἴσαν καὶ μακάρων θεῶν φρένας ἀθανάτων (‘Our city will never perish by the dispensation of Zeus or the intentions of the blessed gods who are immortal’). Furthermore, the blame for the city’s destruction on those who are κακοί can likewise be seen as an attempt to circumscribe a guilty subset of the ἀστοί who are defined by their character instead of tarred by the broader brush of wealth and/or status. But regardless of how this poem situates itself with respect to the coming tyranny, it is highly significant that in his description of the εὐθυντήρ ὕβριος ἡμετέρης (‘straightener of our hybris’), Theognis confirms the traditions surrounding tyrants, reflecting the importance of δίκη in the phenomenon of tyranny, at least to the extent that a tyrant comes as a consequence, and even corrector, of unjust behaviour (cf. line 45).⁶³

For Solon, the description of the tyrant as εὐθυντήρ is extremely important. The metaphor of ‘straightening’ is one which belongs to δίκη as seen in Hesiod.⁶⁴ Solon himself employs the metaphor of straightening in his poetry. The

⁶² See Adkins (1985) 112 and 226 n. 12.

⁶³ Of course, this representation can be contested, as is seen in the alternative version to line 40 preserved also in the *Theognidea* at lines 1081–2: Κύρνε, κύει πόλις ἦδε, δέδοικα δὲ μὴ τέκη ἄνδρα | ὕβριστήν, χαλεπῆς ἡγεμόνα στάσιος (‘Cyrnus, this city is pregnant, and I fear lest it give birth to a hybriatic man, a leader of harsh stasis’). But taken together, lines 41–52 and line 1082 represent two different (aristocratic) strategies for coping with the tyrant’s self-representation as the agent of δίκη: one can circumscribe the blameworthy group, or one can rename the tyrant for what he ‘really’ is. See also Nagy’s discussion (1983) 86–7.

⁶⁴ Straight(ening) δίκη: *Op.* 36, 225, 263 (v.l.), *Theog.* 86 (cf. crooked δίκη, *Op.* 219, 221, 250, 262, 264 (v.l.)). See McGlew (1993) 71 and above pp. 177–8. See also the figure of Deioces (discussed above), who is described as ἰθύς τε καὶ δίκαιος (‘both straight and just’, Hdt. 1.96.2–3).

Εὐνομία of Solon 4.36 εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς ('straightens crooked judgements'). In 36.18–20, immediately after claiming to join δίκη with βίη, Solon further asserts:

θεσμούς [δ'] ὁμοίως τῷ κακῷ τε κάγαθῷ
εὐθεῖαν εἰς ἕκαστον ἀρμόσας δίκην
ἔγραψα.

I wrote laws for the bad/lowly and the good/noble man equally, fitting straight justice to each.

While speaking the discourse of straight δίκη belonged to poetic tradition, its use in tyrannical contexts suggests that such language would have had more than poetic associations for Solon and his audience.⁶⁵ The union of δίκη and βίη is best explained as the exploitation of contemporary political language most closely associated (if not almost exclusively) with tyranny, a judgement further reinforced when it is remembered that fr. 36 is a poem in which the main thesis is the claim that the speaker upheld his promises to the δῆμος: ἐγὼ δὲ τῶν μὲν οὐνεκα ξυνήγαγον | δῆμον, τί τούτων πρὶν τυχεῖν ἐπαυσάμην; ('Those matters on account of which I led the demos, before the accomplishment of which of them did I stop?'). The assertion of the poem is that all that a tyrant would have provided, and that Solon seems to suggest he promised, was in fact achieved, but it is carefully worded so as to be read doubly: a rejection of tyranny, but lacking the explicitness of other poems – the word 'tyranny' or 'tyrant' never appears; an implicit suggestion that in essence he was a tyrant – or rather did all that a tyrant would do, but without the name. His contrafactual of lines 20–2 points in a similar direction: 'If someone other than I (ἄλλος ὡς ἐγὼ) had taken up the goad (κέντρον), . . . they would not have contained the people'; the contrafactual stating that no one else took up the goad, tyrannical instrument

⁶⁵ The supposed oracle to Solon may be read in this light: ἦσο μέσσην κατὰ νῆα κυβερνητήριον ἔργον | εὐθύνων· πολλοί τοι Ἀθηναίων ἐπίκουροι ('Sit in the middle of the ship, making straight your task of steering, for the majority of/the many among the Athenians are your allies', Plut. *Sol.* 14.6).

par excellence,⁶⁶ leaves Solon holding it. The language of fr. 36 effectively describes the speaker's actions in rhetoric that blurs the distinction between what he in fact did do and what was expected and desired by the δῆμος as he portrays them, that is, the assumption of a tyranny.⁶⁷ Close examination of the language of Solon's poetry threatens to undermine the very distinctions that he elsewhere so aggressively attempts to sustain, but that potential seems to have been a desired effect of the poem's design rather than an unforeseen accident.

If poem 36 were the only evidence of Solon's use of tyrannical language, it would be more difficult to determine whether this particular poem is distinctive, or whether the appropriation or exploitation of tyrannical language was a prominent feature of Solon's political stance. The previous chapters, and that which follows, all suggest that courting a political language and orientation shared with tyranny was a fundamental aspect of his political and poetic agenda.⁶⁸ And indeed, this view of Solon's career is not alien to the ancients. According to Plutarch (*Sol.* 14.2–4), it was said that when Solon used the slogan τὸ ἴσον πόλεμον οὐ ποιεῖ, 'equality makes no war', he pleased both the wealthy and the poor, who understood differently the meaning of τὸ ἴσον. Regardless of whether this slogan was actually used by Solon, the story narrates at the very least an ancient reading of Solon that recognised creative ambiguity in his use of language.

One might return to the picture of the emerging tyrant in Theognis 39–52 quoted above. Gregory Nagy employs Theognis' description in his argument for a panhellenic universalising tendency in elegy, commenting, 'So universalized is this picture that the description of the emerging tyrant is

⁶⁶ For example, Thgn. 847–50; see also Noussia (2001) 361–2, and Catenacci (1991) 30–1.

⁶⁷ See below (pp. 245–60) for discussion of the simile of the wolf in this fragment.

⁶⁸ See the *Ath. Pol.*'s assertion (2.2, cf. 28.2–3), however anachronistically expressed, that Solon πρῶτος ἐγένετο τοῦ δήμου προστάτης ('He was the first leader of the *demos*'). See also Salmon (1997) 62 on Aristotle's equation of some tyrants with demagogues (*Pol.* 1310b14–16, 29–31).

expressed in words that are appropriate for describing the Athenian lawgiver Solon in Solon's own poetry.⁶⁹ But this valid observation may be otherwise interpreted. I would argue instead that the direction of the relationship may well be reversed: tyrannical language is actively exploited in the poetry of Solon. I turn now to a third example.

IV Heroic inversions, a political approach: γέρας to the δῆμος

For anyone at all familiar with epic poetry, Solon's assertion in fr. 5 should be shocking:

δήμῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα τόσον γέρας ὅσον ἐπαρκεῖν,
 τιμῆς οὐτ' ἀφελὼν οὐτ' ἐπορεξάμενος·
 οἱ δ' εἶχον δύναμιν καὶ χρήμασιν ἦσαν ἀγῆτοί,
 καὶ τοῖς ἐφρασάμην μηδὲν αἰκὲς ἔχειν·
 ἔστην δ' ἀμφιβαλὼν κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισι,
 νικᾶν δ' οὐκ εἴασ' οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως.⁷⁰

To the demos I gave so much privilege as to suffice, neither taking away their honour, nor ἐπορεξάμενος.⁷¹ And those who held power and were splendid

⁶⁹ Nagy (1983) 84; cf. Rihll (1989) 283 n. 32.

⁷⁰ Quoted by Plut. *Sol.* 18.5 and [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 11.2–12.1. Plutarch has κράτος and ἐπαρκεῖ (ἐπαρκεῖν Brunck, defended by West (1974) 180) instead of the *Ath. Pol.*'s γέρας and ἀπαρκεῖ. For most recent discussion of the textual problems see Mülke (2002) 186–7.

⁷¹ The translation of ἐπορεξάμενος poses problems. Most place it in opposition to ἀφελὼν, 'nor offering them more' (Linthorpe (1919) 135, *contra* his own note, 180; Gerber (1970) 134; West (1993) 75; Miller (1996) 67; Noussia (2001) 269; Mülke (2002) 187–8), but Rhodes (1981) 172, citing Lloyd-Jones, seems right to comment that the normal meaning of the word in the middle is 'reach out for', and therefore does not contrast with ἀφελὼν but rather reinforces it. The contrast in the participles would then lie primarily in their voices: ἐπορεξάμενος conveys the idea of 'reaching out [to take τιμή] for oneself' (cf. Mülke (2002) 188). On this reading, Solon would fend off another charge, namely the relationship he struck with the demos was done for his own advantage – that is, he neither deprived them (ἀφελὼν) of τιμή, nor was his giving them γέρας a manoeuvre designed to add to his own (ἐπορεξάμενος); cf. Hdt. 7.104.2. This reading fits better the Homeric usage of the verb, renders the poem structurally neater, and may lie behind Diogenes Laertius 1.53, in which Peisistratus is made to defend himself to Solon by claiming ἐγὼ οὐ πλεον τι φέρομαι τάξιόματος καὶ τῆς τιμῆς ('I take for myself nothing more than is due my rank and honour'), but politically much is at stake in how these lines are interpreted, as Aristotle and Plutarch show, and therefore their ambiguity will be discussed below, pp. 235–7; see Mülke (2002) 187–8 for discussion with bibliography.

in their wealth, I contrived that they suffer nothing unseemly. And I stood throwing a strong shield over both sides and I allowed neither side to win unjustly.

From a poetic perspective to speak of the δῆμος as recipient of the γέρας is a striking departure from heroic language.⁷² The Homeric poems attest to the importance of these concepts in the world of the epic warrior.⁷³ Epic and didactic texts concur in the view that these concepts represent the honour and status, material and otherwise, allotted to special individuals or categories of individuals. τιμή and γέρας denote that which is allotted to the various immortals in the *Theogony*, and both the *Odyssey* and the *Works and Days* emphasise the association of γέρας with kingly honours.⁷⁴

The archaic appearance of γέρας most comparable with Solon 5 demonstrates just how radical Solon's language is. In *Odyssey* 7.147–50, Odysseus supplicates Arete while calling on the goodwill of the other feasters:

σόν τε πόσιν σά τε γούναθ' ἰκάνω πολλὰ μογήσας,
τούσδε τε δαιτυμόνας, τοῖσιν θεοὶ ὄλβια δοῖεν
ζώμεναι, καὶ παισὶν ἐπιτρέψειεν ἕκαστος
κτήματ' ἐνὶ μεγάροισι γέρας θ' ὃ τι δῆμος ἔδωκεν.

Having endured much hardship, I approach your husband and your knees in supplication, and these feasters; may the gods grant it to them to live in prosperity, and may each leave to his own children the possessions he holds in his halls and the honour that the demos has granted him.

⁷² The unusual relationship to Homeric usage has often been commented on, with varying degrees of emphasis: see Linforth (1919) 180, Anhalt (1993) 100–1, Balot (2001) 87–8, Noussia (2001) 268–9, Mülke (2002) 184–5. As a concept already applied to all social groups in Homer, τιμή is perhaps less startling, but it is nevertheless principally an aristocratic concept as Mülke well notes and see Ulf (1990) 4–12.

⁷³ The overwhelming connection of these concepts with the Iliadic Achilles and the density of γέρας references in Book 1 mark the *Iliad* as the γέρας/τιμή poem *extraordinaire*. The *Odyssey* provides an apt reading of the Iliadic Achilles at *Od.* 11.534, where the otherwise peevish shade of Achilles is finally and ironically made happy by reports of his son's γέρας. On τιμή and γέρας in Homer see Nagy (1979) 132–3, and van Wees (1992) 69–71.

⁷⁴ *Od.* 7.10, 150, 11.175, 184, 15.522. The only appearance of γέρας in the *Op.* is line 126, καὶ τοῦτο γέρας βασιλῆιον ἔσχον ('and they hold this kingly right'), used of those of the Golden Age to describe their final elevated status.

Although elsewhere in Homeric epic the appearance of δῆμος in any connection with γέρας is apparently unparalleled, this passage makes explicit what the other uses of γέρας imply: while the δῆμος may be the dispensers of γέρας, they are certainly never the recipients, the category of which includes rather warriors, kings, and gods.⁷⁵

Even in fifth-century prose, the word γέρας maintains its elevated status. Herodotus uses γέρας often, and most frequently in the context of the power of kings, whether describing what they receive or possess, or what they may choose to bestow. It is also common in denoting honours for those distinguished in martial prowess.⁷⁶ Thucydides, on the other hand, is characteristically sparing with this apparently still poetically charged word. He uses it only three times, in descriptions evoking dignified and temporally somewhat distant contexts: in the *Archaeology*, describing the privileges kings used to possess; in reference to the γέρας owed by a colony to its mother-city; and in the Plataean appeal to the Spartans based on the graves of the latter's Persian War dead lying in Plataea.⁷⁷

While Solon's poetic predecessors and even fifth-century prose reveal as drastic the claim to have given γέρας to the δῆμος, it is again in the realm of archaic tyranny and popular politics that the most striking analogies are to be found. The tyrant's programme as instrument of δίκη, claiming exclusive jurisdiction over what was traditionally the domain of a particular elevated group of individuals, is matched by his transferral of typically heroic, and therefore to a certain extent coextensively aristocratic, honours to a new entity,

⁷⁵ On the relationship between princes and the people in terms of government see van Wees (1992) 31–6.

⁷⁶ Of kings (tyrants) possessing: 3.85.1, 4.162.2, 165.1, 6.56, 6.57.5, 7.3.3, 7.104.2; an ambiguous tyrant requesting: 3.142.4 (cf. priests: 7.154.1). Of kings (tyrants) granting: 4.143.1, 7.29.2, 1.114.2. In relation to martial prowess: 2.168.1 (Egyptian warrior class), 8.125, 9.26.5, 9.27. It also appears in the context of hereditary honours: 7.134.1. For language similar to Solon 5.1–2 see Damareus' description of the Spartans as οἱ με τιμὴν τε καὶ γέρεα ἀπελόμενοι ('those who deprived me of my honour and my privileges', 7.104.2).

⁷⁷ 1.13.15, 1.25.17, 3.58.13.

the δῆμος.⁷⁸ In terms of its appropriation of aristocratic language to exploit the δῆμος as a political ‘ally’ or power base, Solon’s formulation of giving γέρας to the δῆμος is comparable with the political manoeuvre attributed to Cleisthenes, that of making the δῆμος part of his ἐταιρεία (‘political drinking club’): οὔτοι οἱ ἄνδρες [i.e. Cleisthenes and Isagoras] ἐστασίασαν περὶ δυνάμιος, ἐσσούμενος δὲ ὁ Κλεισθένης τὸν δῆμον προσεταιρίζεται (‘These men were engaged in a power struggle, and in response to having been bested Cleisthenes made the demos part of his political club’).⁷⁹

At the same time the claim to transfer γέρας not to oneself, but to the δῆμος suggests a strategy of mystification regarding where power actually resides. In making such a claim one linguistically alienates power from oneself while ensuring one’s own indispensability as the guarantor of this transfer.⁸⁰ In this paradox the complicity of tyrant and community comes

⁷⁸ It is telling that the closest poetic analogy with Solon’s formulation comes in Pind. *Pyth.* 1, a political poem which simultaneously celebrates tyrant *qua* tyrant and his new city: δᾶμον γεραίρων τράποι σύμφωνον ἐς ἡσυχίαν (‘conferring *geras* on the people may he guide them into harmonious peace’, 70–1). Contrast with Hdt. 5.67.5.

⁷⁹ Herodotus 5.66; Solon’s formulation suggests that there need be nothing substantially anachronistic (*pace* Cartledge (1998) 393) either in the dynamics attributed to Cleisthenes by Herodotus or the language he uses. Had Cleisthenes’ activities not immediately followed a tyranny in Athens he might well have become a tyrant or on the basis of his actions later been remembered as one: for the complexities of using demagogic language in situations immediately following a tyranny see Maeandrius in Samos (Hdt. 3.142–3); and cf. Aristagoras of Miletus (5.37 and 49) with McGlew (1993) 135–6.

⁸⁰ Such a paradox appears in the definition of the expression, λύκος κρέας νέμει (‘the wolf allots the meat’), given as what one says ἐπὶ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ διδόναι βουλομένου (‘in the case of a person who wishes both to be greedy *and* to give’, *Paroem. Gr.* 1.431.75). For discussion of this expression see Detienne and Svenbro (1989) 157–8. For the wolf and tyranny see below. Thuc. 1.13 may also be reflecting this linguistic strategy. His description of the rise of tyranny is modified by a parenthetical πρότερον δὲ ἦσαν ἐπὶ ρητοῖς γέρασι πατρικὰ βασιλείαι (‘Earlier there were hereditary kingships based on established terms of privilege’). Kingship used to have ρητὰ γέρεα (‘determined privileges’) until τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι καθίσταντο (‘tyrannies were established in the cities’). That the notion of γέρεα disappears from Thucydides’ narrative and is not used to describe the new power of the tyrant may be significant: the linguistic strategy implicit in giving γέρας to the δῆμος suggests a certain impossibility of locating γέρας after it ceases to reside with kings. The tyrant has it without calling it by name; he has alienated it linguistically (to the δῆμος) in order paradoxically to possess it (cf. Diog. Laert. 1.53). See Parker (1998) 164, who shows the scrupulous care with language that Thucydides takes when referring to tyrants.

to the fore: δῆμος and political leader are mutually dependent in establishing the basis for and means of articulating their own political identity and power.⁸¹

Many tyrant narratives include enactments of this complicity, as for instance, Peisistratus' staged entry into Athens with 'Athena' implicated his audience, who accepted him in his assumption of power (Hdt. 1.60).⁸² Similarly, the granting of a public bodyguard to the tyrant emphasises popular support for his assumption of power, while seeking to imply or dramatise the notion that his authority and security reside in the dispensation of the people, in their power.⁸³ Diodorus illustrates this kind of drama in the story of Gelon's assembly following his victory over Carthage in 479.⁸⁴ Unarmed and nearly naked he appeared before the Syracusans, giving an account of his achievements on their behalf, and making himself available to anyone desiring vengeance. The Syracusans responded enthusiastically by calling him εὐεργέτης ('benefactor'), σωτήρ ('saviour'), and βασιλεύς ('king'). While Gelon no doubt expected (and essentially was demanding) confirmation of his position through such a drama, its very content illustrates the desire to cultivate ambiguity as to where power actually resides.

So Solon's formulation in 5 of giving γέρας to the δῆμος, as well as the rest of the poem, may well be drawing on this linguistic strategy of appropriating heroic language in political and social contexts, analogous with that described in Parts I and II of this book. And yet Solon 5 is more complex still. The first couplet makes a claim for the benefits reaped by the δῆμος, the second for unpleasantness averted from those of high station.

⁸¹ See Connor (1987) and McGlew (1993) 4–5 and *passim*. ⁸² Connor (1987).

⁸³ Cf. Arist. *Rhet.* 1357b30ff., *Pol.* 1305a7–15 and Hdt. 1.59.5, 1.98.2. Notice the reciprocity of protection and the importance of αἰτεῖν ('to petition for') in Plato's account: τὸ δὲ τυραννικὸν αἶτημα τὸ πολυθρύλητον ... αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακὰς τινὰς τοῦ σώματος, ἵνα σῶς αὐτοῖς ᾖ ὁ τοῦ δήμου βοηθός ('the notorious tyrannical demand ... to petition for some bodyguards in order that the people's helper may be kept safe by them', *Rep.* 566b).

⁸⁴ Diod. Sic. 11.26.5–6. See also Ael. *VH* 6.11, 13.37; Polyaeus, *Strat.* 1.27.1 and McGlew (1993) 137–8. Compare with Peisistratus in *Ath. Pol.* 16.8 and Plut. *Sol.* 31.2.

Solon completes the poem with himself and the famous image of the shield, emphasising apparent impartiality through ἀμφοτέροισι ('to both sides') and οὐδετέρους ('neither side'). Epic imagery pervades the poem: the δῆμος get γέρας and τιμή, usually the privilege of the élite; the wealthy avoid what is ἀεικές ('unseemly'), an adjective used to describe δεσμοί ('shackles') as in Solon 4.25 and 36.13, that is, the usual lot of the poor; finally, Solon carries a κρατερὸν σάκος ('strong shield'), allowing neither side νικᾶν ... ἀδίκως ('to conquer ... unjustly'). The careful balance of couplets further articulates the message of the poem.

The balance of the poem is extremely fine, in fact almost aggressively so. And yet one may wonder about the equivalences and equivocations. How far does the adverb ἀδίκως ('unjustly') allow for the possibility (or sustain the hope) of one side's νίκη ('victory')? Can it be entirely neutral to use epic language in conjunction with the δῆμος as if it were an epic individual? There remain the questions of how far Solon subscribes to the politics behind this use of language and how far he may be implicated by using it. Does the balance of the poem, both structurally and politically, subdue and diffuse such language by the context in which it is placed, or does it instead facilitate the politically sagacious ploy of seeming to say something pleasing to everybody, including a tyrannical claim? This is not simply to say that different audiences will hear political claims differently, but that the design of the poem is to leave these questions usefully unanswered: a studied ambiguity pervades Solon's claim.⁸⁵

Plutarch and Aristotle reflect this ambiguity. Plutarch uses this poem to substantiate the extremely democratic claim that Solon meant the popular court to become supreme, thus effecting a significant transferral of power to the δῆμος, and indeed the fragment he quotes has replaced γέρας with κράτος ('power').⁸⁶ In contrast, Aristotle uses the same fragment to

⁸⁵ For the explicit recognition of the deceptive use of political language in this period see Solon 11. See also Plut. *Sol.* 15.

⁸⁶ Plut. *Sol.* 18.5.

emphasise Solon's neutrality, his position in the middle.⁸⁷ How these diverse readings arise from Solon's poem is worth closer attention.

At first glance Aristotle's view is more obviously palatable, given the content of the fragment as a whole. Following him one may read *τόσον γέρας* ('so much privilege') as an important limiting phrase whereby the poet borrows the force of tyrannical language while limiting the extent of his dependence upon it and of its implications. Scholars must implicitly follow this interpretation when they translate *έπορεξάμενος* as 'having offered' in opposition to *άφελών* ('having taken away') rather than reinforcing it (i.e. 'having reached out for').⁸⁸ Such an interpretation of the participle has been seen as fitting Solon's martial metaphor of lines 5–6, in which he describes himself as occupying a place between groups, and fits the image he cultivates in other fragments, though neither the poem itself nor Aristotle's understanding of it requires such a construal.⁸⁹ In contrast, the interpretation recorded by Plutarch, as well as the appearance of *κράτος* ('power') for *γέρας* ('privilege'), may suggest the active reinvention of tradition whereby Solon and his poetry, seemingly less radical than those appropriating him as proto-democratic leader desired, were strained to reveal the seeds of current democratic practice.

And yet, Plutarch's association of this fragment with Solon's adaptation of the courts seems so forced that one might on those grounds alone be reluctant to dismiss his interpretation of the passage completely. Indeed, further investigation muddies the waters. The modifying of *γέρας* with *τόσον* ('so much', 'as much') cannot be used to support translating *έπορεξάμενος* as 'adding' or 'offering'. Judged from Herodotus at least, the quantitative and qualitative adjectives *τόσος* ('so much') and *τοίος* ('of such a kind') are frequent in speeches in which monarchs confer honours and seem there to accompany *γέρας* not in order negatively to imply the sense of limitation or restraint but rather positively in order to express the aptness

⁸⁷ *Ath. Pol.* 11.2–12.1. ⁸⁸ See n. 71. ⁸⁹ Cf. frs. 36, 37.

of the reward they bestow.⁹⁰ How one takes the participle and understands the adjective provide different co-ordinates for locating the middle that Solon claims to have occupied. The extent to which modern commentators accept Aristotle's interpretation, construing the participle to stress the limit of what Solon gave the demos, overlooks the possibility that Solon's 'middle' ground was somehow off-centre, in reality closer to one side than the other; and overlooks the most obvious force of the middle voice in Solon's participle – 'reached out to take for myself' – and the accusation of tyrannical behaviour it implies.

But more important than the question of how γέρας is modified may be the mere fact that Solon presents himself as occupying a position in which it is *he* who gives γέρας to the δῆμος. The ability to formulate such an inversion implies an authority in itself and underscores the paradox of the tyrant. At the same time as one may ask what it means to give the δῆμος γέρας, one may ask what it means to assert that one is actually the person who has done this. Solon can be seen from this perspective to be participating in tyrannical language.⁹¹ Despite the overall veneer of moderation of Solon 5 to which Aristotle responds, one may still want to assess it as radical, or rather as exploiting the radical, in its original early sixth-century context.

V Tyrannical κλέος and the lawgiver

In fragment 32 (Plut. *Sol.* 14.8) Solon vindicates his own political actions in grand heroic language:

εἰ δὲ γῆς (φησιν) ἐφεισάμην
πατρίδος, τυραννίδος δὲ καὶ βίης ἀμειλίχου

⁹⁰ 7.29.2, 3.142.4, cf. 3.140.4. Cf. Achilles' promise to Patroclus in *Il.* 24.595: σοὶ δ' αὖ ἐγὼ καὶ τῶνδ' ἀποδάσσομαι ὅσα ἐπέουκεν ('And to you I will give a share from this ransom so much as is fitting').

⁹¹ Cf. pp. 228–9 above on the counterfactual of *Sol.* 36.20–2 κέντρον δ' ἄλλος ὡς ἐγὼ λαβὼν ... οὐκ ἂν κατέσχε δῆμον ('if someone other than I took up the goad ... he would not have restrained the people') in which the overt attempt to distance Solon from some more excessive (tyrannical) ἄλλος nevertheless seems to place the κέντρον in Solon's hands.

οὐ κατηψάμην μίανας καὶ κατασχύνας κλέος'
οὐδέν αἰδέομαι· πλεόν γάρ ὧδε νικήσειν δοκέω
πάντας ἀνθρώπους.

If I spared the fatherland, and I did not lay hands on tyranny and implacable violence, μίανας καὶ κατασχύνας my fame, I am not ashamed; for I think in this way all the more will I conquer all men.

The hesitation to translate the participles μίανας καὶ κατασχύνας ('befouling and shaming') arises from a question involving the scope of the negative οὐ in line 3. While to some it seems more natural to take the negation with the participles – 'and thereby not befouling and shaming my fame' – other scholars, such as Wilamowitz, have occupied the contrary position.⁹² Often scholars' preconceptions, no doubt fostered by evocations of speeches such as Hector's at *Iliad* 6.441–6, have determined how the grammar is taken – 'could he possibly have said that he befouled his κλέος and was not ashamed?'⁹³ But in truth, the entire fragment is riddled with ambiguity, and given that the grammar is so eminently disputed, one might change tack – at least for a moment – and explore whether the poem itself fosters this ambiguity.

One might begin with some basic questions. Could forgoing the chance to become tyrant be described as μίανας καὶ κατασχύνας κλέος ('befouling and shaming one's fame')? Should one, following Solon's own vehement repudiations of tyranny, read tyranny as antithetical to κλέος? What are the attitudes toward tyranny expressed in the early Greek poets?⁹⁴

According to Hippias, Archilochus provided the earliest references to the word 'tyranny' with the famous renunciation of the tyrant's life in fr. 19.⁹⁵ Despite rejecting tyranny, though, the entire poem in fact implies that tyranny is enviable and

⁹² Wilamowitz (1893) 309, followed by Gentili-Prato (1988) 191. Most Anglo-American commentators and translators take the participles as negated: see, for instance, West (1993) 81. Pellizer (1981) esp. 29–30 nn. 3–4 reviews this question. On the scope of negation see most recently Mayer (2001) 66–7 with bibliography.

⁹³ See, for instance, Linforth (1919) 216–17.

⁹⁴ See also Parker (1998) and Yerly (1992) for recent rehearsals of the archaic evidence.

⁹⁵ *FGrHist* 6 F 6: μεγάλης δ' οὐκ ἔρω τυραννίδος ('I do not desire a great tyranny', line 3).

capable of being listed in the same context as θεῶν ἔργα ('deeds of the gods') even if the speaker himself has no preference for it.⁹⁶ Moreover, Archilochus seems in another fragment to refer to κλέος and tyranny in an erotic context, as if this was an entirely unproblematic connection for his audience.⁹⁷

Alcaeus provides a more secure association. Fragment 70 provides another reaction to tyranny, this time actual and from a somewhat different perspective:

κῆνος δὲ παώθεις Ἀτρεΐδα[ν] . [
δαπτέτω πόλιν ὥς καὶ πεδὰ Μυρσί[λ]φι
θᾶς κ' ἄμμε βόλλητ' Ἄρευσ ἐπιτ. ὕχε . . [
τρόπην· ἐκ δὲ χόλω τῷδε λαθοίμεθ . .]⁹⁸

χαλάσσομεν δὲ τὰς θυμοβόρω λύας
ἐμφύλω τε μάχας, τάν τις Ὀλυμπίων
ἔνωρσε, δᾶμον μὲν εἰς ἀνάταν ἄγων
Φιττάκω<ι> δὲ δίδοις κῦδος ἐπήρ[ατ]ορν.

But let that man, a son-in-law of the family of the Atreidae, consume the city as he did also with Myrsilus, until Ares wishes to turn us to our arms;⁹⁹ and may we forget this anger again.

Let us ease off from soul-consuming stasis and internecine battle, which someone of the Olympians has stirred in us, leading the people (*demos*) into ruin, but granting to Pittacus lovely glory.

In this poem Alcaeus derides Pittacus apparently for his political manoeuvring, whether for his actions directly preceding his assumption of the tyranny or for assuming the tyranny itself.¹⁰⁰ Interestingly, the poem has several verbal similarities

⁹⁶ For the tyrant as enviable see Arch. 23.21, Simon. 584 *PMG*, Hdt. 3.52.4–5, Xen. *Hier.* 1.9 (cf. Pind. *Pyth.* 1.85); and of course Solon 33. See also Parker (1998) 151–2, who, however, fails to appreciate that since fr. 19 is spoken by a character – Charon, the carpenter (Arist. *Rhet.* 1418b23–31) – the full implications of this renunciation remain obscure, and cannot be assumed to be identical with that of the poet's 'I'. For ἐσθλά as commonly referring to tyranny, see Solon 33 (cf. Hdt. 3.53.5 and Pind. *Pyth.* 1.84, cf. 86) and Fränkel (1955) 67–8 n. 3, who ascribes this description to the 'fester Jargon und Schlagwörterchatz' belonging always to 'politische Bewegungen und Gesellschaftsgesinnungen'.

⁹⁷ Fr. 23.19–21. The text is however heavily restored. For discussion see Treu (1979) 177–85.

⁹⁸ αὖ (Lobel), see Voigt (1971) *ad loc.*

⁹⁹ On conjectures of some form of τεύχη ('arms') see Voigt (1971) *ad loc.*

¹⁰⁰ See Page (1955) 235–43. He sees this poem as reflecting a period before Myrsilus' death and Pittacus' appointment as tyrant, but it may well reflect his appointment.

with Solon's poetry, although Alcaeus' reflects an explicit bias absent from Solon.¹⁰¹ Civil war (70.10–11, τὰς θυμοβόρως | ἐμφύλῳ τε μάχῃς, 'heart-consuming strife and internecine battle'; Solon 4.19, στάσιν ἔμφυλον πόλεμόν θ' εὔδοντ', 'stasis among kin and sleeping war'), the consumption of the city by factions (70.6, δαπτέτω πόλιν, 'let him consume the city'; Solon 4.21–2, πολυήρατον ἄστν | τρύχεται, 'the very lovely city is consumed'), destructive χόλος ('anger', 70.8; Solon 4.38 – both in contexts invoking desire for its cessation) and suffering for the δῆμος (70.11 δάμον μὲν εἰς ἀνάταν ἄγων, 'leading the people into ruin'; Solon 4.23, ταῦτα μὲν ἐν δήμῳ στρέφεται κακά, 'These evils redound upon the citizen body').¹⁰² That Alcaeus expresses similar sentiments to Solon regarding the πόλις and δῆμος are best read as an attempt to neutralise the popular leader's political appeal.¹⁰³

For my purposes, however, Alcaeus' use of κῦδος in line 12 is crucial: in calling Pittacus' political activity κῦδος ἐπήρ[ατ]ον ('lovely glory'), Alcaeus shows that tyrannical activity could be conceived of as bringing κῦδος upon its agent.¹⁰⁴ In the last two lines Alcaeus may be seen to challenge the tyrant's platform, creating division between leader and people by asserting that the interests of Pittacus and the δῆμος are at odds (their ruin is his κῦδος). But despite their political hostilities, Alcaeus does not describe Pittacus' activity itself as shameful or base, nor does he say that bad κλέος will redound upon Pittacus; instead he employs the always positive κῦδος, describing it

In either case the politics Alcaeus is attacking are likely to have been the same. For full discussion of this poem see also Rösler (1980) 159–70. On the tyranny of Pittacus see more generally Romer (1982).

¹⁰¹ See lines 1–4 for strong sympotic associations.

¹⁰² The amount of overlap leads one to wonder about closer connections, particularly as Solon explicitly denies divine causality, while Alcaeus blames the present strife on some god.

¹⁰³ Alcaeus' repeated use of the verb δάπτω with the object πόλιν ('consume the city', see fr. 129.23–4) may well suggest the hollowness of a quickly learned catch-phrase.

¹⁰⁴ Note the tremendous heroic flair in τις Ὀλυμπίων ... δίδους κῦδος ('Someone of the Olympians ... granting glory'). Cf. Solon 33.2 ἐσθλὰ θεοῦ διδόντος ('when god grants good things') and *Od.* 1.390. See also 348: Φίττακον ... ἐστάσαντο τύραννον, μέγ' ἐπαίνειντες ἄλλες ('They established Pittacus as tyrant, heaping praise on him all in a throng'); cf. Romer (1982) 32. On κῦδος see Kurke (1991) 204–9, (1993) and Gruber (1963) 73–89.

moreover as ἐπῆρ[ατ]ον, lingering over this luxurious description as the final word of the poem.

Alcaeus' description suggests that even if from an aristocratic point of view becoming a tyrant may be seen as a betrayal of one's φίλοι and perhaps one's class, from that same point of view it is also seen as capable of procuring delightful κῶδος.¹⁰⁵ The presence of heroic language is important for several reasons, but first I will focus on its relationship to the interpretation of Solon 32. Alcaeus' formulation implies that one certainly cannot *a priori* rule out the idea that refusing tyranny was equivalent to befouling one's κλέος, and, together with the evidence from Archilochus, actually provides grounds for thinking that such an equation was possible.

On closer analysis the poem *itself* suggests that the participles should be read this way. When one takes the fragment as a whole one is faced not only with the question of whether to negate the participles, but also with the challenge of determining the force of οὐδὲν αἰδέομαι ('I am not at all ashamed'). Leaving aside the participles for the moment, one can ascribe either an emphatic or defiant force to this phrase, but in each case one finds problems. Most scholars implicitly accept an emphatic reading by negating the participles:

If I spared the fatherland and didn't seize tyranny . . . , [emphatic] I am not at all ashamed [of course not, why should I be?]; for I think that in this way all the more will I conquer all men.

κλέος has not been shamed and therefore Solon feels no αἰδώς ('shame'). But this reading seems to render the explanatory γάρ clause unnecessary: there is nothing to explain. In contrast,

¹⁰⁵ Plutarch (*Sol.* 14.8) records that Solon said πρὸς μὲν τοὺς φίλους . . . καλὸν μὲν εἶναι τὴν τυραννίδα χωρίον, οὐκ ἔχειν δὲ ἀπόβασιν ('to his friends he said tyranny was a fine land, but one that could never be left') but to one Phocus (πρὸς δὲ Φῶκον) he addressed fr. 32. Regardless of its veracity, that the verdict of tyranny as καλόν could be ascribed to Solon is significant; see den Boer (1966) on the possibility that Plutarch's quote represents a fragment of Solon. One would like to know the force of the μέν and δέ: if one knew more about Phocus one might be able to determine whether a distinction between Solon's public and sympotic (that is, private, what is said to φίλοι) positions on tyranny lies behind this story.

ascribing a defiant force to οὐδὲν αἰδέομαι provides γάρ with something to explain:

If I spared the fatherland and didn't seize tyranny . . . [defiant] I am not at all ashamed [and I'll tell you why]; for I think that in this way all the more will I conquer all men [i.e. you think I have lost, but I have really won, big time].

Unfortunately a negation of the participles leaves no grounds for that shame. This problem, however, disappears if the participles are *not* negated, 'befouling and shaming one's κλέος' gives perfect grounds for shame. Moreover, πλέον ('more') in the γάρ clause suggests that there would be νίκη in seizing a tyranny, but that Solon forwent this for what he asserts to be a better, more encompassing victory. The association of νίκη with the seizing of tyranny complements the conception of it as κλέος. But those who negate the participles are right to be confused: not only is not feeling shame for μίανας καὶ κατασχύνας κλέος a travesty of epic norms,¹⁰⁶ but that Solon does end up with positive κλέος seems, regardless of whether one negates, strongly implicit in his νίκη.¹⁰⁷

Whatever the biases of modern commentators, the difficulties of interpretation are ultimately embedded in the fragment itself: not only may the choice to extend the scope of the negative to the participles have been open to audiences, but the larger syntactical construction itself harbours ambiguity. Lines 1–3 forge an iron-clad connection between sparing the fatherland and not seizing tyranny, reinforcing it by the parallelism of the aorist verbs and their clauses, and by a hyperbolic use of language: πατρίδος ('land of one's fathers') used as adjective, appearing moreover in enjambment, and abutting τυραννίδος ('tyranny'), starkly polarises the choice between tyranny and sparing the πατρίς. Judging from the strength of this formulation, it would seem absurd to ask whether Solon's audiences found this connection natural. And yet while forging

¹⁰⁶ As in *Il.* 6.442–6, where shame stands in opposition to the striving for κλέος; see also Eur. *Helen* 845.

¹⁰⁷ See Vox (1983) 310–11, who describes Solon's strategy as '[E]rede e allo stesso tempo contestatore dell'ideologia eroica' who emerges in contrast to Achilles as the Odyssean 'double-winner', a survivor with (a greater) *kleos* intact.

a link between rejecting tyranny and sparing the πατρίς, parataxis in fact effects the weakest of all syntactic links, leaving unanswered whether the rejection of tyranny should be conceived of as related causally, instrumentally, or, concessively to the act of sparing the πατρίς. Parataxis is, however, politically convenient because opinions on this question were likely to have varied.

Such a formulation, moreover, occludes the possibility of other, less favourable, verdicts upon Solon's career: for those who wanted a tyrant it is perhaps clear that Solon did not seize tyranny, but whether the πατρίς was spared is another question, while for others the πατρίς may have been spared, but Solon was unacceptably tyrannical. One might further wonder why he should formulate this claim in the conditional at all.¹⁰⁸

The entire fragment may be riddled with grammatical and contextual ambiguities, but one thing is certain: Solon seems to have achieved what a tyrant achieves anyway, νίκη, only πλεον ('more') – the rewards of seizing a tyranny without having its particular κλέος. πλεον γὰρ ᾧδε δοκεῖ νενικηκέναι πάντας ἀνθρώπους ('For in this way he seems to have conquered all men') – no one remembers him as a tyrant. Solon exploits the language of tyranny while seeming explicitly to reject it. He is, of course, implicated by his use of language; and yet his manner of manipulation suggests that being implicated is precisely a state which he chooses to exploit politically as in fragments 36 and 5.¹⁰⁹

Greater significance may be drawn from Alcaeus' use of κῦδος and Solon's use of γέρας and κλέος (whether shamed or not): heroic, and therefore poetic, language appears central to the conception and formulation of political activity. While this is no doubt a function of the sources being, in fact, poetry, this use of epic language corresponds to other, not exclusively

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Solon's effective ambiguous use of conditional sentences in 36.20–5: they leave unanswered what exactly Solon did, in what role, and who the other interested parties were – simply designated by ἐναντίοισιν and οὔτεροι – and what exactly they wanted, and end forcefully with the contrafactual assertion of the disaster that would have ensued for the city had he not acted as he did. See pp. 245–61.

¹⁰⁹ See n. 91 on Solon 36.20–2.

poetic, elements of archaic aristocratic culture.¹¹⁰ That such language also characterises tyrannical activity captures the defining paradox of archaic tyranny: its simultaneous affinity with, and alienation from, aristocratic culture. The tyrant is both the epitome *and* travesty of aristocratic values:¹¹¹ supreme aristocrat, hero and victor in the struggles of aristocratic factionalism, *and* the subverter of aristocratic values in his distribution to the δῆμος of aristocratic privilege and status (expressed in heroic terms) in order to achieve that end.

This dichotomy is recapitulated in two patterns of appropriating epic language: first, the startling transferral of epic language to the δῆμος – the γέρας effect;¹¹² and second, the equation of the seizing of tyranny with κλέος and κῦδος epitomises the ways in which archaic ἀγαθοί ('élites') conceived of success and power, whether their own – individually or collectively – or that of others within their social group. It is precisely the long tradition of aristocratic appropriation of epic that facilitates the tyrant's two-pronged manipulation of it: the tyrant, seizing not only power but language, can aggrandise both the δῆμος and himself individually; and indeed so can the νομοθέτης ('lawgiver').¹¹³ In this connection, I turn now to the image of Solon the wolf.

¹¹⁰ See Stein-Hölkeskamp (1989) ch. 2 and 104–22.

¹¹¹ Gernet (1981) 289–302, esp. 293, 'In general, the tyrants' methods can be understood in terms of a past in which we recognize the elements that tyranny helped overthrow and the processes it adapted for its own purposes.' On the tyrant and the hero see Catenacci (1996). See also Stein-Hölkeskamp (1989) 139. More generally, though aristocratic sources may sometimes attempt to assert otherwise, the separation of the tyrant from other aristocrats and aristocratic culture was not always great. The Alcmaeonid relationship to Peisistratus demonstrates the continuities between tyrant and leading aristocrats (Hdt. 1.60–1, and see the archonship of Cleisthenes in 525/4, ML 6 = *IG* i³ 1031). Likewise the epinicians for Hieron show him as the acme of aristocratic culture, both participating in it *par excellence*, at the same time as revealing him as above, and therefore outside, its confines; cf. Kurke (1991) chs. 7 and 8.

¹¹² Comparable with Solon's subversion of elegiac martial *paraenesis*: see Ch. 4 and pp. 142–6.

¹¹³ See Solon 31: πρῶτα μὲν εὐχόμεσθα Διὶ Κρονίδῃ βασιλῆϊ | θεσμοῖς τοῖσδε τύχην ἀγαθὴν καὶ κῦδος ὀπάσσαι ('First let us pray to Zeus, son of Cronus, king, to grant good fortune and glory on these laws'). See also McGlew (1993) ch. 3 *passim* (esp. 111).

VI Solon: the lawgiver in wolf's clothing

In fr. 36 Solon makes his great claim to have fulfilled his promises to the δῆμος while protecting the city against the warlike conditions of factionalism, vividly depicting his situation through a striking, if perplexing, simile:

εἰ γὰρ ἤθελον
 ἂ τοῖς ἐναντίοισιν ἦνδανεν τότε,
 αὖτις δ' ἂ τοῖσιν οὔτεροι φρασαίετο,
 πολλῶν ἂν ἀνδρῶν ἥδ' ἐχρηώθη πόλις.
 τῶν οὐνεκ' ἀλκὴν πάντοθεν ποιεόμενος
 ὥς ἐν κυσὶν πολλῇσιν ἐστράφην λύκος.

For if I had been willing to do those things then that were pleasing to one group, and again those things that their opponents would have contrived for them, this city would have been bereft of many men. Because of these circumstances, I composed strength from all sides, and as among many dogs I reared about – a wolf. (22–7)

As in frs. 4, 5, 37.9, the conclusion of this fragment clearly draws on war imagery and the language of its dominant poetic genre, epic, in order to convey the potential devastation of civil war:¹¹⁴ while line 25 echoes the description of the first sack of Troy in *Il.* 5.642, a formulation apparent also in Herodotus (6.83.1), the fragment culminates in an animal simile, highly evocative of Homeric poetry.

Commentators all note the formal link with the Homeric simile, and its particular closeness to a particular group of similes, those describing the beleaguered single wild animal. *Iliad* 12.41–2 constitutes the closest parallel: ὥς δ' ὅτ' ἂν ἐν τε κύνεσσι καὶ ἀνδράσι θηρευτῇσιν | κάπριος ἢ ἐλέων στρέφεται ('as when among dogs and hunting men a wild boar or a lion will rear around').¹¹⁵ And yet despite the obvious similarities with this well-known poetic figure, on closer analysis, the simile's Homeric sheen creates a paradox: from a Homeric

¹¹⁴ See Ch. 4 and Loraux (1984).

¹¹⁵ Campbell (1972) 253, De Martino and Vox (1996) 768, Linforth (1919) 187–8, Rhodes (1981) 178, Anhalt (1993) 126. Cf. *Il.* 17.281–3. See Lonsdale (1990) for a detailed account of hunting similes in the *Iliad*.

perspective Solon's besieged wolf is an impossibility.¹¹⁶ As several have noted, wolves *never* appear in Homeric similes in the singular – they are always collective¹¹⁷ – and therefore wolves never feature in the stock simile of the beleaguered single wild animal, in which lions and boars are the animals of choice.¹¹⁸ Solon's simile therefore raises several questions: why a wolf, what associations is this image meant to evoke? The context of this Homerically un-Homeric simile is also peculiar: the simile appears not in elegiacs but in iambic trimeters, and in a fragment conspicuous for its scarcity of Homeric references.¹¹⁹ The question why such a Homerically charged simile should be used at all comes to the fore.

The use of Homeric, Iliadic, material in a way that defies Homeric usage is often and rightly identified as a key feature of this simile. But in contrast to discussions labelling Solon's usage 'anti-heroic', attributing to it moreover the generic notions of alienation and individuality, both poetic and political, this discussion will situate Solon's 'Homeric simile with a very un-Homeric application'¹²⁰ within a wider archaic pattern of poetic appropriation of epic language. As has been argued, Solon participates in a poetic process similar to that of Tyrtaeus and Callinus, but with an important difference. As Solon subverts the tropes of martial elegy, borrowed from epic, to illustrate the horrors of civil war, and chooses to align himself with the most uncharacteristic of epic heroes, so here his simile provides a dual message, claiming and defying a relationship to the epic tradition, creating a stance which exploits the force of this genre while attempting to remain

¹¹⁶ Cf. Loraux (1984) 207. ¹¹⁷ *Il.* 4.471–2, 11.72–3, 16.156–66, 352–7, 22.263–7.

¹¹⁸ Richter (1978) 984, Detienne and Svenbro (1989) 149, Buxton (1986) 64, Blaise (1995) 33–4. Mainoldi (1984) 101–2: 'le loup participe toujours à des scènes collectives – les loups, par bandes, représentent la masse des armées – tandis que le lion (ou le sanglier) est, en général, le modèle de l'individu héroïque ... le loup et le lion, constituent deux modèles différents de sauvagerie: plus anonyme et collective ... [et] plus individualisée.' When wolves have their most prominent appearance (of the Myrmidons, 16.156–66) explicit emphasis is placed on their collectivity (e.g. ἀγέληδόν, 160).

¹¹⁹ Masaracchia (1958) 355. ¹²⁰ Else (1965) 35.

defiantly distinct. The final position of λύκος ('wolf') implies the force of surprise, and indeed the more expected λέων ('lion') would have scanned.¹²¹

With this distance, certain crucial elements of the epic model are lost. As Mainoldi points out, while the wolf, like the lion, represents 'la force guerrière, le courage dans la lutte, ce qui rend possible son identification avec le soldat homérique, dont il constitue le modèle',¹²² the collectivity and anonymity of the wolf in Homeric similes and 'la totale absence de références à sa noblesse' stand in contrast to the individual heroic lion.¹²³ Mainoldi herself concludes that 'Solon a choisi un animal sauvage, combatif comme le loup ... à la place du lion qui incarnait, lui depuis longtemps, le symbole de l'aristocratie guerrière'.¹²⁴ But although the wolf distances Solon both from a heroic ideal, and also from an aristocratic tradition of appropriating epic, it remains important to note that Solon still draws on epic, therefore generating ambiguity about how to understand this stance:¹²⁵ he creates for himself an unheroic stance that is simultaneously, like his Odysseus-stance discussed in Chapter 5, *exceptionally* heroic.¹²⁶

And yet the sophistication of this simile is not solely expressed, negatively, in the defiance of epic norms. The connotations of the wolf contribute to the ambiguity of Solon's stance: not merely the negation of the aristocratic lion, the wolf is actually characterised by his cunning

¹²¹ Noted also by Mülke (2002) 395.

¹²² Mainoldi (1984) 98, *contra* Anhalt (1993) 129 who would have profited from Mainoldi, as well as from Detienne and Svenbro (1989).

¹²³ Mainoldi (1984) 101. On the lion as fixed portrait of the Homeric king see Pucci (1997) 51 with n. 7.

¹²⁴ Mainoldi (1984) 128. See Arist. *HA* 488b17 for the wolf as γεινναῖος ('noble') and ἐπιβουλος ('treacherous'). Pucci (1997) 51–3 notes the tension of attributing the fierce force of the lion to heroes.

¹²⁵ Else (1965) 117 n. 28 stresses the epic element of the simile, but misses the importance of the wolf: 'Note how crisply the final simile, for all its un-Homeric brevity, brings home Solon's imperiled position and his heroic stance; for in the *Iliad* the lion or boar or wolf that turns and faces the dogs is an analogue of the hero. It is a Homeric image used un-Homerically: now the poet himself is the wolf.' See also Bell (1984) 25, who in likening Pindar's wolf of *Pyth.* 2 to Solon's describes the poet himself as replacing the epic hero as tenor of the simile. Anhalt also makes this point, several times (1993) 115, 120, 125.

¹²⁶ See Rose (1992) 115.

(δόλος).¹²⁷ The appearance of the wolf's pelt as an essential feature of Dolon's garb in *Iliad* 10 (334, 459) as well as the name of Odysseus' grandfather, Autolycus, establish an early connection of the wolf, trickery and cunning intelligence. The description of Autolycus in *Odyssey* 19.394–8 evokes a self-serving cleverness used to prevail in all dealings,¹²⁸ and these features of Autolycus again bring to mind Solon's Odyssean stance. Solon's choice to be a *single* wolf distances his stance from the purely collective associations of the Iliadic simile and associates him with the more cunning and crafty characteristics of this animal.¹²⁹

These associations of the wolf introduce a second level in the explanation of this simile. Linked to the cunning of wolves is 'the political bent' and, more specifically, the tyrannical associations of the wolf reflected in our ancient sources.¹³⁰ Stories involving wolves in political activity abound, such as the Arcadian tradition of Lycaon who founds the first city Lycosura,¹³¹ the story of Athamas, and of Danaus', an outsider's, assumption of the kingship of Argos over Gelanor, based on an omen in which a wolf is witnessed killing a bull.¹³² Moreover, several other stories exist that are more pointed in language and detail for discussing Solon's courtship of tyranny and tyrannical language.

The *locus classicus* for wolves and tyrants is Book 8 of Plato's *Republic* (565d–566a). In describing the transformation of the protector of the people into a tyrant by means of an analogy with the legend of Lycaean Zeus in Arcadia, Plato makes the connection between wolves and tyrants explicit:

¹²⁷ Buxton (1986) 64 *contra* Mainoldi (1984) 97–103, 127. On the wolf as the stealthy fighter see Gernet (1981) 125–39; cf. Vidal-Naquet's analysis (1986) 106–28 of the *ephebeia* and the Spartan *krypteia*.

¹²⁸ Cf also 10.266–71 and comments of Russo (1992) 96 and Rutherford (1992) 184. See Stanford (1954), chs. 2 and 6 and Clay (1997) 68–88 for Odysseus' 'Autolycean' nature. See Rose (1992) 115 and 121, who rightly stresses the uniqueness of the 'positive valuation placed on lying and cheating' in the *Odyssey*. See pp. 285 and 304–6.

¹²⁹ Vox (1983) 305–7 also comments on the darker side of this image.

¹³⁰ Detienne and Svenbro (1989) 155, Blaise (1995) 34. *Contra* Mainoldi (1984) 128 who sees for Solon no 'connotation politique' in the wolf.

¹³¹ Detienne and Svenbro (1989) 155 and 251 n. 39 and Buxton (1986) 67–74.

¹³² Paus. 2.19.3–4. Cf. Buxton (1986) 63.

Ὡς ἄρα ὁ γευσάμενος τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σπλάγχχνου, ἐν ἄλλοις ἄλλων ἱερείων ἐνὸς ἐγκατατετμημένου, ἀνάγκη δὴ τούτῳ λύκῳ γενέσθαι. ἢ οὐκ ἀκήκοας τὸν λόγον; Ἔγωγε. Ἄρ' οὖν οὕτω καὶ ὅς ἂν δήμου προεστώς, λαβὼν σφόδρα πειθόμενον ὄχλον, μὴ ἀπόσχηται ἐμφυλίου αἵματος, ἀλλ' ἀδίκως ἐπαιτιώμενος, οἷα δὴ φιλοῦσιν, εἰς δικαστήρια ἄγων μαιφονῇ, βίον ἀνδρὸς ἀφανίζων, γλώττῃ τε καὶ στόματι ἀνοσίφ γευόμενος φόβου ξυγγενοῦς καὶ ἀνδρηλατῇ καὶ ἀποκτινύνῃ καὶ ὑποσημαίνῃ χρεῶν τε ἀποκοπὰς καὶ γῆς ἀναδασμόν, ἄρα τῷ τοιούτῳ ἀνάγκη δὴ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ εἴμαρται ἢ ἀπολωλέναι ὑπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν ἢ τυραννεῖν καὶ λύκῳ ἐξ ἀνθρώπου γενέσθαι;

'And when a man has tasted human flesh, a single morsel cut up among some or other of the sacrificial offerings, it is inevitable that he will become a wolf. Or have you not heard that story?'

'I certainly have.'

'And isn't it also the case with a leader of the people, who once he's acquired an exceedingly obedient throng, does not refrain from the blood of his own people, but unjustly makes accusations – indeed as is usual for such men – takes a man to court and murders him, causing the man's life to vanish; and tasting with his unholy tongue and mouth the slaughter of kin, he banishes and kills, and insinuates that he will cancel debts and redistribute land? After all this, isn't it inevitable and fated for such a man as this either to be destroyed by his enemies or to rule as tyrant and to transform from a man to a wolf?'¹³³

A product of fifth-century political rhetoric, elite bias, and Plato's own political views, the negative valence here ascribed to tyranny is inconsequential to the relevance of this passage for interpreting Solon's wolf.¹³⁴ The more important task is to determine whether the connection between wolves and tyrants existed in the archaic period or whether it originated later or even with Plato himself.

Although evidence is lacking from the archaic period, there are grounds for attributing an early date to the political connotations of the wolf and for tracing a connection with tyrants pre-dating Plato.¹³⁵ Suggestive is the possible etymology of

¹³³ See also Pl. *Phaedo* 82a: τοὺς δέ γε ἀδικίας τε καὶ τυραννίδας καὶ ἀρπαγὰς προτετιμηκότας εἰς τὰ τῶν λύκων τε καὶ ἱεράκων καὶ ἱκτινῶν γένη ('those who have preferred injustices and tyrannies and theft are assimilated into the races of wolves and hawks and kites').

¹³⁴ See Parker (1998) for the (relatively) late development of negative connotations to tyranny, in which, he argues, Solon and Athens seem to have played a significant role. See also Salmon (1997), and [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 12.3, which attributes the ἀποκοπή χρεῶν ('cancellation of debt') to Solon.

¹³⁵ At the risk of making a circular argument, I suggest that the problematic λυκαίμιας of Alcaeus 130b.10, a clearly political fragment, may belong in this

Lycurgus, lawgiver of the Spartans, as ‘he who wards off the wolf’, given the Spartan tradition of deposing tyrants and their own avoidance of tyranny despite having reportedly experienced those pressures which characterised the rise of tyrants in other cities.¹³⁶

Pindar provides firmer evidence from the early fifth century.¹³⁷ His single mention of the wolf appears in an ode to the tyrant Hieron:

ἀδύνατα δ' ἔπος ἐκβαλεῖν κραταῖον ἐν ἀγαθοῖς
δόλιον ἀστόν· ὁμῶς μὰν σαίνων ποτὶ πάντας ἄ-
ταν πάγχυ διαπλέκει.¹³⁸
οὐ οἱ μετέχω θράσεος. φίλον εἴη φιλεῖν·
ποτὶ δ' ἐχθρὸν ἅτ' ἐχθρὸς ἐὼν λύκοιο
δίκαν ὑποθεύσομαι,
ἄλλ' ἄλλοτε πατέων ὁδοῖς σκολιαῖς,
ἐν πάντα δὲ νόμον εὐθύγλωστος ἀνὴρ προφέρει,
παρὰ τυραϊνίδι, χῶπόταν ὁ λάβρος στρατός,
χῶταν πόλιν οἱ σοφοὶ τηρέωντι.

It is impossible for a deceptive citizen to utter an effective word among good men; but fawning in the same way on all he weaves complete ruin. I do not share this man's boldness. May I be a friend to a friend; but towards an enemy as an enemy I will run him down in the manner (*dike*) of a wolf, at one time or another walking crooked paths. But the straight-speaking man does

discussion. Reading *λυκαιχιμαῖς* based on *P. Oxy.* 3711.32 (Haslam (1986) 123) Lloyd-Jones and Lefkowitz (1987) 9–10 persuasively argue that the image evokes not the lone wolf or hermit but an active fighter. Their conclusion, however, that Alcaeus has fought like a wolf (or in a kind of ‘guerrilla warfare’) does not necessarily follow: *λυκαιχιμαῖς* may instead refer to Alcaeus' conflict with or ambush by a wolf – a tyrant, Pittacus. For other interpretations of this word see Page (1955) 205.

¹³⁶ For the derivation of Lycurgus from *λύκος* and (F)ἔργω see Chantraine (1968) 650 (s.v. *λύκος*), Burkert (1979) 165–6 n. 24 and Nagy (1990) 272. Although the earliest reference to Lycurgus is Herodotus (1.65–6), there must have been at least a sixth-century origin for the figure (cf. Lycurgus, the Athenian, and his politics, Hdt. 1.59). The tradition of Spartans as tyrant-deposers is attested as early as Thucydides (1.18) and Herodotus (5.92a), but may be contemporary with the events belonging to it. See also Arist., *Pol.* 1312b7 and Plut. *Mor.* 859c. For Sparta in the seventh century see Arist. *Pol.* 1306b36 and Paus. 4.18.2–3.

¹³⁷ As does later Aesch. *Ag.* 1258–9. See n. 146.

¹³⁸ ἄταν: Heyne's emendation for the MSS. unmetrical ἄγαν. I prefer ὁμῶς as an emendation of ὁμῶς, a common manuscript confusion; for defence of which see Most (1985) 113–14, and n. 85 (citing Wilomowitz and Schroeder, and providing parallels).

well amid any political system – under a tyranny, or when the impetuous people or when wise men watch over the city. (*Pyth.* 2.81–8)

Two aspects of Pindar's wolf cannot be over-emphasised, that is, how positive the depiction is – the poet in fact uses it of himself¹³⁹ – and how explicitly political the passage in which it occurs is.¹⁴⁰ Pindar's use of the wolf in conjunction with honesty and consistency in friendship seems polemical when considered from the perspective of those *Sprichwörter* in which the wolf characterises the opposite qualities, such as λύκου φιλία ('the friendship of the wolf') and λύκου ῥήματα ('the words of the wolf').¹⁴¹ But polemic is actually contained within the text itself in the marriage of apparent opposites, the generalised εὐθύγλωσσος ἀνὴρ ('straight-talking man') and Pindar πατέων ὁδοῖς σκολιαῖς ('walking crooked roads'). The tensions resolve themselves when one reads the passage as an *apologia* for both the tyrant and his praise poet, being effected by re-appropriating the ambivalent but prevalent image of the tyrant, the wolf, into a positive context.¹⁴² Moreover, the fusion of paradoxical language, the use of an εὐθυ-compound, and the pointedness of the phrase λύκοιο δίκαν ('the manner/dike of

¹³⁹ As Most (1985) 115 notes, this positive equation of the poet with the wolf has upset several commentators. Outraged by Pindar's choice of 'so unpleasant an animal as a wolf', Farnell (1961) 131 comments, 'The whole passage ... remains ... his worst piece of composition in which he seems to lose his head and to show a weakness of brain that he never shows elsewhere.' Miralles and Pòrtulas (1983) 53–60, in my opinion wrongly, see Pindar as drawing on a topos of poet as wolf which they trace back to Archilochus, based on an etymology of Lycambes as meaning 'victim of the wolf'. The name is, however, better construed as imputing wolf-like characteristics to Lycambes – e.g. the one with the 'wolf's gait', Pickard-Cambridge (1927) 15, probably crooked (σκολιόν) or untrustworthy – who (deservedly) receives the abuse of the iambic poet. As praise poet (of the tyrant/wolf), Pindar adopts (and redefines) a wolf-like persona, implicitly reproaching the poet of blame, Archilochus (cf. 55–6) who poured invective on his wolf-like subject, Lycambes.

¹⁴⁰ Not only is there a heavy political emphasis in this antistrophe (Most (1985) 111–18), but the poem itself is programmatically political from the start: Hieron is owed a hymn as a king (14); on tyrants as kings see Pleket (1969) 23, Oost (1972) 24, Parker (1998) 169, Salmon (1997) 62. See also Catenacci (1991) and Vox (1983) 306–7.

¹⁴¹ *Paroem. Gr.* 1.431.77 (cf. [Pl.] *Letters* 3.318e), 186.70. See Richter (1978) 982–3.

¹⁴² See Catenacci (1991) on the tyrannical imagery of this passage; it is significant that tyranny here is aligned more closely to the rule of σοφοί.

a wolf'') recapitulates themes of tyrannical language discussed earlier in this chapter.¹⁴³

The Aesopic corpus is highly relevant to an investigation of the political implications of Solon's wolf and its association with tyranny. Although it is for the most part impossible to establish an archaic date for any particular fable,¹⁴⁴ the persistence of certain attributes of the wolf in these fables at least argues for a consistency of character that may well reach back into the sixth century.¹⁴⁵ Above all one must note that rather than simply figuring in generally moralistic fables, the wolf appears overwhelmingly in ones that are political in content and language. A pattern emerges from the collection of fables: to the wolf belong political aspirations and initiative. These aspirations may be represented in the actions of a single wolf as with his challenge to the kingship of the lion,¹⁴⁶ but most often the political initiative of wolves involves a strong rhetoric of collectivity and unity, usually expressed in terms of equal division or distribution.

This theme is played out in several directions. In one fable the wolves persuade the dogs in highly politicised language that should they unite they could all then share the flock:¹⁴⁷ the wolves argue that they and the dogs are ὅμοιοι and should therefore be like-minded (ὁμοφρονεῖτε); but while wolves enjoy freedom (ἐλευθερίᾳ συζῶμεν), the dogs are in fact slaves (δουλεύοντες);¹⁴⁸ however, if they were persuaded by the

¹⁴³ Bell (1984) 25–6 is right to see all the associations of δίκη operative in this phrase. Hieron provides another connection of the wolf with tyranny: later tradition records that a wolf stealing the writing tablet of the young Hieron indicated that he was destined to rule (Just. 23. 4.9, Richter (1978) 972).

¹⁴⁴ The genre is of course extremely early, as attested by Hesiod and Archilochus. The fact that versions of the fables of these poets appear in the corpus suggests that some others are likely to be of similar antiquity. See Ar. *Av.* 651–3 with the schol. *ad loc.* and West (1983) 106. For a list of fables told in extant Greek literature prior to the Alexandrian age see Perry (1959) 29 n. 42 and see also van Dijk (1997).

¹⁴⁵ It seems less plausible that all wolf fables were uniformly modified by later generations.

¹⁴⁶ 219 Chambry (260 Perry); see also 227 Chambry (347 Perry) for the confrontation of wolf and lion. See also Aesch. *Ag.* 1258–9 (cf. 1024) for Aegisthus as usurper wolf, impostor lion, in contrast to Agamemnon, the lion king.

¹⁴⁷ 216 Chambry (342 Perry).

¹⁴⁸ Cf. *Pyth.* 2.82–5 for the contrast of slavish dog (implicit in σάινων of 82) and independent praise-poet wolf, cf. Carey (1981) 58.

wolves, they would have πάντα κοινὰ εἰς κόρον ἐσθίουτες ('all things in common, eating their fill'). The dogs agree and perish at the hands (paws?) of the wolves and the epimythium makes sententiously clear the political implications of this story: ὅτι οἱ τὰς ἐαυτῶν πατρίδας προδιδόντες μισθοὺς τοιούτους λαμβάνουσι ('Those betraying the countries of their fathers earn such wages as these').¹⁴⁹ The language of slavery and freedom, the claim for all to be κοινὰ ('common'), and the promise that dogs and wolves, if united will get to eat εἰς κόρον ('to their fill') are evocative of elements of tyrannical rhetoric discussed earlier in this chapter. It is interesting that the attribute of collectivity (real or feigned) goes back as early as the Homeric epics.

Again using dogs, another fable further illustrates the political connotations of the wolf's collectivity (Chambry 215). The dogs and wolves are at war. The general of the dogs blames the need to deliberate for his delaying battle. The dogs, he says, are at a disadvantage in this fight against the wolves because whereas the wolves have one γένος ('family'), the χροιά ('coat') of the dogs is not μία καὶ ἴση ('one and equal') and they do not have ὅμοια πάντα ('all things the same'). Here the fable specifies war (the general is called 'Greek'), but its language equally evokes stasis with political catchphrases emphasising homogeneity and collectivity likely to have a basis in the rhetoric of the earliest popular (or populist) leaders; in the absence of reference to humans the dogs would carry an aristocratic valence, with emphasis placed on γένεα, which thwarts their capacity for unified action against a unified enemy.

A third fable tells how the gullible sheep die, persuaded by the wolves to send the dogs away as the alleged cause of their mutual animosity and lack of εἰρήνη.¹⁵⁰ The fable demonstrates the rhetoric of the wolves, their aspirations and self-profiting couched in a language of unity. This use of language is a crucial part of the wolf's depiction in fable: in another fable

¹⁴⁹ For discussion of *epimythia* see Perry (1940).

¹⁵⁰ 217 Chambry (153 Perry). The fable says that having no luck in overcoming the dogs who guarded the sheep, the wolves ἐγνώσαν δεῖν διὰ δόλου τοῦτο πράξαι ('knew it was necessary to accomplish this through guile').

a wolf attempts to eat a lamb εὐλόγως ('with fair speech'), providing numerous grounds in order to justify his action.¹⁵¹ So it is also in the fable of the wolf and horse: a wolf munificently claims upon encountering a horse that εὐρὼν κριθὰς αὐτὸς μὲν οὐκ ἔφαγεν, αὐτῷ δὲ ἐφύλαξεν, ἐπεὶ καὶ ἡδέως αὐτοῦ τὸν ψόφον τῶν ὁδόντων ἀκούει ('having found the barley he himself did not eat it, but guarded it for the horse, since he hears with great pleasure the sound of the horse's teeth').¹⁵² The horse rightly calls his motives into question, saying, εἰ λύκοι κριθῶν τροφῇ χρῆσθαι ἡδύναντο, οὐκ ἂν ποτε τὰ ὦτα τῆς γαστρὸς προέκρινας ('If wolves could eat barley, you would not prefer your ears to your belly'). Such a story has analogies with a typical critique of the tyrant's strategy for securing power:¹⁵³ if his γέρα ('privileges') were truly ῥητά ('established', to use the phrase from Thuc. 1.13 and Diog. Laert. 1.53) – were he not attempting some kind of appropriation for himself, or, in some cases, usurpation, and had he not had to work for and justify his position – he would not have chosen to give γέρας to the δῆμος;¹⁵⁴ nor would he necessarily have chosen a platform of δίκη.¹⁵⁵ Although continually cynical, these representations of the wolf's rhetoric provide insights into the strategies of political, and more specifically demagogic, language.

The most important fable in connection with Solon and with the political implications of the wolf combines the elements of the wolf's political aspirations and of his platform of unity

¹⁵¹ 221 Chambry (155 Perry). For the wolf and language see also the phrase λύκου ῥήματα: ἐπὶ τοῦ καὶ λόγοις καὶ ἔργοις ἀδικοῦντος ('the speeches of wolves: applied to one wishing to be unjust in words and deeds', *Paroemiographi Graeci* 1.431.77) and λέγεται δίκαιον εἶναι καὶ τὸ τοῦ λύκου εἰπεῖν ('the saying goes that it is right for the wolf's case to be made as well', Pl. *Phaedr.* 272c; cf. 'Cleobulina' 2).

¹⁵² 225 Chambry (154 Perry).

¹⁵³ Cf. Deioces (Hdt. 1.96–8); and the theoretically distilled Arist. *Pol.* 1310b2–3; see also 1305a5.

¹⁵⁴ Notice the ambiguities around giving and what is given in this fable.

¹⁵⁵ Cf. Deioces and Herodotus' ungenerous evaluation of his motivations for being just (1.96.2 ὁ Διόκης ἐρασθεὶς τυραννίδος ἐποίησε τοιάδε ... ὁ δὲ δη, οἷα μνώμενος ἀρχήν, ἰθὺς τε καὶ δίκαιος ἦν, 'Deioces having conceived desire for a tyranny acted in the following manner ... and indeed because he courted rulership, he was straight and just').

based on equal division and distribution. The fable is that of the wolf turned lawgiver:

Λύκος τῶν λοιπῶν στρατηγήσας [var. lect. κρατήσας] λύκων νόμους ἔταξε πᾶσιν, ἵνα ὅ τι ἂν ἕκαστος κυνηγήσῃ, πάντα εἰς μέσον ἄξῃ καὶ μερίδα ἴσῃν ἐκάστῳ δώσει, ὅπως μὴ οἱ λοιποὶ ἐνδεεῖς ὄντες ἀλλήλους κατεσθίωσιν. Ὅνος δὲ παρελθὼν τὴν χαίτην σείσας ἔφη· Ἐκ φρενὸς λύκου καλὴ γνώμη· ἀλλὰ πῶς σὺ τὴν χθεσινὴν ἄγραν τῇ κοίτῃ ἐναπέθευ; Ἄγε ταύτην εἰς μέσον ἀπομερίσας. Ὁ δὲ ἐλεγχθεὶς τοὺς νόμους ἀνέλυσεν.

Having become a general over the other wolves, a wolf was laying down laws for all, so that he would put in the middle whatever each took in the hunt and give to each an equal share, so that they would not out of need resort to eating one another. But an ass approached and with a shake of his mane said, 'It is a fine sentiment that comes from a wolf's mind, but how is it that you put yesterday's hunt in your lair? Come put this in the middle and divide it.' But having been challenged the wolf-lawgiver dissolved the laws.¹⁵⁶

Several features of this story are relevant in a political context. First, the emphasis on equal shares, the placing of πάντα εἰς μέσον ('all things into the middle') and the giving of μερίδα ἴσῃν ('equal part') belongs to highly politicised discourse, a discourse that is frequently evoked in connection with wolves.¹⁵⁷ Timotheos of Gaza in his treatise on animals observes that when wolves come together at a kill 'the shares are equal' (εἰς ἴσα).¹⁵⁸ The (fabulous) cooperation of wolves is also widely attested in antiquity.¹⁵⁹ Second, the consumption of one another that the wolf's action is intended to avert belongs to the discourse of stasis and civil discord, used to describe the aristocratic factionalism which gives rise to the tyrant, as well as sometimes being turned against the tyrant himself.¹⁶⁰ Third, it is telling that the critique of the wolf's

¹⁵⁶ 228 Chambry (348 Perry).

¹⁵⁷ For discussion of εἰς μέσον see Detienne (1996) 100–3.

¹⁵⁸ Haupt (1869) 8, lines 27–9 in Buxton (1986) 62. See Detienne and Svenbro (1989) 155 on the isonomic wolf.

¹⁵⁹ Xen. *Hippiarchus* 4.19–20, Ael. *NA* 8.14, 3.6, schol. *Ody.* 14.161, *Anth. Pal.* 9.252. See Buxton (1986) 62 and Detienne and Svenbro (1989) 149.

¹⁶⁰ Thgn. 39–52, Solon 4.22, Alc. 70.7, 129.23–4 (cf. 130B.7), Thgn. 1181. The injunction to abstain from eating human flesh in the Arcadian werewolf myths (Plin. *HN* 8.81 and Paus. 8.2.16) is best taken politically: the difficulty Buxton (1986) 72 has with the idea of an initiation ritual nine years in length disappears if this period is taken to be one of political inactivity (or moderation) for young men, rather than ephebic life in the wilderness.

proposal comes not from other wolves, but from the perspective of another species or group, the donkey: there is no commentary from the wolves themselves either collectively or individually.¹⁶¹ The wolf turned lawgiver remains paradoxically among the other wolves at the same time as asserting a unique position which is above them. The whole logic behind the fable is to pit two images of the wolf, ultimately linked to contrary political perspectives, against one another: his positive collective instinct and his cunning, self-serving nature.

The fable has much in common with Herodotus' account of archaic Samos and the tyranny of Maeandrius (3.142–3).¹⁶² Following the death of Polycrates, Maeandrius wishes to be δικαιότατος, as Herodotus says: he builds an altar to Zeus the Liberator, and renounces the basis of Polycrates' rule. He argues that Polycrates was wrongly master of the people despite being no different from them. He instead will place power εἰς μέσον and only award himself, as is right (δικαιῶς), comparatively moderate rewards (τοσσάδε γέρεα), some money and a hereditary priesthood of Zeus the Liberator since he has conferred freedom on the Samians. A person of standing (ἐν τοῖσι ἀστοῖσι δόκιμος, 3.143.1), one Telesarchus, confronts Maeandrius, who, Herodotus says, realising that he cannot renounce the tyranny lest someone else assume it, proceeds to deceive and imprison his enemies. Maeandrius' excuse is rather feeble, and Herodotus' preface to the story, that Maeandrius wanted to be most just (δικαιοτάτω ἀνδρῶν βουλομένῳ), may reflect the figure's own packaging of his activity, a rhetoric of δίκη, which in this case, however, is challenged. Telesarchus calls his bluff, implicitly pointing out the paradox of offering equality while actually elevating himself; here again is the strategy

¹⁶¹ Is it possible that the gratuitous detail of the donkey's deportment – his mane (τὴν χαίτην σείσας) – suggests that the donkey replaced the horse, aristocratic animal *par excellence*, at an early stage of transmission? The evidence is inconclusive, but the mane is an attribute more appropriate of horses (cf. Ael. *NA* 2.10, 12.16 and Arist. *HA* 498b30), and the horse confronts the wolf elsewhere in the Aesopic corpus (i.e. 225 Chambry). It may simply be that 'horse-like' airs have been attributed to the donkey in this confrontation with the wolf.

¹⁶² On the story of Maeandrius see Detienne (1987) 73–81.

of appropriating power through a claim to be offering some form of (equal) redistribution. It is notable that there is no comment about the overall desire of the people, from whose perspective the logical contradictions of Maeandrius' position were in practical terms presumably unproblematic.¹⁶³ Herodotus' postscript to this story is of possible significance for the link between wolves and tyranny: Maeandrius' brother who next assumes the tyranny is called Lycaretus.¹⁶⁴

The similarity of detail between the fable and the story of Maeandrius is striking and has led scholars such as Detienne, Svenbro and Nagy to connect the image of the wolf as lawgiver with the tyrant.¹⁶⁵ The element of justice implicit in both (the wolf makes laws, Maeandrius wishes to be δικαιοτάτος), the shared claim to place things εἰς μέσον, while yet attempting to maintain something exclusive (extra meat, a priesthood), the renunciation by an exceptional figure (the single long-maned donkey; Telesarchus, a man of standing) in contrast to the inferred silence of the collective, and finally the removal of pretence (the wolf dissolves his laws and Maeandrius becomes tyrant) are together striking. The strategy of Maeandrius and the wolf turned lawgiver, namely to give while keeping, embodies the paradox implicit in the *Spruchwort* λύκος κρέας νέμει ('a wolf apportions the meat'), said ἐπὶ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ διδόναι βουλομένου ('in connection with a person who wishes to be greedy and to give').¹⁶⁶ Given the similarities with

¹⁶³ It is significant that while Telesarchus implicitly points out the paradox of Maeandrius' position, he explicitly attacks Maeandrius' breeding, an aspect which may have irked only an élite section of the community.

¹⁶⁴ Hdt. 3.143.3. Lycaretus appears again 5.27. For the possibility of coining significant names see Hdt. 4.149.1; cf. on significant names more generally Pucci (1997) 54–5 and Sulzberger (1926). For 'wolf' names connected with tyranny compare Lycophron, son of the tyrant Periander, and the tyrannical Lycus of the *Heracles* (e.g. 250–1: μεμνήσεσθε δὲ | δοῦλοι γεγώτες τῆς ἐμῆς τυραννίδος, 'and remember you are slaves of my tyranny'; cf. κέντρον, 'goat', of 949) whose presence is generally held to be an Euripidean innovation (Bond (1981) xxviii, cf. March (1998) s.v. Lycus (2)), though he is said to be descended from Lycus, husband of Dirce, on whom see March (1998) s.v. Lycus (1).

¹⁶⁵ See Detienne and Svenbro (1989) 158 and Nagy (1990) 272 n. 13.

¹⁶⁶ *Paroem. Gr.* 1.431.75. For the discussion of this expression see Detienne and Svenbro (1989) 157–8. See the discussion of γέρας earlier in this chapter (pp. 230–7).

Herodotus' account, a late fifth-century description of an archaic event, a similar range for the date of the fable is highly likely. In the *Theognidea* (677–8) in a passage likely to be of early date, the shared phrase εἰς μέσον appears likewise in a context of equitable distribution: χρήματα δ' ἀρπάζουσι βίη, κόσμος δ' ἀπόλλωλεν, | δασμὸς δ' οὐκέτ' ἴσος γίνεται ἐς τὸ μέσον ('They steal with violence, and order is destroyed and no longer is there an equal division in the middle').

It is of course impossible to secure a close connection between this fable and the story of Maeandrius, let alone Solon, lawgiver as wolf.¹⁶⁷ One may point out the recognisable story pattern that emerges from both the fable and the story of Maeandrius, and go farther by showing the ways in which the career of Solon adheres to this. Equal distribution and exceptional status for the distributor characterise the narratives of wolf, lawgiver and tyrant. It seems impossible to imagine Solon using the image of the wolf had the associations implied in the fable already been securely in place, and yet if one removes the commentary at the end of the fable, the dissolution of the laws, this fable of the wolf as lawgiver becomes a rather fitting commentary on the career of Solon, lawgiver as wolf: Solon is part of the collective (ἡμετέρα δὲ πόλις, 'our city', 4.1) who is, however, exceptional (δήμῳ μὲν γὰρ ἔδωκα, 'For to the demos I gave', 5.1; ἔστην, 'I stood', 5.5; ἐγὼ δέ, 'and I', 36.1). One might even include the apparently active alternative tradition of detractors of Solon to find an analogue to the donkey of the fable.¹⁶⁸ Furthermore, although Solon

¹⁶⁷ And yet, as Detienne and Svenbro (1989) 152 comment, it may be significant that Samos is both Aesop's home (Hdt. 2.134) and the location of this story. Aristotle *Rhet.* 2.20 (1393b8–22; cf. van Dijk (1997) 155–8) records two examples of fables being used in sixth-century political situations (Stesichorus warning the Himerans against Phalaris and Aesop pleading a politician's case in an embezzlement trial in Samos), suggesting at least a tradition of fables applied to archaic political contexts, if not that they were actually so applied. Meuli (1954) follows the lead of our sources in claiming that the origins and applications of fables belong to concrete situations.

¹⁶⁸ See [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 6.2–3 and Phanias of Eresos in *Sol.* 14. Both Plutarch (*Sol.* 15) and the *Ath. Pol.* suggest a polyphony of alternative versions to the eulogising wise-lawgiver tradition. On the plausibility of these accusations and the sources for them see Rhodes (1981) 128–30.

does not dissolve his laws, according to tradition he may be said to have effectively removed himself from their jurisdiction. One can begin to construct a picture in which Solon conforms to the traditional tyrant story, rather than to that of the idealised lawgiver and sage.¹⁶⁹ As the fable of the wolf as lawgiver and traditions of Solon's career draw closer to one another, one might well wonder how pointed the jibe of Plutarch's Aesop is: ἀλλ'οὐδὲ τοῦτο τὸ ποτήριον δημοτικὸν <ἐοικεν> εἶναι· Σόλωνι γὰρ ἔκπαλαι παράκειται μόνῳ ('But this drinking cup does not appear to be shared by the people. For it has sat by Solon alone for a long time').¹⁷⁰ Although belonging to a late author's depiction of Aesop, the comment represents a less enamoured ancient reading of Solon's career, valid in itself, but more so if it derives, as is possible, from a tradition of very early date.¹⁷¹ It certainly provides a fitting epilogue to the fable if Solon is cast as the nomothetic wolf.

That is, so to speak, the dark side, but how do these tyrannical associations work in fr. 36; what does Solon get from them? First and foremost, the tyrannical *connotation* of the wolf allows him to imply that he had been a tyrant (that is, provided what the demos expected from him in giving him autonomous power), but without saying so explicitly; and here one should recall the jarring collocation of δίκη and βίη in the same poem. Moreover, as an image, the wolf with its associations of co-operation and of equality, particularly with respect to distribution, perfectly embodies the claims of fr. 36, namely that Solon's measures were close enough to those of a tyrant.¹⁷² Solon delivered all that a tyrant would have done: he was a wolf.

¹⁶⁹ Recognising the ways in which these stories converge is important for constructing an account of archaic tyranny which can overcome the biases of the fifth century and later. See again Salmon (1997) and Parker (1998). For a comparable situation see the discussion of Solon's colony, pp. 147–51.

¹⁷⁰ *Sept. Sap. Conv.* 155e 17–19. For discussion of the dating of the topos of the symposium of the Seven Sages see West (1983) 126–7.

¹⁷¹ Such readings certainly existed as early as the fourth century: see Demosthenes 19.255, with pp. 137–8; and Ch. 5 n. 86 above.

¹⁷² It is significant that in this poem he never uses the word 'tyrant' (as he does freely elsewhere) and therefore in this context never explicitly says that he was not a tyrant.

And yet, he presents himself not simply as a wolf, but as a wolf in a struggle against hostile dogs: ὥς ἐν κυσὶν πολλῇσιν ἐστράφην λύκος ('as among many dogs I reared about – a wolf') He presents an image of himself focalized through his detractors. Here Solon's use of the Homeric simile takes a final ingenious turn in representing this group. If Solon casts himself as the single wolf in a role normally held in epic simile by the lion (or boar) – despite the ease with which λέων would scan – thereby eschewing the status connotations of that beast and the tenor which he describes, his presentation of his detractors is equally sophisticated. κύνες πολλαί embrace both groups of detractors: the élite are denigrated in the simile to play the role of dogs against the single heroic wild beast;¹⁷³ at the same time the adjective πολλαί widens the group of detractors, at once clearly alluding to widespread criticism, but also conveying in the political connotations of 'many' (an adjective never used in such contexts in Homeric similes) just a hint of the unjustified hostility of some members of the πολλοί who should recognize their interests as having been served by Solon the wolf.¹⁷⁴

In either case, Solon portrays himself as revelling in the label, a manoeuvre directed at those detractors (not least, from the lower orders) who criticize him for not going far enough – 'Look, I am a wolf, the (hunting) dogs prove it.' At the same time, the focalisation allows for the possibility that he is not a wolf, it is merely what élite detractors who think he went too far say about him, a message as much to other sections of the élite as to future audiences: 'Those dogs *would* treat me as a wolf (but of course I never was)' and 'How could I be a wolf when the dogs who attack me are "many"?' It is precisely these many competing claims, desires and perspectives of the clashing

¹⁷³ On the status of dogs in similes: Redfield (1975) 193–5, Lonsdale (1990) 74–83.

¹⁷⁴ On Solon's use of πολλοί see fr. 4.20 and discussion on pp. 107–8. In either case, the use of the feminine, unexpected from the point of view of Homeric simile where the dogs are always male (e.g. 17.725), has its bite: both evoking the epic insult κακαὶ κύνες, particularly stinging for Solon's élite detractors (cf. *Iliad* 13.623 with schol. *ad loc.*), and functioning as invective towards his detractors among the wider demos – 'those of the πολλοί who criticize my measures are πολλαί'. On gender in similes see Lonsdale (1990) 29–30 with *Il.* 4.242–6.

sides that are the overall subject of fr. 36, and provide the immediate context for Solon's image (22–4); and these perspectives are also of course what would have been a threat to Solon's future reception had his poems not been so successful in managing them.

VII Conclusion

Explaining Solon's simile and therefore defining Solon the wolf in Homeric clothing is complex: it creates and maintains certain uneasy polarities: he is and he is not cast in a Homeric fashion; he is and is not a tyrant. Parallel to this is the tyrant, who is and is not an aristocrat, and Odysseus, who is and is not a traditional epic hero. The complex strategy of playing both sides (*ἀλκὴν πάντοθεν ποιούμενος*, 'composing strength from all sides'), of being and not being – a strategy of displacement – resembles the displacement or obfuscation inherent in tyrannical rhetoric, and yet Solon takes this strategy one step further: he so effectively displaces the label of tyrant that tradition unanimously records him as not a tyrant (unlike the fate of Pittacus). Of course in a sense the traditional story of Solon in the middle emerges from the account put forward here by these five studies, but that middle is viewed from an archaic, pre-Aristotelian and Solonian perspective – very much a forced harnessing of oppositions – and in that sense is more realistic, revealing the middle to be a constant articulation of the extremes from which it was derived, and raising questions of what was entailed in occupying such a middle, and what sort of figure one would have to be to come to be offered the opportunity to mediate.¹⁷⁵ At the same time, one begins to realise that tyrants may also have been claiming such a middle ground.

¹⁷⁵ See Loraux (1984) 199–214 for an excellent discussion of the militant aspect of the middle which Solon occupied.

REWRITING (SOME) HISTORY: SOLON AND PEISISTRATUS

I

However persuasive the literary and linguistic analysis of the last chapter may have succeeded in being, a ‘tyrannical’ Solon may still seem shocking from the point of view of the ancient traditions recording his career and the anti-tyrannical stance adopted in his poetry. Shifting the focus from Solon’s poetry, this chapter will survey aspects of these traditions in order to examine what room exists in the traditions about Solon to read his career otherwise. The range of subjects to be covered, each with their notorious difficulties, is too great for full discussion; this chapter will function as a preliminary survey of the directions in which investigation of Solon’s career and its continuities with archaic political culture – particularly as it intersects with tyranny and poetry – may move forward.

Interpretations of Solon’s poetry are invariably informed by the dominant ancient accounts of his life. Since the extant fragments of Solon’s poetry are largely preserved in such accounts, it requires a determined act of will to read against the tradition. And yet the problems inherent in uncritically accepting these narratives are by now obvious. The mutual dependency between the biographical tradition of Solon and the poetry used by these sources to relate the tradition serves to perpetuate a dangerously circular argument: most details about Solon’s life derive from his poetry, and our extant selection of the poetry of Solon depends largely upon these accounts.¹

¹ See van Wees’s discussion (1999) of an analogous problem in connection with Tyrtaeus’ *Eunomia* and the Great Rhetra.

In interpreting Solon's poetry and by extension his career, I have begun instead with what the poems have to offer, particularly Solon 4, a poem not preserved in the context of a historical or biographical narrative. This approach does not ignore the biographical tradition, but rather looks for connections that are not obviously based on the poetry (and thus arguably somewhat more likely to belong to independent oral tradition, or to poetry that fell outside the dominant narratives and therefore was not preserved), and that run contrary to the grain of the overwhelming narrative patterns through which the figure of Solon was remembered.²

One important theme that has emerged from analysis of Solon's poetry has been the discovery of the tensions between his explicit and implicit relationship to tyranny. Despite Solonian rhetoric, continuities between his politics and methods and those of tyrants locate both Solon and the idea of poetic appropriation within an historical context. From this vantage point, this chapter will survey the traditions surrounding Solon and Peisistratus – their relationship to one another – as a basis for demonstrating how their careers may be re-evaluated.

II Lawgiver and tyrant

The careers of Solon and Peisistratus are inexorably linked by our sources for sixth-century Athens. On the one hand, their stories are often fused within continuous historical narratives, in which, with the help of Solon's ostensibly anti-tyrannical poetry, they are depicted as opponents;³ on the other,

² While it is always possible, despite the ancients' fondness for supporting assertions with quotation, that these other details are derived from poetry of Solon which has not survived, it would remain of interest to speculate on why these poems have not reached us.

³ The disputed date of Solon's death demonstrates this well (reported in Plut. *Sol.* 32): two students of Aristotle, Phantias and Heracleides, posit very different dates apparently defined precisely in relation to their proximity to Peisistratus' assumption of the tyranny – for Phantias it was immediately after, for Heracleides some years later; see Rhodes (1981) 224 and Davies (1971) 323–4, who favour Phantias' date.

scholars are often forced to bring Solon and Peisistratus together in response to disparate sources suspiciously ascribing the same actions to both figures. The question then arises, how does one respond to these connections?

It has long been orthodox to emphasise the way in which the reception of historical events and figures has been shaped and influenced by traditional story patterns:⁴ to put it simply, the lives of historical figures – poets, lawgivers and others – underwent a process both of pruning and embellishing in order to comply with the overriding demands of typical narratives. The function of such typical narratives did not remain static: the value of their retelling shifted in emphasis according to the needs of audiences over time. In the case of Solon and Peisistratus, the stories of their careers have been influenced by overarching narrative models such as those of lawgiver, wise man, tyrant, and these traditional narratives themselves have also undergone transformations in the service of the needs of successive generations.⁵

A strategy for getting beyond these narrative transformations so as to assess historical aspects of sixth-century Athens has achieved a kind of orthodoxy of its own. H. A. Shapiro, among others, demonstrates this approach in describing the two common practices in our ancient sources: ‘to attribute to Solon legislation and other innovations for which he was not responsible, and to deny credit to the Peisistratids or refuse to admit that anything good happened under the tyranny’.⁶ That is, one must second-guess the sources, an activity that is the bread and butter of the historian. But taken as more than a guiding principle it runs the risk of creating an account which replicates the same polarities (albeit in reverse) that it presupposes, and implicitly criticises, in the ancient traditions.

⁴ See, for instance, Fairweather (1974), Szegedy-Maszak (1978), Lefkowitz (1981).

⁵ Contrast, for instance, the Solon of fourth-century Athens with that of the Second Sophistic, or consider the changing image of the tyrant.

⁶ Shapiro (1989) 43–4. See also, for instance, Ritoók (1993) 48, 51, Jensen (1980) 139, 147; Taylor (1997) 34–7 surveys the application of this kind of reasoning in relation to campaigns over Salamis.

More specifically, one can level two criticisms against applying so simple a formulation in assessing the careers of Solon and Peisistratus. First, an unexamined inconsistency in modern scholarship permits the undervaluing of a persistent tradition negatively assessing Solon's career and motives. The logic that holds the 'unnatural/artificial' distancing of Solon and Peisistratus to be responsible for omitting, or re-attributing to Solon, positive features of Peisistratus' career is overwhelmingly applied in one direction. This logic, however, could justify another conclusion: attempts to distance these figures would be likely to suppress, or transfer to Peisistratus, negative attributes of Solon, and ought to lead one to suspect Solon when tradition ascribes the same or similar negative activities to both figures. Using Salmon's methodology in assessing tyrant narratives, one could argue that when details contrary to the pattern of good lawgiver or sage are preserved they need to be considered seriously precisely because they do not obviously serve the needs of the dominant narratives, those that successive generations preferred to tell.⁷ The persistence of this inconsistency and its inherent bias must be recognised, particularly as a reminder that, however unavoidable such methodology may be in assessing historical 'events', it should always be clear that choices actually have had to be made in order that the prevailing stories could continue to prevail.⁸

The second critique is more fundamental and provides the basis for the discussion which follows. Despite the forces that attempt to push Solon and Peisistratus apart, our sources record a high degree of overlap in the careers of these figures, most interestingly in the ascription of the same activities to both.⁹ An attempt to determine which figure really was responsible for an act or law overlooks the most obvious feature of such attributions: the implication of similarity. It must be

⁷ Salmon (1997); see also Pleket (1969). ⁸ See Taylor (1997) 42.

⁹ Podlecki (1987) applies the term 'mistaken identity' to these instances, which he rightly argues must be treated with 'total scepticism', and from which he concludes that attempts to ascribe any given event to one or the other figure are inherently flawed. In what follows I entirely agree that separating fact from fiction is hardly possible, but will argue that double attribution may point to other conclusions.

significant that within antiquity various narrators of the stories of Solon and Peisistratus felt they could and did relate a story of continuity and similarity between them. Seen this way, among the appropriate responses to the confusion in the sources, or to the persistence of double attributions, ought to be the recognition that in antiquity the lines between these figures could not be so firmly drawn. Some tellers of their stories reflected and/or manipulated, for a host of reasons, above all political, the careers of Solon and Peisistratus in narratives of similarity.¹⁰ Double attribution may in some cases then be better understood as an ancient ‘reading’ of the continuities between the careers of Solon and Peisistratus. That in certain cases neither ascription predominated to the exclusion of the other suggests an ancient ‘recognition’ of at least the potential, if not also actual, similarity or continuity between the figures that managed to survive despite the separating forces – narrative, political, philosophical – set in train by the interests of successive generations.

III *Déjà vu*

While encouraging a view of ‘total scepticism’ as to their historical value, a substantial body of evidence exists that may suggest that ancient *reception* of these figures, contrary to modern expectations, did not always keep Solon and Peisistratus far apart.¹¹ One might quickly review some of this evidence. On the level of simply connecting these figures, tradition had it that Solon and Peisistratus were actually

¹⁰ The two most obvious biases to my mind are: first, the tyrants’ (particularly the second generation’s) own desires to emphasise continuity with Solon – in which case the traditions are early and the staying power of the assertions is striking, leading to the further questions of how and from whose perspective is it to be assessed whether the continuity was real or constructed; and second, in the case of Salamis, the possible biases of Megarian writers in which too much faith on the part of scholars will generate an (equally questionable) Athenian bias.

¹¹ Although having some points of difference with Martin’s excellent article (1993) on the Seven Sages, I find his overall approach to the historically problematic sources of their lives well formulated and useful to quote here: ‘My preliminary answer is that we will not discover the positivist’s dream of a “historical” occurrence, “wie es eigentlich gewesen ist”, what “really” went on. What we *can* find is the truth of

related: their mothers were cousins.¹² Some sources go so far as to say that they were lovers, a tradition which Aristotle is at pains to deny.¹³ The sensationalism of the testimony may induce doubts about its literal accuracy, but there are no grounds for rejecting it *a priori* as conveying a popular (and possibly archaic) reading of the two political figures as ‘in bed together’, so to speak, at some earlier point in both their careers. Rhodes rightly comments that despite the rejection of this tradition in the *Ath. Pol.*, it persisted to be noted as a possibility both by Plutarch and Aelian.¹⁴ Familial connections, sexual relations, and the persistent repetition of this information, may be read at the most basic level as narrating connection or continuity.¹⁵

Furthermore, various aspects of their careers are conflated in our sources. The Athenian conflict with Megara provides the most striking example. It seems certain from our sources that, like Solon, Peisistratus derived politically useful fame from involvement in a war with Megara, and it is clear from Plutarch and the *Ath. Pol.* that a strong tradition held it to be the same war in which Solon regained Salamis.¹⁶ One of the versions given by Plutarch, which he calls τὰ δημῶδη τῶν λεγομένων (‘the popular account’) elaborately portrays

historical *representations*. We might glimpse the way in which the Greeks themselves thought things happened and pictured to themselves the ideal by which they then judged the real’, 108.

¹² Plut. *Sol.* 1 (quoting Heracleides Ponticus, *fr.* 147 Wehrli; cf. Davies [1971] 322–4), commenting also that all (ἅπαντες ὁμαλῶς) say he was descended from Codrus (cf. Diog. Laert. 3.1), a lineage known elsewhere to be claimed also by Peisistratus (Hdt. 5.65.3, Diog. Laert. 1.53); Diog. Laert. 1.49 (quoting Sosicrates, *FHG* 4.501–3). For Heracleides on Solon and Peisistratus see Gottschalk (1980) 132–3; for Diogenes’ quotations of Sosicrates see Mejer (1978) 45–6.

¹³ *Ath. Pol.* 17.2.

¹⁴ Rhodes (1981) 224. Plut. *Sol.* 1.4–5 (ἐνιοὶ φασιν, ‘some say’), Ael. *VH* 8.16 (λέγεται, ‘it is said’). It should also be noted that for the *Ath. Pol.* those who say this are in the plural (φάσκοντες, ‘those claiming’).

¹⁵ Of course such details may be repeated and/or invented for the sake of their ironic value, to emphasise the extent of separation between their later careers, but it will be seen below that this tradition of connection runs much deeper. Heracleides, at least, seems to follow Aristotle in positively assessing Peisistratus’ career; cf. Gottschalk (1980) 132–3.

¹⁶ Hdt. 1.59, *Ath. Pol.* 14, Plut. *Sol.* 8.3–4. *Ath. Pol.* 17.2 rejects this tradition, but with such vehemence as to imply its strength – if not also its veracity – see below. See Martina (1968) for the evidence, and the detailed discussions of Linforth (1919) Appendix 1, 249–64, and Taylor (1997) 21–47.

Peisistratus and Solon together as colleagues in the incitement and execution of the war with Megara and both, whether together or apart, are credited with cunning strategemata in taking the island.¹⁷ Given the nature of the sources, even a basic account of the Athenian conflict(s) with Megara over Salamis and the degree of historical involvement of either or both of these figures lie well beyond recovery.¹⁸ And yet what does emerge fairly unambiguously from the testimony is an implicit narrative of similarity and overlap in the representations of the careers of Peisistratus and Solon.

The *Ath. Pol.*, however, makes the presence of this narrative of continuity somewhat more explicit. *Ath. Pol.* 17.2 firmly states, διὸ καὶ φανερώς ληροῦσιν οἱ φάσκοντες ἐρώμενον εἶναι Πεισίστρατον Σόλωνος καὶ στρατηγεῖν ἐν τῷ πρὸς Μεγαρέας πολέμῳ περὶ Σαλαμῖνος· οὐ γὰρ ἐνδέχεται ταῖς ἡλικίαις, ἂν τις ἀναλογίζεται τὸν ἐκατέρου βίον καὶ ἐφ' οὗ ἄπεθανεν ἄρχοντας ('On the basis of these facts clearly those who claim Peisistratus to be the beloved of Solon and to have been general in the war over Salamis are talking nonsense. For their respective ages do not allow it if someone were to reckon based on the archonship in which each died'). This passage is significant not only because it indicates at least a fourth-century date for (some part of) the fanciful tradition that Plutarch reports, but more importantly because the vehemence of the rejection of this tradition is not justified by the strength of its argument. As Rhodes notes, the chronological argument involved here is not convincing. He adds, 'More

¹⁷ Plutarch actually gives two accounts which he contrasts as τὰ μὲν οὖν δημῶδη ('popular accounts', 8.4) and ἄλλοι δὲ φασιν ('others say', 9.1). While Peisistratus figures large in the former and not at all in the latter, Plutarch does not make reference to his presence or absence as a point of contrast. For full discussion – admitting aporia – on the elaborate traditions regarding the capture of Salamis by either or both figures see Taylor (1997) 28–34. The degree to which the Atthidographers are responsible for these popular traditions remains uncertain – Cleidemus' *Nostoi* (FGrHist 323 F 15, *apud* Athen. 13 609c–d) was certainly interested in more romantic elements of the lives of Peisistratus and his sons, and given these appeared as late as Book 7 a comparable treatment of Solon is likely – as is the degree to which this shared engagement belongs to what Podlecki (1987) 8–9 calls the 'Novel', the drama regarding the later years of Solon's life in which he opposed Peisistratus. On which see below.

¹⁸ See, for instance, Hopper (1961) 211, Podlecki (1987) 4–5, Taylor (1997) 27.

pertinent would be a comparison of the two men's birth dates: no ancient source gives us these, but on the information we have it seems that Solon was born c. 630–625 and Peisistratus c. 605–600 ... in which case on chronological grounds the story is entirely possible.¹⁹ Furthermore, the wording of this passage does not sit so easily with *Ath. Pol.* 14, which states that Peisistratus was involved in the war against Megara (ἐν τῷ πρὸς Μεγαρέας πολέμῳ), raising the question of what exactly the *Ath. Pol.* is denying, Peisistratus' involvement in the same war with Solon or only his generalship in that war.²⁰ It is important here to recognise the studious bias of the *Ath. Pol.*: in an account which otherwise shares so much with Herodotus 1.59, *Ath. Pol.* 14 omits Peisistratus' achievements in the conflict, namely that he at one point held a generalship and that he seized Nisaia. The language seems selectively vague, rendering it impossible to know whether Peisistratus participated in Solon's war, and obscuring the fact that he did in fact at one time hold a (successful) generalship.

The vehemence of the *Ath. Pol.*'s denial must be read as more than a historian's appeal to the strength of his chronological argument precisely because as such it is not that strong. The fervour is in fact better explained by the strength of the tradition he is opposing. As Plutarch shows, a persistent tradition existed in which the participation of Solon and Peisistratus in the Megarian War was remembered as contemporaneous. Moreover, the underlying message of this tradition

¹⁹ Rhodes (1981) 224, who likewise notes that *Ath. Pol.* 'has not reported all the data available to him ... [and] nowhere gives the date of Solon's death' though he seems to ascribe to Phanias fr. 21 Wehrli *ap. Plut. Sol.* 32.3, one year after Peisistratus' first coup. Taylor (1997) 34–5, esp. n. 39 makes a similar point. See Davies (1971) 323–4, 445.

²⁰ If τῷ πρὸς Μεγαρέας πολέμῳ ('in the war against Megara') in 14 can refer to the entire conflict with Megara over several decades (compare Thuc. 5.26.2 and 6. 17.5 with Dover [1970] *ad loc.*), then there is no problem. One might reconcile the sources by supposing, with Hopper (1961) and Piccirilli (1978), several conflicts with Megara during this period, one for which Solon gained fame (in which Peisistratus may or may not have been involved) and a later one in which Peisistratus distinguished himself, probably as general. Another attractive solution is to challenge the traditional dating of Solon's career: see for example Miller (1969) and Hignett (1952) 318–21. On the various strategies to cope with the intractable 'evidence' see Taylor (1997) 27–47.

seems implicit in the very things which the *Ath. Pol.* chooses to connect as chronologically impossible: that Peisistratus was the *eromenos* of Solon *and* that he was general in the Salamis affair,²¹ attributions that both politically and personally imply a close relationship with Solon.

The traditions surrounding the conflict(s) with Megara provide a demonstration of close connection on two different levels: they both remember what may have been historically impossible, the joint participation of Solon and Peisistratus in this war, and depict their careers as analogous – both Solon and Peisistratus win their popularity and political advantage through successful wars waged against Megara.²² On both levels, the overwhelming message is connection, whether literally or implicitly, through indications of similarity and continuity.

The legal sphere provides further material. The sources record several examples in which the same law is attributed to both Solon and Peisistratus, as seen in Plutarch's *Life of Solon* 31.2.²³ In fact the entire tradition that emphasises Peisistratus' strict adherence to Solon's laws represents an ancient and favourable evaluation of the former's career in light of the latter's (or a willingness to accept the former's self-representation in these terms). What the tradition narrates is precisely connection, passing a verdict of continuity on their

²¹ And in fact Aristotle might have done better to keep them separate since the chronological argument works somewhat better for the generalship.

²² Likewise, tradition remembers or ascribes similar techniques to both. Plutarch's account suggests that Solon and Peisistratus were birds of a feather with respect to the trickery involved in their successful capture of Salamis, and Strabo 9.1.10 comments on the attribution to both figures of the famous interpolation of lines in the *Catalogue of Ships* (καὶ φασιν οἱ μὲν Πεισίστρατον, οἱ δὲ Σόλωνα παρεγγράψαντα ἐν τῷ νεῶν καταλόγῳ . . . , 'And some say that Peisistratus, others that Solon, added lines into the *Catalogue of Ships* . . .'). On the traditions of interpolation see below.

²³ Plutarch attributes the law concerning public support for those maimed in battle to Peisistratus, but says Heracleides attributed it instead first to Solon (apparently with explicit reference to conflicting accounts and detailed refutation). Plutarch also reports that Theophrastus attributed the law περὶ ἀργίας to Peisistratus (cf. *Ath. Pol.* 16.2–4 with Szegedy-Maszk (1981) 76), not Solon (cf. *Sol.* 22, Dem. 57.30–1 and Ch. 6 n. 10); on this law as 'tyrannic' policy see Pleket (1969) 48–9 (cf. 24) who notes its attribution to Pittacus and Periander. It is important to note the polyphony of named sources. See Miller (1969) 73–4. Cf. Podlecki (1987) 5, 7–8.

careers that is all the more striking because of the near unanimity in our sources despite their general élite bias, and despite the expected tendencies to depict tyranny as lawless.²⁴

IV Political performances

The relationship of Solon and Peisistratus to poetry and performance is crucial. Tradition records political ‘performances’ by both. Not only does Solon perform his Salamis exhortation, but his resistance to Peisistratus’ tyranny is dramatically portrayed: a visibly aggrieved old man appearing in the assembly, in some accounts clad in armour, or, according to other versions, laying his armour before his own front door.²⁵ Peisistratus, of course, is most famous for his entrance into Athens with a divinely-clad Phye, and furthermore for his ruse of wounding himself in order to gain a bodyguard.²⁶ From a strictly historical point of view, these anecdotes are of course extremely suspect, but for the purpose of this discussion one can leave that issue to one side.²⁷ It remains of some significance that both figures continued to be represented among later generations as performing in political contexts, and that

²⁴ Hdt. 1.59.6, Thuc. 6.54.6, *Ath. Pol.* 16.5, Plut. *Sol.* 31. For the peacefulness of Peisistratus’ tyranny, see also [Pl.] *Hipparchus* 229b and *Ath. Pol.* 16.7, in which his rule is called the golden age of Cronus; cf. Pleket (1969) 29–30. One might also adduce the tradition of peaceful and happy co-existence of Solon and Peisistratus after the latter’s assumption of the tyranny to show continuity between these political figures, see Aelian, *VH* 8.16. It is quite possible these traditions took shape under the tyranny of the Peisistratids in order to secure the basis of the sons’ legitimacy to rule – or possibly as a critique of their rule through implicit contrast with their father, but in either case that the tradition persisted suggests that later generations were willing to accept this narrative of continuity.

²⁵ Salamis: Dem. 19.251, Diog. Laert. 1.46–8, Plut. *Sol.* 8–10, Polyaeus, *Strat.* 1.20.1–2 (μανίαν ὑποκρίνεται, ‘he put on an act of madness’), Cic. *Off.* 1.30.108 (*versutum et callidum factum*); see also pp. 132–46 and Martina (1968) 122–30. Armour in assembly: Diog. Laert. 1.49–54, Diod. Sic. 9.4, 20. Armour in front of his house: *Ath. Pol.* 14.2, Plut. *Sol.* 30.6–7, Ael. *VH* 8.16. Podlecki (1987) 8–9 is right to treat this material with extreme scepticism, and posits Ephorus and Sosicrates as among possible sources; see Rhodes (1981) 201–3.

²⁶ Athena: Hdt. 1.60.4–5; *Ath. Pol.* 14.3–4. Self-wounding: Hdt. 1.59.4, *Ath. Pol.* 14.1, Plut. *Sol.* 30.1–3, Polyaeus 1.21.3. See Rhodes (1981) 199–203; and see pp. 151–2.

²⁷ That Herodotus records the account of Phye shows how old this particular tradition is. Connor (1987) 42–7 has made a good argument for accepting that this event ‘happened’, and is followed by other scholars (e.g. Chaniotis (1997)).

in some cases they are depicted as performing in a shared drama, such as Peisistratus' self-wounding and Solon's appearance before the assembly and his use of arms.

While it may be argued that these dramatic elements seem to be characteristic of narratives of archaic politics, and therefore the similarities in the depictions of Solon and Peisistratus are indicative of nothing more than this, such an objection can be forcefully countered. Even if one were to view with extreme scepticism the historicity of the accounts preserved in the biographical tradition, ascribing all the details to the typical story patterns which are the common property of these traditions, it must nevertheless be considered significant which story-types gravitate toward which figures.²⁸ Moreover, the sources explicitly establish these attributes as particularly salient for Solon and Peisistratus. One may recall Solon's fabled reproach of the self-wounding Peisistratus recorded in Plutarch: οὐ καλῶς, ὦ παῖ Ἱπποκράτους, ὑποκρίνη τὸν Ὀμηρικὸν Ὀδυσσεά· ταῦτ' ἀ γὰρ ποιεῖς τοὺς πολίτας παρακρούμενος, οἷς ἐκεῖνος τοὺς πολεμίους ἐξηπάτησεν, αἰκισάμενος ἑαυτὸν ('Not nobly, son of Hippocrates, do you play the Homeric Odysseus; for by that same ploy do you mislead your fellow citizens by which he deceived his enemies when he disfigured himself').²⁹ In this anecdote, tradition not only records them both as 'performing', in a loose sense of the word, in political contexts, but contains a powerful recognition scene between two performers, one catching the other in the act. In this respect one might interpret Solon's comment to Peisistratus as indicating that acting in itself is not necessarily the problem: Peisistratus is reproached because he acts the Homeric Odysseus οὐ καλῶς ('not nobly'); there is no absolute shame assigned to the use of acting in politics, but rather (note the explanatory force of γάρ) for

²⁸ Even Martin (1993) 119, who sees the 'performing' of wisdom as a generic feature in the stories of the Seven Sages must also note the superlative – if not also exceptional nature – of Solon's performances.

²⁹ This refers to a scene narrated in Lesches' *Little Iliad* and only obliquely referred to in *Odyssey* 4.244, αὐτὸν μιν πληγῆσιν ἀεικελίησι δαμάσσας ('having marred himself with unseemly blows'). See pp. 151–2 for further discussion of this scene.

doing so in an inappropriate manner. Presumably Solon's *Odysseus* had been performed καλῶς.

The themes of theatricality, feigned behaviour, the spilling over of the poetic into the political, swarm around the figures of Solon and Peisistratus. A seemingly concrete part of the Solon tradition is his famed meeting with Thespis, reported in detail by Plutarch and in an abridged version by Diogenes Laertius. After providing a context for the encounter, Plutarch describes their meeting:

[Solon] ἐθεάτο τὸν Θέσπιν αὐτὸν ὑποκρινόμενον, ὥσπερ ἔθος ἦν τοῖς παλαιοῖς. μετὰ δὲ τὴν θέαν προσαγορεύσας αὐτὸν ἠρώτησεν, εἰ τοσοῦτων ἐναντίον οὐκ αἰσχύνεται τηλικαῦτα ψευδόμενος. φήσαντος τοῦ Θέσπιδος, μὴ δεινὸν εἶναι τὸ μετὰ παιδιᾶς λέγειν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ πράσσειν, σφόδρα τῇ βακτηρίᾳ τὴν γῆν ὁ Σόλων πατάξας ταχὺ μέντοι τὴν παιδιάν ἔφη ταύτην ἐπαινοῦντες οὕτω καὶ τιμῶντες εὐρήσομεν ἐν τοῖς συμβολαίοις.

Solon saw Thespis acting his own parts as was the custom among those of earlier times. After the performance, he addressed Thespis and asked if he was not ashamed to tell so many lies in front of so many people. When Thespis answered that to speak and to do such things in play was not terrible, Solon struck the ground with his staff and said, 'Soon, however, if we praise this play and honour it in this way we will find it in our contracts.'³⁰

In both Plutarch and Diogenes this story is ominously placed before Peisistratus' self-wounding, functioning as both prophetic warning and critique of Peisistratus' tactics.³¹ One

³⁰ Plut. *Sol.* 29.6–7. Naber emends the manuscripts' problematic συμβολαίοις to σπουδαίοις and is followed by Ziegler. For objections see Flacelière ('Il me paraît inutile de corriger συμβολαίοις en σπουδαίοις, comme l'a proposé Naber: Solon craint que l'habitude du mensonge ne corrompe la sincérité des contrats, fondement de l'ordre social') and Else (1957) 37–9.

³¹ Diog. Laert. 1.59–60: καὶ Θέσπιν ἐκώλυσε τραγῳδίας διδάσκειν, ὡς ἀνωφελὴ τὴν ψευδολογίαν. ὅτ' οὖν Πεισίστρατος ἑαυτὸν κατέτρωσεν, ἐκέιθεν ἔφη ταῦτα φῦναι ('And he stopped Thespis from teaching tragedy, on the grounds that lying speech was unhelpful, and when Peisistratus wounded himself Solon said it was from there that his acts arose'). While there is undoubtedly Platonic influence on the story as we have it (see *Rep.* 3 395 and 10 605), it would be unwise to dismiss entirely a pre-Platonic date for this story. The deceptive potential of poetry is already an important theme in archaic poetry and in Solon's poetry itself (29; see also Kolleritch (1968) 4 n.14 and Else (1957) 38–9). Furthermore, although it is difficult to assess the value of this testimony, some mention should be made of here of a tantalising attribution to Solon of a poem addressing the origin of tragedy: τῆς δὲ τραγῳδίας πρῶτον δράμα Ἀρίων ὁ Μηθυμναῖος εἰσήγαγεν, ὥσπερ Σόλων ἐν ταῖς ἐπιγραφομέναις Ἑλεγεῖαις ἐδίδαξε ('Arion the Methymnian, first introduced the drama of tragedy, as Solon taught in his inscribed Elegies', 30a: Io. Diac. Logoth. in

should note the care for detail in the account: Θέσπιν αὐτὸν ὑποκρινόμενον, ὥσπερ ἔθος ἦν τοῖς παλοιοῖς ('Thespiis himself was acting, as was customary among those of earlier times'). This story works best as a preamble for Peisistratus' self-wounding and for the connection of acting with politics because Thespiis himself, like the political actor Peisistratus, performs his own script. While Solon's meeting with Thespiis represents another notorious synchronism of as much, or rather as little, historical value as his stay with Croesus, Periander or Philocyprus,³² it is of great significance for understanding the reception of Solon to note precisely which synchronisms are made and which themes thereby emphasised.

Although as Plutarch narrates these stories Solon is placed in opposition to Peisistratus' 'acting' career, Solon's role must certainly not be seen solely as the sober wise man calling the bluff of his unscrupulous younger opponent. Solon and Peisistratus are drawn closer together by three considerations. First, as discussed above, Solon himself is a performer *par excellence*, thus producing a tension between Solon's moralising role and his own 'acting' career: Polyaeus for instance uses the verb ὑποκρίνεται to describe Solon's feigned madness, and Plutarch describes Solon as rehearsing, μελετήσας ὥστε λέγειν ἀπὸ στόματος ('having practised so that he could deliver it naturally').³³ This aspect of performance certainly accords with traditions of the Seven Sages who, as Richard Martin shows, are characteristically portrayed as performing wisdom usually in political contexts.³⁴

And yet, and this is the second consideration, a feature overlooked by Martin is the recurrence of tyranny as an element in the lives of the Seven Sages: the category of the archaic sage frequently overlaps with that of the archaic tyrant.

Hermog.). Kolleritch (1968) defends this attribution and provides a survey of previous discussions. For my purpose it is at least suggestive that a synchronism of Solon and tragedy was derived directly from poetry attributed to Solon, or that later generations felt the synchronism so strongly that they created the possibility of deriving it from his poetry.

³² Each of these is, of course, not always judged uniformly by scholars in terms of mythic or historical value. On Thespiis and acting in connection with Solon and Peisistratus see Podlecki (1987) 6.

³³ Polyaeus 1.20.1–2. Plut. *Sol.* 8.2. ³⁴ Martin (1993) 113.

Periander and Pittacus are two defining examples, and even Peisistratus was sometimes included in the canon;³⁵ Myson's father was reportedly also a tyrant.³⁶ Solon's poetic rejections of tyranny portray him as having had to resist this conflation.³⁷ The normal assumption that a substantial gulf existed between these categories of archaic figures, tyrant, on the one hand, and sage or lawgiver, on the other, should be put under scrutiny, since it corresponds to the natural distortion that time would effect as the historical persons became increasingly transformed into caricatures or ideal types.

Thirdly, the retort of Demosthenes to Aeschines' emulation of Solon suggests that Solon's performances, like those of Peisistratus, were open to criticism.³⁸ Therefore in terms of analogous reputations for performance, the overlap of the categories of archaic stock figures to which they belong, and the potential for negative appraisal of Solon's theatrical stunts, accounts of their careers actually indicate continuity at the same time as they ostensibly portray Solon and Peisistratus in conflict. The role-playing of Odysseus suggested in Solon's poetry and in the Salamis story provides an important recent

³⁵ Diog. Laert. 1.122.

³⁶ The traditions that postulate two Pittacuses (Diog. Laert. 1.79) and two Perianders (Diog. Laert. 1.99), one the wise man, the other the tyrant, suggest how distressing this overlap could be. For Peisistratus see Diog. Laert. 1.13 and cf. 1.108. For Myson, see Diog. Laert. 1.106. Diodorus (9.11) says of Myson, ὃν ἀντεισηῆσαν εἰς τοὺς ἐπτά σοφοὺς, ἐκκρίναντες τὸν Περικλῆδον τὸν Κορίνθιον διὰ τὸ τύραννον γεγενῆσθαι πικρόν ('those rejecting Periander the Corinthian because he became a harsh tyrant include Myson among the seven sages'). This testimony is interesting on two counts: first, if the mere fact of Periander being tyrant posed a problem, it would be perverse that he should be replaced by another figure with tyrannical connections; and second, Diodorus doesn't say that the problem was that Periander was a tyrant or had become a tyrant and therefore didn't belong on the list, but διὰ τὸ τύραννον γεγενῆσθαι πικρόν ('on account of the tyrant having become harsh'), an important qualification. Cleobulus of Lindos is another tyrant/sage; cf. Berve (1967) 119. On tyrants as sages see Yerly (1992).

³⁷ See Plut. *Sol.* 14 (cf. 15.1), *Ath. Pol.* 6.4, Solon 32–4.

³⁸ Demosth. 19.255: καὶ λογάρια δύστηνα μελετήσας καὶ φωνασκήσας οὐκ οἶε δίκην δώσειν τηλικούτων καὶ τοσούτων ἀδικημάτων, ἂν πιλίδιον λαβὼν ἐπὶ τὴν κεφαλὴν περινοστήσῃ καὶ ἐμοὶ λοιδορή; ('and because you've rehearsed some wretched phrases and trained your voice do you think you won't be punished for all these terrible crimes, if you put a felt cap on your head and walk around and criticise me?', MacDowell's text and translation (2000) 164–5). See also Cic. *Off.* 1.30.108.

and local precedent for Peisistratus' acting and arguably also for his choice of character.

V Appropriating poetry

Further significant double attribution is found if one turns specifically to their relationship to poetry and its political application. Both Solon and Peisistratus have been accused of interpolation: the famous Salamis lines in the *Catalogue of Ships* (2.557–8) have been attributed to both figures.³⁹ Whether Solon's fame in the Salamis affair drew a story of Peisistratean interpolation to him, or, more likely, there were unsuccessful moves (intentional or otherwise) to re-ascribe this cunning act to Peisistratus,⁴⁰ it remains significant that definite and exclusive ascription did not always take place. Moreover, since various sources cite Peisistratus as making his own interpolations,⁴¹ what emerges is not simply an either/or scenario in

³⁹ Strabo 9.1.10. See Leaf (1900) 91–2 and the most recent edition of the *Iliad*, West (1998) *ad* 2.558, and *ad* 2.547–51; for discussion of the subject see most recently Graziosi (2002) 228–32. But Solon is overwhelmingly credited with the interpolation involving Salamis: see Plut. *Sol.* 10.1–5, Diog. Laert. 1.48, Stephan. schol. Arist. *Rhet.* 1375b30, schol. A Dem. 19.255 (478b Dilts) and reference to Solon (without mention of ascription) in the schol. b *Il.* 2.558. Schol. A *Il.* 3.230 mentions this interpolation without ascribing it to a particular source (τινές). For an excellent survey of the traditions of interpolations, particularly in relation to Peisistratus, see Ritoók (1993) esp. 40–1; and see now West (1999).

⁴⁰ Only Strabo (and possibly Deuchidas (Diog. Laert. 1.57)) suggests Peisistratus, and not without citing Solon as an alternative. See Piccirilli (1974) 412. Had the act been from an early date ascribed to Peisistratus, his own well-established fame from conflict with Megara would arguably have countered this overwhelming (re-)ascription to Solon. The *formulation* of Solon's use of Homer as *interpolation*, however, is likely to have been influenced by the Peisistratean tradition; cf. Slings (2000) 57. It may be that actual verses of Solon's *Salamis* played some part in the rise of this tradition, perhaps engaging pointedly with material of the *Catalogue*. At any rate, neglected in discussions of sixth-century conceptualisations of a poetic text and the manipulation of it is the explicit language of Solon 20 where he requests Mimnermus to alter his poem, using the phrases, ἔξελε τοῦτο ('remove this') and μεταποίησον ('recompose', 'change'). On the Megarian sources for the political use of the *Catalogue of Ships*, see Piccirilli (1975) 29–36 (Dieuchidas, *FGrHist* 485 F 6) and 59–63 (Hereas, *FGrHist* 486 F 1); the failings of positing a simple 'Megarian bias' for the sources on Salamis become clear in that these Megarian sources themselves differ on the figure to whom they ascribe interpolation.

⁴¹ Such as the *Doloneia* (schol. T *Il.* 10, Eustath. 785. 41, cf. West (2001) 10–11, 13) and *Od.* 11. 631 (Plut. *Thes.* 20 = Hereas, *FGrHist* 486 F 1).

which philologists and historians may choose to ascribe an act to one figure or the other, but instead evidence of perceived continuity, seen again on two levels, *both* in the double ascription of the same act *and* in the attribution of similar acts to both figures. Expressions such as that appearing in Diogenes Laertius, claiming, μάλλον οὖν Σόλων Ὅμηρον ἐφώτισεν ἢ Πεισίστρατος ('Solon did more than Peisistratus to illuminate Homer'),⁴² suggest that underlying the explicit opposition between these figures is paradoxically the implicit threat that their stories will merge; or rather the action itself of asserting an exclusivity to elements of their careers in fact renders the figures all the more homogeneous. The manipulation of Homer is a crucial example, of great significance for the discussion here because at the basis of such claims is the notion that there are political dimensions to the exploitation of poetry.⁴³

Feigned behaviour in politics, remembered in terms of performance, acting and role-playing, and the assumption of roles belonging to epic poetry, and more specifically that of Odysseus, characterise the stories of both figures.⁴⁴ But it is through the shared tradition of interpolation that the link with poetry becomes more specific: both are portrayed as manipulating Homeric epic for political purposes.⁴⁵ A garbled citation of Dieuchidas in Diogenes Laertius suggests a further tie between these figures and Homer: [Solon] τὰ τε Ὅμηρου ἐξ υποβολῆς γέγραφε ῥαψωδεῖσθαι, οἷον ὅπου ὁ πρῶτος ἔληξεν, ἐκείθεν ἄρχεσθαι τὸν ἐχόμενον ('Solon legislated that public recitations of Homer follow in a sequence, thus the next performer was to begin from where the first one stopped').⁴⁶

⁴² Diog. Laert. 1. 57. See Ch. 8 n. 40. ⁴³ Confirmed by Hdt. 5.67, 5.94, and 7.161.

⁴⁴ See pp. 128–53 for Solon as Odysseus.

⁴⁵ Plut. *Thes.* 20 describes Peisistratus' motive, saying he interpolated χαριζόμενος Ἀθηναίους ('gratifying the Athenians'). For a similar description of Peisistratus, not in connection with interpolation, see Diod. 9.4. See Graziosi (2002) 217–32, who examines succinctly traditions that link Homeric poetry with the politics and political figures of archaic Athens. See also Ritoók (1993).

⁴⁶ Diogenes continues μάλλον οὖν Σόλων Ὅμηρον ἐφώτισεν ἢ Πεισίστρατος. ὥς φησι Διευχίδας ἐν πέμπτῳ Μεγαρικῶν [*FGH Hist* 485 F 6]. ἦν δὲ μάλιστα τὰ ἔπη ταυτί· οἱ δ' ἄρ' Ἀθήνας εἶχον καὶ τὰ ἐξῆς. The text seems lacunose immediately preceding the

Determining the true origin of the Panathenaic Rule is a notoriously difficult problem, but regardless of where one places responsibility – no doubt residing a great deal later – it does remain to be noted that antiquity records a further level of Homeric appropriation shared by Solon and the tyrants who followed him, the orderly recitation of the Homeric poems.⁴⁷ To complete this picture of analogous appropriations of Homer by Solon and Peisistratus, all that is lacking is a source that mentions Peisistratus actually composing poetry. And yet, while not describing composition in a strict sense, the tradition of the Homeric recension depicts Peisistratus as manipulating not just the occasion of performance – reorganisation of the Panathenaia – but the Homeric texts themselves.⁴⁸

By juxtaposing the traditions of the lawgiver Solon and tyrant Peisistratus, a narrative of continuity between these figures emerges that both complements and confirms discoveries found in the language of Solon's own poetry. Leading back as they do to the subject of poetry and poetic appropriation, these continuities, moreover, provide a fitting conclusion to the central themes of this book: the political implications of appropriating poetic traditions and the reflection of contemporary politics in poetry. As both poet and

reference to Dieuchidas, and therefore renders unclear what exactly he attributed to Solon, interpolation, a recension, or both. For discussion of this passage and its importance, see Leaf (1900) xviii, Merkelbach (1952) 27–30, Piccirilli (1975) 29–36, and Jensen (1980) 145–7, Podlecki (1987) 6, Slings (2000) 67–70, Graziosi (2002) 230–2. Dieuchidas is dated to the fourth century BC and is followed by most scholars following Wilamowitz (1884) 240–1 (e.g. Piccirilli (1975) 14–15). For opposition see Davison (1959).

⁴⁷ While many scholars interpret this testimony as prompted by a desire to deny the tyranny any achievements (e.g. Ritoók (1993) 47–8, Jensen (1980) 147), the tradition of the golden age during his tyranny suggests that achievements would not *necessarily* have been denied to Peisistratus or his sons. I do not argue that this testimony be accepted as fact – indeed the Panathenaic rule is likely to belong to the sons of Peisistratus (see the deft discussion of Slings (2000) esp. 67–70 and West (2001) 17–19) – but I do question the simplicity of the arguments used to dismiss it.

⁴⁸ For a short (sceptical) overview of the evidence for the 'Peisistratean recension' see now Slings (2000) 74–6 with bibliography; for a strongly mounted case for the opposing view see Jensen (1980); for a fine and measured discussion of the Peisistratid involvement with all aspects of Homeric performance, from occasion to text, see Ritoók (1993). To complement the tradition of Peisistratean interest in poetry, one might add Solon's own attention to festivals and civic ritual, as discussed by Jacoby (1944), Connor (1987) 47–9, and Parker (1996) 48–9.

politician, Solon provided the perfect figure with which to explore the interaction of poetry and politics. And yet although the *perfect* figure, he does not seem to have been the *only* figure: while Solon is unique in the fortunate survival both of his poetry and of accounts of his career, traditions recording, if not preserving, the poetic efforts of other archaic figures, such as the tyrants Pittacus, Periander, and Cleobulus, suggest a similar synthesis of the spheres of poetry and political action in the archaic period.⁴⁹ One might well ask whether Solon's poetry would have suffered the same fate as that of these other poet-politicians had events not transformed its subsequent sympotic recitation into a possible means of élite disaffection under the tyranny. Leaving such speculation aside, in the context of political figures employing poetry, the tyrannical involvement with Homeric epic of Peisistratus and sons, and earlier of Cleisthenes of Sicyon, suggests a different, but related, kind of synthesis.⁵⁰ A variety of evidence therefore situates Solon and his poetry not just within a particular Athenian context, but within a wider archaic phenomenon of exploiting poetry for political ends. Some reflections on this wider phenomenon will be the subject of the Conclusion.

⁴⁹ See Diog. Laert. 1.78 (Pittacus), 89–91 (Cleobulus and his daughter), 97 (Periander) (and see Stephan. Schol. *ad Arist. Rhet.* 1375b31) and Athen. 632d; cf. Berve (1967) 119. Gentili-Prato (1985) and West (1992) include Pittacus and Periander in their editions of the elegiac poets. Lobo of Argos may well be Diogenes' source for the poetic output of these figures, but this does not undermine the testimony; see now Farinelli (2000).

⁵⁰ For a full discussion of the Peisistratean relationship to the Homeric epics, including redaction, the reorganisation of the Panathenaia, and the Panathenaic Rule see Merkelbach (1952), Jensen (1980), Ritoók (1993), Slings (2000), and West (2001) 17–19. See also Leaf (1900) xviii and Herington (1985) 86. For Cleisthenes of Sicyon see Hdt. 5.67 and p. 288. On the Peisistratids' use of poetic performance in relation to other tyrants see Aloni (1984) 115.

CONCLUSION

I

A careful examination of one tradition of elegy helped to generate conclusions about the relationship of archaic poetry to its contemporary environment. A gentle disengagement from previously imposed narratives combined with close reading led to a greater appreciation of the role of poetry in articulating the political in archaic Greece, and more specifically to a re-evaluation of the poetry and political career of Solon. Several interrelated narratives emerged – narratives about martial exhortation elegy and epic role-playing, about Solon, and about tyrants – all thematically related through their focus on the fluid dynamic existing between political and poetic discourse in the archaic period. Poetic traditions provided Solon and his contemporaries with an important medium for reflecting and even fashioning political and social relations, while, in turn, political concerns influenced poetic composition and its performance. This Conclusion draws together the main themes of this book, and indicates directions in which these new readings may lead.

II

In Part I, a new interpretation of the political content of elegiac *paraenesis* demonstrated how poetic traditions could be harnessed to the needs of particular groups. Best seen as epic role-playing, recitation of elegiac *paraenesis* at the symposium provided a medium through which symposiasts asserted their own elevated position within a social hierarchy modelled on that of the warriors of epic. Political consequences are implicit

in such poetic appropriation. The explicit expressions of civic attachment and obligation to the polis paradoxically functioned to articulate social division and exclusivity when uttered in the private space of the aristocratic symposium.

Analysis of Solon 4 demonstrated the political consequences of poetic appropriations *par excellence*. The structure and thematic material of Solon 4 illustrated how an archaic poet and his favourable audience could together situate themselves within poetic traditions in order to respond to their contemporary political environment. Solon's multiple critique, in both his *Eunomia* and his *Salamis*, of martial elegy and the role-playing characterising this genre confirmed the pretensions and political connotations of elegiac *paraenesis*. At the same time, his adversarial position with respect to martial elegy and epic was met by a positive alignment with Hesiodic and Odyssean traditions. Taken as a whole, the strategy of this poem confirmed the capacity of the archaic poet not only to create his own stance, but to respond dynamically, both competitively and favourably, to his peers and predecessors, at the same time as responding to the manifold uses for which their poetry was being employed.

But Solon was both poet *and* political actor. Using the conclusions drawn from a close reading of Solonian exhortation, Part III focused more closely on the political elements of Solon's poetry. On the one hand, Solon's poetry was shown not only to have been influenced by contemporary political language, especially tyrannical language, but actively to have exploited it. On the other hand, evidence was gathered to show how other competing political actors, particularly tyrants, were also involved in poetic appropriations. Moving beyond the straightforward heroic aspirations of sympotic martial elegy, epic appropriations appear in several other more obviously political contexts. Political actors were shown to engage in public demonstrations of epic role-playing, such as Peisistratus' entrance with 'Athena', the Odyssean Solon of the *Salamis* tradition, and the more general heroic self-fashioning characterising the tyrant. Moreover, not only were various tyrants credited with the composition of poetry, thereby

rendering Solon's political poetry less unique, but the staging of epic at civic festivals represents the culmination of political appropriations of poetry.

III

These civic appropriations of epic provide one direction in which the conclusions of this book may be developed. Similarities between tyrant and Solon confirmed the validity of attempts to read the poetry and career of Solon against the grain of the ancient and scholarly traditions we have inherited, as well as contributing to a fuller understanding of the importance of poetry in archaic political contexts. They provided a closing point for Solon's story and for this book. But as this story ended with Solon, so another might begin with the tyranny of Peisistratus and his sons and their relation to the Homeric poems. A consideration of Peisistratus' career helped to illuminate aspects of the political career of Solon. But the direction might also be reversed. As a local historical antecedent, Solon's poetic strategies, his manipulations of poetic traditions, may have consequences for understanding the political dimensions of the Athenian tyrants' own poetic appropriations. Solon's use of Homeric poetry, and the similarities of the traditions involving Solon and Peisistratus indicate possible trends in sixth-century Athens that eventually culminated in the institution of orderly recitations of the Homeric poems at the Panathenaia.¹ Solon's poetic appropriations may therefore contribute to understanding the nature and role of the poems at this festival.

At the least the following outline should suggest the potential for political significance which the poems had in this

¹ See Herington (1985) 84–7, Ritoók (1993) and Slings (2000) for a realistic assessment of the evidence. Jensen (1980) and Davison (1955 and 1958) provide the most extensive, and opposing, discussions regarding the relationship of the tyrants to Homeric epic and its performance at the Panathenaia. On the political dimension of the epic poems at the Panathenaia more generally see Aloni (1984) for emphasis on the Peisistratid involvement and Haubold (2000) ch. 3 who sees it as belonging to the festival's ritual re-enactment of political formation.

context. Solon's treatment of Iliadic and Odyssean material, particularly his response to martial exhortation elegy, may help to explain the function of the two crucial features of the traditions around the Peisistratean relationship to the Homeric texts: the performance context of the Panathenaia and the ordering of the poems.² Each of the surviving poems will be addressed in turn.

The possible identification of Solon and Peisistratus with Odysseus, coupled with the performance of Homeric poetry in the context of a tyrant-sponsored public festival, invites speculation about the political associations of Odysseus and his epic. It takes little imagination to see the potential utility of the *Odyssey*, a story in which an appealing, cunning, and divinely supported main character exacts retribution for the destructive political aspirations and personal excesses of the ἀγαθοί, as well as reinstating the normal political order destroyed by them.³ Strong oppositions are created: on the one hand, as Whitman notes, the suitors are essentially depicted as young oligarchs, while, on the other, the returning king has resonances with what seems to have been Peisistratus' claim, and was probably similar to that of other tyrants, that his tyranny was a return to an earlier and idealised political order of monarchy for which he also claimed hereditary entitlement.⁴ The fact that our poem subordinates the fantastic tales of

² For the Panathenaic Rule see [Plato] *Hipparchus* 228b and Diog. Laert. 1.57. For recent discussion of the performance of Homer see Taplin (1992) 29 with n. 31. For the importance of the performance of Homer at Athens see Isoc. *Panegyricus* 159, Lycurg. *Leocr.* 102, Plut. *Per.* 13.6, and Plato, *Ion*.

³ For the lack of public assemblies since Odysseus' absence see *Od.* 2.25–34. The *Odyssey*'s Odysseus actually repeats several features characterising the narratives of archaic tyrants identified by McGlew (1993).

⁴ Whitman (1958) 306–8. Diog. Laert. 1.53: οὐτε μόνος Ἑλλήνων τυραννίδι ἐπεθέμην, οὐτε οὐ προσήκόν μοι, γένιους ὄντι τῶν Κοδριδῶν. ἀνέλαβον γὰρ ἐγὼ ἃ ὁμόσαντες Ἀθηναῖοι παρέξειν Κόδρῳ τε καὶ τῷ ἐκείνου γένει ἀφείλοιντο ('Neither am I the only one of the Greeks to embark upon a tyranny, nor is it unfitting for me, being as I am of the race of Codrus. For I took up that which the Athenians having sworn to provide to Codrus and to his race took away'). Rose (1992) 95 comments: 'Particularly noteworthy are the clear preference of the *demos* for monarchy, the rhetorically embellished indictment of the oligarchs' life-style, and the ferocity of the revenge, given the popular support of the avenger, must be viewed as representing more than personal whim.' See also Salmon (1997) and McGlew (1993).

Odysseus' adventures to a larger narrative of his visitation of justice on the hybriatic ἀγαθοί is certainly suggestive.⁵

Moreover, the ambiguities of Odysseus reflect well the ambiguities implicit in and fostered by tyranny: Odysseus is a card-carrying hero, fitting well with the tyrant's essentially aristocratic origins and heroic self-representations, but complexities in his depiction have analogies with the tyrant's political cunning and his link to lower orders. Confirmed by the support of Athena, the character of Odysseus (with his wily grandfather Autolycus) demonstrates the poem's 'positive valuation placed on lying and cheating – so remote from the aristocratic frankness proclaimed by Achilles (*Il.* 9.312–13)', while, at the same time, 'the poet's handling of the beggar-wanderer motif suggests his ambiguous self-distancing from values of the ruling elite'.⁶ Certainly the class perspective of the poem is complicated by the king's return in the disguise of a beggar.⁷ Odysseus' return as the beggar represents the photographic negative of Eumaeus as the noble swineherd, and is evocative of the kind of traditions associated with the tyrant, such as Peisistratus wandering around the countryside, visiting peasants with his true identity not made explicit.⁸ Naturally the

⁵ See Rose (1992) 119 for evocations of the tyrant in the *Odyssey*. See also Appendix II pp. 302–7.

⁶ Rose (1992) 115 and 120. It is highly suggestive that the only entire scene said to be interpolated by Peisistratus is one in which Odysseus figures prominently, the *Doloneia* (schol. T *Il.* 10), and if truly Peisistratean its salient features would have further implications. It represents the insertion of a prominent scene with Odysseus into the *Iliad*, a scene which provides this character with an *aristeia* on his own terms. The appropriate use of trickery is legitimated both by its context in the *Iliad* (so much so that scholars are still distressed by it) and by the presence of another hero with impeccable credentials, Diomedes. While it is always possible that later generations ascribed a book with such 'unseemly' contents to Peisistratus, it must be noted that the scholium doesn't deny Homeric authorship, but rather the inclusion of it within the *Iliad*: φασὶ τὴν ῥαψωδίαν ὑφ' Ὁμήρου ἰδίᾳ τετάχθαι καὶ μὴ εἶναι μέρος τῆς Ἰλιάδος, ὑπὸ δὲ Πεισιστράτου τετάχθαι εἰς τὴν ποιήσιν ('They say this lay was designated (τετάχθαι) by Homer to stand on its own, and not to be part of the *Iliad*, but that it was positioned (τετάχθαι) in the poem by Peisistratus'). See also Eustath. 785. 41 and Gallavotti (1969) 203.

⁷ Rose (1992) 106, cf. 120. As Rose points out, though this motif may be traditional, its 'extraordinarily full development' in the *Odyssey* remains significant. Moreover, the elevation of the swineherd Eumaeus (emphasised through use of apostrophe) complements Odysseus' story.

⁸ *Ath. Pol.* 16.5–7.

poems themselves must ‘work’ as poems. If they were nothing more than context-specific, thinly disguised political manifestos later generations would have long since tired of them, and any panhellenic claims would have been compromised.⁹ Furthermore, as in the case of the reception of Peisistratus’ famous return with ‘Athena’, such shaping of the epic would not be possible without the complicity of its audience. And yet, despite these caveats, ‘shaping’ does seem present, as for instance, in *Od.* 10.225, when Odysseus gratuitously says of one of his men κήδιστος ἐτάρων ἦν κενυότατος τε (‘This one was the dearest of my companions and the most cherished’): that man’s name was Polites (‘citizen’).¹⁰

But what about the *Iliad*? In Chapter 2, I argued that performance of martial exhortation poetry is characterised by the free appropriation of epic-style exhortation in a private context, the symposium, designed to confirm or assert the privileged and deserved position of those reciting it within their community. In Chapter 4, I showed the way Solon 4 turned these pretensions on their head, using the tropes of this genre to undermine its implicit claims. Solon’s handling of Tyrtaean-style martial exhortation indicates at the very least competition over the appropriation of epic material, with his treatment functioning as a ‘corrective’ to his predecessors’. The question then was left open whether Solon in revealing the pretensions of martial elegy’s appropriation of martial epic levelled criticism against epic itself or against a popular ‘mis’-reading or ‘mis’-using of epic.

The interpretation of sympotic martial exhortation elegy in Part I suggests reasons why a tyrant would choose to appropriate entire poems for public use. Performance of the *Iliad* in

⁹ Herington (1985) 83.

¹⁰ For the apparent Athenian and Peisistratean touches to the poems see Murray (1934) ch. 12, esp. 312–14 and S. West (1988) 38 and her note ad *Od.* 3.36. For the most thorough discussion of Peisistratean manipulation see Jensen (1980) chs. 9 and 10. For detailed bibliographical survey of Peisistratean readings of the *Odyssey* and his own contribution see Catenacci (1993); see also S. West (1989) 134, Ritoók (1993) 47, 52–3, and below Appendix II pp. 302–7; and for a wider climate of archaic Athenian political competition reflected in hexameter poetry see Irwin (2005) on the pseudo-Hesiodic *Catalogue of Women*.

its entirety at the Panathenaia provides an analogous corrective to two 'mis'-appropriations of epic, trumping two aspects of current exploitation implicit in martial exhortation: its private performance context, the symposium, and unconstrained manipulation and exploitation of particular aspects of martial epic, such as symposiast singers' identification with its heroic characters through exhortation. Panathenaic performance of the *Iliad* in its entirety implies the widest possible performance context for the poems, in a sense 'distributing' the poem freely to everyone,¹¹ while ensuring that these heroic exhortations are kept within and moderated by a particular narrative context.¹² The *Iliad* shifts the focus of martial epic from an ideological justification of the hierarchical social *status quo*, to a story of stasis and the destructive power of the *χόλος* ('anger') of powerful figures.¹³ The importance of collective survival looms large both in the form of the city and in the form of the impressive, and arguably unexpected, importance of the *λαός* ('people') in the poem.¹⁴ Glorious heroic exhortations cannot be separated from the dire consequences of heroic *χόλος* ('anger') and the contests over *τιμή* ('status') and *γέρας* ('privilege'). Epic exhortation becomes subordinated to the larger narrative of strife between great figures, a narrative which in the context of sixth-century Athens could easily be read as typifying aristocratic stasis.¹⁵ The poem as such would have embraced the largest possible audience in depicting heroes *and* subordinating them to a social context.¹⁶

¹¹ See Goldhill (1991) 173: 'The work performed in the Panathenaia becomes the shared narrative of all Athenians.'

¹² Significantly for the political appropriation of Homer, it is *ordering* the poems – as opposed to the mere acquisition of them – that is marked as distinctively Athenian and used to establish the priority and pre-eminence of Athens' claim to Homeric poetry over that of the Spartans and Lycurgus: see for instance Ael. *VH* 13.14 with Ritoók (1993) 44–50; cf. Graziosi (2002) 220.

¹³ For the potential to read the *Iliad* in this way later, at least, see Pl. *Rep.* 545d.

¹⁴ See Haubold (2000).

¹⁵ In its description of stasis as *χόλος* and its designation of Pittacus as part of the family of the Atreidae, Alcaeus 70 may also suggest this reading of the *Iliad*'s story, in a poem significantly attempting to rob the tyrant of the uniqueness of his position by appropriating its rhetoric. See above pp. 239–41.

¹⁶ Thus the *Iliad* in the Panathenaia would have a function similar to that which Griffith (1995) argues for tragedy in the Dionysia, that of satisfying various sections

The nature of our evidence for the archaic period often requires that attempts to shed light upon it remain conjectural and tentative, and the material presented here is no exception. It is, however, enough if this discussion convinces the reader that the manipulation and appropriation of Homeric poetry in this period had an unquestionable, if continually changing, political dimension. It is clear from Herodotus' testimony about Cleisthenes of Sicyon that Homeric epic, and poetry more generally, placed in particular public contexts of performance, could be felt to have political impact at different times and in different cities. Herodotus tells us that owing to his hostility toward the Argives Cleisthenes both stopped the performance of Homeric poetry and transferred the *tragikoi choroi* from Adrastus to Dionysus (5.67.1–68.1).¹⁷ Significant for the discussion of the Homeric poems at the Panathenaia is the fact, as Herodotus records it, that Cleisthenes' actions presuppose the importance both of the *content* of poetry and of its *occasion* or performance context.

IV

To place such emphasis on individuals, Solon and Peisistratus, as formative in the reception and shaping of the Homeric poems is not to deny the inevitable influences on the poems of larger societal and historical trends, such as, most notably, the 'rise of the city'.¹⁸ Such a dual perspective on the evolution of the poems and their relationship to their contemporary environment is better able to capture the essential dynamic between actors and their times, poets and their contexts. One may *both* surmise that the prominence of the themes of the Homeric poems was the product of a gradual trend – an

of the population who range between experiencing identification with the heroic figures and satisfaction at disastrous consequences from such heroic tempers. For Homer and tragedy see Herington (1985) 213–14.

¹⁷ See Herington (1985) 83–4. Cingano (1985) argues that Cleisthenes may have objected most to the *Thebais*, but even the *Iliad* could be seen to praise Argives too much. Cf. Hdt. 1.2 where his evidence for Argos' past greatness must derive from epic.

¹⁸ As for instance Seaford (1994) argues.

on-going dialogue between the poetry and its politically and socially changing audiences – *and* examine, as I have tried to do, how at any one time these poems may have been used in a particular social context by individuals, actors in the conflicts and events that seem, from a diachronic perspective, to have driven this process. This synchronic perspective on the material yields two favourable outcomes. It provides an important corrective to the strictly philological studies of earlier in the twentieth century, which charted ‘progress’ in linear terms with the *telos* of the classical polis at the end. More importantly, it allows archaic poetry and politics to be regarded not just as a step, both poetic and historical, between Homer and classical Athens, but to occupy centre stage as deserving of analysis in their own terms.

APPENDIX I

WHO WERE TYRTAEUS' *GYMNETES*?

ὕμεις δ', ὧ γυμνήτες, ὑπ' ἀσπίδος ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος
 πτώσσοντες μεγάλοις βάλλετε χερμαδίοις
 δούρασί τε ξεστοῖσιν ἀκοντίζοντες ἐς αὐτούς,
 τοῖσι πανόπλοισιν πλησίον ἱστάμενοι.

You, light-armed men [lit. naked ones], each cowering on different sides under shields, throw huge rocks, and let fly at them your polished spears, taking a position near to the fully armed. (11.35–8)

In chapter 2, these last four lines of Tyrtaeus 11 were used to demonstrate stratification within exhortation elegy and thus challenge traditional narratives that depict elegy as conveying a unified picture of the polis and its citizenry. This demonstration was sufficient for the argument presented there, but, despite the pitfalls of historical reconstructions from poetry, one might still wish to ask who Tyrtaeus' γυμνήτες were and what military function they performed. Traditional approaches debate the owners of the shields behind which the γυμνήτες ('light-armed') cower and whether the instructions in line 38 imply that ψῖλοι ('light-armed troops') in the archaic period were not, as in classical practice, marshalled separately:¹ again the poem is subsumed in a teleological narrative, that of the development of classical phalanx tactics. Unquestioned is the assumption that it is valid to call these γυμνήτες 'ψῖλοι' at all and to think of them in terms appropriate to classical warfare. Since this is the earliest appearance of the word by over a century, it is impossible to determine whether the γυμνής already denotes the ψῖλος, as either a technical term or an insult, or whether it in fact designates

¹ Lorimer (1947) 127–8, where such an assumption does, however, cause her to wonder at a striking omission of other classes of ψῖλοι in this poem.

some other kind of fighter. Examined within its own context the certainty with which this label is understood begins to erode, leaving behind, if not with conclusive results, what is certainly true about this passage, that it is an ideologically driven representation of the participants of war. To begin this examination, I first challenge the grounds upon which the γυμνήτες are understood as ψῖλοι.

First, while the poem would certainly be describing the γυμνήτες as light-armed troops, ψῖλοι, albeit derogatorily, were they standing behind the fully-armed soldiers without shields of their own, even scholars who call them ψῖλοι generally agree that the shield is their own, and this seems most probable as it dispels the tension between the adverbs in the description of where the γυμνήτες with shields are found and where they should instead be: ‘cowering here and there (ἄλλοθεν ἄλλος) under shields’, instead of ‘standing near (πλησίον) the πάνοπλοι (‘fully-armed’)’.

Second, appropriate comparisons must be made: from the perspective of poetic representations of warfare the activities that these γυμνήτες perform are not confined to those of the ψῖλοι. The poet instructs them to cast stones and hurl spears. The things they are doing would, admittedly, if recorded in prose, suggest ψῖλοι. But they have a good epic pedigree, performed by characters in the *Iliad* who are not light-armed troops. The verb ἀκοντίζω (‘hurl’) is very common for *promachoi*, and real heroes do throw χερμάδια (‘rocks’).² In Homeric poetry the activities described in lines 36–7 would not in themselves belong to a different group or suggest inferiority. Indeed, one Iliadic description of Agamemnon does not separate these categories of fighting: ἔγχει τ’ ἄορί τε μέγалоισί τε χερμαδίοισιν (‘with spear, and sword, and large rocks’, 11.265). Outside epic, Archilochus shows how conjoined these activities can be when he states that there will be no fighting with slings and bows

² χερμάδια: 4.518, 5.302, 582, 11.265, 12.154, 14.410, etc. Agamemnon, Diomedes and Ajax all count among the stone-throwers. See Prato (1968) 115. For another appearance of χερμάδια in Tyrtaeus see 19.19.

(i.e. long-distance warfare performed by the light-armed), but close fighting with the δεσπότες Εὐβοίης δουρικλυτοί ('spear-famed masters of Euboea') who will use swords, thus associating the δόρυ implicit in their fame with close fighting involving swords.³

Third, the choice of πτώσσω ('cower') requires further comment. As discussed above, instead of the expected epic and elegiac εἴλω ('crouch', 'pull oneself in tightly'), a verb with derogatory connotations appears. The unusual (in Homeric terms) coupling of this prepositional phrase with this verb suggests that the shield is a part of the criticism, an element integral to the insult. That this derogatory address incorporates the one element seen to be the defining feature of the contemporary transition in military tactics – the shield – may be significant. Scholars acknowledge that one result of adopting the heavy hoplite shield may have been that heavy body-armour became less essential. Robin Osborne, for instance, comments, 'It may be important to note that, if used with close-packed ranks, the hoplite shield is the *only* piece of armour which a hoplite has to have: hoplites could be anything but uniform behind their hoplite shields.'⁴ The great varieties in the armour behind this shield would inevitably be an index of status among hoplites. A question would then arise whether Tyrtaeus could be reflecting tensions within a single class of fighters. Given that the types of fighting Tyrtaeus exhorts the γυμνήτες to perform are, neither in epic nor elegiac terms, nor iconographically, exclusive to the light-armed, there is nothing in the poem to exclude the possibility that γυμνήτες carry

³ That hoplites are frequently depicted as carrying two spears on seventh-century vases demonstrates that the same hoplites both hurled spears and engaged in close combat with them. See van Wees (2000) 147–9 and 160–1 n. 37 for iconographic references. Lorimer (1947) 121 finds significance in Tyrtaeus giving the main addressees of the poem ἔγχεα ('spears'), but there seems to be no consistent distinction between the different terms for spears in the extant poetry of Tyrtaeus. δόρυ is in fact used of the main addressees immediately preceding this passage in line 34. On the various terms for spear in Tyrtaeus see Cartledge (1977) 14–15. On a similar lack of significant differentiation between these terms in Homer, see *LfrgrE* s.v. δόρυ B2 (11.337). On the fighting of Archilochus 3 see Renehan (1983) 1–2.

⁴ Osborne (1996) 176. See Hanson (1989) 58–60 and most recently van Wees (2000) 132.

something like a hoplite shield, and therefore something closer to, if not identical with, what the πάνοπλοι carry.

Such an interpretation can be easily reconciled with Tyrtaeus' lines. The implication of depicting diversity in the arms and armour of the fighters is that it allows the main audience of the poem, those with the full kit, the πανοπλία, to represent themselves among their sympotic cohorts as magnificent in their appearance, while representing the γυμνήτες as cowering behind their (hoplite) shields as a result of their being, it is implied, totally dependent upon their shields (and therefore also dependent on the πάνοπλοι). Although Tyrtaeus contrasts the πάνοπλοι standing their ground with the present behaviour of the γυμνήτες, this contrast need not imply different military functions, but rather a difference in their execution of the same one. According to this view, then, the combination of a derogatory term such as πτώσσουντες with the shield would suggest an aristocratic bias against the larger group with whom they (now) must fight in close proximity. The agenda is to forge a link between those of a certain elevated economic status and the ideal of martial ἀρετή.⁵

At issue are ideological representations. The juxtaposition of the terms πάνοπλοι vs. γυμνήτες creates a gulf between the two groups, exaggerating the appearance of one at the expense of the other.⁶ But the extent of this exaggeration leads us to

⁵ And to this extent the aim of this passage would bear affinities with Sarpedon's famous address to Glaucus in *Il.* 12.310–28.

⁶ Fifth- and fourth-century instances of πάνοπλος and πανοπλία refer overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, to elevated circumstances – the dressing-up of Phye in πανοπλία, dedications at sanctuaries, awards to the best fighters, or in comedy where there is an incongruity between character and garb (Thuc. 3.114.1, Hdt. 1.60.19; 4.180.12; Ar. *Av.* 434, 830; *Pl.* 951; *Pl. Leg.* 796c1, *Men.* 249a7; Isocr. *De Big.* 29.9). The frequency of 'panoply' in English translations of *hopla* obscures the exceptionality of πανοπλία. πάνοπλος is likewise used sparingly, mainly in tragic contexts (Aesch. *Th.* 59, Eur. *Ph.* 149, cf. 671, 779, *Rh.* 22, *Helen* 1316) where, needless to say, the scale of the action is superlative and the characters heroic; see Mastronarde (1994) 371. This is not to argue that the usage from the classical period represents that of the archaic, but that those who choose a classical definition for γυμνήτες must also take on board the superlative nature in classical times of the oppositional term used by Tyrtaeus; other evidence does, however, suggest that πάνοπλος was superlative even in the archaic period: Sappho 16.19 uses it of the splendid Lydian ranks.

question how great the gap between the function of these fighters in battle actually was.⁷ Need these groups represent entirely different kinds of fighters, or is it merely a hierarchical representation based not on function *per se* but on an alleged difference in capacity to perform that function, a forced division in order to champion the pre-eminence of one, therefore justifying claims to élite status on the basis of military performance?⁸

The problems of using poetry as history, particularly in this period, render it impossible to answer this question with certainty. The difficulty of assuming a classical definition for ψῖλοι introduces the possibility that rather than the favourable product of the developments in phalanx warfare, Tyrtaeus' text may be better seen as originally the product of tensions in that development, tensions which are ultimately grounded in distinctions of class and status.⁹ In identifying a strong aristocratic bias in exhortation elegy this position

⁷ Van Wees has demonstrated the ideology underpinning evaluations of the decisive arm in battle in both the *Iliad* and classical texts: see (1988) 1–24 and (1995a) 153–78.

⁸ On this interpretation, γυμνήτες would then be a term originally pejorative in origin, which later became a technical term for a functionally different group as hoplite armour and warfare attained a greater degree of uniformity.

⁹ On the tensions between classes in the hoplite ranks, see Cartledge (1977) 22–4. This tension may also be apparent within the hoplite ideology of the *Iliad*: the obscure Homeric *hapax* ὑπεροπλία in *Il.* 1.205 may provide, in sharp contrast with Tyrtaeus, a negative appraisal of the confidence inspired by possession of the πανοπλία, or the wealth that makes such possession possible. In response to Athena, Achilles prophesies that Agamemnon's outrage (ὕβρις, 203) will be his destruction: ἥς ὑπεροπλίῃσι τάχ' ἄν ποτε θυμὸν ὀλέσση ('one day soon he may lose his life because of his *hyperoplia*'). The word ὑπεροπλία obviously connotes arrogance (an apparent derivation from the better attested ὑπεροπλον), and apparently a boldness that is dependent upon one's ὄπλα (and therefore for Eustathius κακία ('cowardice', *ad Il.* 1.205); see also *Etym. Magn.* s.v. ὑπεροπλία; Chantraine (1968) and Frisk (1970) s.v. ὑπεροπλος), if not upon an excess of them – the possible force of ὑπέρ. In the context where Agamemnon has relied on his greater resources (186) to commit outrage against a hero of – even he must concede – greater natural capacities (178), the word may epitomise the disdain for a bravado dependent on arms and implicit wealth as attributes external to one's natural capacities. For this contrast between the Aeacidae and Atreidae see [Hesiod] fr. 203, and Irwin (2005). For the early link between material resources and hybris, see for instance Solon 6 and the discussion in Ch. 7. For further evidence of contemporary contestation in evaluating the link between armour and martial capacity see also the contrasting μέν and δέ in the depiction of Locrian Ajax (2.529–30).

challenges the prevailing views of this poetry, showing instead how exhortation elegy may have arisen or gained popularity as a means of defining the 'true' warriors of heroic stature in the exclusive environment of the aristocratic symposium.

ΛΥΚΑΒΑΝΤΟΣ: WHEN THE WOLF COMES?*

At *Odyssey* 14.158–64 and 19.303–7, the disguised Odysseus swears oaths, amounting to prophecy, to Eumaeus and to Penelope, respectively, that Odysseus' return is imminent. To Eumaeus he swears:

ἴστω νῦν Ζεὺς πρῶτα θεῶν ξενίη τε τράπεζα,
 ἰστίη τ' Ὀδυσῆος ἀμύμονος, ἣν ἀφικάνω·
 ἦ μὲν τοι τάδε πάντα τελείεται ὡς ἀγορεύω.
 τοῦδ' αὐτοῦ λυκάβαντος ἐλεύσεται ἐνθάδ' Ὀδυσσεύς,
 τοῦ μὲν φθίνοντος μηνός, τοῦ δ' ἰσταμένοιο.
 οἴκαδε νοστήσει, καὶ τίσεται ὅς τις ἐκείνου
 ἐνθάδ' ἀτιμάζει ἄλοχον καὶ φαίδιμον υἱόν.

Now let Zeus be my witness, before any god, and this table of guestfriendship and the hearth of blameless Odysseus at which I have arrived. Truly indeed will all these things come to pass as I say. τοῦδ' αὐτοῦ λυκάβαντος Odysseus will come here, when one moon wanes and the next rises. He will come home, and he will exact retribution from whoever here is dishonouring his wife and splendid son.

The oath to Penelope is almost identical, though shorter and with a different first line:¹

ἴστω νῦν Ζεὺς πρῶτα θεῶν ὕπατος καὶ ἄριστος,
 ἰστίη τ' Ὀδυσῆος ἀμύμονος, ἣν ἀφικάνω·
 ἦ μὲν τοι τάδε πάντα τελείεται ὡς ἀγορεύω.
 τοῦδ' αὐτοῦ λυκάβαντος ἐλεύσεται ἐνθάδ' Ὀδυσσεύς,
 τοῦ μὲν φθίνοντος μηνός, τοῦ δ' ἰσταμένοιο.

Now let Zeus first be my witness, loftiest and best among the gods, and the hearth of blameless Odysseus at which I have arrived. Truly indeed will all

* I am grateful to Alan Griffiths for suggesting that an examination of this term might be fruitful.

¹ As early as the ancient commentators, the lines were believed to have belonged originally to Book 19, which if true suggests a desire to import the urgency of a later book to this scene.

these things come to pass as I say. τοῦδ' αὐτοῦ λυκάβαντος Odysseus will come here, when one moon wanes and the next rises.

These passages are famous for the controversy surrounding the meaning of the critical phrase τοῦδ' αὐτοῦ λυκάβαντος: λυκάβας is a term otherwise unattested in Homer and one that does not resurface until some few centuries later, glossed by the less enigmatic term, 'year'. In what follows, I explore the possibility that the discussions of tyrannical language in Chapter 7 might contribute to elucidating the meaning of this much debated term, presenting an explanation of the term in context that focuses on the overall emphasis in these passages on retribution, the potential of the term to be etymologised from wolf, and the possibility that this couplet represents yet another of the Athenian touches visible in our *Odyssey*. Each of these aspects, I argue, gestures towards archaic tyranny, and particularly the instantiation of it that occurred in Athens and supported the occasion upon which the *Odyssey* was performed.

Given that debates about etymology and origins persist and probably will continue to do so, it is fortunate that such questions are not necessary for interpretation in context.² More relevant – or at least attainable – than actual origins would be the possible reception of the term in its Odyssean context, the etymologies generated at reception activated by the poem's choice to use this term. None of the arguments proposed for the 'true' etymology are fully convincing:³ the origins of λυκάβας are alternatively proposed as pre-Greek – quite possibly related to the prehellenic name of the Attic mountain Λυκαβηττός – or even Semitic.⁴ The first half of the word has been alternatively derived from 'light' or 'wolf', and the second

² Maas (1926) 260.

³ As noted by Russo et al. (1992) 91; one need only compare the entries of the two volumes of the new Oxford commentaries, Russo et al. (1992) 91–2 and Heubeck and Hoekstra (1989) 204. See also Frisk (1970) s.v. 'Etymologisch ganz dunkel' and *LfrGrE* s.v. λυκάβας, 'unklar'.

⁴ Prehellenic origin (most probable): with survival in Arcadian, Ruijgh (1957) 147, (1979) 559–60; 'wahrsch. vorgr.', *LfrGrE* s.v. λυκάβας; connected to the Attic mountain Λυκαβηττός and Apollo Lukeios, most thoroughly argued by van Windekens (1954) 31–2 and see Leumann (1950) 212 n. 4; cf. Hoekstra (1989) 204. Semitic origin: Szemerényi (1974) 151.

from βαίνω ('to walk') so rendering the phrase 'when the wolf walks'⁵ or 'when the light goes'.⁶

Most commentators opt for a connection with light and have variously taken the word to refer to a specific period of time, whether 'year',⁷ 'month',⁸ or 'day';⁹ but once one abandons as unsatisfactory the scholiasts' understanding of the term as 'year' and its use in later Greek as such, one must also admit that the proposed alternatives are little more than guesses.¹⁰ As Szemerényi comments – perhaps a bit too confidently – 'λικάβας can hardly mean a "year", nor a "day", or a "month", as has been alternatively suggested, not at least in the normal Greek sense since there are good IE words for these; rather is it some period of time of unknown length but surely not a long period.'¹¹ As far as temporal expressions go, Szemerényi is right to note that λικάβας is less than clear – as evident from ancient and modern reception – it is, however, to

⁵ Maas (1926) 259–70; while the etymology is problematic, it may still hold some weight at the level of folk associations. His interpretation of the wolf-phrase as denoting winter is contradicted by the text's suggestions of the onset of spring: see Austin (1975) 246–52, Lee (1962) 171, Russo et al. (1992) 92. See below for the associations with Apollo Lukeios.

⁶ Koller (1973) 29–34, Leumann (1950) 212 n. 4, opposed by Szemerényi (1974) 151 n. 42. The second part has alternatively been associated with circle or wheel – whether from ἀβά glossed by Hesychius as πρόχος (Fick (1894) 240 and Boisacq (1950) s.v. λικάβας) or from a semitic root *nqpt* (Szemerényi (1974) 151) – rendering 'circle/wheel of light', a phrase then stretched to an interval of time – 'year' – but one that introduces the question of the source of the light, moon or sun; see Stengel (1883) 304.

⁷ Following later usage and the scholiasts, but these may all go back to Homer: see Ap. Rhod. 1.198, Bion 6.15, B and Q scholia *ad loc.*; for further references and discussion of this gloss see Koller (1973) 30–1, Szemerényi (1974) 150–1; modern scholars who subscribe to this view are Wilamowitz (1884) 54 and (1927) 43–4, Ameis-Hentze (1910) 37 and (1925) 22, LSJ s.v. λικάβας, Chantraine (1968) s.v. λικάβας, and *LfrGrE* s.v. λικάβας. Lee (1962) 169 points out that those who use Hesychius' gloss of ἀβά as πρόχος to justify 'wheel of light' must also acknowledge that the word is also glossed as βοή, and could be rendered as 'when the wolf howls'. As far as the scholiasts were concerned, despite glossing the term as 'year', they only ever etymologise the word from wolf; see below, n. 12.

⁸ Following Dio Chrys. 7.84 and influenced by reference to the moon in the next line; Hayman (1882) 65, Stengel (1883), Stanford (1967) 222–3. Against this see Wilamowitz (1884) 54 n. 4.

⁹ Monro (1901), Kirchhoff (1879) 500–1; but this requires positing the earlier appearance in 14.161 as an interpolation, a move that is entirely unwarranted; see Pocock (1965) 57.

¹⁰ Pocock (1965) 57. ¹¹ Szemerényi (1974) 151; cf. Hayman (1882) 65.

my mind unclear that *λυκάβας* need denote an interval of time at all, though whatever it does express it does so opaquely.¹² What should be admitted – as it never is – is that should *λυκάβας* in fact represent a particular and standard unit of time, absolute certainty about its duration would offer little to an overall appreciation of the passage;¹³ moreover fixation on this narrow issue forestalls wider attempts to see the phrase in context, an endeavour that may in turn help to clarify its meaning, or at least its narrational significance.

In contrast, the most promising connection has not been with a standard unit of time, but with a particular date: the upcoming feast of Apollo, occurring in book 20 and in fact the day when Odysseus will reveal himself to the suitors.¹⁴ *λυκάβας* – as also the name of the Attic mountain *Λυκαβηττός* – is read to evoke Apollo Lukeios, rendering the phrase to mean ‘when the feast day of Apollo comes’.¹⁵ This goes some way towards a solution, but a problem still remains: if Apollo’s feast were such an obvious connection, it is striking that it was neither received wisdom on the text, nor does it appear in any ancient commentator; moreover, it is surprising that those addressed by Odysseus do not explicitly respond as if they understand the day to be so very near.¹⁶

The current discussion of this phrase has reached *aporia*, but some aspects of the debate may assist in the way forward. First a comment on ancient reception, and the modern responses it

¹² It should also be noted that even when glossing the phrase as meaning ‘year’, the scholiasts etymologise the word from a *manner* of proceeding (παρὰ τὸ λυγαίως βαίνειν, ἤτοι κεκρυμμένως καὶ λεληθότως, or metaphorically from the behaviour of wolves – ἐκ μεταφορᾶς τῶν λύκων – B *ad* 19.306, cf. HQV *ad* 14.161), not from more obviously temporal associations.

¹³ That temporal expressions have led to a dead-end is shown in Abbenes’ succinct and accurate entry in *LfrGrE* s.v. *λυκάβας*: it begins ‘unklar, wahrsch. vorgr.’, briefly surveys the proposed meanings with the arguments undermining each, and concludes, ‘Fazit: alte Deutung *Jahr* wohl beizubehalten’.

¹⁴ The feast of Apollo: *Od.* 20. 156, 276–8, 21.258–9.

¹⁵ Van Windekens (1954) 31–2, Lee (1962) 170–1 – both of whom discuss the etymology of Apollo Lukeios – Russo et al. (1992) 91; cf. already Monro (1901) 26. Fisk (1905) 82, however sees the homophony with the mountain name as ‘wohl nur zuffällig’.

¹⁶ This is not to assert that Penelope definitely has not understood the meaning of the beggar’s words, merely that if she has, she has not explicitly let on.

has generated: as scholiasts were moved to gloss the term at each appearance and to provide an etymology, the term can certainly not have been entirely self-evident to later Greeks, a fact that has suggested (to many modern critics) that they had little idea outside of what they inferred from its context. This description is uncontroversial, but the step that follows is open to question: 'year' is interpreted as nothing more than a guess to which modern scholars react with distaste. Russo comments that such a meaning is 'contradicted by the context where the stranger is trying to convince Penelope that Odysseus' return is imminent', while Monro concludes, that 'within this same year' would have sounded like 'mockery to Penelope, who was literally on the eve of abandoning hope and consenting to accept one of the suitors'.¹⁷ While it seems quite likely that this term became vogue for Alexandrian scholars whose interest in the word influenced its subsequent use, objections to 'year' on dramatic grounds are not compelling: to a woman separated from her husband for twenty years and awaiting his return for the last ten, even the best part of a year could seem soon. It is perhaps better to posit that what may lie behind such modern criticisms of the scholiasts' gloss is not so much the duration of time they chose to suppose, but rather the diminished intensity induced by such a substitution; month or day would provide greater urgency, though they have no more support. Second, in the narrative context of these utterances of Odysseus' certain return, those addressed do not seem to give the impression of understanding these statements as precise and almost immediate.¹⁸ These two considerations amount to saying that the poet did not straightforwardly say 'year' (ἔτος, ἐνιαυτός): λυκάβας is not an ordinary way of marking Odysseus' arrival, either for the characters within the poem, or for later audiences who seemed only to understand (or misunderstand) its meaning in relation to the context in which it was expressed and their knowledge of what was

¹⁷ See Russo et al. (1992) 91–2, and Monro (1901) 27; see also Lee (1962) 170–1.

¹⁸ Just what Penelope understands at this point in the narrative remains one of the most interesting indeterminacies of the text: for a survey of the problem see Doherty (1995) 35–44 and Katz (1991) 93–113.

to ensue in the narrative. The task then is to develop an interpretation that can accommodate both the apparent uniqueness of the phrase and its function within its narrative context.

I turn first to context. We might cast our nets wider for this context, both within the text and without, and from these pose the least asked but – as far as I can see – the most important question, why the poet should use this expression at all. I would suggest that the reason lies in the context of retribution inherent to both passages, and an Athenian influence on the text of the *Odyssey*; and in turn these factors both evoke aspects of archaic tyranny and its instantiation in Athens.

The emphasis in the beggar's portentous oaths of book 14 and 19 is not solely on the imminence of Odysseus' return, but on the retribution that will necessarily follow on that occasion. The τίσις of Odysseus is made explicit in the oath uttered to Eumaeus, elaborating on his return to Ithaca (ἐλεύσεται ἐνθάδ' Ὀδυσσεύς, 'Odysseus will come here') in lines 163–4: οἴκαδε νοστήσει, καὶ τίσεται ὅς τις ἐκείνου | ἐνθάδ' ἀτιμάζει ἄλοχον καὶ φαίδιμον υἱόν ('He will come home, and he will exact retribution from whoever here is dishonouring his wife and splendid son'). The repeat of the future tense with a verb of motion (ἐλεύσεται; νοστήσει) and the adverbs (ἐνθάδ', 'here'; οἴκαδε, 'home') produce a strong sense of unity between the two utterances, and at least suggest that lines 163–4 amount to a strong assertion of what Odysseus' 'coming' will in fact mean.¹⁹ Similarly, Odysseus' conversation with Penelope in which he makes this oath is situated within his preparations for the revenge – immediately following the hiding of the weapons, and preceding his preparations for the feast of the next day.

The pure identification of Odysseus' coming with his vengeance is expressed at the level of formula: a frequently repeated line-ending, ἀποτίσεται/-αι ἐλθών is a central theme of the *Odyssey*.²⁰ That Odysseus' promise οἴκαδε νοστήσει, καὶ τίσεται evokes the words of Athene/Mentes – likewise

¹⁹ Pocock (1965) 56 points out that, at the point of expressing this, Odysseus knows in detail from Eumaeus about the behaviour of the suitors (80–108) and is already devising vengeance (110).

²⁰ 3.216, 5.24, 11.118 (Teiresias' prophecy), 16.255, 24.480; variation in 17.539–40.

dissembling and spoken in disguise – in Book I as she effectively and metapoetically communicates the plot of the *Odyssey* to Telemachus emphasises inexorably how the poem fuses its *nostos* and *tisis* narratives.

Certain aspects of this description of Odysseus in this capacity suggest intertextuality with Solon 4, or rather a shared participation in the discourse of justice to which Solon's poetry belongs. The frequently repeated formula, βίας ἀποτίσσει-ται/-αι ἐλθών ('coming, he will avenge their violent acts'), links Odysseus' arrival and requital, and in doing so evokes Solon's depiction of Δίκη who ἦλθ' ἀποτεισομένη ('comes intending to exact vengeance', 4.16).²¹ At the same time, the harshness of Odysseus' retribution may point – more clearly than Solon's poetry – to participation in the justice discourse closely aligned with tyranny discussed in Chapter 7.²² Odysseus will emerge, just like the tyrant in Theognis' poetry, Cypselus, or Deioces, as a εὐθυντὴρ κακῆς ὕβριος ('straightener of evil hybris'), severe in punishing the βίαι and ὕβρις of the suitors.²³

These Solonian intertexts on the subject of retribution become more pronounced when one turns to the second element, which the *Odyssey* passages link to Odysseus' return: τοῦ μὲν φθίνοντος μηνός, τοῦ δ' ἰσταμένοιο ('when one moon wanes and the next rises'). Even if λυκάβας does refer to a particular broad interval of time, such as a year, this second line isolates a particular and apparently single day upon which the vengeance will occur.²⁴ Both ancient and modern commentators link this phrase to the 'old and new' day (ἐνὴ καὶ νέα), with Plutarch explicitly connecting this line to Solon in discussing the Solonian reforms to the calendar: αὐτὴν μὲν ἔταξε ταύτην ἑνὴν καὶ νέαν καλεῖσθαι . . . πρῶτος ὡς ἔοικεν ὀρθῶς ἀκούσας 'Ομήρου λέγοντος' τοῦ μὲν φθίνοντος μηνός, τοῦ δ' ἰσταμένοιο ('And he first appointed this day to be called "old

²¹ See Ch. 7 n. 49. ²² See above pp. 223–30.

²³ On the suitors' behaviour as ὕβρις see 15.329 = 17.565 (coupled with βίη). As object of ἀποτίσσει: ὕβρις ('hybris'), 24.282; βίαι ('acts of violence'), 3.216, 11.118, 16.255, 17.540; ὑπερβασίαι ('transgressions'), 3.206, 13.193, 22.64, 22.168.

²⁴ Stanford (1967) 223 however tries to make it a vague period of several days, the moontide, but this has no support; cf. Lee (1962) 169 and Szemerényi (1974) 151.

and new”... He was first, it would seem, to understand correctly what Homer meant when he said, “when one moon wanes and the next rises”²⁵). Plutarch’s association of Solon with the ‘old and new’ day raises the stock question about the legitimacy of attributing this day to Solon, an issue of no great importance to this argument, but at any rate, one may say his connection to the ‘old and new’ day is attested as early as Aristophanes, *Nub.* 1188–91.²⁶ More significantly one might ask about Plutarch’s sequencing: given the presence of Athenian touches to the *Odyssey*, it is legitimate to ask whether this passage reflects Athenian practice, and if so the associations of the ‘old and new’ day become relevant.²⁷ Whether the day was termed such in the archaic period and whether it derives from Solon, what remains striking given the Odyssean context of retribution is the associations of this particular day with debt repayment: this is the day Strepsiades fears in the *Clouds*, the day of reckoning, so to speak.²⁸ How early this practice was cannot be said with any certainty: later audiences at least (witness Plutarch) could identify Odysseus’ day of retribution with Solon’s; but given the absence of a firm date for the composition of our *Odyssey* perhaps certain archaic audiences also did (while for other audiences, both non-Athenian and modern, it would remain appropriately portentous, if also mysterious).

Here one might return to the phrase itself, and not its disputed etymology, but its possible folk etymologies. For the scholiasts the association of the word with year came from a connection with the wolf, λύκος, which they justified

²⁵ Schol. Vind. 133 *ad* 14.162, Plut. *Sol.* 25.4, Wilamowitz (1883) 54 and (1927) 43, Ameis–Hentze (1910) 38, Monro (1901) 26, Lee (1962) 171, Pocock (1965) 56. On the quotation in Plutarch see Manfredini–Piccirilli (1977) 262–3.

²⁶ On this issue Ruschenbusch (1966) 118 (F 123a), Martina (1968) 185–9. On Solon in comedy see Oliva (1973).

²⁷ For ἔνη καὶ νέα (‘old and new’) as distinctively Attic, see for instance Harpocration s.v. ἔνη καὶ νέα: τὴν ὕφ’ ἡμῶν τριακάδα καλουμένην ἔνην καὶ νέαν καλοῦσιν Ἀθηναῖοι ἀπὸ τοῦ τὴν τελευταίην ἔχειν τοῦ προτέρου μηνὸς καὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν τοῦ ὑστέρου (‘The Athenians call “old and new” the day called by us the thirtieth because it is the end of the previous month and the beginning of the new one’); cf. sch. Aristoph. *Ach.* 172.

²⁸ This is made explicit in *Nub.* 1131–41, 1189–91 and see Tzetz. *ad* Aristoph. *Nub.* 1131.

by the supposed amazing cooperative power of wolves who, each grasping in their jaws the tail of the wolf in front, were said to form a chain to cross rivers, a sequence that is said to evoke the motion of time as sequential units (ὥσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ χρόνου, ‘as also in the case of time’).²⁹ The explanation is fanciful, but at least points to a tradition of associating the word more distinctly with ‘wolf’ rather than ‘light’.

Further, in all discussions of this phrase, τοῦδ’ αὐτοῦ λυκάβαντος, is the phrase’s potential to evoke Odysseus’ grandfather Autolycus, the ‘wolf himself’, whose name enters the narrative soon and repeatedly after the second appearance of λυκάβας.³⁰ The homophony of αὐτοῦ λυκάβαντος and Autolycus is striking, and there to be apprehended almost immediately by a listening audience, particularly one that has been primed in Odysseus’ cunning use of puns in outwitting the Cyclops. But this is also an audience who is being encouraged to take the latent meaning of names seriously: the etymology of Odysseus’ name will be given in 19.403–9, a name chosen by the wolf himself, Autolycus, and one deeply implicated in the character of his grandfather: πολλοῖσιν γὰρ ἐγὼ γε ὀδυσσάμενος τόδ’ ἰκάνω | ... τῷ δ’ Ὀδυσσεὺς ὄνομ’ ἔστω ἐπώνυμον (‘Because detested by many I came to this place ... let him be named Odysseus after this’, 407–9).³¹ The potential for evoking the wolf in λυκάβας and with it the associations of the wolf and indeed of Autolycus, who is introduced as ὃς ἀνθρώπους ἐκέκαστο | κλεπτοσύνη θ’ ὄρκῳ τε (‘who had surpassed men with his thieving and his oaths’, 395–6) cannot be accidental, particularly when the wolfy phrase appears in a deceptive oath promising the return of Odysseus, who famously all know (cf. 9.19–20) uses such means to win his distinctive κλέος. In such a context, I would argue that whatever its origins

²⁹ B schol. *ad* 19.306; cf. schol. *ad* 14.161. The explicit use of ἡτυμολογίῃ suggests later theorising about this opaque term. See Ch. 7 n. 159.

³⁰ 19.394, 399, 403, 405, 414 (2×), 418, 430, 437, 455, 459 (2×), 466; the only appearances outside book 19 are three, 11.85, 21.220, 24.334.

³¹ See Chapter 7, n. 134. See also Miralles-Pörtulas (1983) 56–7 and Pucci (1998) 24–5. On the sophisticated play with naming in the *Odyssey* see Pucci (1998) 128–9, Clay (1997) 54–68, 89; on significant names more generally see Sulzberger (1926).

and contemporary meaning outside the poem, the force of this phrase within the context of the *Odyssey* is 'when the wolf comes/goes walking'. In the light of the severity of the retribution that is to come, the association of such retribution with tyrannical narratives, and the connection of the wolf with tyranny,³² one might push the argument one step further and see reference to the 'wolf coming' as actually a reference to the time when a particularly *tyrant-like* Odysseus will come, one who will exact retribution for the ὕβρις, βίαι and ὑπερβασίαι of the suitors, configured as a reckless symptomatic élite.³³

The final step is to ask whether the tyrant-like portrayal has anything to do with Athenian tyranny: the return of the king after ten years of wandering to set in order his polis and quash the outrageous élite with the help of Athena is certainly evocative of Peisistratus, and the epic that narrates such a plot would not go amiss in the Peisistratid-supported Panathenaic festival.³⁴ As Stephanie West aptly comments on the conclusion of the *Odyssey*: 'The clear and decisive manner in which heaven's support for Odysseus is manifested ought to have held a particular appeal for the tyrant who enlisted Athena to assist his return from exile, and to a ruler constantly troubled by resentment among his fellow aristocrats the miracle of instant

³² See above pp. 284–6.

³³ And in an Athenian context this wolf may also be one who gathers the warrior community, if *λύκας* evokes Apollo Lukeios, an epithet associated with assemblies; see Burkert (1975) esp. 14 n. 56 cited by Jamesson (1980) 230–1. The cult is attested as early (pre-Solonian, *Ath. Pol.* 3.5; cf. Rhodes (1981) 105) and, as Jameson (1980) 233 argues, its Athenian manifestation seems essentially to have been 'an expression of the assembled warriors of the community' and as such was 'always potentially political'. If this connection with the assembled community was brought to the poem by Athenian audiences, the emphasis it would have had may well have been on the resumption of political life in Ithaca, stagnating in the absence of the good king, and through the recklessness of the haughty suitors (on the dire conditions in Ithaca and the lapse of assemblies see *Od.* 2, esp. 25–7, 230–4). And again Peisistratus is not far away: Theopompus (*FGrH* 115 F 136) attributed the building of the Lukeion to him, cf. Jameson (1980) 226.

³⁴ On Peisistratus as the returning king, descendant of Codrus, see Hdt. 5.65.3, Diog. Laert. 1.53; more generally on tyrants as kings see Part III Introduction n. 5. See Conclusion n. 10 for those who have proposed Peisistratean readings of the *Odyssey*.

reconciliation validated by Zeus himself must have seemed the most satisfactory of all possible conclusions.³⁵

But a final issue remains: I have left untranslated αὐτοῦ. Traditional understandings of λυκάβας that see it as a narrow expression of time render the phrase as ‘during this same *lukabas*’, whether this refers to a year, a month, a day, or the feast of Apollo. It is perfectly compatible to see the activation of the ‘wolf’ element of the word and the gesturing towards Odysseus’ Autolycean nature as an indication of what is in store τοῦδ’ αὐτοῦ λυκάβαντος within this rendering of the phrase. The scholiast to 14.161, however, does cite an alternative reading as τοῦδ’ αὖ τοῦ λυκάβαντος, a reading preferred by Eustathius.³⁶ If his reading is correct or even a choice for an audience, lurking would be a hidden reference to the return of Odysseus: with the deictic pronoun τοῦδ’ he would refer to himself – or rather to Odysseus, as it is in the person of Aithon that Odysseus makes this utterance – with emphasis laid on αὖ to evoke the return. The internal audience of the poem may instead have heard it as reference to the feast of Apollo, or even a particular temporal reference, but it was there also to be heard both for them and for members of an external audience as an allusion to the time when ‘this wolf [in front of you] comes again’, that is when Odysseus returns.

And again, one might well wish to ask further: is the invitation to recognise Odysseus offered within the narrative to be limited only to the world and characters presented within the poem; may not the whole *Odyssey* in the final form that we have it have been designed to flirt with an audience, to challenge those listening to recognise just who it is that goes under the name of Odysseus outside the construct of the poem’s narrative? But this is of course a question that deserves its own study.³⁷

³⁵ S. West (1989) 43. I would modify it however by suggesting that the *Odyssey* we possess, emphasising as it does the next generation, reads better as a Hipparchean-influenced retrospective on the establishment of the tyranny.

³⁶ Schol. Q and H ad 14.161. Eustathius (1755.40) attributes this reading to τοῖς ἀκριβεστέροις.

³⁷ I hope to conduct such a study; for a preliminary outline see the Conclusion and cf. Irwin (2005) on traces of other Peisistratean epics.

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